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FOREWORD
BY

EDSON R. SUNDERLAND

Professor of Legallleseardh,, University of MiMigan Law School,

It is probable that no procedural process offers greater
opportunities for increasing the efficiency of the admin
istration of justice than that of discovery before trial.
Much of the delay in the preparation of a case, most of
the lost effort in the course of the trial, and a large part
of the uncertainty in the outcome, result from the want
., of information on the part of litigants and their counsel
as to the real nature of the respective claims and the
facts upon which they rest.
False and fictitious causes and defenses thrive under
'
a system of concealment and secrecy in the preliminary
stages of litigation followed by surprise and confusion
at the trial. Under such a system the merits of con
troversies are imperfectly understood by the parties, are
inadequately presented to the courts, and too often fail
to exert a controlling influence Uf>on the final judgment.
All this is. well recognized' by the ·profession, and ·yet
there is a wide-spread fear of liberalizing discovery.
Hostility to " fishing expeditions " before trial is a tradi
tional and powerful taboo. To overcome its subtle in
fluence requires more than logic and learning. .Experi
ence alone can effectively meet it.
The primary purpose of this study is to present the
results of professional experience in administering dis
covery as a normal function of pre-trial procedure. Mr.
Ragland has devoted two years to the work, the first as
lll
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Graduate Fellow, and the second as Research Associate,
in the Law School of the University of Michigan. His
thesis for the graduate degree in law dealt with the
history and theory of discovery, and his· researches in
cluded practically everything to be found in print upon
the subject. With this as a foundation he devoted a
second year to a field study of the actual _use of dis
covery in all the jurisdictions of the United States and
Canada where it had been effectively developed. The
book, therefore, represents an extensive survey of the
current practice regarding this important procedural de
vice, in the light of its history and its logical theory. It
is being published under the auspices of the Law School
of the University of Michigan for the information of the
American bench and bar, in order to exhibit the great
possibilities of discovery as a means of removing some
of the needless hazards of litigation.
Mr. Ragland has made a unique contribution to the
literature of the administration of justice. The method
employed, which involved interviews with hundreds of
lawyers, judges and court officials in many jurisdictions,
was difficult and laborious, and produced a vast amount
of detailed data which he has analyzed and presented
with great skill. He is an accurate observer and reporter,
and his conclusions are well founded and conservative.
The book is submitted to the judgment of a critical pro
fession with full confidence that it will prove to be of
unusual interest and value.
Ann Arbor, Michigan

October 1, 1932

PREFACE
The purpose of this volume is to present in a conven
ient and usable form a comparative study of the expe
dients which are being employed in various American
and English jurisdictions for the purpose of facilitating
pre-trial practice, to describe the practical operation of
the different devices, and to show their effect upon the
general administration of justice. An analysis of the
statutory and case law has been combined with data
which shows the practical operation of the procedure in
the everyday work of the lawyer and judge. Field studies
were made by the author in different cities of the follow
ing fourteen jurisdictions for the purpose of ascertaining
the experience of the profession with each type of
device which is being us.ed: Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Ontario, Quebec, Texas,
and Wisconsin. Interviews were sought with representa
tive judges, lawyers, and where there were such, officials
in charge of discovery examinations. Other means em
ployed in obtaining information inclu'ded the study of
trial court records of examinations for discovery, obser
vation of actual examinations and· correspondence with
lawyers in states other than those in which field investi
gations were made.

GEORGE RAGLAND, J:a.
Chicago, illinois
October 1, 1932
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DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL
CHAPTER I

INADEQUACY OF PLEADING AS BASIS
PREPA.B.ATION FOR TRIAL

0�

CoMMON LAw PLEADING
Written pleadings formed the traditional basis of
preparation for trial in courts of common law. The chief
objective of common law pleading was the production of
a single issue which might be tried by the jury. The
facts of the controversy were supposed to be narrowed
down to a single issue from the respective allegations of
the parties.

The plaintiff was required to plead his case

according to its legal effect and, therefore, eould not
plead evidence but only the ultimate facts upon which
his claim rested.1

When the facts had thus been stated

by the pleader, the opposite party was required to deny
specifically each allegation which he wished to contro,..
vert at the trial. All the well-pleaded facts not denied by
the adverse party were deemed to be admitted.

This

device, applied to the alternate pleadings, was supposed

in the end to produce a single controverted point or issue,

but a great number of highly technical rules were re
quired to make it effective. As has been said, "refine
ments of pleading grew up on the court's passive will
ingness to let issues emerge out of the allegations recited
1 Stephen

on Pleading,

�41.
1

2
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to it by contending pleaders in antiphonal rivalry, and the
stilted form which written pleading eventually assumed
was born of the tradition of care with which every state
ment in one 's opponent 's pleading had to be met to the
court 's satisfaction without disclosing to that opponent
much of one 's own case. ' ' 8
It is doubtful whether common law pleading ever af
forded an adequate basis of preparation for trial. In
any event there were two factors at work which ultimately
destroyed to a large extent whatever degree of efficiency
the system formerly had. Clear statements of the facts
of the case in the plaintiff's pleadings gave way to ficti
tious and vague allegations which were couched in anti
quated terminology. The plaintiff was more concerned
with invoking the judicial process by incantation of the
precise ritual than he was in reciting the facts of the case.
The defendant, too, was allowed to conceal his true posi
tion under the guise of an easy formula, the general issue.
The general issue was used not only for the purpose of
denying everything in the opposite pleading, whether
really controverted or not, but also for the purpose of
enabling the party pleading it to prove matters not sug
gested on the face of the pleading
Especially did use of the general issue work havoc with
'
the system of special pleading. This was the oldest form
of traverse, which Stephen describes as ' ' an appropriate
plea fixed by ancient usage as the proper mode of travers
ing the declaration, in cases where the defendant· means
to deny the whole or the principal part of its allega
tions. " 8 Its effect had always been to put a summary
close to the pleadings, thus, as Stephen says, "narrowing
very considerably the application of the greater and more'

�

/

a Rosenbaum, Rule-making Authority in the English Supreme Court,
109.
8 Stephen on Pleading, 172.
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subtle part of the science of special pleading," and mak, ing it impossible for the pleadings to perform their theo
retical function of disclosing the real points in dispute be
tween the parties. Both the courts and the legislature
encouraged its use. An act passed in 1650 provided that
the general issue might be pleaded in any case whatso
ever 4 and though, as Holdsworth has pointed out, " this
sweeping change did not outlive the period of �he com
monwealth, a number of statutes were passed in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, expressly allow
ing the general issue to be pleaded in certain actions in
which it would not otherwise have been applicable." 1
Blackstone has pointed out exactly why the general issue,
after that date, was increasingly used: " formerly the
general issue was seldom pleaded, except when the party
meant wholly to deny the charge alleged against him.
But when he meant to distinguish away or palliate the
charge, it was always usual to set forth the particular
facts in what is called a special plea ; which was originally
intended to apprise the court and the adverse party of
the nature and circumstances of the defense and to keep
the law and fact distinct. And it is an invariable rule,
that every defense, which cannot be thus specially
pleaded, may be given in evidence, upon the general issue
at the trial. But, the science of special pleading, having
been frequently perverted to the purposes of chicane and
delay, the courts have of late in some instances, and the
legislature in many more, permitted the general issue to
be. pleaded, which leaves everything open, the fact, the
law, and the equity of the case, and have allowed special
matter to be given in evidence at the trial." 6
443, 444;

t Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum (Firth and Bait) ll,
an Act of Bot. 23, 1650, cited by Holdsworth's History of English Law,

IX, 321, note 3.
lid.

e Blackstone's Commentaries, UI, 305.

4
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Upon the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1705,'7 it
became the fashion for defendants to add the general is
sue even when they :filed special pleas of confession and
avoidance. This had the effect of preventing the opera
tion of the rule of implied admission by failure to deny.8
The practice was justified on the ground that it saved the
defendant from the risk of a judgment non obstante
where the pleadings raised a technically immaterial is
sue.9 Such men as Runnington advocated an even greater
use of the generaf issue. " Nothing, " he said, "would
more prevent ' the many miscarriages of causes, ' or more
promote the ends of justice, than to enact that the de
fendant shall in all actions, on giving previous notice of
his intended defense to the plaintiffs, be permitted to
plead the general issue, and give the merits of his case.
in evidence. ' ' 1 0 This was the policy which was adopted,
with the exception that the defendant was not required
to give ' 'notice of his intended defense. ' ' Whereas for
merly nothing could be shown under the general issue
except that which went to dispute the truth of facts
stated in the declaration; it became customary to allow
also matters which merely avoided liability.11 To a
declaration of indebitatus assumpsit, for instance, it be
came possible, as Brougham pointed out in 1821, to set
up no less than eight different defenses under a plea of
the general issue of non assumpsit. 111 These were a de
nial of the contract, payment, usury, gaming, infancy,
accord and satisfaction, release, and coverture. Use of
the general issue prevented the disclosure of the real
/

'1 Anne, ch. 16, sec. 4. This statute also diminished the possibility of
reducing the· controversy to a single point since it allowed the d,efendant
to plead as many several pleas as should be necessary to his defense.
8 Millar, Ficta Confessio as a Principle of Allegation in Anglo-American Civil Procedure, 23 Illinois L . Rev. 215, 222.
9 Ex parte Pearce (1885) 80 Ala. 195.
10 Holdsw.orth 's. History of English Lftw, IX, 322.
11 Reppy, ''The Hilary Rules and Their Effect, ' ' 6 N. Y. Univ. L. Rev.
95, 111.
111 Cited in Holdsworth, op. cit. IX, 323, note 4
•

.
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points at issue. Especially was this true of such actions
as trespass on the case, trover, and ejectment, for in
these actions the declaration itself was already marked
by an all too great generality of statement. 18 The situ
ation became so intolerable in the early part of the Nine
teenth Century that reforms in pleading were adopted in
the form of the Rules of Hilary Term 1834. The prin
cipal effect of these rules was to ' ' restrict drastically
the scope of the general issue. ' ' 14 The reform, however,
did not prove satisfactory. The effect of the Hilary
Rules has been accurately estimated thus, upon the basis
of a survey of cases decided in the ensuing twelve years:
" Under the common law system the. matter was bad
enough. with a pleading question decided in every sixth
case. But 'J!nder a Hilary rules it was worse. Every
fourth case decided a question on the pleadings. Plead
ings ran riot. ' ' 16
The confusion occasioned by the attempt to make :writ
ten pleadings the chief, if not the only, basis of prepara
tion for trial at common law was tersely stated by Bent
ham when he said: ' 'General pleading conveys no in
formation, but there is an end to it ; if any information is
conveyed by pleading, it is by special pleading, but there
is no end to it. ' ' ie The mistake of the common law sys
tem of procedure in the final analysis was that written
pleadings were supposed to do �hat they were inherently
incapabie of doing. Instead of recognizing the limita
tions of pleadings as a fixed basis for litigation and sup
plementing them by other devices, pleadings were made
increasingly complicated and technical in an attempt to
force them to produce impossible results.
18 Millar, Ficta Confessio as a Principle of Allegation in Anglo-Ameri
can Civ.il Procedure, 23 Illinois L. Rev. 215, 222.·
14 Holdsworth's History of English Law, IX, 324; Reppy, "The Hilary
Rules and Their E1fect, " 6 N. Y. Univ. L. Rev, 95 �111Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 507. Id.
16 Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Works Vll, 274
·

• .
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EQUITY PLEADING

Pleading in courts of chancery performed a quite dif
ferent function from pleadings in courts of common law.
There was ho formal trial with witnesses in equity until
a comparatively recent date. 17 Pleadings were supposed
to present the facts of the case to the court in so com
plete a fashion that the court would be able to render its
decision thereon. The pleader set forth detailed state
ments of the .evidence in support of his case. A bill in
equity cpnsequently was a very lengt�y and elaborate
affair./tndeed as Story has said: ' ' Equity pleading has
now become a science of great complexity, and a refined
species of logic, which requires great talents to master
in all its various distinctions and subtle contrivances. ' '. JS
A bill consisted of nine parts, the most important" of
which, as far as disclosure of the facts of the case was
concerned, were the stating part and the interrogating
part. The stating part was supposed to contain a full
narrative of the facts and circumstances of the plaintiff's
case.19 The interrogating part of the bill contained ques
tions addr.essed to the defendant. The defendant 's an
swer was supposed to bring forward such other facts
and circumstances as might be considered essential to his
defense, as well as to make full response to the inter
rogatories contained in the bill.20 A defense by answer
in equity always meant an affirmative defense. Defense
by denial was . not necessary because, unlike the practice
of common law, there was no constructive admission by.
failure to deny.81

The later reform of pleading by the codes, it has been .
said, owed much to equity pleading.82 Even so, equity

1'7 Langdell, ·Summary of Equity Pleading, sec. 57.
18 Story, Equity Pleading (7th Ed.) sec. 13.
19 Id. sec. 27. Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading, sec. 56.
liO Story, Equity Pleading (7th ed.) sec. 849; Great Britain Chancery
Commission Report (1852) 6.
11 Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading, sec. 79.
n Clark on Code Pleading, 13.
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pleadings were not intended to prepare a case for a
formal trial with witnesses. They were intended to dis
close all of the evidence of the case rather than to reduce
the controversy to such a form as would make a trial

with witnesses practicable.

ConE PLEADING
Reforms in pleading under the codes of practice which
have been adopted in many of the United States have not
rendered pleadings a sufficient and satisfactory basis of
preparation for trial.

It is true that some changes have

been made in the direction of a more complete disclosure
of the facts in dispute.

Draftsmen of the first codes

recognized that common law pleading too often contained
formal and general statements which did not distinctly
set forth the pleader's case.
quired that parties

Accordingly the codes re

plead the facts, not the evidential

facts but the material operative facts.118

The codi:fiers

considered the requirement that the actual facts be
pleaded in simple and concise language to be ''the key

of the reform" which they were proposing.114

While the

defendant is not allowed to make a general denial of all

of the allegations of the complaint in a few code jurisdic
tions which require that every allegation of the complaint
be specifically denied, the more usual rule under the
codes is to allow general denials.116
Some of the same factors which made cotpmon law
pleading ineffective as a means of disclosing the facts in
issue are to be seen at work under the code practice.
Even though a pleader is faced with the requirement that

he plead the facts on which he relies, he often copies his
c�plaint direct from a previously approved form.

Sim

ple and concise statements of the actual facts gradually
U!d. 150.
HFirst Report, New York Commissioners on Practice and Pleading
.
(1848) 137. .
116 Olark on Code Pleading, 392.
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have given way to statements couched in the language of
form books.

The complaint used in one negligence ac

tion, for example, could, with slight changes of wording,
be used with equal propriety in a dozen similar cases. A
comparatively small portion of the facts involved are
disclosed by the pleadings.

The defendant, too, can con

ceal his real. position by use of the general denial.

By

denying ''each and every allegation'' of the complaint,

he gives no indication as to what statements he will actu
ally contest at the trial.

Even in the few code jurisdic

tions in which it is required that denials be specific rather
than general, lawyers often make a literal denial of every
allegation, thus effecting what is in reality a general
denial.

The final result is that code pleadings do not

afford a satisfactory solution of the problems of pre-trial

practice.

There is needed some additional device or

devices for the clarification of issues and for the elimina
tion of fake claims.
REFORMED

ENGLISH P LEADING

Pleadings are no longer regarded as the primary basis
of preparation for trial under the reformed English pro
cedure. Rather pleadings are regarded as mere forecasts
of the points in dispute and are supplemented by dis
covery and various pre-trial administrative devices.
forms under the Judicature Acts of

1873

and

1875

Re
were

predicated upon the view that it is impossible to expect
written pleadings alone to provide a sufficient means of
pre-trial practice.

Pleadings may be dispensed with

entirely in many types of actions. Every action is com
menced by a writ of summons. 118 The plaintiff must en
dorse on the writ the general nature of the claim upon
which he sues.

It is not necessary that he set forth the

precise ground of complaint or the precise remedy or
118 Annual Practice (1932) Order II.

INADEQUACY

OF

PLEADING

relief to which he considers himself entitled.27

9
In actions

to recover a .debt or liquidated claim and in actions to
recover possession of land or possession of specific chat
tel, the plaintiff may specially endorse the writ with a
short and concise statement of his claim,28 and this is all
the pleading there is in 'the action.

Even in cases in

which the plaintiff endorses the writ generally rather
than specially it is not always necessary for the parties
to file pleadings.

Since

1897

the question as to whether

pleadings are necessary in an action and the time within
which such pleadings must be filed is a matter for the
master to decide.

In each individual case the matter is

presented to the master on a preliminary reference
known as the hearing on summons for directions.
When pleadings are required they consist of a short
and concise statement of the material facts upon which
the party relies.

The Judicature Acts required that:

''Statements shall be as brief as the nature of the case
will admit and every pleading shall contain as concise
as may be, a statement of the material facts on which the
party pleading relies, but not the evidence upon which
they are to be proved. '' 29 The present rules provide
that :

''Every pleading shall contain, and contain only,

a statement in a summary form of the material facts on
which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense,
as the case may be, but not the evidence upon which they

are to be proved.'' 80

General denials are not and never

have been allowed under the reformed English practice.81
The present rules provide that allegations of fact in a
pleading if not denied specifically or by necessary impli

cation are taken to be admitted.811
117 Id.

Order III.
III, rule 6.
Rule-making Authority in the English Supreme Court, 54.
80 Annual Practice (1932) Order XIX, rule 4.
81 Hepburn, Development of Code Pleading, sec. 297.
811 Annual Practice (1932) Order XIX, rule 13.
18 Id. Order
29 Rosenbaum,
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Pleadings have been simplified by these reforms in
England and some of the faults which existed under the
common law system and under the equity system, re
spectively, have been corrected. But even so, pleadings
are not suppos�d to perform the full function of disclos
ing and sifting the facts of the case before trial. They
have been supplemented by other procedural devices
which make possible a more thorough preparation for
trial.

CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENT OF D ISCOVERY PROCEDURE TO
SUPPLEMENT PLEADING
ANCILLARY PRE-TRIAL DEVICES IN CouRTS oF CoMMON LAw
Two ancillary devices were employed to supplement.
pleadings and to furnish additional means of preparation
for trial in courts of common law. These were the bill of
particulars and the bill of discovery. The classic descrip. tion of the bill of particulars is thus given in Tidd's
Practice: "Where the declaration does not disclose the
particulars of the plaintiff's demand • • • the defend
ant's attorney or agent may take out a summons before
a judge for the plaintiff's attorney or agent to show
cause, why he should not deliver to the defendant's attor
ney or agent, the particulars in writing of the plaintiff's
demand, for which the action is brought, and why all pro
ceedings should not in the meantime be stayed. This
summons, which cannot, it seems, be had till after· the
defendant has appeared, is usually taken out before a
plea; and unless good cause be shown to the contrary,
the judge will make an order, agreeably to the summons,
which operates as a stay of proceedings till the particu
lars are delivered.'' 1 The real purpose of ordering the
bill of particulars was to limit the generality of pleading
and to more fully disclose the facts of the case. Their
object was to give the parties every reasonable facility
for coming to the trial fully prepared for what might be
produced by the other side.• At common law granting or
1 Tidd's Practice (3rd ed.) vol 1, 534.
I Liscomb v. Agate (1889) 4 N. · Y. 8. 167.
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refusing a demand for particulars was a matter within
the sound discretion of the court under the facts of the
particular case. On an entire failure to furnish a bill
of particulars when ordered, the court could order a stay
until it was furnished or it could strike out the pleadings
respecting which the particulars were required and not
,
given.8
A second additional means of preparation for trial was
afforded by the equitable bill of discovery. Discovery
of facts and discovery, and production of documents
could be had in aid of actions at law by application to
courts of chancery. Spence in his treatise on Equitable
Jurisdiction shows how ancient this practice was:
''Where discovery was wanted in order to sustain an
action at law, without reference to any equitable ques
tion, the Court of Chancery, certainly as early as the
reign of Henry VI, entertained jurisdiction to compel
it." 4 The statute of 36 Henry VI, p. 26, provided in part:
"Where certainty wanteth the common law faileth, but
yet help is to be found in Cliancery for it.'' 6
One of the chief objectives of the common law pro
cedure acts which w-ere passed in the early part of the
Nineteenth Century was that courts of common law be
empowered to grant complete relief without the necessity
of resort to chancery. In line with this policy an attempt
was made to empower the law courts to administer the
remedy which equity formerly had given by bills of dis
covery. The Commissioners on Courts of Common Law
in 1830 circularized the bar of England with these ques
tions: "Would it not be desirable, in order to obtain
the benefit of a discovery without having recourse to a
court of . equity, that the parties in a cause should be
examined upon oath either personally, or by interrog8 31 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, 571.
Equitable Jurisdiction, vol. 1, 677.
l>ld.
4 Spence's
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atories? At what stage of the proceedings should this
be done, and before whom, and what regulations would
you suggest for the purpose of carrying this measure
into effecU" 6 The answers which were sent in by the
bar did not favor the innovation which was proppsed.7
It was not until the passage of the second common law
procedure act in 1854 that law courts were allowed to
administer discovery. Section 51 of the act allowed par
ties to deliver with their pleading interrogatories to their
adversary, who was required to answer them under oath.
For failure to answer without just cause the punishment
was as for contempt. Section 52 of the same act pro
vided the mode by which a party could obtain the appro
priate court order allowing interrogatories, namely, upon
an application under oath that the party believed the
matter sought was material, that he had a good cause of
action, and that discovery was not sought for purposes
of delay.8

DEVELOPMENT OF DiscoVERY PROCEDURE IN CouRTS OF
CHANCERY
The first chancellors were churchmen and accordingly
procedure in courts of chancery was modelled in many
respects after procedure in the ecclesiastical courts. The
canon law practice is especially significant in respect to
the development of discovery procedure in equity. Plead
ings occupied a relatively unimportant place in pre-trial
practice in the ecclesiastical courts. The object of the
plaintiff's pleading was "not to state the facts which
plaintiff would prove on the trial, but to identify the
claim, to indicate its legal nature, and to specify the re
lief which the plaintiff sought; and thue to enable the
defendant to decide whether he would resist the claim or
6 Report of Commissioners on Courts of Common Law, ·Rep. (1830)
Appendix, p. 3.
'7Id.
8 See also Day 's Common Law Practice Under the Procedure Acts
{4th ed., 1872) p. 295.
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submit to it, and to assist the judge in framing his sen
tence.'' 9 As the pleadings were always in the affirmative
there was no such thing as a denial corresponding to the
common law traverse; all the defendant had to do was to
indicate by oral statement in court whether or not he
would contest the plaintiff's claim. If he indicated that
he would so contest, all of the facts stated by the plaintiff
were deemed to be denied.10
Regarding pleadings as a mere preliminary forecast
of the issues to be tried, the ecclesiastical courts provided
an additional means of reducing the controversy to a.
justicable form. The plaintiff was required, in a series of
separate allegations which were not a part of the plead
ing and which were called positions or charges of evi
dence, to set forth in detail the evidence in support of
the facts which he had alleged in his pleading and to
demand of the defendant a categorical answer of "yes"
or "no" to each proposition. This detailed statement or
charge of the party's own evidence was divided into
paragraphs which were numbered, and each paragraph
was called a position; the whole instrument was called
positions; and the procedure was called positional. The
defendant had to proceed in the same way as to the evi
dence supporting his affirmative defense, if he had
pleaded such. The adverse party could object to any par
ticular charge and ask that he be relieved from answer
ing, on the ground that the matter was impertinent, or
irrelevant, or that the statement was bad for uncertainty,
or that it was set forth in negative form. But once the
positions were held admissible it was incumbent upon the
adverse party to categorically admit or deny them. If
he did neither, it was held equivalent to an admission.11
9 Langdell,

Summary of Equity Pleading, sec. 5.
sec. 6.
11 This admission was not accomplished ipso juro but only upon the
intervention on the part of the court to make the admission effective.
Millar, ficta confessio as a principle of allegation in Anglo·American
Civil Procedure, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 215, 216.
10 Id.
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This was exactly the reverse of the rule applied to the
pleadings themselves, for there a failure to do anything
was equivalent to a denial.
Englemann observes that this procedure in Romano:..
canonical law "possessed the great advantage of dis
pensing with proof of all positions either expressly ad
mitted or left undenied, and of lending an extraordinary
degree of precision to the propositions remaining to be
proved.'' 18 Among the writings of the canonists we find
similar encomiums on- the effectiveness of the method, as
for instance, the following: ''Positions have long been
·used for the purpose of relieving the litigant 6f the
onerous burden of proof, by means of admissions obtained from his adversary.'' 18
Pleadings and discovery proper were commingled in
equity pleadings.14 The result was that pleading in
equity assumed the form of a detailed statement of the
party's evidence. The bill in equity not only showed a
right to relief founded upon a statement of facts, but it
also demanded the personal answer of the defendant to
the plaintiff's evidence stated in the bill.15 The part of
the defendant's answer which set up affirmative allega--,
tions by way of defense and the part' of the answer
responsive to the charges of evidence were even more
closely blended than were the two corresponding ele
ments of the bill. In fact the union was so close that for
a long period it was not noticed that the answer con. tained these two distinct elements.16 About 1700 drafts
men began to insert interrogatories in bills for the pur
pose of obtaining a more complete answer from the de
fendant. However, no interrogatory was permissible
18 Englemann, History of Continental Civil Proeedure (Millar 's translation) 472.
.
18 Deeretals of Pope Clement V., Lib. 5, tit. 11, e. 2., eited in Langdell, Equity Pleading, see. 22.
14 Gilbert, Forum Romanum, 90.
16 Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading, see. 76.
16 Hare on Diseovery, 223.
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unless it was founded upon a charge or statement of evi
dence in the bill. In theory there was no nece�sity for
the use of interrogatories because the defendant was al
ready required to categorically answer each and every
charge of evidence. , Interrogatories in time assumed an
independent status as an important part of eq\}ity plead
ings. Gradually over a period of more than a century
they ceased to be used as mere specifications of the state
ments of evidence which should be answered. While
theoretically they still required a supporting charge, in
reality they became independent of the charging p�rtion
of the bill. This development facilitated the separation
of interrogatories from the bill proper. Interrogatories
already had a separate status and use in the chancery bill
of discovery which was employed as an ancillary remedy
in law actions. Discovery without any other relief was
the sole object of bills of discovery and consequently such
bills were composed of interrogatories entirely. Appar
ently David Dudley Field, of New York, first suggested
the separation of interrogatories from the pleading in
all chancery pleadings. His proposal was " that the
practice of obtaining discovery by answer in equity, be
discontinued, leaving the bill of complaint and answer to
be regarded merely as pleadings, " for, said Field, " if
the practice of obtaining discovery by answer in equity
were discontinued the pleadings would naturally fall into
a plain, short statement by each party of his own case.
May not a discovery be obtained in some other way¥ ' ' 11
A similar recommendation of the English Chancery
Commissioners was adopted, that : (1) Every bill should
contain a concise narrative of the material facts, matters
and circumstances on which the plaintiff relies ; (2) a bill
should not contain interrogatories for the examination
of the defendant ; (3) the plaintiff should file separate
17 From an essay of Field's published Jan. 1, 1847, found in Speeches
.
and Papers of David Dudley Field, vol. 1, p. 230.
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interrogatories for the defendant to answer; and until
the plaintiff files such interrogatories the defendant need
not answer the bill.1s

DisCOVERY UNDER THE CoDES
.

·

Draftsmen of the New York Code of Procedure of 1848
recognized that discovery procedure should play an im
portant part in the reforms which they proposed. The
Commissioners in their note to the sections of the New
York Code of Procedure dealing with the subject of dis
covery, said: "The provisions contained in this chap
ter, we have considered so important to the success of our
system, that from the first we have contemplated their
introduction. Meantime the legislature, at their late
session, have passed an act upon the subject. That act,
however, contemplates the examination at the trial only. '
We think it important to extend it so as to permit the
examination to take place before the trial at the option
of the party.
"Before the act of the last session, whenever a party
sought a discovery from his adversary, he was obliged to
file a bill in equity, called a bill of discovery. The pro
ceeding was dilatory and expensive. If the examination
be had at all it may be had in the same action as well as ·
in another. That it should be had in some form our law
has always admitted. The difficulty was, that the process
to obtain it was oppressive and often ineffectual.
"One of the great benefits to be expected from the
examination of the parties is the relief it will afford to
the rest of the community, to a considerable degree, from
attendance as witnesses, to prove facts, which the parties
respectively know, and ought never to dispute, and would
not dispute if they were put to their oaths. To effect this
objeGt it should seem 1,1ecessary to permit their examinalli IS and 16 Viet. Chap. 86, sees. 10-12. See also Langdell, Discovery
Under the Judicature Acts, 12 Harv. L. Rev, 16, 166.

\,
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tion beforehand, that the answer of the party may save
the necessity of a witness.'' 19
Many of the other American jurisdictions which
adopted codes of practice modelled after the New York
Code of Procedure of 1848, overlooked the importance of
discovery as such and its relation to the general scheme
of pleading and pre-trial practice under the code. A
number of these jurisdictions, however, have remedied
the defect by enacting liberal provisions for taking depo
sitions generally. This has made possible a combination
of the methods for discovering and preserving the testi
mony of parties and witnesses alike. It has proved an
entirely feasible way of allowing oral examinations for
discovery before trial.

DISCOVERY uNDER REFORMED ENGLISH PROCEDURE
Draftsmen of the English judicature acts devised a
combination of the devices for obtaining discovery before
trial which had formerly been used in courts of common
law and courts of chancery respectively. The purpose of
the combination was "to obtain the benefit ·of the ex
tended principles of the court of chancery and to com
bine with them the simplicity of the common law meth
od.'' 20 Briefly the system of discovery set up under the
judicature act of 1875 provided that any party might,
after the first pleadings had been exchanged, deliver to
his opponent without leave, a set of written interrog
atories requiring sworn answers. Rules of court pro
vided full details as to the times and methods for re
questing discovery and for enforcing the right, by penal
ties, when refused. Discovery as well as other pre-trial
administrative devices has played a prominent part in
the reformed English practice.
19 Report of Commissioners on Praetiee and Pleading (1848) p. 244

10 Rosenbaum,

Rule Making Authority, 58.

• .

CHAPTER III

PRESERVATION OF TESTIMONY BY MEANS OF
DISCOVERY
Preservation as well as discovery of testimony is one
of the important functions of pre-trial procedure. It is
important that the lawyer have at his. disposal adequate
means of providing for the contingency of the death or
removal of necessary witnesses, since cases are not
reached for trial until months and sometimes years after
the occurrence of the transactions in question. This is
especially true in the large cities where there is a shifting
population and where court calendars are so crowded
that there are unusual delays in reaching trial. The law
has always recognized the need but the machinery which
it has provided to supply it too frequently has been cum
bersome and inadequate.
Courts of common law for a long period of time fur
nished no machinery to perform this function. Conse
quently courts of chancery were called upon to supply
the defect. Just as courts of chancery entertained bills
of discovery, which preserved as well as discovered the
testimony of adverse. parties, so, likewise, did they enter
tain bills to perpetuate testimony and to take testimony
de bene esse in aid of actions at law.1 The purpose of
both of the latter remedies was to provide a means of
preser$g the testimony of witnesses generally. In the
early part of the nineteenth century common law courts
were empowered by special statutes to give the same
remedy which chancery formerly had given by these
1 Story's Equity Jurisdiction (2nd English ed.) sees. 1505, 1513;
Wee'lm, Law of Depositions (1880) see. 10 fl.
19
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ancillary bills. The statutory remedy became known as
deposition procedure.
There has been an increasing tendency under modern
practice to combine the methods of obtaining discovery
and preservation of evidence, respectively. As a matter
of fact there usually can be no discovery without inci
dental preservation. Conversely, preservation often
affords an incidental discovery. Why not,. therefore,
combine the two procedures into a single one T This is
the trend of the modern practice. Two developments
have removed differences in the two types of procedure
which formerly made their assimilation less practicable.
At one time parties to an action were neither competent
nor compellable to testify as witnesses but later this dis
ability was removed.8 When parties became witnesses
in fact it was an easy step to provide that they be ex
amined as witnesses. There has also been a tendency to
make liberal allowance for the taking of depositions of
all witnesses . on the theory that it is impossible to tell
when a witness may die or become inaccessible and that
therefore . a litigant should not be required to show the
witness is unavailable before taking his deposition. It
has been thought sufficient to make the unavailability of
the witness a condition to the use of the deposition at the
trial rather than to the taking thereof.
If depositions may be taken from both witnesses and
parties and if the right to take is unconditional, a very
liberal method of discovering and preserving evidence
is afforded. If the right to take is unconditional there is
no reason for the court to inquire whether the preserva
tion of testimony or the discovery of testimony is the
primary objective of the applicant. The words of the
Supreme Court of Kansas in this regard are classic :
' ' Now the giving of testimony, whether on the trial or
by deposition, is not a privilege of the witness, but a right
·

a Wigmore

on Evidence, IV, sec. 2217.
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of the party. He need not solicit ; he can compel. It
seems to us therefore that under our statutes a witness
may be compelled to give his deposition, although he re
side in the county where the action is pending. It is said
that this power is liable to abuse, and that a witness may
be compelled to give repeated depositions, and still be
present at the trial. Courts will see that this power is
not abused, or the time of· witnesses unnecessarily taken.
It is also said that large amounts of costs will be ac
cumulated. This will not injure the adverse party, for a
party taking depositions which he does not use must him
self pay their cost. It is also said that this permits one
to go on a 'fishing expedition' to ascertain his ad
versary 's testimony. This is an equal right of both par
ties, and justice will not be apt to suffer if each party
knows fully beforehand his adversary's testimony." 8
When first introduced there was considerable aversion
on the part of the bar to the use of deposition procedure
for purposes of discovery before trial. Such use of the
procedure has been attacked as a "fishing expedition "
and as being foreign to the traditional purpose of depo
sition procedure. Some lawiers have felt that, to employ
words used by the Kansas Supreme Court upon another
occasion, ' 'the taking of the deposition of a party in a
pending case merely to find out in advance what his testi
mony will be, and to annoy and oppress him, and not for
the purpose of using the same as evidence, is an abuse of
judicial authority and process.'' 4
8 In re Abeles (1874) 12 Kan. 451, 452. See to the same e1fect Tyson
v. Savings and Loan Association (1900) 156 Mo. 588, 57 S. W. 740 ;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Williams (1908) 129 Ky. 515, 112 S.
W. -651; Owensboro City Ry. Co. v. Rowland (1913) 152 Ky. 175, 153
S. W. 206; Willis v. Bank of Hardinsburg (1914) 160 Ky. 808, 170,8. W.
188; Kentucky Utilities Co. v. McCarty's Adm'r (1916) 169 Ky. 38, 183
S. W. 237 ; In re Rauh (1901) 65 0. S. 128, 61 N. E. 701; Dogge v. State
(1887) 21 Neb. 272, 31 N. W. 929; Ulrich v. McConaughey (1901) 63
Neb. 10, 88 N. W. " 150 ; Olmsted v. Edson (1904) 71 Neb. 17, 98 N. W.
415 ; In re Berger ( 1919) 13 0. App. 206 (affirmed 101 0. S. 512, 130 N.
E. 935).
4 In re Davis (1898) 38 Kan. 408, 16 Pac. 790.

22

DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL

This hostility on the part of the bar, however, is short
lived once the use of deposition procedure both to dis
_cover and preserve evidence is given a fair trial. Its
very reproach becomes its glory-the courts say that the
virtue of the device is that it is a means of discovering
evidence. The following quotations from various opin
ions will serve to illustrate the satisfaction which such a
use of the procedure gives: ( 1) "The code confers the
right on either party to take the deposition of the adverse
party, not merely for use as evidence if the necessary con
ditions arise, but for the purposes of exploration, or of
ascertaining the facts on which the adverse party re
lies. " 11 (2) "This is a very wise provision of the code
. of procedure, taking the place of the old bill of discovery
and affording a much more speedy and efficient remedy
than was given in that mode." 6 ( 3 ) "Taking the deposi
tion of a party is the only substitute we have for a bill
of discovery under our practice." 7 ( 4) " It was the in
tention of the legislature • • • to remove every barrier
to the discovery of the truth.'' 8 ( 5) ''The common law
originally was very strict in confining each party to his
own means of proof, and, as it has been expressed, re
garded a trial as a cock-fight, wherein he won whose
advocate was the gamest bird with the longest spurs.
But we have come to take a more liberal view and have
done away with most of those features of trials which
gave rise to that reproach.'' 9
Effective machinery for discovery and preservation of
evidence already exists in all of the states which allow
II Clay, in Kentucky Utilities Co. v. McCarty 's Adm 'r (1916) 169 Ky.
44, 183 s. w. 237.
6 Valliant, J., in Tyson v. Savings & Loan Association (1900) 156 Mo
. 588, 57 S. W. 740. Compa:.;e the earlier case of Ex parte Krieger (1879)
7 Mo. App. 367.
7 Barnes, J., in Olmsted v. Edson (1904) 7i Neb. 17, 23, 98 N. W: 415.
8 Reese, J., in Dogge v. State (1887) 21 Neb. 272, 277, 31 N. W. 929.
9 Pound, C., (Now Dean of the Harvard Law School) in IDrich v.
McConaughey (1901) 63 Neb. 10, 20, 88 N. W. 150.
•
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the taking of depositions to be an unconditional right of
the party, and impose limitations, depending upon the
availability of the witness, only upon the use of the depo
sition at the trial. Already approximately half of the
states of this country have this type of deposition statute
and other states could obtain the same result by a simple
statutory amendment to the effect that the conditions
which are now imposed for the taking of depositions
henceforth shall apply only to the use thereof at the trial
and that depositions may always be taken as of right.
It would facilitate the practical use of the device and
reduce the possibility of illiberal decisions limiting such
use if the deposition statutes were so labelled as to indi
cate that use both for discovery and for preservation of
testimony is intended. Indeed, the greatest danger inci
dent to the use of ordinary deposition procedure for pur
poses of discovery before trial is that since it is not
labelled discovery procedure courts and lawyers hesitate
to use it as such. The easiest way to remove this danger
is . to specifically label the statutory provisions discovery
and deposition procedure.
It is to be regretted that the first tentative draft of the
proposed uniform deposition act submitted to the Oom
missioners on Uniform State Laws in 1929 has not made
provision for. such a practice. The proposed act pro
vides that, "depositions may be taken of any witnesses
who are about to be beyond reach of a subpoena or for
some cause are expected to be unable to attend court at
the time of trial.'' 10 In a note to this provision it is
said: ''Question is raised as to whether under this Act
the deposition of a party could be taken and if so under
what circumstances. And if his deposition could be
taken, could he be compelled to produce books, docu
ments, or things under his control? Some states have
·

10 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and Proceedings (1929) 360.
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special statutes or rules which permit examination of
parties before trial. The entire question could be compre
hended in this statute but, as now drafted, Section 1
would have to be modified. If, however, it is desired to
exclude examination of parties hereunder, it could be so
stated, perhaps in Section 1. To include the whole sub
ject here might introduce a controversy which would be
undesirable. However, it should be broad enough · to
cover parties beyond the reach of a subpoena or who
cannot attend trial.'' 11 Perhaps one explanation of the
fact that this type of deposition statute has been pro
posed is the personnel of the committee which drafted
it. Lawyers from the following states were on the com
mittee : Washington, Delaware, Utah, Iowa, lllinois,
Mississippi, and Oregon. None of these states exhibits
an effective discovery practice based upon a statute
which gives an unconditional right to take depositions.
It seems rather unfortunate that the committee had no
representative from such states as Ohio, New Hampshire,
Missouri, Kentucky, Indiana, Nebraska and Texas,
where liberal deposition statutes have been the means of
developing an effective practice for discovery and pres
ervation of testimony.
l l ld.

CHAPTER IV

METHODS OF DISCOVERY IN DIFFERENT
JURISDICTIONS
·

,.

.There are two basic methods of discovery of testimony
which are being employed in the different jurisdictions.
In addition there are several methods for discovery and
inspection of documentary evidence. The two methods
of discovery of testimony are written interrogatories and
oral examination before trial. Under the former the
party serves a series of written questions upon his ad
versary who is required to answer under oath. Under
the latter the person from whom· discovery is sought is
subjected to an examination upon oral questions pro
pounded by the applicant for discovery. The questions
and answers are recorded in the form of a deposition.
The written interrogatory practice is modelled after
the chancery procedure for discovery. Considerations
of procedural policy, however, favor an oral examination.
Ever since the time of Jeremy Bentham who pointed out
the superiority of what he termed "confrontatory" to
"epistolary" examinations 1 lawy�rs have increasingly
recognized that an oral examination is the only efficient
means of taking testimony. David Dudley Field, one of
the draftsmen of the New York Code of Procedure, con
sistently urged t�e general adoption of this mode of tak
ing testimony by all of the cour�s.11 Accordingly the com
missioners in their note to the sections of the New York
Code of Procedure which provided for an oral examina:
tion before trial, said : "Two modes of examination have
.
, 1 Bentham 's Rationale of Judicial Evidence, �ol. 2, pp. 140, 158, 197199; viot 4, p. 613 ; vot 5; pp. s7U, 401. .
a Speeehes and Papers of David Dudley Field, vol 1, pp. 230, 269.
.
,
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been proposed, one oral, the other upon written interrog
atories. The latter is the method of the civil law. We
think the question is decided by the act of December, and
if it were not we should still prefer the oral examination.
A written deposition taken in private is not the best
means of eliciting the truth ; nor do we see why the law
should be so tender of the consciences of parties when it
is so hard with the consciences of witnesses. These are
brought into court, are made to waste their time about a
matter not their own, and when called to the stand, are
subjected to the most searching and often offensive ex
amination. Why should he who has brought them here
be exempted from the same scrutiny? '' 8 The various
jurisdictions have adopted one or the other of these two
methods of discovery, either the oral examination or
written interrogato:Hes. In many states discovery and
preservation of testimony have been combined so that an
oral examination may be had under the ordinary deposi
tion procedure.
The statutory provisions on discovery are set forth
in the appendix at the back of this volume. The provi
sions in the United States federal courts are given :first
and thereafter the other jurisdictions are listed alpha
betically. The statutes and rules of court in each state
dealing with oral examinations for discovery and pres
ervation of evidence before trial, written interrogatories
and inspection of documents are set forth. The number
·
and the elaborateness of the statutory provi�ions is no
index to the effectiveness of the practice. New York has
lengthy and detailed statutes and rules of court dealing
with discovery, yet the actual practice is notoriously in
effective. Ohio, New Hampshire, Kentucky and other
jurisdictions, oli the other hand, have developed an ex
tensive and effective discovery practice upon the basis of
a short and simple statutory authorization.
8 First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleading (1848)
p. 244.

CHAPTER V

TYPES OF ACTIONS IN WHICH DISCOVERY IS
AVAILABLE
DiscoVERY AvAILABLE IN ALL TYPEs
JURISDICTIONS

OF

AcTIONS IN MANY

There are no prohibitions or restrictions upon the use
of discovery, as far as the type of action is concerned, in
most of the jurisdictions which have procedures for dis
covery before trial. On the contrary the usual provision
is that discovery may be had in all civil actions. In some
states, such as Missouri for instance, it is also possible
to have discovery under the guise of depositions in crimi
nal actions. The latter aspect, however, is without the
scope of this treatise. In all of the jurisdictions in which
field investigations were conducted, except New York,
it was found that discovery is actually used much more
extensively in automobile accident litigation than in all
other types of action combined. Some lawyers who take
discovery examinations as of course in personal injury
cases seldom resort to the device in other cases.
The following statistics from Wisconsin and Ontario,
respectively, show that while personal injury cases ex
hibit the most extensive use of discovery, it is actually
employed in all kinds of litigation in those jurisdictions .
These statistics were obtained . by examination of fifty
consecutive records of cases in which discovery had been
used in each of the following cities : Milwaukee, Wiscon
sin ; Madison, Wisconsin ; and Toronto, Ontario.
·

..
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Showing Types of Actions in Which Discovery Is Used
in Wisconsin

Type of Action

MilwaUkee

Madison

24

21

6

7

45
13

5
2
4

3
5
3
4
5

8
7
7
6
6
2

Automobile Accident
Contract

Composite .

Negligence Other than
Automobile
Fraud
Divorce
Account

2

Promissory Note

1

Malpractice

1

1

Mortgage Foreclosure

1

1

Assault and Battery

1

2

Cancellation of Deed

1

Slander

1

1
1
1

Conversion

1

1

ToTAL 13

Different Types

50

50

100

TYPES oF AcTIONs IN WRICH DiscoVERY Is PROHIBITED IN
SOME JURISDICTIONS
Discovery is not allowed in actions to enforce for
feitures or penalties in England and Ontario.1 Some of
the federal courts have held that, under federal equity
rule 58, discovery cannot b e had in patent litigation, it
being the theory that discovery is inappropriate because
such proceedings often are in the nature of actions to
enforce penalties.8 There is, however, substantial au
thority to the effect that discovery is available in such
cases, because of the fact that rule 58 itself mentions no
such �xception.8 Discovery in patent actions, while not
1 Annual Practice (1930) p. 500 and cases cited thereat ; Bray 's Law
of Discovery, 345; Ontario Judicature Act ( Holmested, 1915) 796.
B F. Speidel Co. v. N. Barstow Co. (1906) 232 Fed. 617 ; Blackmore v.
Collins (1923) 286 Fed. 629; Heatometer Co. v. Jacobs Bros. Co. (1926)
12 F. (2d) 103 (citing many other cases) .
8 Taylor v. Ford Motor Co. (1923) 2 F. (2d) 473; Standard Oil Co.
v. Rozana Pet. Corp. (1925) 9 F. (2d) 453 ; Koehring Co. v. Foote Co.
(1927) 21 F. (2d) 569,
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Ohart Showing Types of Actiona in

in Ontario

Type of Action

Which Discovery Is Used

Number in Whick
Discovery Was Used

11
7
5
4
3
3
2'
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Automobile Accident
Negligence Other than Automobile
Contract
Promissory Notes
Specific Performance
Fraud
Quasi-Contract
Mortgage Foreclosure
Cancellation of Instrument
Alimony
Possession of Realty
Malpractice
Will Contest
Collection of Assessment
Account
Guaranty
Partition
Injunction
Mandatory Injunction
Dissolution of Partnership
ToTAL 20 Different Types

50

favored, is not prohibited by the English courts.4 Dis
covery in divorce proceedings is forbidden by the courts
of Indiana.5 Discovery in action� for criminal cop.versa
tion is forbidden in Ontario.8 The New York courts have
held that there can be no examination for discovery in
summary actions, since discovery is deemed to be incon
sistent with the theory �nd spirit of such actions."
4 Annual Practice (1930) p. 494; Bray's Law of Discovery, 550 :tr.
5 Barr v. Barr (1889) 31 Ind. 240 (this ease applies only to discovery

by written interrogatories and not to discovery by oral examination) .
8 Ontario Judicature Aet ( Holmested, 1915) p . 796.
'7 Inter·City Apartment Hous(l Co. v. Kern (1925) 212 N. Y. S. 284;
Dubosky v. Goldsmith (1922) 195 N. Y. S. 67.
·

DISCOVERY B EFORE TRIAL

30

TYPES OF AcTIONS IN WHICH DiscoVERY Is RESTRICTED BUT
NOT PROHIBITED IN SoME JURISDICTIONS
Peculiar rules which obtain in New York in regard t o
the scope o f discovery examination generally have made
it possible for courts to restrict discovery to , such an
extent that it becomes almost useless in some types of tort
actions and particularly in automobile accident litiga
tion. There is a distinct division of opinion among the
several departments of the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court in regard to the allowable
scope of examination before trial in negligence cases.
The question at issue is whether the examination in these
cases shall be limited to such items as ownership and
control of the vehicle or shall extend also to the facts of
liability and damage. Generally speaking, the First De
partment has adhered to the rule that the examination
may extend only to such items as ownership and control
of the vehicle, whereas the Second Department of the
Appellate Division has allowed the examination to ex
tend to the facts of liability and damage as well. Re
strictions upon the scope of the examination similar to
those enforced in automobile negligence cases are also
applied in such tort actions as deceit, libel and malprac
tice. The English courts likewise have taken the posi
tion that in most accident cases both parties are able to
call witnesses and therefore do not need to interrogate
upon small questions of fact relating to the details of the
accident.8
The experience of lawyers in California, Missouri and
Wisconsin, particularly, suggests that discovery is more
apt to be abused in certain types of litigation than in
others, but that the remedy is to prevent publication of
the results of the examination rather than to restrict the
scope of the interrogation.
8 Griebart

v.

An excerpt from the letter

Morris (1920) K. B. 659, 666.

AcTioNs IN WHICH AvAILABLE

31

of a Los Angeles attorney . illustrates the problem which
is involved : " In certain types of cases, such as seduc
tion under promise of marriage, and malicious prosecu
tion, depositions are frequently threatened and taken for
blackmailing purposes. I recall particularly a case in
which the newspapers were full of salacious details dis
closed by a deposition. That was a year or so ago and
I have never heard anything further of the case, so I
presume it was finally disposed of out of court. No
doubt everyone reading those articles thought that the
witness interrogated had been guilty of the indiscretions
charged and yet there may not have been a word of truth
in the charges. However, this blackmailing use of a
deposition is very infrequent. But it would be an easy
matter to entirely guard against it by providing that on
the application of either party the deposition would be
taken behind closed doors, sealed by the notary and filed
as sealed by him, and not opened until offered in evi
dence by one party or the other. I think any state grant
ing rights similar to those given by our discovery stat- ute should include some such provision. ' ' Missouri law
yers complain that in election contests, divorce proceed
ings and alienation of affection actions, particularly, an
opportunity is afforded for what is called a " newspaper
trial of the case. " The Milwaukee courts have met this
situation in the way suggested by the Los Angeles attor
ney. They have enacted a rule of court which forbids
the opening of the record of a discovery examination except under order of court.
·

CHAPTER VI

RESPECTIVE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF AND
DEFENDANT TO DISCOVERY
Discovery in equity was of more importance to the
plaintiff than to the defendant. It was primarily the duty
· of the defendant to answer the interrogatories which the
plaintiff had included in his bill. Less frequently did
the defendant seek discovery from the plaintiff. The
tendency under modern discovery practice is to make
discovery equally available to both plaintiff and defend
ant. Where the written interrogatory procedure obtains
either party may file interrogatories for his opponent to
answer. Similarly either party may have an oral ex
amination of his adversary where this form of discovery
is employed.
There are, however, certain rules in a few jurisdictions
which prevent discovery from being an entirely equal
right of both parties. Especially under the New York
practice is there an inequality of discovery. The New
York rule is that a party can have discovery only as to
the issues of which he has the affirmative under the plead
ings. Obviously this allows a plaintiff far greater rights
to discovery than is allowed the defendant, for the reason
that the former . usually has the affirmative of most of the
issues. Similarly, a defendant is not allowed discovery
under a mere denial.
Absence of a provision for examination of representa
tives of corporate parties may prevent discovery from
being equal. While lawyers for a corporate party can
examine the adverse party the latter obviously cannot
examine the artificial body.

This is the situation in New
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Even under the ordinary deposition p rocedure

the rights to discovery are not absolutely equal in the
event one party is a corporation, for the corporation can
examine its adversary as a party while the latter can
examine the corporate representatives, only as wit
nesses. The difference is that in one case the answers
constitute admissions, while in the other case they may
not.
Even in those states in which as ,a matter of law the
rights to l:liscovery are equal the actual use of the pro
cedure is not always so. In most of these states defend
ants use the procedure much more frequently than do
plaintiffs. This, however, is not true in all jurisdictions.
In Wisconsin, for example, both plaintiffs and defend
ants use the procedure widely. In fifty consecutive cases
in which discovery had been used in Milwaukee the rec
ords showed that both parties were examined in eight
cases, the plaintiff alone in thirty, and the defendant
alone in twelve. Similarly in Madison both parties were
. examined in twenty-two out of fifty cases, the plaintiff
alone in twelve, and the defendant alone in sixteen. One
hundred consecutive cases studied in the Superior Court
of Suffolk County, Boston, indicated that under the
Massachusetts written interrogatory procedure defend
ants had filed interrogatories approximately five times to
every three times plaintiffs had done so. The special
procedure for an oral examination for discovery in New
Jersey, however, has been used almost exclusively by
defendants. Indeed one lawyer said that he had seen
hundreds of examinations and applications for exam
inations by defendants ' lawyers, especially those repre
senting insurance and corporate interests, but that he
could remember only two cases wherein lawyers for
·
plaintiffs had sought an examination of the adverse
party. In all of the states in which the deposition is
used for discovery purposes defendants employ the proc
ess much more frequently than do plaintiffs.
·
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The following reasons have been assigned why defend
ants use discovery more than plaintiffs : (1) The plain
tiff generally is less able to afford the expense.
(2)
There i s a tendency upon the part of many plaintiffs '
lawyers to want to get to the jury and to disparage any
dissipation of their strength in the form of pre-trial
moves. Corporate interests, on the other hand, often are
glad to use any expedient to avoid a trial. ( 3 ) Whereas
much of the business of defendants is concentrated in
the larger law firms, with skilled lawyers, the plaintiff's '
business usually is scattered. Often actions are initiated
by men with inferior training, and a more thoroughly
trained lawyer is not called into the case on the plain
tiff 's behalf until immediately before trial. Accordingly,
the case, up until the trial stage at least, is handled by
men who are either ignorant or careless in their prepara
tion for trial. This explanation is borne out by the fact
that some plaintiffs ' lawyers who are careful about their
preparation for trial use the process just as frequently as
do defendants ' lawyers. But plaintiffs ' lawyers as a
whole do not.
It is a mistake to suppose that simply because defend
ants use the process more widely the procedure favors
the defendant and prejudices the plaintiff. Even in
states in which plaintiffs ' lawyers make little use of the
device, they say that they have no hostility toward the
process. Outside of New Jersey, practically no oppo
sition to discovery was found among the several hun
dred lawyers who were interviewed.

A typical response

upon · the part of the lawyers who specialize in repre
senting plaintiffs in automobile accident litigation was
that they welcomed the examination of their client if he
had a good case because it enhanced the possibility of an
'
advantageous settlement. In some states which have no
provision for the oral examination of parties before
trial lawyers for the plaintiff sometimes will grant an
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examination of their client as & basis for settlement
negotiations. This is testimony to its effectiveness in
this regard. Again, many plaintiffs ' lawyers said that
the process had afforded them a valuable remedy in cer
tain cases. Some stressed the fact that it afforded the
outsider a means of preparation for trial which placed
·
him more nearly on an equality with the larger firms
which have at their disposal independent means of in
vestigation. Still others said that in cases in which em
ployees of the defendant were witnesses to the accident
they had found it desirable to examine such employees
just as soon as possible after filing suit, and that often
times these employees at such an early stage of the liti
gation were more sympathetic to the victim of the acci
dent than they would be after adroit and suggestive
questioning by claim agents, fear of loss of their jobs,
or merely the lapse of time had dampened their sym
pathies.
In fairness it should be said that the little prejudice
toward dis_!:lovery which was found in the fourteen ju
·
risdictions which were visited, was confined to lawyers
who specialize in representing plaintiffs. In New Jersey
these lawyers were uniformly opposed to the p rocedure,
whereas defendants ' lawyers favored it. But in other
states no such wide-spread prejudice was found. Upon
occasion defendants ' lawyers said that they supposed
some prejudice toward the procedure would be found
among plaintiffs ' attorneys. They were asked to name
particular men whom they supposed entertained such
prejudice.

Interviews with the latter did not bear out

the suppositions.

Even those plaintiffs ' lawyers who

were said to dislike the procedure because of its deal
ing with so-called fake claims concealed their animosity,
if they had such.

While many lawyers of all types said

that they had in mind specific instances in which the
process had been abused, very few were willing to say
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that the process as a whole was not a good thing. On
the contrary, the great majority were outspoken in their
praise of the device.
The ideal, of course, is that all procedural devices be
available to both sides equally. The often quoted words
of the Kansas Supreme Court are in point : " It is said
that this permits one to go on a ' fishing expedition' to
ascertain his adversary 's testimony. This is an equal
right of both parties, and justice will not be apt to suffer
if each party knows fully beforehand his adversary 's
testimony. ' ' 1 Not only is it important that the · oppor
tunity for discovery be mutually available, but it is like
wise important that a mutual use of the device be en
couraged. Missouri has a provision which is unique in
this regard. If one party takes depositions, the other
party can begin taking depositions just as soon as his
adversary has finished without giving formal notice. It
is only required that he make known his desire some
time during the taking of depositions by the first party.2
This encourages a party to take advantage of the process
whenever his adversary does so, and to this extent it
fosters an equal and a mutual use of discovery.
1 In re Abeles (1874) 12 Kan. 451.

II

Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) sec. 5465.

CHAPTER VII

PERSONS FROM WHOM DISCOVERY MAY BE HAD
DISCOVERY FROM pARTIES
The statutes very generally provide either that " ad
verse " or that " opposite " parties may be examined
or interrogat�d for discovery. 1 The only exception is to
be found in New York where, under the amendment of
1926, the words " any other party " have been substituted
for the words " an adverse party. " 1 Various inter
pretations have been given to the words " adverse " and
" opposite. " The latter word has been construed by the
English courts to mean parties on the other side of the
record, parties between whom some right is to be ad

justed in the action, and parties intervening to oppose
the claim of the party seeking discovery.8 The Wiscon
sin court .has held that a co-defendant may be examined
if his interests in reality are adverse.4 In states in which
depositions of parties and witnesses alike are taken for
discovery the statutes usually make no mention of parties
as such.

There the right to examine a party is obtained

by virtue of the fact that he is a witness, and separate
statutes which make parties witnesses are relied upon
for the connecting link.
On principle it would seem that the ordinary rules as
to parties un4er the law of pleading would suffice to ·
determine whether

a

particular person is examinable for

1 The statutes are set forth in the appendix at the back of this volume.
a New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 288 ; Kirman v. Fries (1927)
220 N. Y. S. 430.
8 Bray, Digest of the Law of Discovery, 12, 48• .
H > 'Day V'. Meiers (1911) 147 Wis. 549, 183 N. W. 605.
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discovery as a party.

In this way a number of extra

neous rules regarding the real party in interest, proper
and necessary parties, and the like, can be used to define
the bare word " party. "

Accordingly the Wisconsin

court has held that the real party in interest rather than
a mere nominal party is the person intended,6 and that

proper as well as necessary parties are examinable.6

In

New Jersey and Louisiana, on the contrary, only the
parties to the record are examinable.'

The Georgia stat

ute expressly provides that either nominal or real parties
may be examined.

Special provision is made for dis

covery from a person in whose behalf an action is prose
cuted or defended in Ontario, North Carolina, South
Carolina and South Dakota.

The converse situation,

namely, the right to discovery from assignors, who under

the real party in interest statutes are not parties to the
record, is specifically provided for in Ontario, New York,
Michigan and California.

The New York provision and

the similar Michigan provision are the more elaborate
in this regard : " the original owner of a claim which con
stitutes, or from which arose, a cause of action acquired
by grant, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or endorse
ment and which is set forth in his pleading as a cause
of action or counterclaim. ' ' 8 But there is some doubt
under the New York provision as to whether the phrase
" original owner " includes an intermediate assignor.9
This defect is cured in the Michigan rules which add the
words " or prior owner. "
II Rohleder v. Wright (1916) 162 Wis. 580, 156 N. W. 9 55. ·
6 Wells v. Green Bay & M. C. Co. (1895) 90 Wis. 442, 64 N. W. 69.

'1 Apperson v. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. (1876) 38 N. J. L. 272; Rev. Code
of Prac. (Marr., 1927) sec. 347.
8 New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 288; Mich. Court Rules (1931)
rule 41, sec. 1 (a slight difference of wording).
9 Question raised but not decided in Green. v. Saisselin (19�7) 214 N.
Y. S. 776. But cf. for · indication that· intermediate assignors are not ex·
aminable, Wappler v. Woodbury Co. (1923) 201 N. Y. S. 503. See a�so
2 7 Col. L. Rev. 422.
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Special questions have arisen as to what persons are
properly examinable where an executor or administrator
is a party to the action. In New York it has been held
that, under appropriate circumstances, legatees, devisees
or the representative may be examined. 10 In New Jersey
it has been held that the representative can be examined
but that he cannot be compelled to ·testify to any trans
action with or statement by the deceased person. 11 Spe
cial provision has been made in Ontario for the situation
where an infant is a party.

Either the guardian or next .

friend is examinable, as is the infant also, unless he is
incompetent to give evidence. The court rather than the
special examiner is the judge of the capacity of the in
fant if his examination is contested.

PERSONS ExAMINABLE ON BEHALF OF CoRPORATION
If discovery was sought from a corporation defendant
under the chancery procedure, it was the practice to add
one of its officers as codefendant.u Under the statu
tory practice the New Jersey court has held that in the
absence of specific statutory authority it was not pos
sible to examine representatives of a corporate party. 18
The South Carolina court, on the contrary, has held that
the word " party " is broad enough to include officers of
a corporation which is a party. 14 In states in which
deposition procedure is used for purposes of discovery
before trial representatives of corporations may be ex
amined as witnesses generally. The question of their .
right to represent the corporation is reserved for the
trial. The discovery statutes in a number of jurisdictions
specify what particular representatives of a corporation
1o m re Kimmerle 's Will (1927) 225 N. Y. S. 779 ; In re Dooper's Will
(1925) 208 N. Y. S. 820; In re Britsch 's Estate (1926) 219 N. Y. S. 124.
11 Deak, Adm 'r v. Perth Amboy Gas Light Co. (1923) 1 N. J. Mise. 457.
1J Wilson v. Church (1878) 9 Ch. D. 552.
11 Apperson v. Mutual Benefit Insurance Co. (1876) 38 N. J. L. 272.
16 U. S. Tire Co. v. Keystone Tire Sales Co. (1929) 153 S. C. 56, 150
8. E. 347.
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may be examined on its behalf. Often the statutes pro
vide both a general and a specific designation of the
representatives who are examinable. T.he statement that
' ' officers ' ' may be examined is followed by the enumera
tion of specific officers. Jurisdictions in which the stat
utes employ the word " officer " are : Alabama, California,
Connecticut, England, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Virginia and Wisconsin. The
following officers and agents are specifically designated
in the various statutes :

President, in Connecticut, Massachusetts, North Da
kota, Ohio and Quebec.

Vice-president, in Virginia.
Secretary, in North Dakota, Ohio, Quebec and Vir
gmra.

Treasurer, in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Quebec and
Virginia.

Superintendent, in Massachusetts and South Dakota.
Manager, business manager, or managing agent, in
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, South Dakota and
Virginia.

Dir"ector, in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan and
New York.

Member, in California and England.
Agent, in Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, North Carolina,
Quebec, Virginia and Wisconsin.

Clerk, in Connecticut and Massachusetts.
Cashier, in Virginia.
Statutes in the following states provide for the ex
amination of corporate employees or servants : Michigan,
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New Jersey, New York, Ontario, Washington and Wis
consin. Since the theory is that the person examined
represents the corporation and to that extent binds the
corporation, it is natural that corporations should dis
pute the right of mere employees to be examined on their
behalf. The decisions in Ontario as t.o what persons may
be examined have been varied and numerous, the most
nearly general test being the ability of the particular
person to give the necessary information rather than
his exact relation to the company.15 In New York it has
been held that the word " managing " in the phrase " man
aging agents and employees ' ' is applicable to both
" agents " and " employees . " 16 The chief reason which
prompted the present wording of the statute was that
employees were to be examined as corporate representa
tives rather than as witnesses merely.17 Therefore the
test generally followed is this : Can the particular em
ployee whose examination is sought speak in any wise
representatively for the corporation in regard to the par
ticular matter in question7 The important point is not
the g�neral relation of the employee to the corporation,l8
but rather his relation to the particular transaction in
dispute.19 Thus, under differing circumstances, iden
tically the same employee of identically the same corpo
ration may or may not be held a managing employee
15 Ross on Discovery (Can. Ed.) 30; MacGregor, What Persons in the
Service of a Litigating Corporation Are Examinable for Discovery in Its
Behalf, 2 Can. L. Rev. 254; Canadian Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario Ed.
1927) vol. 3, page 781 ff.
18 Swift v. General Baking Co. (1927) 220 N. Y. S. 554.
1'7 Cf. Rothschild, The Simplification of Civil Practice in New York,
23 Col. L. Rev. 732, 742.
18 The earliest cases indicated that this was the test. Friedman v. New
York Central R. Co. (1923) 200 N. Y. S. 337; Bloede & Co. v. Devine Co.
(1924) 206 N. Y. S. 739. But there has been a constant and conscious
backing away from the theory of the Friedman ease. See Rothschild,
The Simplification of Civil Practice in New York, 23 Col. L. Rev. 732,
742 ; 26 Col. L. Rev. 30, 56; 27 Col. L. Rev. 413, 422.
19 See Fulton v. Nat. Aniline & Chemical Co. (1925) 211 N. Y. S. 769;
and eases in the next several footnotes.
·
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within the meaning of the statute.2°

Certainly few em

ployees would have less right to represent a corporation
generally than elevator operators, and yet in one case
where the issue concerned the condition and state of
repair of an elevator at the time of an accident, such an
employee was deemed to be a fit representative of the
corporation.21
In such states as New Hampshire, Missouri, Kentucky,
Indiana, Ohio. and Nebraska, where it is possible to take
the deposition of parties and witnesses alike for discov
ery purposes, there is no such trouble about the right to
examine employees of corporations. Any and all em
ployees may be examined just as if they were ordinary
witnesses. The question as to whether, and to what ex
tent, the statements of any particular employee can be
used against the corporation, under such a procedure,
is not raised until the trial.
Particular problems have arisen concerning the ex
amination of former officers and employees of litigating
corporations due to the prejudice which common ex
perience has shown former employees may bear toward
the very corporation on whose behalf they are examined.
Such problems have been handled in the following ways :

New York.

.Although neither the Civil Practice Act

nor the Rules cover the exact situation, it has been held
that a trial court, under its general discretionary powers,
may allow the examination before trial of a former em
ployee of a corporation which is a party to the action." .
A rather practical expedient in the examination of such
former employee for discovery is to allow the employee
10 Cameron v. Rochester & S. R. Co. (1925) 210 N. Y. S. 241 ; Warner
v. Rochester & S. R. Co. (1926) 214 N. Y. S. 579. In one case the claim
agent was held a managing employee and in the other case not.
21 Bregman v. Edbro Realty Co. (1929) 135 Misc. 87, 236 N. y; S. 409,
where an examination of an elevator operator under such circumstances
was allowed. See also Swift v. General Baking Company (1927) 129
Misc. 135, 220 N. Y. S. 554.
U Mayer v. New York Canners (1926) 217 App. Div. 202, 216 N. Y. S.

568.
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to be examined as a witness only and not as a corporate
representative.
This precludes an unfair use of the
examination at the trial.118 This is the method used for
the examination of all corporate officers and agents, both
present and past, in states which allow the taking of
depositions generally for discovery.

There has been some complaint against
the practice of allowing the examination of former em

Wisconsin.

ployees as adverse witnesses on the ground that they
are not in reality hostile. It is always possible, how
ever, for the corporation, under the ordinary rules of
evidence, to object at the trial that such examinations
should not be used as admissions against it, regardless
of the specific ·allowance of the examination by the dis
covery statutes.
The problem of former employees is han
dled by allowing interrogation of bona fide present rep
resentatives of the corporation only, but requiring such
representatives to make due inquiry for information

England.

from past agents. It is, however, a reasonable excuse
that it is impracticable or impossible to obtain the de
sired information from the former agents.84

Massat•httsetts. Only persons in the present employ of
corporations are examinable in its behalf and there is no
duty of making inquiry from former employees and servants."
·

Ontario.

It was at one time allowable to examine

former officers for discovery, but later such a policy was
abandoned.86
83 Schmitt v. Neapolitan Ice Cream Co. (1925) 213 App. Div. 884, 209
N. Y. S. 916. See also' Cokely v. Bronx Nat. Bank (1926) 127 Misc. 175,
215 N. Y. S. 311.
84 Bray's Law of Discovery, 142.
85 Gunn v. Railroad Co. (1898) 171 Mass. 417, 50 N. E. 1031.
86 See Canadian Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario Ed. 1927) vol 3, page
789 as to the exact time as of which the officer shall be deemed a present
or past officer of a corporation in cases where the connection is severed
after the cause of action accrues or after the action is brought.

44

DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL

Several of the states make special provision for exam
ination of officers of municipal corporations. In Massa
chusetts the mayor or chairman of the board is the
proper representative to be interrogated. While an offi
cer or employee of a municipal corporation may be exam
ined for discovery in New York in a proper case, it has
been held that the proceeding for such an examination
must be initiated by court order rather than by notice
as in the case of representatives of private corpora
tions.117 Under the statutory provision for written in
terrogatories to corporate parties it has been held that
a county can be compelled to answer through its offi
cers.28 The federal equity rules treat private and public
corporations alike in this respect, but in both instances,
· it is necessary to procure a court order for the examina
tion, rather than to proceed by notice as in the case of
an ordinary litigant.29
If the theory is that the person examined is the alter
ego of the corporation and that his answers are regarded
as the answers of the corporation,80 it is of some moment
whether the corporation or the applicant for discovery
selects the representative who does the answering. This
matter has been handled in the following way in different
jurisdictions.

England.

The applicant for discovery can serve the

interrogatories upon the corporation and let it select a
representative to answer for it, or he can show why some
particular officer or member is better qualified than
others to give an answer.8 1 But in the latter event the
117 City of New York v. Velmachos (1927) 129 Misc. 177, 221 N. Y. S.
40; Hannon v. City of New York (1929) 226 App. Div. 757, 234 N. Y. S. 1.
liS Ex parte Elmore County (1921 ) 207 Ala. 68, 91 So. 876.
ll9 Union Sulphur Co. v. Freeport Texas Co. (1916) 234 Fed. 194. ·Cf.
Grasselli Chem. Co. v. National Aniline & Chemical Co. (1920) 282 Fed.
379.
SO Berkeley v. Standard Co. (1879) 13 C. D. 98. Some of the statutes
provide that the corporate representative shall be examined " as if he
were a party. ' '
3 1 Authorities are collected in Annual Practice (1930) page 514;
Bray's Law of Discovery, 79.
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corporation can contest the right of the person named
to represent the body.

Massachusetts. Sometimes the proponent of the in
terrogatories specifies the officer from whom an answer is
desired, but more often the questions are addressed to
the corporation and it selects the officer to do the answer
ing. Even in the former event the corporation can select
some officer other than the one named.

Georgia. It is necessary to address the interroga
tories to some particular officer of the corporation and
to give notice of filing of the interrogatories to its attor
ney of record, or officers.
Ontario. The party seeking the examination rather
than the corporation is the one to say what corporate
officer shall be questioned.88
Other states. The usual practice is for the applicant
for discovery to name the corporate officer whose exam
ination is desired. Especially is this true in states which
employ an oral examination for discovery, and this for
the practical reason that the applicant not only must
serve n<ltice of the examination but he mu�t also sub
poena the particular person who is to be examined.
Shall only one representative be examined on behalf
of a corporation, or may more than one · be examined ¥
The following variations of practice are to be found.

Wisconsin. It is possible to examine as many cor
porate representatives as are thought to have knowledge
of any of the facts in dispute. Some complaint as to
this practice was heard among Wisconsin lawyers, who
reported several instances in which whole train crews
had been examined at one time, causing some hardship.
88 Barry

770.

v.

Toronto and Niagara Power Company (1906) 70 W. R. 700,
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Federal equity. In the absence of a special showing
of necessity only one corporate officer can be examined.88
New York. The policy has been to discourage the
scheduling of simultaneous examinations of different
corporate representatives, but to allow successive exam
inations until the necessary . information is finally ob
tained.at
·

Ontario. Only one corporate representative may be
examined as of right, although discovery may be obtained
from others upon court order for cause shown.85 Such
leave seems to be seldom granted, unless the first exam
ination has failed to give an adequate disclosure. Al
though there are cases of record in which a number of
officers or agents have been examined,86 the tendency at
present is to restrict the questioning to a single person
who is entitled to speak for the corporation.
Other states. States in which it is permissible to take
the depositions of both parties and witnesses for dis
covery obviously have a practice which allows the exam
ination before trial of as many corporate officers and
servants as the applicant desires, since they are exam
ined upon the theory that they are witnesses rather than
upon the theory that they are corporate representatives.
DISCOVERY FROM WITNESSES
Discovery could be had only from parties under the
clrancery practice. The rule was that only persons who
had such an interest in the action that they would be
directly affected by the decree could be parties for pur
poses of discovery.87 This was tantamount to saying
88 Texas Co. v. Gulf Refining Co. (1926) 12 F. (2d) 317.
84 N. Y. City Car Ad. Co. v. Regensburg and Sons (1923) 205 App. Div.

705, 200 N. Y. S. 152.
85 Dawson v. London St. Ry. (1898) 18 P, R, 223.
86 Clarkson v. Bank of Hamilton (1904) 90 L. R. 317. See al110 Ca
nadian Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario Ed. 1927) vol, 3, p. 791,
8'7 Bray 's Law of Discovery, 40.
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that discovery could not be had from witnesses or from
any other third persons not parties. This doctrine has .
been carried over into some of the �pecial statutory sub
stitutes for the chancery practice. A Massachusetts opin
ion is representative when it states that : " It is clear
that courts do not compel discovery from persons who
sustain no other relation to the contemplated litigation,
or to the subject of the suit, than that of witnesses. ' ' 88

In such a situation it is of importance to note the inroads
which modern practice is making upon this principle.

Ontario. There is a rule of court which allows the
court to order the examination of any person as upon
deposition when it appears necessary for the purposes of
justice.89 Up until 1894 some use was made of this pro
vision to obtain discovery from persons not parties and
from ordinary witnesses, and the practice was sanc
tioned.40 In that year, however, the court overruled the
line of cases allowing this expedient and held that this
provision could not be used to enlarge the power of dis
covery under the regular rules covering that subject.41
Toronto judges and practitioners are opposed to the al
lowance of widespread discovery from ordinary wit
nesses. Sometimes, however, there can be discovery of
documentary evidence from persons not parties- to the
action.48 The test as to whether production for inspec
tion will be ordered is whether production of the par
ticular document at the trial could be compelled.
New York. The deposition of any other person, which
is material and necessary may be taken if any of the
following conditions are met :
.
( 1 ) Where the person i s about t o depart from the
state ;
88 Post v. Railway Co. (1887) 144 Mass. 341, 11 N. E. 540.
89 Rule 271.
40 See list of cases in Ontario Judicature Act (Holmested, 1915)
page 738.
41 Beaton v. Globe Printing Co. (1894) 16 P. R. 281.
41 Rule 350.
·
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(2) Where the person is out of the state ;
( 3 ) Where the person resides at a greater distance
·from the place of trial than one hundred miles ;
( 4) Where the person is so sick or infirm as to afford
reasonable grounds of belief that he will not be able to
attend the trial ; or
( 5) Where ' ' other special circumstances ' ' render it
proper that his deposition ·should be taken.48 It is obvi
ous that these provisions offer possibilities for discovery
before trial from ordinary witnesses. The courts have
been v�ry liberal in their construction of (2) and ( 3) ,44
and one of the " special circumstances " under ( 5 ) is that
the adverse party has wrongfully refused to furnish in
formation in his possession which he has been ordered
to disclose.45
A memorandum decision has been rendered recently
in the First Department which indicates an allowance of
. discovery of documents in the possession of persons not
parties to the action.46 The brief for the successful party
in the case stated : ' ' The court has inherent power to re
quire the production of any books and papers within its
jurisdiction and to direct that those books and papers
may be used to refresh the memory of any person without
putting the subpoenaed person upon the stand to identify
the books and papers or testify with regard to them. As
a practical matter, the party producing the books and
records would neither be sworn nor examined. He would
merely be directed to turn over to the defendant, who was
being examined, the books and records produced. The
defendant would then examine these books which either
·

48 New

York Civil Practice Act, sec. 288.
125 Misc. 643, 211 N. Y. S.

44 Muschler v. General Metalsmiths (1925)
693.
411 Loomis v. Marsch (1925) 215 App. Div.

691, 212 N. Y. S. 859. See
also as to special circumstances, 0 'Neill v. James (1925) 214 App. Div.
522, 212 N. Y. S. 386 ; Roberts v. Hayden (1925) 213 App. Div. 1, 209
N. Y. S. 598. The first cited case indicates limitations upon discovery
from witnesses generally.
46 Bernheim v. Samuels (1928) 224 App. Div, 722.
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would or would not refresh his recollection. There the
matter would end. ' ' 47 An act was passed, in 1929 pro
viding for the production under compulsory process of
hospital records but apparently only production at the
trial is contemplated.48
Wisconsin. There is a liberal provision for exam
ination of parties and representatives of corporate par
ties in Wisconsin, but there is no provision for exam
ination of witnesses before trial. Discovery procedure
is quite widely used by Wisconsin lawyers and has given
entire satisfaction. For this reason it was thought wise
to ascertain the viewpoint of the bar of the state as to
the wisdom of allowing discovery from witnesses gen
erally. A variety of opinion is entertained. Slightly
less than fifty per cent of those who were questioned
about the matter (not counting the commissioners,. whose
opinion might be said to be of less weight because of per
sonal interest ) were in favor of allowing discovery from
witnesses. · Some of those favoring it added certain limi
tations, as for instance, that the party taking the exam
ination of an ordinary witness be forced to pay for it
and not be allowed to tax therefor. . Several kinds of
objections were offered by those who opposed the innova
tion : ( 1 ) It would make it even harder to get voluntary
witnesses at the trial than it is now ; ( 2 ) It would be too
costly ; ( 3 ) It might work injustice in particular actions
such as actions for divorce ; ( 4) It would prevent the
lawyers from keeping back certain parts of their evi
dence which for tactical reasons is a valuable practice.
The arguments advanced by those who favored the pro
posal were : ( 1 ) That the best way to get at the truth
is to turn all of the light possible on the case ; ( 2 ) That
settlements would be facilitated ; ( 3 ) That it would give
47 See also the following cases for possibilities of discovery of docu
ments from witnesses: Continental ,Ins. Co. v. Equitable Trust Co. (1930)
244 N. Y. S. 377; Meretsky v. Wolff (1928) 229 N. Y. S. 776.
48 Laws of New York. (1929) Ch. 339.
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a weapon with which to deal with witnesses who refuse
to give voluntary statements ; ( 4) That the experience
with discovery so far has been so wholesome that the
extension would be worth a trial. Only one Wisconsin
lawyer gave as a reason for opposing discovery from
witnesses the one formerly employed against discovery
as a whole, namely, that if the party knew his opponent 's
evidence in advance of trial he would manufacture evi
dence to meet it or would tamper with witnesses.
Ohio, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Missouri, Nebraska,
Indiana and Texas. The ordinary deposition procedure
did not follow the rule of chancery that only parties
should be examined, for its primary purpose was to
provide a way to take and preserve the testimony of
ordinary witnesses. Accordingly, in states in which the
deposition procedure has been used as a device for ob
taining discovery, discovery from witnesses as well as
from parties is allowed. Such a practice exists and is
used in the following states : Ohio, Kentucky, New
Hampshire, Missouri, Nebraska, Indiana and Texas. It
likewise exists in a few other states but has not been
used to any considerable extent.
The policy behind a liberal allowance of discovery
from witnesses has been well stated by the late William
Howard Taft while he was Judge of the Superior Court
of Cincinnati, Ohio :
" There is likely to be no motive for fishing unless
the person whose deposition is sought has been unwilling
to state his knowledge upon inquiry. If a witness is so
reluctant as not to state his knowledge to a party asking
it, the witness cannot complain if the party presumes
that the knowledge thus withheld may be useful evidence
to him on the trial of the case, and that his refusal to
give information indicates a desire to avoid the trial.
Witnesses do not belong . to one party more than to
another. What they know relevant to the issue should
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be equally available to both sides, and if they claim im
munity from examination by deposition on the theory
that their testimony is one side 's rether than the other 's,
their claim is utterly indefensible. , What a witness is
presumed to know is the truth and that cannot vary be
tween the time of taking the deposition and the trial.
If there is likely to be a variance in the testimony, the
earlier a witness is committed to a statement the better
for the sake of the truth. There is no objection that I
know, why each party should not know the other 's \
case. " 49
Even though it is possible to take depositions af any
and all witnesses there is no inclination upon the part
of lawyers to take them promiscuously for purely dis
covery purposes. In the first place there is no general
necessity for doing so, because it is usually possible to
get voluntary statements from witnesses. Only when a
witness refuses to give a statement, or when the lawyer
distrusts a witness, is there any need to employ the com
pulsory process. Occasionally, for tactical reasons, the
depositiiJln of an important witness is taken without first
seeking his voluntary statement. Apparently the taking
of depositions of witnesses for purposes of discovery
is more widespread in New Hampshire and in Missouri
than elsewhere. In the principal cities of both states
quite a number of lawyers make it a regular practice to
take the deposition of every witness who refuses to give
a voluntary statement. In Ohio, Texas, Nebraska, Ken
tucky and Indiana there is a similar though less com
mon practice. Several other reasons are assigned by
practicing lawyers to explain why they do not take
depositions of witnesses more frequently. One reason
is that either party may use the deposition of a witness
at the trial, if the witness is unavailable for oral testi
mony, regardless of which party has taken the deposition.
49 Shaw

v. Ohio Edis.on Co. (1887) 9 0. Dee. Rep. 809, 812.
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In Texas it can be used even if the witness is present.
Since depositions would be taken for discovery purposes
from hostile witnesses more often, there is some danger
that by taking the depositions of such witnesses a lawyer
might be supplying ammunition for his adversary. If
the witness should die or become unavailable his testi
mony really would have been preserved by the adverse
'
party. Even though the witness were available, there
is a chance that the party favored by the testimony might
induce the witness to be unavailable at the trial so as to
be able to use the testimony without the witness being
subjected to rigid cross examination, if the deposition
has proved particularly unfavorable to the party who
took it for discovery. Such is the fear expressed by some
lawyers, especially in states where practically no use is
made of the deposition procedure for discovery from
either parties or witnesses. Of course the danger is
less in the case .of parties, for a party usually would lose
more than he would gain by staying away from the
trial.
Coupled with the fear of supplying testimony for the
adverse party is the fear of " being bound" by the wit
ness ' testimony. The only relevant rule of law upon
which such fear could be based is the rule that a party
by using the deposition of a witness thereby makes the
witness his own so as to preclude him from impeaching
the credit of the witness. Clearly upon principle, and.as
a rule of law in most states, a party does not lose the
right to impeach the credit of a witness by taking his
deposition but only by using it. Dean Wigmore has set
forth the rule thus :
" But the difficulty is, where A the taker, has made no
use of the depositions, that he can hardly be said to have
made the witness his own ; indeed, his failure to use them
is generally due to the discovery that the witness ' testi
mony is unfavorable, and is practically a repudiation of ·
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it ; his taking the deposition was thus a mere unsuccessful
voyage of discovery, and the first and only person to
utilize the deposition as testimony ie B ; the witness there
fore is B 's ; accordingly, B may not impeach him. ' ' 60
The final reason assigned why the practice of taking
depositions of ordinary witnesses for discovery is not
more widespread is the expense involved. Generally the
party who takes depositions must pay for them in the
first instance and he may tax them as costs only in case
he uses them at the trial. That this rule has some bear
ing upon the practice under discussion is indicated by
the experience in Missouri, where the cost of all depo
sitions may be taxed regardless of whether they are used
or not. The taking of depositions of witnesses is quite
widespread in Missouri and the rule as to costs is as
signed as one of the reasons why it is widespread.
60 Wigmore

on Evidence, III, 912.

CHAPTER VIII

TIME OF DISCOVERY
DISCOVERY UsuALLY AvAILABLE ONLY AFTER PLEADING
As a general rule discovery is available to a party only
after he has filed his pleading. Nor is discovery before
pleading often necessary. A party usually knows enough
about his supposed cause of action to file a pleading.
The statements contained in the pleading are regarded as
an indication of the party 's bona fides in seeking dis
covery. 1 Then, too, the proper scope of the examination
is more easily ascertained after the pleadings have been
filed. While discovery is not necessary until after plead
ing in most cases, there are occasional cases in which
justice requires that a party have discovery before
pleading. Several states have provided for this situation
by specific statutes.
RIGHT OF PLAINTIFF TO DISCOVERY BEFORE PLEADING
Most of the states which have a written interrogatory
procedure have adopted the rule of chancery that dis
covery can be had by a party only after pleading. In
terrogatories must be attached to the pleading under the
practice in some states.8 In others the party is not re
quired to annex his interrogatories but may serve them
separately. Even so, it is usually provided that the
plaintiff may do so only after filing his petition.8 In Eng1 Campbell

v. Scott (1890) 14 P. R. 203.
is true in Indiana, Iowa, Ohio and Louisiana. The statutes are
set forth in the appendix at the back of this volume.
8 This is true in Connecticut, Washington, Florida and the United
States Equity Courts. The New Jersey provision is even stricter, allow
ing discovery only after issue joined.
a This
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land a plaintiff is rarely if ever allowed discovery before
statement of his claim, or defendant before statement of
his defense.' Bray aptly summarizes the English atti
tude when he says : ' ' From the earliest times the courts
have set their faces against allowing discovery for the
purpose of fishing out a case. ' ' 5 Within the last year
the question whether the plaintiff can ever have discovery
before he has delivered his statement of claim has been
presented to the King 's Bench Division of the High
Court of Justice in England. The court held that such
discovery would not be allowed except " in the most ex
ceptional circumstances. ' ' Scrutton, L. J., said : ' ' This
is a daring experiment but I am afraid I am too old to
yield to Mr. van den Berg 's entreaties. The appeal is
against an order made by the Master and Judge order
ing the production of documents before the statement of
claim in the action has been delivered. Neither Lawrence,
L. J., nor I has ever known of such an order being made.
I do not question for a moment that under the wide
words of Order XXXI., rr. 12 and 14, there is power to
make such an order, but equally I think that it should
not be made unless in the most exceptional .circumstances.
A plaintiff who issues a writ must be taken to know what
his case is. If he merely issues a writ on the chance of
making a case he is issuing what used to be called a ' fish
ing bill ' to try to find out whether he has a case or not.
That kind of proceeding is not to be encouraged. For a
plaintiff after issuing his writ but before delivering his
statement of claim to say, ' Show me the documents which
may be relevant, so that I may see whether I have a case
or not ', is a most undesirable proceeding. " 6
Several jurisdictions allow discovery by oral exam
ination before pleading. The procedure, however, is dif.

i British

Thompson-Houston Co. v. Duram (1915) 1 Ch. 823; Dis
Longbourne (18·75) 2 C. D. 704.
II Annual Practice ( 1929) 494.
6 Gale v. Denman Picture Houses, Ltd. (1930) 1 K. B. 588, 590.

ney

v.
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ferent from that which obtains if the discovery is sought
after pleading.
Wisconsin. If discovery is desired for the purpose of
enabling the party to plead, the notice must be accom
panied by an affidavit of the party, or his attorney or
agent, stating the general nature and object of the ac
tion ; that discovery is sought to enable him to plead ;
and the subjects upon which information is desired. The
examination is allowed as a matter of course unless be
forehand the judge further limits the subjects to which it
may extend. This places the burden on the adverse
party to raise the issue of the right to take the examina
tion. It is not necessary that the affidavit set out facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action ; nor even is it
necessary that the affiant know that a cause of action
exists. It is sufficient if the plaintiff shows that he may
be entitled to recover against the defendant and that dis
covery is necessary to enable him to plead.7 The courts
have even gone so far as to hold that bad faith in seeking
an examination should not defeat the right thereto as
long as the affidavit sets out the grounds mentioned in the
statute, the view being that the statute itself affords
ample protection against unnecessary or improper exam
ination.' Nor does it necessarily defeat the plaintiff's
right that he already has facts sufficient to frame a com
plaint general in its terms.8 After service of the com
plaint the defendant 's right to an examination of his
opponent is the same as if the allegations of the com
plaint had already been put in issue. T...he notice should
be served at least five days beforehand. If the exam
ination is to be taken without the state three days' notice
7 American Food Products Co. v. American Milling Co. (i912) 151 Wis.
385, 138 N. W. 1123 ; Keckendorn v. Romadka (1909) 138 Wis. 416, 120
N. W. 257 ; Gratz v. Parker (19()7) 137 Wis: 104, 118 N. W. 637.
8 Ellinger v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (1909) 138 Wis. 390, 120
N. W. 235.
9 Schmidt v. Menasha W. W. Co. (1896) 92 Wis. 529, 66 N. W. 695.
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plus an additional day's notice for each three hundred
miles or fraction thereof after the first ten miles from
the place where the notice is served, must be allowed.10
The notice must comply with the• requirements of the stat
utes as to notices generally ; it must be in writing and be
served on all adverse parties or their attorneys. 11 As a
practical matter, it is usually not necessary for the court
to limit the examination. Nor is it often requested. The
records further indicate that in a large percentage of
cases no action is ever brought after the discovery is com�
pleted. Some of the court clerks have a file for miscella
neous papers in which they place depositions which have
not been followed up by any subsequent papers. The
number of such depositions which accumulate in a year
is rather remarkable.
New York. The earliest New York cases under the
Code of Civil Procedure in 1848 held that discovery could
be had only after issue joined but this construction was
later refuted. 111 The Civil Practice Act specifically pro
vides that the examination may be had before pleading. 18
The purpose of the provision is to allow an examination
for the purpose of framing a pleading and the showing
upon which the order allowing the examination is granted
must be in accordance with this purpose. 14 The pro
cedure is equally available to a defendant to aid him in
drawing his answer, although the Rules of Practice do
not specifically cover the case.1 5 Of the two possible
methods of initiating examinations for discovery in New
10 Wis. Stat. ( 1927) ch. 326, sec. 9.
11 Wis. Stat. (1927) ch. 269, sec. 32 ff;

First National Bank of Elk
horn v. Wood (1870) 26 Wis. 500.
lll Phoenix v. Dupuy (1878) 2 Abb. N. C. 146. See generally New
York Civiii Practice Notes (Cahill, 1927) p. 366.
18 N. Y. Civil Practice Act, sec. 295, Rules of Civil Practice, rule 122.
14 Newman v.' Potter (1922) 201 App. Div. 335, 194 N. Y. S. 207 ;
Welsh v. Cowles Shipyard (Jo. (1922) 200 App. Div. 724, 193 N. Y. S.
355.
15 Ainsworth v. Cooper Underwear Co. (1929) 227 App. Div. 837, 237
N. Y. S. 301.
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York only ·one, an application for a court order in the
first instance, can be used if discovery is sought before
issue joined. 18 The showing required on the application
for such order is that the discovery is material and
necessary for the purpose of framing a pleading.17 Un
der this general provision the test as outlined by the
decisions is that the party must show reasonable grounds
for belief that he has a meritorious cause of action ; 18
and must name the definite adverse parties. 19 A distinc
tion is drawn between facts constituting a good cause of
action and facts constituting a good complaint, a dis
tinction in line with which it has been held that an exam
ination of the defendant to frame a complaint can be
permitted only when the plaintiff states a good cause of
action in his affidavit, but is unable to state material and
necessary facts with sufficient definiteness or particu..:
larity to make a good pleading.80 Similarly a justifiable
purpose in seeking discovery may be to :find out the exact
legal character of the claim so that the proper form of
action may be ascertained.11 Again, a somewhat similar
theory, under the disguise of different terminology, is
that discovery before issue joined will be allowed when
the party applicant can give an approximate forecast of
what the issues may be.u
Since it is conceived to be the very essence of the pro
vision allowing an examination to enable a party to plead
that it can be allowed only when otherwise injustice
would result, an application for such an examination can
16 In re Titanium Alloy Mfg. Co. ( 1923) 198 N. Y. B. 503.
17 Rule 122.
18 Ashton v. Baker Mfg. Corp. (1923) 206 App. Div. 343, 201 N. Y. B.
259.
19 In re Titanium Alloy Mfg. Co. (1923) 198 N. Y. B. 503. Cf. Lauffer
v. Eastern Star Temple (1924) 210 App. Div. 619, 207. N. Y. B. 292,
where an examination for the purpose of identifying the defendant was
allowed.
liO Garbrinsky v. Meagher (1923) 198 N. Y. B. 833.
ll1 Teall v. Roeser (1923) 206 App. Div. 371, 201 N. Y. S. 280.
u Noble v. Copake Lake Pure Ice & Water Co. (1927) 129 Miac, 4451
222 N. Y. B. 367.
·

59

TIME OF DISCOVERY

·

be defeated by a showing that the party already has the
requisite knowledge, or could reasonably get it by fol
lowing up the knowledge which he"'has.88 Discovery may
be postponed until after the determination of some pre
'
liminary issue, if the court thinks it expedient.84 This
is especially the desirable practice in actions for account
ing, namely, to postpone the discovery until after the
right to an accounting has been decided.26
Carolinas and Dakotas. The statutes in North Caro
lina, South Carolina, North Dakota and South Dakota
provide that the examination may be had ' ' at any time
before trial. " Only in North Carolina has this provision
been definitely construed to allow discovery to enable a
party to plead. The applicant must show the necessity
and materiality of the discovery by appropriate affi
davits.86 The South Dakota Supreme Court has avoided
the question of the right to examine before pleading say
ing, " whether under this statute an adverse party may
be called for oral examination prior to issue joined is a ·
question with which we are not concerned at this time. ' ' 87
'

California, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio and Texas. The.c2
are two different expedients under deposition procedure
in some states by which it is possible for the plaintiff to
obtain discovery before pleading. First, the statutes re
garding depositions to perpetuate testimony, in contrast
with the statutes regarding depositions generally, allow
taking before commencement of the action.28 Such depo-

•

28 Tanebaum v. Lindheim (1900) 66 N. Y. S. 375 ; Thompson v. Haigh
(1909) 119 N. Y. S. 331. Likewise discovery is not proper where the
only information lacking is the exact amount of recovery to be de
manded. Flackee v. Peck (1925) 212 App. Div. 883, 208 N. Y. S. 860;
In re Groothaert (1922) 201 App. Div. 510, 194 N. Y. S. 577.
M Struckler v. Teitz (1923) 206 App. Div. 436, 201 N. Y. S. 394.
26 De Rapalie v. Gavin (1924) 209 App. Div. 883, 205 N. Y. S. 578.
ll6 Bailey :v; Matthews (1911) .156 N. C. 78, 72 S. E. 92 ; Smith v.
Wooding (1919) 177 N. C. 546, 94 S. E. 404 ; Fields v. Coleman and
Young (1912) 160 N. C. 11, 75 S. E. 1005; Chesson v. Washington County
Bank (1925) 190 N. C. 187, 129 S. E. 403.
ll'7 Niblo v. Ede (1917) 39 S. D. 338, 341, 164 N. W. 109, 111.
ll8 See Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) sec. 565; Mo. �ev. Stat. (1919)
sec. 5476. See 4 Sou. Cal. L. Rev. 190 as to the California situation.
·

·
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sitions can be taken only upon court order for cause
shown.19 Very little actual use of this procedure for dis
covery before pleading has been found, but it offers possi
bilities which a few lawyers have used. The second
device for obtaining what is in reality discovery before
pleading is to file a skeleton pleading, take depositions
and then amend. This expedient is used quite widely,
especially in Missouri, Ohio, California and Texas. The
Missouri courts have considered this practice at differ
ent times and have upheld it, saying that : ' ' The failure
_of the petition to state a cause of action will not deprive
a party to a suit of the right to obtain the deposition of
a witness. ' ' 80 ' ' The institution of the suit ' ' is regarded
·
as the ' 'guaranty of the plaintiff 's earnestness. ' ' 31
Similarly the California court has allowed the plaintiff
to take the defendant 's deposition for discovery after a
general demurrer has been sustained to the pleading and
before any amendment has been filed.32 While authority
: ; ' for obtaining discovery before pleading has not been
set forth by the courts 'in other states the practice actu
a
, , lly exists. It is a ·quite frequent thing for plaintiffs to
' ' s
., ' ,' erve notice to take depositions at the same time they
'
serve the summons in the action, take depositions, and
then file an amended complaint.
RIGHT OF DEFENDANT TO DISCOVERY BEFORE PLEADING

Some courts have taken the position that there should
be more liberal allowance of discovery before pleading
to defendants than to plaintiffs since the former may
more reasonably be resisting claims as to which they
19 This is not true in Texas ; while no court order is necessary the
procedure is more formal and complex than the ordinary deposition
procedure. Tex. Stat. (1928) art. 3842.
80 State ex rei. Methudy v. Killoren. (Mo. App. 1921) 229 S. W. 1097.
See also C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Olin & Sons (1924) 218 Mo. App. 578,
266 s. w. 130.
31 Ex parte Munford (1874) 57 Mo. 603, 604.
811 Rossback v. Superior Court (1919) 43 Cal. App. 729, 185 Pac. 879.
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have no knowledge.88 Moreover, defendants are involun
tary participants to the controversy and less assurance
is needed of their bona fides. Accordingly, in some ju
risdictions either party may have discovery as soon as
the plaintiff has filed his pleading.84 There is also the
possibility of discovery before pleading for the defend
ant under deposition procedure. In Ohio, New Hamp
shire, Nebraska, Indiana, Texas and Missouri either
party can take depositions for discovery as soon as the
action is commenced.85 But in Kentucky the defendant
may not take depositions until after he has filed his
answer.88
88

Hovey v. Gilbert (1887) 12 P. R. 114.
Gen. Laws (1921) Ch. 231, sec. 61; Mich. Court Rules (1931)
rule 41, sec. 1.
Griggs' Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, sees. 286,
286 (a).
85 The statutes are set forth in the appendix at the back of this

84 Mass.

volume.

86 Ky.

Civ. Code (Carroll, 1927) sec. �557.

CHAPTER IX

INITIATING STEP IN OBTAINING ORAL EXAM
INATION FOR DISCOVERY
WHERE ExAMINATION Is MATTER OF RIGHT
The examination is initiated by notice and subpoena in
all jurisdictions in which the examination is a matter of
right. This is the practice in Wisconsin, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ontario, Indiana, Kentucky, New Hamp
shire, Ohio, Nebraska, Missouri, California and Texas.
Except in Ontario the notice is entirely an. extra-judicial
affair. In Ontario it takes the form of an appointment
from the special examiner before whom the applicant
desires that the examination be conducted. A somewhat
similar practice exists in Wisconsin and elsewhere but
with the difference that there is no necessity for the ex
amining officer to issue the notice ; he merely does so for
convenience. In Wisconsin the commissioners send
around to the various lawyers forms for the notice and
subpoena, already signed by themselves. This is a con
venience for the lawyers as well as a means of soliciting
business for the commissioners. Printed forms for the
notice are available in other states and, sometimes, the
examining officer will effect service thereof for the party
without extra charge.
Usually, the notice, in contrast with the subpoena,
may be served either upon the adverse party or his attor
ney. The notice must be served upon each adverse party
if there are several parties. 1 Some of the statutes pro
vide for substituted service of the notice in the event ·
1 Cf. First National Bank of Elkhorn v. Wood (1890) 26 Wis. 500.
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neither the adverse party nor his attorney of record can
be served.
The manner of service of. the notice varies in different
states. Sometimes it is required that it be served by an
officer of court/ but more usually it may be made in any
way in which notices generally may be served under the
practice of the particular state.
A common provision is that the notice must be served
a specified number of days before the examination. The
exact time differs from ten days in Texas to one day in
Quebec. The most popular provision is that five days '
notice be given, a provision which obtains in Indiana,
Wisconsin, North Carolina, and North Dakota. Six days '
notice is required in South Dakota. No specific period is
provided in Kentucky but it is required that a reasonable
time be allowed. In a few jurisdictions the time for
service of the notice is arranged upon a graduated scale :
a minimum of one clear day must be allowed for prepara
tion and sufficient time for travel. This plan is employed
in N ebraska and Missouri.
The usual requirement is that the notice must contain :
The title of the action ; the court in which the action is
pending ; the time and place of the examination ; the name
of the officer before whom it will be held ; and the name of
the person to be examined. Ohio has a peculiar pro
vision as to the specification of the time when the ex
amination will be held. It is possible, instead of specify
ing the exact hour, to schedule the examination between
two different specified hours. This provision has been
the subject of some little abuse in Ohio, in that the oppos
ing lawyer cannot tell exactly when the examination will
begin. In Nebraska and Missouri the notice merely
specifies that the examination will be held before " com
petent authority, " without naming the particular officer.
Of course the subsequent subpoena discloses the officer 's
2 Kyle v .

Kyle (1876) 5 5 Ind. 3 8 7..
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identity. While it is usual to require- that the names of
the particular persons to be examined be specified in the
notice,• Ohio and Kentucky omit this requirement. Since
the ordinary deposition procedure is used, the only speci
fication of the notice is that depositions of ' ' sundry wit
nesses ' ' will be taken. This form gives neither the party
nor his attorney any indication as to whether an examina
tion of the adverse party or an examination of witnesses
is contemplated. Nor does it disclose the identity of the
witnesses who will be examined. Sometimes, if an ex
amination of the adverse party is contemplated, a phrase
is added to the effect that the deposition will be taken
' ' as if upon cross-examination. ' ' The practical result
of the failure . to specify the persons to be examined is
that it · is more difficult to coach such persons how to an
swer anticipated questions. The importance of this as
pect of the notice is minimized somewhat by the fact
that the subsequent subpoena divulges the identity of
the person or persons whose depositions are desired.
Some Ohio lawyers delay service of the subpoena as late
as possible, so as to prevent disclosure of the identity of
the persons to be examined.
States which employ the notice procedure require that
the person to be examined be served with a subpoena for
his attendance. Usually the officer before whom the
examination will be held issues the subpoena, but in
California the clerk of the court in which the action is
pending issues it.t It seems rather clear that American
courts would not uphold penalties for contempt not predi
cated upon a subpoena and a refusal to comply there
with. A subpoena is necessary in Ontario only in the
event that the person to be examined is not a party to
the action. It is not necessary to subpoena the party
8 In addition to the statutes, see Miller v. Frey (1896) 49 Neb 472,
68 N. W. 630; Bartholomay Co. v. Regan (1924) 205 N. Y. S. 745.
t Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. (1923) see. 2031 ; Cal. Stat. (1929) eh. llO,
p. 197.
.•
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nor yet to serve notice on the party.

It is sufficient to

serve notice upon the party 's solicitor. If the party
fails to appear for the examination his appropriate

pleading is stricken from the files.

This procedure has

proved very popular with Toronto lawyers because it is
a step toward simplicity, and reduction of expense.6

In New Jersey where the proceeding must be initiated

by court order in the first instance, the service of the
order is deemed � sufficient summons and notice to the

party to be examined.6

The actual practice in the states in which an examina

tion before trial is a matter of right indicate s its effec

tiveness in fostering that which is better than a forced

discovery, namely, a voluntary disclosure. Investigations

were made in nine states which exhibit such a practice.
There is a widespread tendency in six of the nine to

dispense with all formal steps in securing discovery.

The longer the practice has obtained in the state, it would

seem, the greater is the tendency to waive technicalities.

A convenient and inexpensive informality has been sub
stituted' for a theoretically technical practice by common

agreement amongst the bar, or at least amongst the

better element of the bar.

The explanation given by

the lawyers is uniformly that lawyers will accord to their
opponents voluntarily anything which they know they

can be compelled to give.
Hampshire experience.

Take, for example, the New

All formalities and technical

ities of every sort regarding the initiating step and other
formal details are waived in ninety-five per cent. of the
cases. The lawyer who desires an examination merely
calls the opposing attorney on the telephone and asks

· to be allowed to examine the opposing party. Often he
offers to produce his own client for examination if it is
desired.

All details as to time and plac� and as to the

li Cf. Campbell v. Lennox (1919) 17 0. W. N. 179 as to possible con
stitutional difficulties with such a practice in the United States.
6 N. J. Laws of 1924, ch. 93, p. 183.
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officer to take down the examination are then agreed
upon. Only when the applicant distrusts the opposing

attorney, or when the examination of an ordinary wit
ness rather than a party is desired, and the applicant

thinks the witness will hesitate to come voluntarily, does
he employ the formal process.

The first part of a deposi

tion in New Hampshire usually reads :

' ' All technical

ities and formalities are waived, so that this deposition
can be useq for all purposes as if they had been com

plied with. "

The same tendency is found in the fol

lowing states in which the ordinary deposition procedure

is used for discovery purposes : Kentucky, Indiana and
Texas.

In Louisville, Kentucky, and Indianapolis, Indi

ana, there is a widespread practice for the firms of re

porters who report examinations to arrange all of the

details.

Individual lawyers in these states testify to

another feature which is yet a · step farther in the direc

tion of an absolutely voluntary discovery.

They say they

offer to allow their opponents to inspect all of the state

ments which they have obtained from witnesses in the
case, regardiess of whether the statements favor them

selves or their opponents. If the opponent can get the
same information under a compulsory process why not

accord him the same voluntarily and thus save expense
and give evidence of an interest in finding the truth,

·

regardless of the result 1

Lawyers who have tried it

testify to its efficacy in gaining the respect of opposing
counsel and in getting at the truth of the case. More
over, such tactics are often reciprocated.

Wisconsin

lawyers often dispense with all technical formalities.

Thirty-one of fifty examinations in Madison, and twelve

out of fifty in Milwaukee were taken by stipulation. In .
Ohio, Nebr� ska, and Missouri the tendency to waive the

formal steps is less noticeable.

Some lawyers do so

among their intimate associates but the bar generally
still proceeds formally-at least up until the time the
attendance of the witness has been secured.
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WHERE ExAMINATION Is NoT MATTER oF RIGHT
Two different methods of initiating a discovery ex.
amination are employed in jurisdictions in which the
examination is not a matter of right. The party who
seeks discovery may either apply for a court order or he
may proceed by notice. If he proceeds by notice, the
opposite party may move to vacate the notice and thus
raise the question of propriety of the examination. Some
jurisdictions provide for both methods, while in others
the examination can be had only by application for a
court order in the first instance.
New York. Both methods are employed under the
New York practice. Under the Code of Civil Procedure
an examination for discovery could only be had upon
court order in the first instance. But in the delibera
tions preceding the revision which culminated in the
Civil Practice Act of 1921 there was ' ' an active discus
sion as to the simplification of the practice relating to
examinations before trial. ' ' 7 ' ' There was a large and
active representation of the bar of New York City, who
argued for an examination upon notice similar to the
federal equity practice, but the board of statutory con
solidation concluded that an examination should not be
had, unless the testimony sought was material and neces
sary. The joint legislative committee, · in passing upon
the consolidation of the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure on this subject prepared by the board, said :
' That the provisions on this subject should be restored
for the present in practically the same language in which
'they now exist. ' And in the final draft they were sub'I This and the following quotations are taken from the opinion of
Rodenbeck, J., in Swift v. General Baking Co. (1920) 220 N. Y. S. 554.
Inasmuch as Judge Rodenbeck was the chairman of the Board of Stat
utory Consolidation which prepared the Report on the Simplification of
Civil Practice in New York (usually called the " Rodenbeck Report ")
these statements are very significant. Compare also pages 200-205, 3283,55 of that report.
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stantially restored, but with a concession of a section to
those who pleaded for more liberal provisions, which
authorized the taking of depositions upon notice. As if
afraid of this, however, the joint committee followed this
section with one authorizing a motion to vacate or modify
the notice. The result is that the profession is back
about where it was under the Code of Civil Procedure,
with a motion to vacate or modify in nearly every im
portant case, where a notice is given, and with the prac
tice gTowing of applying to the court, in the :first instance,
as was done in the present case. ' ' 8
There are, then, two different initiating steps which
may lead . to approximately the same result. Discovery
may be had either upon court order in the :first instance,
or upon notice, subject to the atlversary turning the pro
ceeding into one upon court order by his motion to vacate
the notice. The two procedures, however, require sepa
rate descriptions.
The Civil Practice Act, as amended in 1923, provides :
' ' A party entitled to take testimony by deposition may
obtain an order of the court therefor in the :first instance,
instead of proceeding by notice. The motion shall be
upon notice to the other parties who have appeared or
answered. ' ' 9 There are three situations in which there
is no alternative, and in which the only possible
mode is to obtain a court order in the :first instance.
These are : :first, where discovery is desired before issue
joined ; Ul second, where the person whose deposition is
desired is an . office� or employee of a municipal corpora
tion ; and third, where it is desired to force the party
to be examined to bring with him books and papers for
inspection. 11 Where the deposition of a party is to be
8 See also Bieber-Isaacs Co. v. Philadelphia Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
(1925) 125 Misc. 494, 211 N. Y. S. 435.
9 Sec. 292. See also 23 Col. L. Rev. 734.
10 See 24 Col. L. Rev. 876.
11 Ritzwoller v. Lurie (1923) 198 N. Y, S. 754; New York City Car
Advertising Co. v. E. Regensburg & Sons, Inc. (1923) 200 N. Y. S. 152 ;
Bartholomay Co. v. Regan (1924) 205 N. Y. S. 745. See also for fine dis-
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taken before issue joined it is not only necessary that
the proceeding be upon court order, but a notice of the
motion for the order and supporting affidavit must be
served upon all adverse parties.18 But the deposition of
a witness can be taken upon notice, if the statutory
grounds for taking exist. 18 The latter rule, however,
does not sanction an evasion of the former rule so as to
allow an examination of the party on the ground that
he is a witness and resides more than one hundred miles
away from the place of triaJ.l1 While an officer or em
ployee of a municipal corporation may be examined in a
proper case, it has been held that the proceeding for
such examination must be initiated by court order rather
than by notice as in the case of representatives of private
corporations.15
The party desiring an examination for discovery, in
stead of applying for a court order in the first instance,
may serve a notice five days beforehand upon his ad
versary.18 The notice must set forth :
( 1 ) 'fhe person before whom the testimony is to be
taken.
( 2 ) The time and place at which i t i s t o be taken ;
(3) The name or names of the persons to be ex- .
amined ;
( 4) The matters upon which such person or persons
are to be examined ;
( 5) The title of the action ; and
( 6 ) The ·name and address of the party giving the
notice.
cussion of these cases, Rothschild, The Simplication of the Civil Prac
tice in New York, 23 Col. L. Rev. 732 ; 24 Col. L. Rev. 881.
18 Rules of Civil Practice, 122; In re Titanium Alloy Mfg. Co. (1923)
198 N. Y. S. 503 ; Davis v. Erdmann (1924) 209 App. Div. 172, 204
N. Y. S. 333.
1lt8 St. John v. Putnam (1927) 128 Misc. 707, 220 N. Y. S. 146.
Curtis v. Searles (1923) 206 App. Div.. 287, 200 N. Y. S. 602.
15 City of New York v. Velmachos (1927) 129 Misc. 177, 221 N. Y. s.
40; Hannon v. City of New York (1929) 226 ,Ap;p. Div. 757, 234 N.
Y. S. 1.
18 New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 290 ; Rules of Civil Practice,
rule 121.
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The requirement that the names of the persons to
be examined be specified applies equally to corporate
employees ; each employee whose deposition is desired
must be named and a blanket notice will not suffice. 17
The notice should state that the applicant desires the
examination of the corporation through the specified
officers or employees. 18
The requirement that the subject matter of the ex
amination be stated has caused more difficulty than any
other. At first there was a variance of opinion among
the several departments as to whether the rule under
the Code that the issues must be definitely stated
without reference to outside papers, should apply. The
First Department held in favor of the older rule ; the
Third Department held the opposite, namely, that it was
sufficient to state that the examination would be upon
the issues formed by the pleadings. 19 In 1923 the Act
was so amended as to substitute the word ' ' matters ' '
for the word " issues. " 20 The purpose of this change
seems to have been to establish the older rule that the
subject matter of the examination must be specifically
stated in the notice. It has been held improper merely
to state that the examination will be " upon the issues
in this action. " 21 But " the fact that the items are in
part stated as in the complaint is not a defect, especially
in view of the fact that the allegations .of the complaint
are unusually full and detailed. ' ' 112 The Surrogate 's
Court of Bronx County, has allowed the statement to be
made by reference to an attached exhibit.28 It is safer
1'7 Bartholomay Co. v. Regan (1924) 205 N. Y. S. 745.

18 Nedlin Realty Co. v. Bachner (1928) 232 N. Y. S. 126.
19 The cases are listed in Rothschild, The Simplication of Civil Practice

in New York, 23 Col. L. Rev. 732, 736.
20 N, Y. Laws of 1923, ch. 205 ; Standard Oil Co. v. Morse Dry Dock
& Repair Co. (1927) 221 N. Y. S. 289. See also letter of Senator J. G.
Saxe in New York Law Journal, April 24, 1923, for explanation of reasons
for the change.
Ill Rubin v. Sheldon (1927) 224 N. Y. S. 340.
112 Heslin v. Whalen (1925) 212 N. Y. S. 830, 831.
28 In re Kimmerle 's Will (1927) 225 N. Y. S. 779.
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to state the matters of the proposed inquiry rather fully,
for it is impossible
to add additional
matters by a sub.
.
sequent notice as long as the first one is outstanding.84
While the usual mode is to state the matters in question
form, the expression " whether or not " should be
avoided.116
Service of the notice upon the attorney of the defend
ant will not suffice so as to render it possible to punish
the defendant if he fails to appear at the examination,86
but service upon the attorney of the plaintiff makes it
possible for the court to stay the proceedings until the
plaintiff submits to the examination.117 It does not suffice
to serve the notice on the person to be examined. He
must also be served with a subpoena before he can be
punished for contempt.8B
It is not permissible for a party to serve successive
'
notices or applications for orders for examinations, be
fore trial, while others are outstanding. The reason for
such rule has been well stated by Rodenbeck, J. : ' ' The
plaintiff is not entitled to pursue the remedy by notice
'
for an examination under the Civil Practice Act, having
already obtained an order therefor under the Code of
Civil Procedure, any more than he may dupLicate orders
or notices for the examination under the present prac
tice. He must stand on the proceedings taken. This
.course is required by an orderly administration of the
law. The principle that prohibits a party from institut
ing a second suit for the same cause of action between
the same parties underlies the prohibition against dupli·

·

114 Pritchard v. Security Trust Company (1924) 123 Misc. 492, 205
N. Y. S. 724.
86 Gaydiea v. Szemko (1927) 219 App. Div. 935, 220 N. Y. S. 650.
86 Levine v. Moskowitz (1923) 206 App. Div. 194, 200 N. Y. S. 597.
87 Bloch v. Guaranty Trust Co. (1922) 119 Mise. 832, 198 N. Y. S. 305.
as New York Civil Practice Act, see. 299; Goldberg v. Candy Products Co. (1926) 127 Mise. 455, 215 N. Y. S. 772; Syracuse Mortgage
Corp. v. Kepler (1923) 122 Mise. 95, 202 N. Y. S. 193 ; Roseberg Holding
Co., Inc. v. Berman (1925) 211 N. Y. S. 900. See also Rothschild, The .
Simplification of Civil Practice in New York, 23 Col. L. Rev. 732, 737.
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eating motions. The object is to prevent a multiplicity
of actions and motions and to obviate a waste of judicial
time. ' ' 19
Lawyers in New York City and Rochester say that
four out of five times examinations before trial are
initiated by notice rather than by court order, except in
situations where there is no alternative. Only when the
applicant for discovery expects that his opponent will
contest the right is it desirable to proceed by order. In
this event there are the following tactical advantages by
proceeding by court order in the first instance : it effects
a saving of time ; it allows the applicant for discovery
to put his opponent on the defensive ; and it simplifies
the procedure for getting a contempt ruling if the op
ponent proves contumacious.
There is a much less noticeable tendency to waive
formalities where the examination is not a matter of
right than where it is a matter of right. The New York
situation is illustrative of lack of waiver of formalities
under the former type of procedure. The fact that the
adv.e rse party is allowed to make a motion to vacate the
notice serves as a sort of inducement to him to contest
the proceedings and to seek a restriction upon the scope
of the examination from the court, or, at least, to obtain
the delay incident to a motion to vacate. The New York
rule that the court has a discretionary control over the
extent of the discovery to be allowed in each case serves
as an invitation to adverse parties to appeal to the
court 's discretion. In such a situation it is no wonder
that the extent of stipulations and waivers is not as large
as elsewhere. A voluntary and mutual discovery does
not obtain in New York. Rather discovery is looked
19 Pritchard v. Security Trust Company (1924) 123 Mise. 492, 205 N.
Y. S. 724. On the same subject see Schriro v. Kennell (1928) 223 App.
Div. 786, 227 N. Y. S. 613 ; Norman Oil Corporation v. Bensabat (1922)
118 Mise. 392, 194 N. Y. S. 359.
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upon as a device with which to extract information from
"
opponents.

Mickigan.

The new Michigan Court Rules contain

a provision which is modeled in part after the New York

practice to the effect that the adverse party can move
to vacate or modify the notice and · that such a motion

shall operate as a stay of the proceedings until its de

termination.80 This prevents the examination from being
entirely a matter of right.

These Rules have also copied

another feature of the New York practice which is in the

direction of limiting the scope of the examination, since

the notice is required to state the " matters as to which
I
such persons are to be examined. ' ' 11 In New York this

requirement is incidental to the more basic rule that the

examination should be limited in scope to the issues of

which the examining party has the affirmative under the

pleadings.

Since the hope has been expressed by one of

the draftsmen of the Michigan Rules that the examina

tion may not be thus limited in Michigan the requirement
seems an.'omalous. Ill The experienee in New York has

been that the setting forth of the. subject matter of the

proposed inquiry serves as an invitation to the attorney

for the party to be examined to coach the party on the

matters set forth.

The contrary experience in states in

which there is no such requirement is that there is less
coaching in preparation for an examination before trial

than for an examination at the trial and that the testi

mony accordingly is more spontaneous and truthful.

Indiana, North Carolina and South Dakota. The stat

utes in Indiana, North Carolina and South Dakota pro

vide that the examination may be had on previous notice

of a specified number of days " unless for good cause
80 Mich. Court
11 Id. see. 3.
Ill Sunderland,

Rules (1931) rule 41, see. 4.

The New Michigan Court Rules, 10 Mich. State Bar
Journal, 586, 592.
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shown the court orders otherwise. ' ' Arguably this could
be held to offer a possibility of restricting the examina
tion. But the North Carolina caurt has held that the
restrictive clause applies only to the time provision and
that the examination is absolutely a matter of right.88
The effect of this construction is to allow the court to
order the examination earlier than the time provided by
the statute, but not to allow the court to restrict the
right to the examination after that period.84
New Jersey. Originally an examin�:�.tion could be had
only upon court order.86 In 1914, however, an amend
ment to the statute was passed, making discovery a mat
ter of course upon the service of a subpoena, and with
out · a court order.86 A case arose under this provision
wherein a party summoned for an examination for dis
covery appeared before the officer but refused to answer
the questions propounded. Thereupon his adversary
moved the trial court for a committal for contempt. The
recalcitrant party, on appeal, contended that the amend
ment allowing an examination without a court order was
unconstitutional. The court, while upholding the con
stitutionality of the amendment, held that there was a
lapsus in the method of procedure outlined by the statute
and that before a party could be punished for contempt
it was requisite that he shouid have violated some order
of the court. The implication was that the party seek
ing discovery should first obtain an order requiring an
answer to the questions, if his opponent refused to an
swer voluntarily, and then use such order as a basis
for contempt proceedings.87 Again, in 1924, the statute

88 Vann v. Lawrence (1892) 111 N. C. 32, 15 S. E. 1031; Abbitt v.
Gregory (1928) 196 N. C. 9, 144 S. E. 297 ; Cartwright v. Norfolk
Southern R. Co. (1918) 176 N. C. 36, 96 S. . E. 647.
84 See also Hardman v. Lasell (S. D., 1929) 225 N. W. 301.
86 N. J. Comp. Stat. (1910) p. 4098, sec. 144.
86 N. J. Laws of 1914, c. 95, p. 151.
8'7 Epstein v. American Hammered Piston Ring Co. (1920) 95 N. J. L.
391, 113 Atl. 3 19.
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was amended so as to require a court order in the first
instance.88 Moreover the granting of the order now is
discretionary with the court. While it might be sus
pected that the purpose of the amendment was to cure
the lapsus in the former procedure, the real purpose was
to discard the former practice of allowing unrestricted
examinations for discovery. The trial courts, under the
power conferred by the 1924 amendment have enforced
several rules, all of which indicate the illiberality which
obtains : The application for the order must be upon '
notice to the adverse party rather than merely ex parte;
the application must state the special circumstances which
are relied upon to show the propriety of an examination ;
an order will not be granted, if other remedies, such as
interrogatories or bills of particulars, will suffice ; and
the scope of the examination may be restricted to par
ticular subjects.
South Carolina. Since 1923 it has been required that
an order of the court be obtained for an examination be
fore trial.89 Prior to that time it had been held that the
examination could be initiated by mere notice to the
adverse party and that it was a matter of right.40 The
amendment has made it necessary for the applicant to
give four days ' notice and to show ' ' good and sufficient
cause " for the examination.11

88 N.

J. Laws of 1924, ch. 93, p. 183.

89 Session Laws (1923) page 170.

40 Fox v.

Clifton Mfg. Co. (1922) 122 S. C. 86, 114 S. E. 700.

41 White v. Banker 's National Life Ins. Co. (1926) 134 S. C. 183, 132

S. E. 171 ; U. S. Tire Co.
56, 150 S. E. 347.

v.

Keystone Tire Sales Co. (1929) 153 S. C.

CHAPTER X
PLACE OF EXAMINATION
PLACE OF EXAMINATION OF RESIDENT
The statutes generally provide that the examination
of a party or witness who is a resident of the state may
be held in the county in which the party or witness re
sides or in the county in which he is served with sum
mons.1 The place of the examination should conform to
the place stated in the notice. The proposed Uniform
Deposition Act provides that the examination may be
had ' ' at any place within twenty miles of the abode of
such witness. ' ' 8
PLAcE OF ExAMINATION OF NoNRESIDENT
There is .a statute in Wisconsin which provides that if
the person to be examined ' ' is a nonresident individual
who is a party to the action or proceeding or is a non
resident president, secretary, treasurer or managing
agent of a foreign corporation that is a party to the
action, the court may �!_)on just terms, fix the time and
place of such examination--either within or without the
state and such nonresident shall attend at such time and
place and submit to the examination, and, if required,
attend the reading and signing of such deposition, with
out service of subpoenas. Such examination shall not
be compelled in any county other than that in which the
person examined resides, except when a different county
1 The statutes are set forth in the appendix at the baek of this
volume.
ll Handbook of the National Conferenee of Commissioners on Uni
form State Laws and Proeeedings (1929)1 p. 361.
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shall be designated for the examination of a nonresident,
and except that any nonresident subject to examination
may be examined in any county of this state and states
in which he is personally served with notice and sub
poena. ' ' 8 The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that
prior to the passage of this statute a trial court was
without power to order an examination of a non
resident party to take place within the state when he
could not be personally served with notice and subpoena.
The court indicated further that there might be serious
doubt as to the constitutionality of the statute quoted
above. The court said : ' ' There may be important and
serious questions raised and argued when an order is
made under this statute compelling a party in a distant
state to appear in Wisconsin for examination under sec
tion 4096. We shall not anticipate those questions
now. " ' The United States Supreme Court subsequently
held that since the law of Wisconsin under the George
case was that a nonresident individual could not be com
pelled to submit to examination within the state unless
personally served with notice and subpoena, it was dis
criminatory and a denial of the equal protection of the
laws to compel an examination of officers of a foreign
corporation within the state when they could not be
served with notice and subpoena within the state.5 The
Court did not hold that it was a denial of due process to
' require nonresident parties to submit to an examination
before trial within the state. It merely held that to
distinguish between individual nonresidents and foreign
corporations constituted unjust �iscrimination. The dis
senting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in which
Mr. Justice Holmes concurred, contains interesting lan
guage concerning the question as to the right of a state
8 Wis. Stat. (1929) ch. 326, sec. 12.
' George v. Brode (1920) 170 Wis. 411, 414, 175 N. W. 939.
li Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp. (1923)
262 u. s. 544.
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to compel attendance of nonresidents generally for ex
amination before trial within the state : ' ' That there
may be cases in which oral examination of a plaintiff in
the presence of defendant and by counsel familiar with
the matter in issue is essential to an adequate presenta
tion of the facts cannot be doubted. If so, it is within
the power of a state to require that a plaintiff shall
submit to such preliminary examination somewhere.
Whether this was a case requiring such examination
could be determined properly only upon hearing the par
ties ; and for such hearing opportunity was given by the
'j udge of the trial court. If this was a case in whiGh
oral examination and inspection of the documents was
essential to an adequate presentation of the matter in
controversy, it was necessary, in order to secure it, that
either the plaintiff 's secretary should go to Milwaukee
for examination, or that defendant and counsel should
go to Louisville. Whether, under such circumstances,
the plaintiff should in fairness be required to come to
the place where it instituted suit or the defendants be
obliged to go with counsel to the plaintiff's place of resi
dence, was, likewise, a matter which could properly be
determined only upon hearing the parties ; and this op
portunity was given by the judge of the trial court. It
cannot be that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment deprives a state of the power to authorize
its courts to so mould their process as to secure, in this
way, the adequate presentation of a case. " 6
The New York Civil Practice Act provides that where
a person to be examined is not a resident, he shall not
be required to attend in any other county than that where
he is served with a subpoena ; except that where the ex
amination is held pursuant to order, he may be com
pelled to att�nd in any county specified in the order 7
..

6 Id. 552.
7 New York Civil Practice Act, sec.

300.
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Examination of nonresident parties or witnesses under
the general deposition procedure is usually conducted
upon commission or letters rogatory. A witness must
be within the jurisdiction before a court has power to
compel him to give testimony.8 Therefore, if a witness
is without the jurisdiction in which the action is to be
tried the right to take his testimony rests on the comity
between courts of different jurisdictions. It has been
held that a court has no inherent power to compel the
attendance of witnesses before an officer or commissioner
appointed by the courts of another state, although it may
qo so when authorized by a statute.9 The court to which
letters rogatory are addressed is vested with a discretion
to compel or refuse to compel a witness to attend and
testify. 10
OFFICE IN WHICH ExAMINATION Is HELD
States in which deposition procedure is used for dis
covery purposes exhibit the practice of the examination
being held in the office of the examining lawyer, unless
necessity or convenience dictates a different place. This
is simply a matter of common practice and is not covered
by the statutes. The choice of the examining lawyer 's
office as the place for holding the examination appears
to be a matter of practical convenience · rather than of
tactical advantage. This is also the New York practice.
Even where the motion for an order is returnable at the
Special Term, the actual examination usually is ad
journed to the lawyer 's office, after the court has decided
the proper subject matters of the inquiry. Neither the
examination nor the swearing of the party takes place
in the court house.
8 State v. Kennan (1903) 33 Wash. 247, 74 Pac. 381 ; In re Hughbanks
(1890) 44 Kans. 105, 24 Pac. 75.
9 Marshall v. Irwin (1917) 280 Ill. 90, 117 N. E. 483 ; In re Searls
(1898) 155 N. Y. 333, 49 N. E. 938.
10 Doubt v. Pittsburgh R. Co. (1833) 6 Pa. Dist. Rep. 238; 19 Pa. C. C.
Rep. 178; In re Martinelli (1914) 219 M::>.ss. 58, 106 N. E. 557.
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Under the Wisconsin and Ontario procedure the officer

in charge of the examination has quarters wherein the
examination is held.

In some of the smaller Wisconsin

towns the officer uses a room in the court house in pref
erence to his office. The officer 's quarters in the larger

cities, notably Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Toronto, On
tario, are arranged to accommodate the holding of sev
eral examinations at one time.

All examinations in

Montreal, Quebec, are conducted in the clerk 's office in

the court house. This office is arranged somewhat on
the order of a modern banking institution, with barred
windows, a lobby and surrounding booths. It is in these
latter that all discovery examinations are conducted.

.,

CHAPTER XI
GENERAL CONDUCT OF ORAL EXAMINATION
SwEARING OF WITNESS
The statutes uniformly require that the party to be
examined be sworn by the officer in charge.
ExAMINATION BY ATTORNEY FOR PARTY SEEKING DiscovERY
The attorney who desires discovery propounds oral
questions to the witness. The Wisconsin statutes spe
cifically provide that the examination may assume the
form of a cross-examination. Some of the states which
allow use of deposition procedure for discovery have
extraneous statutes which provide that a party may be
examined as if under cross-examination by the adverse
party, either orally or by deposition as any other wit
ness. Such a statute, taken together with the deposition
statute, ' allows the discovery questioning to be in the
form of a cross-examination. Wjthout such a statute
. the theoretical rule is that questions shall not be leading,
because the party makes the witness his own by taking
·
his deposition. But as a practical matter lawyers in
conducting discovery hearings usually probe a party, or
even a witness, about as thoroughly as if a cross-ex
amination were allowed. The chief
reason for this is
•
that the attorney for the party who is being examined
seldom makes objection to the form of the questions. Of
course there is the danger that the adverse party may
take advantage of his right to file written objections to
the form of the questions before trial and thus deprive
the examining lawyer of that part of the testimony which
was obtained upon leading questions. This is very in
frequently done in actual practice.
81
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ExAMINATION BY ATTORNEY FOR PARTY AGAINST WHOM
DiscovERY Is SouGHT
After the attorney seeking discovery has finished ques
tioning the witness, his own attorney is allowed to pro
pound questions. Only in Wisconsin was it found that
attempts have been made to limit the extent of question
ing by the latter on the ground that it is a misconception
of the purposes of discovery and works a hardship in
that it forces the applicant to pay in the first instance
for folios increased by his adversary. Ordinarily there
is no desire upon the part of the party 's lawyer to ask
questions, unless they are for the purpose of explaining
some incidental statement or straightening out the wit
ness where it is thought he has misunderstood the ques
tion. Occasionally such questions are interposed during
the course of the principal examination. Lawyers who
have had experience in the matter say they refrain from
questioning their client at a discovery hearing initiated
by the adverse party, not because it is considered im
proper but simply because they have no desire to add to
the adversary 's knowledge. In only three cases out of
fifty examined in Toronto, for instance, did the party 's
solicitor ask a single question. When a lawyer becomes
accustomed to the use of discovery procedure he adjusts
his tactics and does not ordinarily ask questions of his
own client. The fact that either party can use the depo
sition if the deponent is unavailable at the trial does not
counteract the tactical .advanj;ages of non-questioning in
the usual discovery situation.
ART OF EXAMINING FOR DISCOVERY
Lawyers who have had considerable experience in con
ducting discovery examinations say that they have devel
oped a peculiar technique as to the mode of questioning.
Seldom is a hostile cross-examination :i,ndulged. The
reasons are that a hostile cross-examination would rev�al
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the examining party 's own line of attack, and would ren
der less effective the cross-examinalion at the trial. The
tactics which are employed are : The lawyer a ssumes a
friendly role ; sometimes he assumes a false front of more
or less aimless, haphazard searching after information ;
his principal object is to get the witness to talk and to
disclose the whole story in his own way. His object is to
get as much information as he. can from the witness and
to disclose as little of his own objective as possible.
Ontario practitioners have developed this art to a finer
point than found elsewhere but various lawyers through
out the states which were visited said they employed the
same technique.
Usually a discovery hearing is very informal, amount
ing in some instances to a virtual conference between
adversaries. This is especially true in states which allow
use of the ordinary deposition procedure for discovery.
Perhaps too great an informality prevails. Examina
tions have been witnessed in which attorneys and parties
alike smoked cigarettes as they pleased. This feature
seemed especially soothing to one particular party who
was being probed in an action wherein he sought to ob
tain payment of an insured loss which the insurance
company claimed was the result of a fire started by him
self. The informality of discovery hearings reaches its
height in Montreal, Quebec. In true French style banter
and repartee are indulged in by the lawyers throughout
the proceedings.
RECORD OF ExAMINATION
In Wisconsin and Ontario either the officer . in charge of
the examination takes. it down and transcribes it or a
reporter does so under his direction. The latter practice
. is the more general in the larger cities. The usual prac
tice elsewhere., especially under the ordinary deposition ·
procedure, is for the officer to do the reporting himself.

·
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There are statutory requirements in some states that the
deposition be written up by the officer in the presence of
the deponent. The courts have not applied such require
ments strictly but have allowed the reporting to be done
in the fashion now generally employed by firms of re
porters.1 The usual practice is for the reporter to take
down all questions, answers and objections. If the offi
cer is allowed to make rulings upon the objections, as in
Wisconsin, such rulings also are noted. The more care
ful reporters make it a practice to number the questions
so as to expedite any subsequent use of, or objection to,
the record of the examination. In New York the statute
provides that no objections, except those to the form of
the questions, are to be noted.11
Except in Wisconsin, the applicant for discovery has
an option as to whether or . not the examination shall
be transcribed. In Wisconsin it is always written up.
The practical importance of the matter is that if there
is no necessity of writing up, the examining lawyer can
save that expense if he cares to. Perchance the ques
tioning has proved entirely futile, or perchance the law
yer 's own stenographer, by agreement, has done the re
porting, in which event he can simply have the shorthand
notes preserved. It is a quite usual practice in some
offices, especially in the smaller towns, for the examining
lawyer to take enough notes to refresh his memory as to
the testimony of the witness, and, if it becomes necessary
to use the examination at the trial, to call the stenog
rapher and have her read her notes. If an outside re
porter is used it usually is possible to adjust the fees if
transcription of the notes is not desired. In the larger
offices, especially in the cities, the expense is 'considered
secondary to the more thorough preparation and depo
sitions always are written up. This is especially true
1 The discussion of the Ohio situation in 14 Ohio Jurisprudence,
pages 41, 42, is representative.
II Rules of Civil Practice 129.
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where the· examination for discovery and the 'trial work
are handled by different members of the law office.
RIGHT TO CoPIES OF RECORD
The rules discussed in the preceding section are sub
ject to the limitation that the adverse party can compel
that the deposition be written up so that he can obtain a
copy, if he will agree to pay the cost thereof. This is the
uniform practice with the possible exception of Indiana.
While the statutes are silent on the matter, a majority of
the Indiana lawyers who were interviewed were of the
opinion that the only way a copy of the examination could
be had, over the objection of the taker, was for the party
examined to bring his own stenographer. The theory
seems to be that the examination is the taker's own pri
vate affair until it is filed. In New Hampshire and in
Texas sbme of the lawyers go to the other extreme of
giving their opponents copies free of charge. But the
usual rule is that the adverse party can have a copy if,
and only if, he will pay for it.
READING OVER AND SIGNING RECORD
There is a uniform requirement, except in Ontario,
Quebec and West Virginia, that the party examined read
over and sign the record of the examination.; But in
almost every jurisdiction there is a widespread waiver
of the requirement. In Wisconsin, for instance, there
had been a waiver of signature in ninety-one of the hun
dred cases which were inspected in Milwaukee and Madi
son. Commissioners said that this was about the usual
ratio. Even so, a majority of the lawyers in the states
which have the requirement do not favor its aboliti�m.
They prefer to be able to require a signature if they
choose to, so as to render use of the deposition more
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effective at the trial. Ontario and Quebec have abolished
the requirement. In Toronto, the Examiner (officer in
charge ) signs the deposition and either he, if he reports
it himself, or the reporter certifies that it is correct.8
Toronto practitioners regard this as a distinct improve
ment over the older practice of having the party read
over and sign the deposition. One of the advantages
pointed out is that a saving of time and trouble is
effected, since it is no longer necessary for the parties
to reappear for the signing formalities. West Virginia
has tried the same expedient in regard to depositions, but
no use is made of the deposition for discovery purposes
in the state.• A number of West Virginia lawyers to
whom letters of inquiry were addressed replied that there
is general satisfaction with the provision as far as ordi
nary depositions are concerned.
CoRRECTING REcoRD
Uniformly the deponent js allowed to make corrections
of clerical errors on the part of the reporter. His right
to make substantial corrections to the testimony which
he has previously given presents a more difficult problem.
A case taken from the records in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
indicates the character of the problem. In a case involv
ing fraud the parties came back three weeks after the
deposition was taken, for the signing thereof. At this
time the following occurred :
Mr. A : " I ask for another adjournment so I can have
the witness correct some errors in the testimony. ' '
Mr. B : " I object to this. "
Commissioner : ' ' Do you mean errors on part of wit
ness or in the transcribing � ' '
Mr. A : ·" On part of witness. "
8 Rule

340.

4 W. Va. Code (Barnes, 1923) eh. 130, see. 33.

CoNDUCT oF ORAL EXAMINATION

87

..

Commissioner : ' ' This is cross-examination, no direct
examination is permitted except on the trial, because this
is supposed to be discovery of one side only. ' '
Mr. A : " Do I understand the rule t o be that a party
may not read over his deposition and any corrections he
desires to make, the witness may make them ? ' '
Commissioner : ' ' I understand h e may correct any
errors of the reporter in writing the testimony. ' '
Mr. A : " He may correct any errors he. has made in
the testimony. I understand that to be the rule. ' '
Commissioner : " I understand the rule that any cor
rection, not taking into consideration mistakes of the
reporter, cannot be made before the commissioner over
objection, because this is strictly a cross-examination.
Now I have never been reversed on that, but I don't think
it has ever been tried out. It might be certified up and
get a ruling from the Circuit Court. That has been my
ruling far upward of ten years. I may be wrong but if
I am I would like to be corrected. I do not want to
rule one way in one case and another way in another
case. ' '
Mr. A : " I know of rulings of that kind where the
deposition is closed and adjournment taken simply for
the purpose of permitting the witness to read it over and
sign it. I appreciate your position that the opposite side
may not directly examine their own witness, but I think
this is true, that if a witness testified in the forenoon and
came back in the afternoon and said to the commissioner
' I said so and so in the forenoon but I was mistaken',
that the witness might have an opportunity to correct his
testimony. ' '
Commissioner : ' ' Suppose on the trial he made a mis
take in testifying, and I want to correct the testimony
the court may say ' You may when your counsel examines
you, correct your testimony. ' But the only opportunity
he has to make it is at the close of the trial, or when a
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deposition is taken at the close of the reading of the
deposition. ' '
Mr. A. : " It seems to me you do not catch my distinc
tion. I appreciate a witness may not be asked to explain
his testimony. But if the witness says, ' I made a mistake
in my testimony', I think the court will and should per
mit correction at any time. ' '
Commissioner : " I think it is in the discretion of the
trial court, ' You may correct it now or you may correct
it when you have your direct examination. ' ' '
Mr. A. : " Well, I will ask some questions in order to
get the matter before the court. ' '
He then asked 23 questions by telling the witness what
he had stated and asking if he desired now to correct it.
These questions covered almost the whole case. Then
Mr. A. said : ' ' There are other questions of the same
character but these are enough to get a ruling. ' '
The case was certified to the trial 'j udge and he ruled
that the correction should be allowed. The exact words
of the ruling were : ' ' Said party is hereby given leave to
correct the answers to questions asked on said examina
tion and his counsel may examine him as to all mat
ters tending to explain or qualify any testimony given
by her on said examination. ' ' 5 A. number of the Wiscqn
sin commissioners refuse to follow such practice but
require the witness to sign without corrections.
Corrections, even substantial corrections, are allowed
under the New York practice. In one case it was dis
closed on appeal that there had been thirty-five different
corrections, varying from slight changes in figures to
very substantial changes. It was urged that the de
ponent should have signed the transcript as prepared by
the reporter but the court held otherwise. The reasoning
of the court was that there would be no sense in having
li Milwaukee Circuit Court Records, No. 79847.
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the transcribed testimony read before it is signed, if no
corrections are to be allowed.6
The view of the Ohio court is indicated by the follow
ing quotation from Minshall, J. : ' ' The witness must be
the judge as to whether his testimony had been accurately
t3;ken down by whomever it is done. What he signs is
his sworn statement, and he should not be required to sign
what he under oath says is not accurate. In case of a
controversy about the matter, witnesses might be called
at the trial to state what the defendant stated in the first
instance, for the purpose of reflecting on his credibility,
but he cannot be compelled to sign a deposition which he
says on oath is not correct. ' ' 7
Officers in charge of discovery proceedings have de
vised pra<?tical ways of solving disputes as to the right to
correct the record. Sometimes they instruct the deponent
to sign and to write out any corrections he desires to make
underneath as a qualification of the signature. This
allows the correction, and yet does not deprive the exam
ining party of the full effect of the previous discovery.
Any scheme which will separate the corrections from the
previous testimony and label the latter as such has a
similar effect. In fact, if the correction is obviously a
change of testimony upon advice of other persons, it does
little harm to the examining party so long as the contra
dictory statements are preserved. Indeed some lawyers
say they are glad to get such corrections because they
tend to discredit the whole story of the witness. Other
officers allow corrections subject to the proviso that the
party allow himself to be re-examined by his adversary
as to the new part.
FILING THE RECORD

The statutes uniformly require that the officer fi.l� the
record of the examination, with the proper certification,
6 Van

Son v. Herbst (1926) 214 N. Y. S. 272.
7 Ex parte Hafer (1901) 65 0. S. 170, 172, 61 N. E. 702.
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with the clerk of the court in which the action is pending.
The clerk then places the record with the papers of the
case. In Wisconsin always, and in Missouri and Nebras
ka usually, the officers obey this rule. In Missouri
this is due in part to the fact that aU depositions which
are filed may be taxed as costs. In Ontario the record
need be filed only in the event that the taker requests the
transcription of the reporter 's notes, but it must be filed
then. There is a widespread disregard of the statutory
requirement in all other jurisdictions. The reasoning in
justification of the failure to follow the statutes is that
they prescribe the requirement only as a condition pre
cedent to the use of the deposition as such at the trial ;
that ordinarily a deposition taken for discovery purposes
will be used . only for purposes of impeachment at the
trial, rather than as original evidence, and that it can be
used for this purpose as a signed statement, or as a con
tradictoey previous statement, without any official sanc
tions. Another reason why some lawyers do not file the
record is that such tactics deprive the adverse party, or
his attorney, of access to the record for purposes of
preparation for trial, unless he is willing to pay for a
copy. Accordingly, it is a widespread practice for the
officer to return the record to the examining attorney,
unless directed otherwise by him, and for the latter to
keep the same in his files. Court rules in Concord, New
Hampshire and in Louisville, Kentucky, specifically di
rected at this- practice, have been disregarded by the bar.
Of course, if a lawyer thinks there may be occasion for
the use of the deposition as original evidence at the trial
he should have the record filed. If he is the attorney for
the party examined in a state where either party is
entitled to use the deposition at the trial if the deponent
is unavailable, he may obtain a court order requiring that
the particular deposition be filed for his use.
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A difference of practice exists as to whether depo
sitions which are :filed must remain sealed until opened
by court order or until published by the taker. Usually
it is required that it be sent sealed to the clerk by the
officer taking. In Ontario there is no such requirement.
But even in some states where the deposition is sent
sealed, the clerk opens it as soon as he receives it. This
is the general practice in Wisconsin, but within the last
year or so the Milwaukee judges have required that all
depositions be kept sealed until the court orders them
opened. The purpose is to check the activities of cer
tain newspaper reporters. An Indiana appellate court
has held that once a deposition is filed the taker loses con
trol over it so that he cannot remove it from the files.•
8 Grant v. Davis (1892) 5 Ind.

App.

116.

CHAPTER XII
EXAMINATION BY WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES
FILING INTERROGATORIES
All of the jurisdictions which allow discovery by writ
ten interrogatories, except England, allow the filing of
the interrogatories as a matter of right, with any objec
tions being decided subsequently. In a few jurisdictions
the questions are annexed to the appropriate pleading,
but the more usual practice is to file the questions sepa
rately. The following American jurisdictions require
some additional step in the nature of a showing of the
propriety of the interrogation either by petition or affi
davit : Alabama, Connecticut, Tennessee, Louisiana, and
New Mexico. Indiana requires that the proponent also
obtain a rule to answer, which is given as of course.
Virginia requires that the proponent, after filing inter
rogatories, require the clerk to issue a summons to be
served by the proper officer. Georgia requires that he
take out a commission, as in deposition procedure. Stat
utes in the following states specify that the adverse party
· be served with a copy of the questions : Massachusetts,
United States Equity, New Mexico, Washington, Ala
bama and Florida.
The English practice is slightly different from that
which obtains in the United States. Up until 1893 in
terrogatories were delivered directly to' the party to be
interrogated and then he entered his objections, as is
generally the practice in American jurisdictions at pres
ent. But since 1893 it has been necessary to first obtain
leave of court before filing interrogatories. 1 The par1 Annual

Practice, order 31, rule 1.
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ticular interrogatories proposed to be delivered are first
submitted for approval to a master in chambers on sum
mons for directions.2 A copy of the proposed questions
is usually served with the notice· of the application, which
is filed two days before the heariJ,lg. At the hearing the
master may either grant or deny the application, in whole
or in part, or he may alter the number, extent or for� of
the questions.3 The English system contemplates the
obtaining of judicial approval to the particular questions
before they are put to the adverse party.
NUMBER

OF

QuESTIONS ALLOWED

One of the most troublesome problems in some Ameri
can jurisdictions, notably in Massachusetts, has been
whether a party may file as many questions as he chooses
to. The Massachusetts experience in this regard throws
an interesting sidelight upon the relative effectiveness
of an oral interrogation and a written interrogation.
Prior to 1929 there was no limit to the number of in
terrogatories which might be filed. In one case 2,258
interrogatories were filed.4 Gradually there came into
use mimeographed and printed forms which contained
two, thtee and four · hundred interrogatories. These
qu�stions were not prepared with . reference to the par
ticular case in which they were to be used, but were stock
forms entirely. Their most widespread use was in auto
mobile accident litigation. One of the purposes in using
so many questions was to put each principal question in
so many forms that evasion would be difficult. It was
urged by way of justification of the practice that, ' ' Most
automobile collision cases involve the 'Same questions,
which can be covered by a prepared set of interrogatories,
and, where plai!ltiffs ' lawyers flood the courts · with
I Id. rule 2 ; Stringer, A. B. 0. Guide to Practice (1928), 66.
3 Rosenbaum, Rule Making Authority, 128.
4 First Report of Massachusetts Judicial Council (1925) 42.
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thousands of cases where merit does not exist, or is very
doubtful, there is no sense or reason for the defendant
trying to get up a special set of interrogatories where
the same principles are involved ; and in order to do it,
a company, under the laws of compulsory insurance,
would have to hire a separate building and a corps of
lawyers and stenographers and the work would be much
less accurate than under a system of mimeographing. ' ' 6
In time the practice became extremely burdensome
upon the courts. Almost all of the various motion hours
were taken up in deciding objections to interrogatories.
Oftentimes the questions asked, as applied to the par
ticular case, were quite ludicrous. The burden on the
clerk 's office was surprisingly heavy. Yet, in a test case
which was carried to the Massachusetts Supreme C6urt,
the practice was allowed. 6 Just recently a statute has
been enacted limiting the number of interrogatories
which may be filed as of right to thirty.7 Nor can several
questions be grouped in one interrogatory so as to escape
the rule, for the thirty include " interrogatories subsidi
ary or incidental to, or dependent upon, other interrog
atories, however the same may be grouped, combined or
arranged. ' ' There is little or no complaint with the
operation of the new rule. Usually, it is said, thirty
questions, if fully answered, are sufficient. Additional
interrogatories can be propounded in a proper case by
special leave of court. The burden upon the court has
been greatly lessened, although it is still considerable.
Other effects of the change are that considerably more
care is spent in the framing of interrogatories and an
swers ; and the use of motions for specifications and par
ticulars has increased. Mimeographed and printed
6 From the defendant 's brief in the case of Goldman v. Ashkins (1929)
266 Mass. 374, 165 N. E. 513.
6 Goldman v. Ashkins ( 1929) 266 Mass. 374, 165 N. E. 513.
7 Aets 1929, ch. 303. Cf. suggestion that this be done, First Report
of Massachusetts Judicial Council (1925) 42.
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forms are still in use, but they comply with the rule.
Usually about sixteen interrogatories are included in the
printed form. The questions have to do chi-efly with mat
ters bearing upon items of damage, extent of injuries,
physicians and nurses employed, earnings at the time of
the accident, and similar matters. "' Forms used by plain
tiffs usually include questions as to ownership and
agency. Clerks who handle such work in some of the
larger law offices have a dozen or so of these mimeo
graphed forms from which they can select the one most
nearly appropriate to the particular case.
Other American states have had less trouble in this
regard principally because they confine the interrog
atories to so narrow a scope that they are not used for
the purpose of eliciting a full discovery upon all the
issues of the case. In Washington one hundred and sixty
interrogatories were filed in one case.8 While there is
no arbitrary limit upon the number of questions under
'
the federal equity practice, the courts look with dis
favor upon an excessive number being filed.9 In the few
states in which both an oral examination for discovery
and one upon written interrogatories are allowed, there
is no need nor desire to increase the number of the writ
ten intertogatories. Rather they are used, if at all, for
the purpose of obtaining a few formal admissions.
ANSWERING INTERROGATORIES
It is uniformly provided that the party served with ·
interrogatories file an explicit, responsive, and full an
swer to each question separately. Of course, as a prac
tical matter, one of the chief complaints with the writ
ten interrogatory procedure is that answers usually are
so evasive as to give little enlightenment. The time
8 Pearce v. Greek Boys' Min, Co. (1907) 48
9 A. B. Dick Co. v. Underwood Typewriter

Wash. 38, 92 Pac. 773.
Co. (1916) 235 Fed. 300
But for a late case in which 345 interrogatories were filed see O 'Brie�
v. Makey (1929) 36 F. (2d) 89.
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within which answers should be :filed varies in the differ
ent jurisdictions. Three different schemes are employed
in various jurisdictions : ( 1 ) Some statutes provide a
specific time within which answers must be :filed unless
the court orders otherwise. Provisions of this character
are : England, ten days ; United States Equity, :fifteen
days ; Massachusetts, ten days ; Alabama, sixty days ;
Washington, twenty days. ( 2 ) Statutes in the following
states provide that the interrogatories shall be answered
in such time as the court may prescribe ; Indiana, Iowa,
Connecticut and Virginia. 10 ( 3 ) States which allow inter
rogatories to be annexed to the pleading require that
answers be filed within the time allowed for answering
the pleading to which they are annexed. This is the pro
vision in Ohio, and under the special interrogatory pro
cedure in equitable' actions in Kentucky and Arkansas.
The adverse party usually is allowed to include in his
answers relevant matters in avoidance. 11

·

10 In Virginia sixty days is the maximum allowance that the court
can grant.
11 In addition to the statutes see Baxter v. Massasoit Ins. Co. (1866)
95 Mass. 320 ; Railsback v. Koons ( 1862) 18 Ind. 274 ; Phelps v. Mul
haupt (1920) 146 La. 1078, 84 So. 362. See also 1 A. L. R. 76, 91, for
a note as to the theoretical basis for such a rule in connection with
self-serving declarations; and Grinnell, Discovery in Massachusetts,
16 Harv. L. Rev. 110, 193, as to policy considerations.

CHAPTER XIII
DECIDING OBJECTIONS AND COMPELLING
ANSWERS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION
WHERE OFFICER DoEs NOT HAvE PowER TO . CoMPEL
ANSWERS OR TO DECIDE OBJECTIONS
I

A number of states follow this plan in administering
discovery examinations : the officer in charge is a re
porter with power only to swear the . witness and pre
serve the orderly conduct of the hearing ; he has no power
to compel answers or to decide objections to questions ;
if objections arise which cannot be decided among coun
sel, the examination is adjourned until a ruling can be
obtained, from the trial court. This is the plan which
obtains in California, Indiana, Kentucky, New Jersey,t
North Carolina,2 Ontario, Quebec and Texas.
The officer under the plan in question is any officer
qualified under the statutes to take depositions generally.
Such an arrangement has the following advantages : ( 1 )
It does not require an additional officer for discovery
examinations but allows the use of officers already pro
vided ; ( 2 ) It fosters an assimilation of discovery pro
cedure and deposition procedure both of which are his1 This plan now obtains in New Jersey : Backel v. Linn (N. J., 1928)
140 Atl. 285. But this decision was rendered after the. right to, and
the scope of, the examination had been drastically restricted. A large
part of the dissatisfaction which finally lead to the substitution of a
restricted examination upon court order for a full examination upon
notice is attributable to an earlier decision to the effect that a lawyer
ran great danger, either of being committed for contempt or of being
scolded by the judge, if he instructed his client not to answer a question,
however incompetent it might be, at a discovery examination. Brown
and Seccomb v. Shafman (1923) 2 N. J. Mise. 13.
2 In addition to the statutes which are set forth in the appendix, see
Cartwright v. Norfolk Southern R. Co. ( 1918) 176 N. C. 36, 96 S. E. 647 ;
Fertilizer Co. v. Taylor (1893) 112 N. C. 141, 17 S. E. 69.
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torically and functionally akin. A disadvantage some
times supposed is that an effective discovery can , be
obtained only when the officer in charge has certain judi
cial and quasi-judicial powers. It is said that the officers
who take depositions generally are not qualified to exer
cise such powers.
The statutory enumeration of the officers eligible to
take depositions varies in the different states, but the
following persons generally are included : judges, justices
of the peace, clerks of courts of record and notaries pub
lic. As a practical matter reporters and stenographers
who are notaries public are almost always used. Many
of the statutes forbid a notary from serving if he is kin
to the parties or interested in the cause. The general
view of the lawyers who were interviewed is that this
prevents a notary in the office of either lawyer in the
cause from serving, unless allowed to do so by agree
ment.8 It is a quite usual thing in many towns and cities
of less than one hundred thousand population, for the
stenographer in the office of the examining lawyer to take
down the examination. In such cities as Fort Wayne,
Indiana, Concord and Manchester, New Hampshire, and
Lexington, Kentucky, for instance, the best law firms
do this, and the sentiment of the bar supports it. The
. principal reason, of course, is to save expense. Skilled
reporters are scarce and the office stenographers are
about as accurate as the reporters who are available.
No complaint of unfairness due to the fact that the
stenographer is an employee of one of the lawyers has
been found. While the practice also obtains to an extent
in the larger cities, there is a general feeling upon the
, part of the bar that it is preferable to employ an outside
reporter in order to remove even the semblance of over8 Of. Singer Mfg. Co. v. MeAllister Bros. (1887) 22 Neb. 359, 35 N. w.
181, where the praetiee is allowed, without any agreement, but is dis·
eouraged.
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reaching and in order to get mote accurate reporting.
In many such cities there are firms of reporters who are
available and whose work is of the highest character.
Large law firms find it convenient to give all of their
work of this nature to some particular firm of reporters,
and the latter in turn feel obligated to have a man avail
able at all times. There are no official court reporters in
Cleveland, Ohio, so some law firms use the same reporter
for deposition work and trial work. Then if any dispute
arises at the trial as to the correctness of a deposition the
reporter who took it is there to verify it. It is said that
the jury looks upon such a reporter as an officer of the
court, and that it makes the use of the deposition more
effective for purposes of contradiction if the l awyer can
ask the witness whether he did not make the alleged
statements before this supposed officer.
The officer in charge . merely notes the objection made
by the attorney for the party who is being examined.
Sometimes the party gives an answer subject to objec
tion. More often the opposing lawyer 's objections ale
addressed to the examining counsel rather than to the
officer. They serve as a word of warning that the inquiry
has reached the limits of its proper scope. Both lawyers
know that the officer has neither power to compel an
answer nor to relieve a witness from answering. What
actually happens is that when the lawyer for the party
under examination objects to the question and instructs
his client not to answer, he and the lawyer conducting
the examination argue the ground of the objection in
formally among themselves, first of all ; usually they
reach an agreement : the proponent either agrees to with
draw or to restate the question or the opponent agrees to
allow an answer subject to objection. If, however, the
lawyers are unable thus to adjust the matter and the
proponent of the question meets with a refusal to an
swer which he considers unjustified, he can take either
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one of two. courses. ( 1 ) He may adopt the policy of get
ting what he can and letting the rest go. In this event
he will waive his right to an answer and proceed to pro
pound other questions. This is usually the course adopt
ed in practice unless the question is especially important
or the witness becomes especially balky and refuses to
answer any and all questions. ( 2 ) He can adjourn the
examination and go before the court and move that an
answer be compelled. The actual operation of discovery
examinations in Toronto is slightly different from this.
The examiners who have had legal training exercise
limited powers. While they cannot compel an answer,
they often order the witness to answer, or relieve him
from answering if they think the question is improper.
Of course the witness has the power to relieve himself
from answer�ng by merely refusing, and thus forcing the
proponent to go before a judge or master and move that
an answer be compelled. The essential difference from
, ·'the American practice is that the examiner enters into the
· discussion with the lawyers as to the propriety of the
question and aids a decision.
Under the American practice the proponent of a qu�s
tion to which an answer has been refused has the right to
g9 before the trial judge and move that an answer be
compelled by contempt proceedings. Usually the pro
cedure is informal : after having met with a refusal to
answer a particular question, the examining lawyer pro
ceeds to propound a number of representative questions
so as to cover all angles of the matter in dispute ; then
he adjourns the examination and takes the matter to
the judge in chambers. A few courts require that the
matter be presented by formal petition or motion, but a
majority allow an informal resort to the judge in cham
bers. While the procedure is informal it is not always
as expeditious as it might be. Access to the judge, espe
cially in the larger cities, often is difficult. In New York
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City it is often necessary to wait a considerable time
before reaching the judge, even after an appointment has
been secured from his secretary. In some of the smaller
towns in Indiana, Kentucky and elsewhere local lawyers
sometimes take advantage of lawyers from the city who
have come to conduct an examination for discovery.
Knowing that their opponents are anxious to :finish the
examination and return to the city and are not apt to
wait over until a rather tardy judge compels an answer,
they instruct their clients to refuse to answer questions
which clearly are proper. Ontario and Quebec have a
somewhat differ.ent method of handling this problem. In
Ontario the master ( an intermediate officet not used in
American practice ) relieves the trial court of most of
this type of work and settles the matter expeditiously.
In Montreal, all such questions, instead of being pre
sented to a judge or a master in chambers, are presented
to the Practice Court, a court which sits each afternoon
from two to four. This court is presided over by an ex
pert in matters of practice who handles all the chamber
work of the various judges. Inasmuch as discovery ex
aminations usually are conducted during the hours at
which the Practice Court sits it is possible to carry dis
putes which arise directly to the court and obtain a deci
sion quickly.
The exact balancing of the scales between unjust con
cealment, on the one hand, and unjust discovery, on the
other, is largely dependent upon the question whether a
ruling can be expeditiously secured from the trial court
when an objection arises during the course of the exam
ination. The indirect effect of this consideration is even
more important than the direct effect. Usually lawyers
know whether a question is proper or improper. Little
danger exists of a party being forced to disclose im
proper matters since he can refuse to answer until com
pelled to do so by the judge. If the party under exam-
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ination can, without unnecessary delay, be compelled to
answer a question, scant encouragement is afforded to a
party to withhold information on the ground that he
knows his adversary will prefer to let the matter drop
rather than to pursue his rather clumsy remedy of en
forcing an answer. Lawyers are willing to do volun
tarily that which they know they can be forced to do. In
a majority of the cities which were visited the means of
compelling an answer is sufficiently expeditious to dis
courage unjust concealment. The remedy in places
where it is otherwise, lies with the trial judge.
There are two factors which foster a voluntary an
swering of proper questions even when the means of com
pelling answers is clumsy. ( 1 ) It is possible to adjourn
the whole examination to the trial judge for its comple
tion. Some lawyers have found that the mere threat of
using this expedient has proved effective in persuading
the witness to answer voluntarily. ( 2 ) Some lawyers
are glad to obtain a refusal on the part of the witness to
answer a question. They would prefer to be able to dis
play the refusal to the jury, rather than to have an an
swer. Their adversaries sense this desire and do not
care to gratify it ; consequently they refrain from in
structing a refusal to answer.
The New York rule that examinations before trial must
be confined to issues of which the applicant has the bur
den of proof has necessitated a somewhat different
method of deciding objections. An attempt is made to
settle the major objections before they arise, by allowing
the trial judge to fix the proper matters of inquiry. To
this end the party applicant is required to set forth the
matters upon which he desires to question his adversary.
Then the latter is allowed to contest the propriety of the
matters set forth by a motion to vacate the notice. The
motion to vacate or modify the notice is applicable when
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it is desired to make an objection as to any of the follow
ing matters :

(1)
( 2)
(3 )
(4)

The right of the party seeking t o examine ;
The time of the examination ;

The place of the examination ;

The person before whom the examination 1s

scheduled ; and

( 5)

The matters upon which the examination is to

be had.4

The notice of motion to vacate or modify must specify

the grounds relied on and may be supported by appro
priate affidavits.5 The service of the motion, if made for
the first term or sitting of court at which the motion can
be heard, operates to stay the examination until the de

termination of the motion.

The order given by the court,

whether requested by the applicant in the first instance
or whether made necessary by a motion to vacate the

notice is framed in accordance with approximately the
same regulations.6

The terms of the order are largely

in the discretion of the court under its power to deter
mine whether the examination sought is material and

necessary.7

The new Michigan Court Rules provide for a motion to

vacate the notice, similar in character to the New York
practice.8 Since the principal objective of the device in
New York is to limit the scope of the examination in a

way which seems undesirable, there is danger that the

very availability of the device in Michigan may serve as
an invitation to limit the scope in a similar fashion.

4 New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 291.
5 Rules of Civil Practice, 124.
6 Bieber-Isaacs Co. v. Philadelphia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1925) 125
Misc. 494, 211 N. Y. S. 435.
'7 New York Civil Practice Act, sees. 288, 294 ; Rules of Civil Prac·
tice, 124.
8 Michigan Court Rules (1931) rule 41, sec. 4.
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WHERE OFFICER HAs PowER TO CoMPEL ANSWERS AND To
DECIDE OBJECTIONS
Some jurisdictions, instead of providing a powerless
officer to supervise the examination and allowing all dis
putes to be presented to the trial court directly, provide
an officer who is empowered to compel answers and to
decide objections. This plan is followed in Wisconsin,
Missouri, Ohio, New Hampshire and Nebraska.
Wisconsin. The examination is supervised by a court
commissioner who is an officer of the court appointed by
the circuit judge and holding office during the term of
office of the judge who appoints him.9 Only a limited
number can be appointed in each county. In Milwaukee
and elsewhere the commissioners are practically all law
yers, but in some of the smaller towns it has been diffi
cult to obtain the services of men with legal training and
reporters have been appointed instead.
A variety of opinion exists in Wisconsin as to the
power of a commissioner. In Milwaukee the view is that
a court commissioner is vested with the powers of a judge
in chambers. He decides all objections which arise dur
ing the course of the adverse examination and, when nec
essary, exercises the power to punish for contempt. The
theory advanced to support this view is that if the com
missioner did not have such powers the examination
might as well be taken before a notary as are ordinary
depositions, yet this latter has been expressly disallowed
by the Supreme Court. 10 The general opinion in Madi
son, Wisconsin, is that the commissioner has only the
power to decide objections bearing on the question of
relevancy. The theory in support of this view is that the
statute says an adverse examination shall be conducted
as the taking of ordinary depositions except where other-

9 See Wis. Stat. (1927) ch. 252, sec. 1415.
10 Hincliff v. Hinman (1864) 18 Wis. 139.
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wise provided and that the statute provides the party
must not be compelled to disclose matters not relevant to
the issues. This theory is carried to such an extent that
when objections as to incompetency, privilege, hearsay,
and the like, are presented, as the records show they
occasionally are, the commissioners rule that they haV'�
no power to decide whether the question is improper.
They even go so far as to refuse to strike irrelevant mat
ter once it is in. Asked what they do with the objection
that an answer would incriminate the party,. they say that
they do not decide the objection but that the counsel for
the party instructs him not to answer and that the exam
ining counsel does not ask for a contempt certification.
A third view is taken in some of the other Wisconsin
cities and towns, namely, that commissioners have no
power to decide objections but must simply note them on
the record. If objections become very frequent counsel
often asks that it be noted of record that all the subse
quent testimony is taken subject to objection. In some
sections such a practice has led to the complaint that
parties are being forced to disclose family affairs and
other matters entirely irrelevant to the controversies.
Possibly this is what has led the Advisory Committee on
Rules to propose that the words ' ' but the deponent shall
not be compelled to disclose 'anything not relevant to the
controversy, " which were formerly in the statute and
which have been omitted in recent revisions of the stat
utes, be re-inserted.11 The saving feature in the practice
in these outlying districts is that the commissioners also
refuse to punish for contempt. A party can refuse to
answer clearly objectionable questions and place the bur
den on his opponent to ask for contempt proceedings be
fore the trial judge.
The explanation of such a diversity of opinion in Wis
consin probably is this. The commissioner, under the stat11 Proposed Changes in Rules · of Pleading Practice and Procedure,
October, 1930, item 18.
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utes, does have the power which he is thought to have by
the Milwaukee lawyers. But the question as to how much
power he should exercise has been decided by the prac
ticalities of the situation in each locality. The chief fac
tor in determining the policy has been the training and
ability of the various commissioners. The commissioners
exercise only that portion of their powers which experi
ence has demonstrated they can exercise to the satisfac
tion of the judges and the lawyers. In those localities
where the view is taken that the commissioner has no
power except to note the objection, the commissioners are
not lawyers but are former court reporters. Then there
is another factor which helps explain the difference be
tween the practice at Milwaukee and Madison. Mil
waukee circuit judges are so overworked that they can
find no time to decide objections arising out of examina
tion before trial, whereas Madison judges can and do
devote a greater amount of their time to this feature of
the procedure. Consequently the attitude of the- judges
in the former city is to discourage certification of ques
tions, and to encourage the commissioners to rule on
objections. The situation at Madison is just the oppo
site. There the judges are readily available to decide
certified questions.
A further word should be said about the administra
tion of the machinery in Milwaukee. There the commis
sioner, who is a trained lawyer, employs reporters to
take down the examination. The commissioner who has
the largest amount of the work maintains a suite of
offices which are so arranged that offices for the reporters
surround a central office in which the commissioner sits.
Under this plan he is able to conduct as many as four
examinations simultaneously. Each examination is in
charge of the reporter entirely until a dispute arises
which the lawyers are unable to settle among themselves.
At this juncture the commissioner is called in. Resort
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is thus had to the commissioner in much the same manner

as to the trial court in other places, except it is much

more expeditious.

If the commissioner punishes for contempt the order

is reviewable by the trial court on habeas corpus pro
ceedings.

If the commissioner refuses to compel an an

swer to a question and the proponent thinks the decision

is erroneous he can ask for a certification to the trial
judge. The officer upon granting the certification sends
up the relevant part of the record.

In Milwaukee the

whole record is sent up together with a formal statement

pointing out the location of the objections.

To the usual

certification at the end of the deposition are added words
such as these :

' ' And I hereby certify and return the

foregoing deposition to the above named court in pursu
ance of request of counsel for them to obtain a ruling on

the matters shown at pages

45, 48

and

50,

to the end that

the above named court may direct whether the rulings
are correct and whether they should be affirmed or re

versed and for such other orders as the court may think
proper. ' '

The commissioner then mails the deposition

to the cletk as usual. In Madison and other places the
certification is informal ; the appropriate questions, an

swers and objections are written up and carried directly

to the judge. Certification upon request is practically a
matter of course in Madison but most commissioners in
Milwaukee will only certify important matters.
The
position is taken that the judges are too busy to be wor

ried with minor matters and that certification is often
asked for the purpose of delay. Several commissioners

make it a regular practice to refuse to <lertify · questions.

The only remedy in such case is to go directly to the
trial judge and move that he order the record sent up.

Missouri. In Missouri cities of a greater population

than fifty thousand inhabitants, it is the privilege of the

party served witlr a notice that his deposition is to be

J
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taken, to apply to the court for the appointment of a spe
cial commissioner to supervise the examination. 12 When
the party applies for the appointment of a special com
missioner, there is no necessity for service of a subpoena
by the latter, the original service of the subpoena by the
notary sufficing. The commissioner must be ' ' an attor
ney of record in such court, learned in the law, disinter
ested, and of no kin to either party to such cause. ' ' The
policy behind the provision for trained officers to super
vise examinations has been explained by the Court of
Appeals : · " Manifestly, in providing-for the appoint
ment by the court, on the motion of the adverse party, of
a special commissioner, learned in the law, to preside as
an officer of the court at the taking of depositions in large
cities, the Legislature was guided by the belief that the
abuses of the power to take depositions before a notary
public of the selection of the party giving the notice were
greater in large cities than in other communities, and
that the adverse party should be accorded the protection
of the right to have a special and disinterested commis
sioner to preside at the taking of the testimony, to the
end that the inquiry might be confined to the legitimate
issues of the case and not range over other and imperti
nent :fields. ' ' 18 A special commissioner has all the power
which any officer empowered to take depositions has, in
cluding the power to compel answers by attachment for
contempt, and, in addition, has ' ' power and authority
to hear and determine all objections to testimony and
evidence, and to admit and exclude the same, in the same
manner and to the same extent as the circuit court might
in a trial of said caus'e before said circuit court. ' ' 14 In
cases in which such an officer is used he actually exercises
his powers.
12 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) sec. 5_446.
18 State ex rel. Wilson v. Burney (1916)

S. W. 23 .
. 14 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) sec. 5446.

193 Mo. App. 326, 334, 186
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As a matter of practice it is the exception rather than
the rule that the opposite party requests· the appoint
ment of a commissioner. It is almost never done in auto
mobile accident litigation. Even so, Missouri lawyers
generally regard the provision as a wise one. They · say
that it affords a sort of residuary protection for those
who feel that an examination before a notary is subject to
abuse. While there is neither need for nor desire
to have such protection in the usual case, there is satis
faction in knowing that it is available. That the expedi
ent is seldom used is further attested by the fact that
there are no lawyers who make it a special business to
serve as commissioners at such examinations. In the
event the opposite party desires that the examination be
supervised by a commissioner the lawyers usually agree
among themselves as to who shall serve and do not apply
to the court to appoint a commissioner.
The following provision is made in Missouri for ap
peals from the special commissioners ' rulings to the cir
cuit court. If the officer rules that the question need not
be answered, the proponent of the question can demand
that he refer the matter to the circuit court for a decision.
In this event the circuit court is required to give a ruling
forthwith as to the correctness of the commissioner 's rul
ing. If the circuit court rules that the question should
be answered the commissioner holds a further examina
tion of the witness for that purpose. It should be no
ticed that the statute does not provide that the witness
can appeal from a ruling of the commissioner which, iii
stead of relieving him from answering a question, re
quires that an answer be given. The only way the wit
ness can present his objection to the trial court before
trial is to refuse to answer the question, suffer commit
ment for contempt and, by habeas corpus proceedings,
get a review by the trial court. His rights in this regard
are the same as if the examination were held before a
notary rather than a commissioner.
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New Hampshire, Nebraska, and Ohio. The practice in
New Hampshire,l5 Nebraska, 16 and Ohio,17 is to allow
the notary who takes depositions to compel answers by
attachment for contempt. The notary who takes a depo
sition in Missouri has power to enforce answers by at
tachment for contempt 18 but, as already pointed out, in
Missouri cities of a greater population than fifty thou
sand inhabitants, it is possible to require the appoint
ment of a special commissioner instead of a notary to
supervise the examination. 19 In all cases in which a
special commissioner is not appointed the practice in
New Hampshire, Nebraska, and Ohio approximates that
in Missouri.
The primary object in giving the notary in these states
power to punish for contempt was to insure that wit
nesses in giving their depositions would answer all ques
tions except those involving personal privilege.80 It was
not contemplated that notaries should decide objections
involving relevancy and similar questions. Rather it was
contemplated that the witness should answer the ques
tions and then object at the trial if they were improper.
Such system was intended primarily for the taking of
ordinary depositions rather than for the taking of dis
covery examinations. The question arises when the pro15 N, H. Public Laws (1926) ch. 336, sec. 1-7 ; ch. 17, .sees. 3, 12 ;
Eaton v. Farmer (1865) 46 N. H. 200; Robertson v. Hale (1896) 68
N. H. 538, 44 A. 695.
16 Dogge v. State (1887) 21 Neb. 272, 31 N. W. 929; In re Hammond
(1909) 83 Neb. 636, 120 N. W. 203.
17 Ohio Gen. Code (Throckmorton, 1926) sec. 11510; DeCamp v. Archi
bald ( 1893) 60 0. S. 618, 35 N. E. 1056. See also for ,a full treatment
of the cases 9 Ohio Jurisprudence, pages 58, 111, 121 ; 14 Id. page 38.
18 Recently the Missouri Supreme Court said: ' 'For almost three quar
ters of a century this court * * * has uniformly held that a notary
public in taking depositions is authorized to commit a witness for
contempt for refusing to answer questions other than those which it is
his personal privilege to refuse to answer." Ex parte Noell v. Bender
(1927) 317 Mo. 392, 396, 295 S. W. 532. For a long list of :Missouri
decisions upholding the right of the notary to punish for contempt, see
Missouri Digest, " Depositions, " sec. 17.
19 The latter aspect of the Missouri practice has been treated in detail
)n the paragraphs immediately preceding.
10 Re Nushuler (1878) 4 0. Dec. Rep. 299.
·
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cedure is used for discovery purposes whether the notary

may relieve a party from answering questions. An Ohio
opinion has suggested a way in which the notary can
assert the right whether the statutes contemplate it or

not.

Said the court :

" It is said that a notary public

when taking a deposition has not p ower to decide- as . to
the competency or relevancy of a question. For the pur
poses of the deposition and of the case in which the depo

sition is taken, he has not.

But for the purpose of pun

ishing a witness for contempt, he has.

A notary public

in committing a witness for contempt exercises judicial

power.

The exercise of that power req1,1ires that he

should find a witness who refuses to answer a question
guilty of contempt.

To :find the witness guilty of con

tempt the notary must determine whether !he question
asked was one which the witness could lawfully be or

dered to answer ; the determination of that fact neces

sarily requires the notary to pass .upon the competency
of the question . ' ' 111

It is a very rare thing that a notary punishes a party

for conte:r:npt, even where the power to punish exists.
Only when the examining lawyer persuades the notary to
do so, does the latter assert his prerogative.

he seldom goes so far as to actually commit.

Even then
If he does

anything 'it is merely to order the witness to answer and
to threaten to exercise his power. Reasons assigned why
the notary will not exercise his power are that he is
afraid he will be liable upon his bond for making a wrong

ful committal,1111 and that, as a practical matter it is very
Ill Ex parte Woodworth (1893) 6 Ohio Dec. 19, 21.
1111 The Nebraska court has said the following about the liability of a

notary.. In a case wherein a person who had been committed by the
notary sued that officer for damages for false imprisonment the court
sustained a demurrer to the petition, saying: ' ' In order to state a cause
of action in such a case the petition must allege * * * that the evi
dence sought to be elicited from the witness was of such a character
as would justify him in :refusing to testify. It is a familiar rule that
a judicial officer, whether of a court of limited or general jurisdiction,
is not liable in a civil action for acts performed in his judicial capacity,
if he has acquired and does not exceed the jurisdiction conferred upon
him by law. He is not liable for a mere error of judgment while acting
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hard for a lady reporter (as is often the case) to make
the actual arrest and it is troublesome to call the sheriff.
The notary does not know, and makes no pretense of
knowing, whether or not the . question is proper.
For these reasons the practice usually approximates
that which obtains in states wherein the officer has no
power. If the witness refuses to answer a particular
question, upon advice of counsel, and the examining law
yer thinks it important enough, he must move the trial
court to compel an answer. There is one advantage, how
ever, to the plan under dis-cussion. The fact that the
notary has power to punish, and the fact that he can
order the witness to answer upon threat of punishment
has a tendency to foster voluntary answers to all ques
tions. A disadvantage of the' plan is that it places within
the hands of a nonjudicial officer a power which is ca
pable of abuse and which has been abused upon more
than one occasion. Occasional abuses of this sort have
caused dissatisfaction with discovery procedure as a
whole in a few localities. Last year companion bills were
introduced in the Nebraska legislature, the one to take
away the notary's power to punish for contempt, the
other to curb the use of depositions for purposes of dis
covery before trial. Investigation revealed that the bills
were introduced by a layman, and that they were intro
duced as a protest against the abuse which one of his ·
friends had suffered at the hands of a notary in a par
ticular case. The Omaha Bar Association opp_osed the
bills and they were defeated. The incident which
prompted them indicates the danger of placing a judicial
power in the hands of a non-judicial officer.
The uniform mode of obtaining a review by the trial
court is upon habeas · corpus proceedings 118 when the
.
within his jurisdiction but he is not protected if he assumes to act
. beyond the scope of his authority. " Olmsted v. Edson (1904) 71 Neb.
17, 21, 98 N. W. 415.
ll8 Eaton v. Farmer (1865) 46 N. H. 200 ; In re Hammond (1909) 83
Neb. 636, 120 N. W. 203 ; Re Rauh (1901) 65 0. S. 128, 61 N. E. 701,
·'
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notary punishes a party for refusing to answer a ques
tion at a discovery hearing. The commitment will stand
or be vacated by the court, depending upon whether the
witness had a right to refuse to answer the particular
question. While the witness can justify his refusal to
answer upon the ground that the evidence elicited is im
material or irrelevant, such practice is · not encouraged,
for, as the Ohio Supreme Court has said : " If the wit
ness assumes to decide these questions for himself at the
time, unless the interrogatory involves a question of
privilege, he must do so at his peril. If he should be
right in his decision [to refuse to answer] he would lose
nothing ; if wrong, he must suffer the consequences. ' ' 14
Presumably the court means the witness would lose noth
ing because he could have the improper matter stricken
at the triaJ.25
ll4 Re Rauh (1901) 65 0. S. 128, 61 N. E. 701.
Camp v. Archibald (1893) 50 0. S. 619, 35 N. E. 1056.
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CHAPTER XIV
DECIDING OBJECTIONS AND COMPELLING
ANSWERS TO WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES
There are several administrative problems involved
in deciding objections and compelling answers to written
interrogatories. The problem of first importance is, who
shall decide objections which are raised to interrog
atories. Shall the court or shall a special officer 1 The
trial judge decides all objections to written interrog
atories under the American practice. The English plan
of administration calls for a special officer, a master.
Objections to, and controversies about, written interrog
atories are presented to the court in one of the following
three ways under the American practice : ( 1 ) The party
upon whom interrogatories are served must either answer
or make objections to the questions by motion to strike
within a limited time after they have been served upon
him under the practice in some jurisdictions. ( 2 ) It is
possible under the practice in some states for him to
present his objections for the first time in response to
the proponent 's motion that the penalty for failing to
answer be enforced. (3) Even after answers have been
filed the proponent of the questions may move that fur
ther and more explicit answers be compelled and thus
precipitate a controversy as to the propriety of particu
lar questions.
The English practice is quite different. Leave of court
is necessary in the first instance before the questions are
submitted to the adverse party. 1 The practice is for the
1 Annual

Practice (1929) order 31.
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p�ticular interrogatories which are proposed to be de
livered to be submitted first for approval to a master in
chambers by notice for directions.• A copy of the pro
posed interrogatories usually is served with the appli
cation at least two days before the hearing. The master

takes into account any offer which may be made by the
party sought to be interrogated, to deliver particulars,

or make admissions, or produce documents, and allows

only such particular interrogatories as he ' ' considers

necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or mat
ter, or for saving costs. ' ' 8

He has the fullest discretion

as to postponing, limiting, conditioning or refusing the
application.4 The hearing upon notice for directions is

an effective auxiliary to discovery procedure proper. By

getting the parties together the master is able to foster

mutual disclosure and admissions and in a measure to

supply some of the benefits attendant upon an oral exam

ination.

In England up until

1893

interrogatories were de

livered directly to the party to be interrogated and then
he entered his objections, as is generally the practice in

the United States today. But since

1893

in England this

practice has been greatly improved by the provision for
the interlocutory applications described above.
ulations of

1893

The reg

have been described as ' ' the most satis

factory arrangement that could be arrived at, since they

have remained unaltered since.

The principal change

they made is that the leave of a master must first be ob

tained and he must approve the specific questions to be

asked ; he may, if he considers proper, alter their num

ber, extent or form. " 11

Of course objections may be

taken by the adverse party after the interrogatories have
ll Stringer, A.
8 Id. 68.

B. C. Guide to Practice (1928) 66.

4 Order 31, rules 12, 18.

li Rosenbaum, Rule-Making Authority, 128.
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been approved and submitted,8 yet it is less frequently
done than formerly.7
'rhe two most glaring defects in the practice of some
of the American states are, that the proponent often has
to make a number of motions before he gets anything
like a complete answer to his questions, and that the bur
den on the court is considerable. Not all of the states
have experienced the same trouble about the administra
tion of written interrogatories that has been experienced
in Massachusetts. One reason the trouble has been less
pronounced elsewhere is that the attempt has not been
made to use written interrogatories on a wholesale
scale as a means of obtaining a full discovery. Such
attempt has been made in Massachusetts and the ex
perience thereunder is worthy of a more detailed con
sideration. While the trial judge is supposed to decide
all objections that arise, a considerable portion of the
administrative details is handled by a very efficient chief
clerk in Boston. Prior to 1903 it was necessary for the
proponent to move the court to compel an answer before
the party served with interrogatories had any obligation
to answer. In 1922 a statute was enacted for the purpose
of shifting this burden. 8 According to its terms a party
served with interrogatories was required to answer with
in ten days, unless he obtained an order of court relieving
him from so doing. But the statute failed of its intended ,
effect for the reason that it was generally thought unfair
for the penalty to be self-operative, when there was
no showing that the proponent had served copies of the
interrogatories. It is necessary for the proponent, if
answers are not duly filed, to move the court, upon notice
to his adversary, that a default or nonsuit be granted.
Upon the hearing, the opponent can present any objec
tions to specific questions. Usually, however, the c!erk
·

8 Order · 31, rule 6.
7 Stringer, Op. Cit. 68.
8 Acts of 1922, ch. 314.

·
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simply enters a formal order : ' ' Allowed by the court.
Defendant (or plaintiff) defaulted (or nonsuited) . De
fault ( or nonsuit) to be removed without further order
if answers to interrogatories are filed within ten days. "
This is in reality an order to answer. The consequence
is that more often than otherwise the parties do not
answer voluntarily, but simply wait until forced to do
so by an order. Sometimes interrogatories remain on
file for months before the proponent moves for an an
swer. If the opponent files evasive or incomplete an
swers, it is necessary for the proponent to make a motion
that further and fuller answers be required. It is re.:.
quired that such a motion contain :
( 1 ) A general statement of the nature of the action.
{2) The interrogatories and such answers thereto as
are deemed insufficient.
(3 ) The basis of the claim for fuller answers. Occa
sionally it is necessary that this procedure be repeated
several times.9 Each of these steps costs time and
trouble. It seems that every consideration is accorded
the party upon whom interrogatories have been served,
so that the default or nonsuit, if such be entered, can be
removed if he repents seasonably. Usually the pro
ponent contents himself with whatever answer he has
elicited by the original motion for a default or nonsuit.
The Massachusetts practice is defective in this respect.
This particular feature is generally recognized by the
Massachusetts bench and bar as the weakest point in
the present interrogatory machinery. The economic
waste incident to it is considerable. The defect would be
remedied somewhat under the revision of the Rules of
the Superior Court which was recommended in 1931.
In substance the proposal is that a conditional default
be entered, without motion and hearing, upon the filing
of an affidavit by the proponent to the effect that a copy
9 Of. Warren v.

Deeoste (1929) 269 Mass. 415, 169 N. E. 505.
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of the interrogatories has been served and that the time
for answering has elapsed.
The Washington procedure is representative of that
which obtains in a number of other states. Under it a
part of the burden placed upon the proponent of inter
rogatories has been eliminated. Once interrogatories
have been duly filed and served the real burden is upon
the party upon whom they are served to either answer
them or present his objections within twenty days to
the court by motion to strike. If he does nothing, the
proponent need only move that the penalty be enforced.
There is no way by which the party served with inter
rogatories can simply allow the time to elapse and force
the proponent to take additional steps such as by mo
tion for an order to answer, as in Massachusetts.10 After
the time has elapsed the proper procedure is for the
proponent to move that the appropriate pleading be
stricken and judgment rendered accordingly, rather than
to move for judgment.11 There are two courses open
to the proponent if the interrogated party files incom
plete or insufficient answers. Generally he should pro
ceed by motion to make the answers more speci:fic.111 But
if the answers are palpably insufficient he may move
to strike them from the files and then proceed as if no
answer had been given.18
The practice in most of the states falls somewhere
between that of Massachusetts and that of Washington.
The statutes provide that the party served must make
his objections or answer. Yet before a penalty can be .
enforced it is necessary for the proponent to move either
10 LeMay

v. Baxter (1895) 11 Wash. 649, 40 Pac. 122; Livesey v.

0 'Brien (1893) 6 Wash. 553, 34 Pac. 134.

11 Haas v. Washington Water Power Co. (1916) 93 Wash. 2911 160
Pac. 954.
111 Knapp v. Order of Pendo (1904) 36 Wash. 601, 79 Pac. 209.
18 Lowry v. Moore (1897) 16 Wash. 476, 48 Pac. 238 (where answers
were very evasive) ; Saar v. Weeks (1919) 105 Wash. 628, 178 Pac. 819
(where only 2 of 44 interrogatories were answered). Cf. Lawson v.
Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. (1906) 44 Wash. 26, 86 Pac. 1120.
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that the penalty be enforced or that answers be com
pelled. It is not clear under some of the statutes and
decisions whether the party served with · interrogatories

is entitled to contest the propriety of the questions, after
time for answering has elapsed.u
Prior to the recent amendme�t Jo the Massachusetts
statutes which limits the number of interrogatories to
thirty, the burden upon both the judge and the clerk 's
office was very great. Although conditions have im
proved since the number of interrogatories has been
limited, there is still a considerable administrative bur
den upon the cQurt in connection with interrogatories.
The same has been true under the federal equity practice.
Wallace R. Lane has said : " In some instances quite
as much time of . the court has been taken in hearing
arguments concerning interrogatories and deciding what
should or should not be answered, as is occupied in the
actual trial of the case . ' ' 11
14 In addition to the statutes whieh are set for-th in the appendix see:
Niven v. Union Trust Co.· ( 1927) 5 N. J. Mise. 291, 136 A. 334; Combs v.
Union Co. (1896) 146 Ind. 688, 46 N. E. 16 ; Sparks v. Reeves & Co.
(1910) 165 Ala. 352, 51 So. 574; Fahey v. Aneient Order of United
Wor)onen (1919) 187 Iowa 825, 174 N. W. 650 ; Free v. Telegraph Co.
( 1907) 135 Iowa 69, 110 N. W. 143 ; Modern .8. S. Co. v. Van Buren
Co. (1905) 126 Iowa 606, 102 N. W. 536.
16 Lane, Federal Equity Rules, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 276, 294.
'

CHAPTER XV
MAY A PARTY BE REQUIRED TO DISCLOSE
EVIDENCE OF HIS OWN CASE?
DISCLOSURE OF WHAT PARTY WILL TEsTIFY To IN SuPPORT
OF HIS CASE
The lawyer who is examining a party for discovery
before trial may interrogate upon all of the issues of
the case in some thirteen jurisdictions. Disclosure of
everything relevant to the controversy may be required.
The examination may assume the same latitude as an
examination of the party at the trial. In none of the
jurisdictions in which deposition procedure is used for
purposes of discovery before trial is the scope of the
examination restricted to narrower limits than would
obtain upon examination �t the trial.l As a matter of
practice the scope is even broader than at the trial. At
tempts have been made to restrict the examination, but
they have been unsuccessful. The epithet "fishing ex
cursion for the adverse party's evidence " has been em
ployed against the taking of depositions for discovery
in every state where it :Pas been attempted, first for the
purpose of preventing the examination entirely, and fail
ing of this, for the purpose of restricting its scope. Judi
cial opinion, however, has been opposed to restriction.
The late William Howard Taft expressed the Ohio view
when he said : " There is no objection that I know why
each party should not know the other 's case. ' ' 8 Com
-

1 Such states are Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Ramp·
shire, Ohio and Texas.
,
8 Shaw v. Ohio Edison Co. (1887) 9 0. Dec. Rep. 809, 812. See also
Re Berger (1919) 13 0. App. 205, 101 0. S. 5121 130 N. W. 935, The
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missioner Clay of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in the
classic case setting forth the Kentucky discovery prac
tice, said : " It is earnestly insisted that the right given
by subsection 8 of section 606 ( allowing cross-examina
tion of adverse party by deposition) , if interpreted
according to the contention of appellant, is liable to
great abuse ; that it will enable the party to find out his
opponent 's evidence. in advance of trial. As, however,
the right is given to each party, they will be upon terms
of equality ; and, as it is to be presumed that neither
will offer any evidence other than the exact facts and
truth of the case, we do not see how either could be preju
diced. ' ' 8 The New Hampshire Supreme Court has said :
" We think it cannot admit of a serious doubt that the
deposition of either party may be taken as to all the
matters in issue between them, except disclosing the .1
names of witnesses and the manner of proving his case.'
So far as the plaintiff is concerned it would hardly occur
to any that the defendant could not take his deposition
to all the material matters on which the suit is founded.
To hold otherwise would render this provision nearly
nugatory. • • • We see no reason to doubt that in
taking the deposition of a party he may be required to
answer all questions relating to the issue on either side,
much as if he were on the stand. ' ' 6 The actual practice
in Missouri, Nebraska, Texas and Indiana, as described
by lawyers in those states, permits the examination by
deposition before trial to be at least as broad as an ex
amination at the trial, and frequently, much broader.
Ohio statutory provision that the examination may assume the form of
a cross,examination has been instrumental in fostering this liberal Ohio
rule as to the scope of the examination.
8 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Williams. (1908) 129 Ky. 515, 112 S. W.
651, 653.
4 This limitation is imposed by the statutes. N. H. Public Laws
(1926) eh. 336, see. 25.
5 Eaton v. Farmer (1865) 46 N. H. 200, 201. See also LaCoss v.
Lebanon (1917) 78 N. H; 413, 101
. A� 364; Penniman v. Jones (1879)
59 N. H. 119.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has taken the position
that examination for discovery may assume the form
of, and be as broad as, cross-examination at the trial, and
that everything relevant to the controversy should be
disclosed.6 In the case in which this policy was first set
forth the trial court had made an order stating ' ' that
the . proposed examination be, and the same is hereby,
limited to such subjects as may be material to the de
fendant 's case, but the same shall not extend to any
examination into the facts essential to support .the plain
tiff 's case. " 7 The Supreme Court set aside the order
and held that it was improper thus to limit the examina
tion.• The Ontario discovery procedure is similar to
that of Wisconsin. There is a similar liberality as to
the scope of the inquiry, permitting questions to be asked
regarding any or all of the issues of the case.9

Limitations were imposed upon the scope of written
interrogatories for discovery under the earlier Massa
chusetts practice, but more recently such limitations have
been discarded.

Today interrogation may be upon all

of the issues of the case.

This change in rules is the

result of statutes which were enacted for the specific
purpose of liberalizing the practice.

The early decisions

held that discovery from a party was limited " to mat
ters in aid of a case to be established against the party
interrogated. ' ' 10 Iri applying the rule the court said :
"It is difficult to imagine a question relative to material

facts in support of a case against a party the answer to
which would not necessarily involve a disclosure of the

mode of the proof. ' '

It was held that a party need not

6 Kelly v. Railroad Co. (1884) 60 Wis. 480, 19 N. W. 521; Horlick's
Malted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel Co. (1913) 155 Wis. 201, 144 N. W. 272.
'7 Kelly v. Railroad Co. (1884) 60 Wis. 480, 19 N. W. 521. The briefs in
the ease show clearly that such was the main issue before the court.
Wis. Cases and Briefs, vol. 18!!.
S id.

9 Graham

10 'W'illl'on

v.

Temperance Co. (1895) 16 P. B. 536.

v; Webb'er (18"54)

2 Gray 55'8.
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party was permitted to refuse to answer such a question
as " What caused the collision T " on the ground that it
would disclose his own case.18 Th'e view was maintained
that the word " case " meant " case set up in his own
pleadings. ' '

In

1910, however, the Massachusetts Su

preme Court indicated a more liberal view when it said :
" But this does not mean that he could file interrogatories
only as to matters upon which he had the burden of
proof, or that a defendant whose answer was merely a
general denial could not require the plaintiff to answer
any interrogatories. ' ' 18 Again in 1912 the court held
that interrogatories could approxilnate in scope an ex
amination at the trial.u

But the court was not certain

whether " interrogation as to specific facts in contradic

tion of a definite claim set up by the adverse party "

would be permitted.16

Shortly thereafter it was held

that a plaintiff could not be questioned for a detailed
account of an accident. 16 The statute of 1913 provided
the final and decided liberalization of discovery in Massa- ,
chusetts,.

It provided that a party might interrogate an

adverse party for the discovery of all facts and docu
ments admissible at the trial, the only limitations being
that he could not discover the names of witnesses or title

papers not material to issues in the action.17
ute has been given a liberal construction.

This stat
Recently it

has been construed to ' ' enable a party to interrogate
his adversary to the same extent as would be permissible
11 Id.
18 Robbins v. Brocton St. Ry. Co. (1901) 180 Mass. 51, 61 N. E. 265.
18 Grabenstein v. Stone & Webster Eng. Corp. (1910) 205 Mass. 431,

439, 91 N. E. 411.
14 Looney v. Saltonstall (1912) 212 Mass. 69, 98 N. E. 698.
15 Id.
16 Wakeley v. Boston Elevated Railway (1914) 217 Mass. 488, 105
N. E. 436. This ease did not involve the statutes of 1913.
17 Mass. Laws of 1913, ch. 815, preserved in Mass. Gen. Laws (1921)
ch. 231, sec. 63, and in amendment of 1922, Acts 1922, ch. 314.
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if he were called as a witness at the trial. ' ' 18 Quebec,
Iowa, Louisiana and Alabama also allow written inter
rogatories to cover all of the issues of the case.19
Field investigations were made by the author in the
following jurisdictions which do not restrict an examina
tion before trial more narrowly than an examination at
the· trial : Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Ohio, Ontario,
Quebec, Indiana, Kentucky, Texas, Missouri, New Hamp
shire and Nebraska. Practically every lawyer and judge
who was interviewed in these states was asked whether
a party who is allowed to find out in advance of trial
what his adversary and his adversary 's witnesses will
testify to, is not encouraged to manufacture evidence to
meet that disclosed. The uniform answer was that this
had not been the experience but that on the contrary
a chief use of the procedure was to curb perjured testi
mony and to eliminate false claims. A few terse ex
pressions of opinion representative of those given gen
erally are as follows : ( 1 ) " It does not foster perjury
for this reason. If each party can first of all pin his oppo
nent down to a definite and detailed position in regard to
the facts in controversy, there is little reason to fear
that the party thus pinned down will concoct evidence
in any fashion. He is already bound. The mutuality of
discovery is a saving feature. " ( 2) " The procedure is
very helpful in keeping in line that class of witnesses
who have not much regard for the sanctity of an oath. ' '
(3) " Instead of finding that a ruthless discovery will
foster perjury, as some lawyers supposed at first, our
experience has been that it is the greatest preventive of
perjury. " (4) " We find that our opponents do not coach
18 Cutler v. Cooper (1920) 234 Mass. 307, 125 N. E. 634; Warren v.
Decoste (1929) 269 Mass. 415, 169 N. E. 505. See also Goldman v.
Ashkins (1929) 266 Mass. 374, 165 N. E. 515.
IS Grigg 's Quebec Code of Civil Procedure (1930) sec. 287 ; Code of
Iowa (1927) sec. 11185; McGhee v. Brown (1848) 3 La. Ann. Rep. 272 ;
Sloss-Sheffield Steel Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1910) 167 Ala. 557,
52 So. 751.
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their witnesses in preparation for a discovery examina
tion like they do for the trial. The.Y are so busy that they
think little of preparation until the necel!lsities of trial
arise. Consequently we get the witness before he has
been coached to any extent. The very spontaneity of the
testimony is an evident guaranty of its truthfulness. ' '
( 5 ) " Inasmuch as it is often more than a year before
trial is reached it means a good deal just to be able to
obtain a witness 's story while his memory is fresh. "
( 6 ) ' ' Our chief use of the procedure is to eliminate the
most elaborate form of perjury-the fake claim. "
(7) " It has proved to be a weapon of the utmost value
to our bar in ascertaining the truth where the claim of
the person whose deposition is being taken is believed
to be a fictitious one. Many lawyers refer to it as a fish
ing expedition and there are a good many cases where
it is abused as such, but where a party is likely to shift
his story after learning the · theory of the case of his
opponent, it is a most satisfactory means of confining
him to one story. It has proved to be the terror of the
lying litigant. ' ' These statements are representative
of those given by some two hundred practicing lawyers
in jurisdictions which employ the unrestricted examina
tion for discovery before trial. There is said to be some
coaching of witnesses upon the basis of what they and
others have testified to upon their depositions, but this
coaching is done in an effort to square up the testimony
of witnesses within the bounds of limitations prescribed
by a knowledge that the opposing attorney has copies
of their previous testimony and will point out any
flagrant change of position.
A final word should be said about the Massachusetts
experience. There, discovery is upon written interroga
tories. Both the narrow rule and the liberal rule have
been tried, the latter obtaining at p resent. Not a single
Boston lawyer who was interviewed expressed the opin-
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ion that the scope of the inquiry was too broad at present.
or that it was resulting in increased perjury. On the
contrary, a number said that they favored augmenting
the written interrogatory procedure with an oral ex
amination so that the theoretical scope of the inquiry
would be utilized under a more effective machinery.
Discovery has been limited in several jurisdictions to
facts relating to the issues upon which the party seeking
discovery has the burden of proof under the pleadings.
The most striking example of the disastrous effect of
this rule upon discovery procedure is furnished by the
New York practice. There was a conflict from the very
adoption of discovery in New York as to whether and
to what extent, a party could be required to disclose evi
dence in support of his own case. A rule of court was
adopted in 1870 which limited discovery to facts ' ' mate
rial in proving the case or defense of the party " seeking
the exarnination.80 The Throop code subsequently com
bined the several methods of taking testimony before
trial into a single deposition procedure, and since it had
formerly been possible to take depositions to perpetuate
testimony, when necessity required it, this element found
its way into the consolidated procedure and the word
" necessary" was added to the word "material. " The
two requirements that a · party must show that the dis
.
covery sought was material and necessary to his cause
of action or defense produced a very strict rule, so that
finally the general . statement of the rule in New York
became : "The applicant can have an examination to
prove his own case only. ' ' 11 This was taken to mean
that a party could not have an examination merely to
establish the negative of a proposition which his ad
versary was required to establish affirmatively,88 the
eo Rule 21, quoted in Adams v. Cavanaugh (1885) 37 Hun 232, 233,
see also cases cited in 1 Silvernail 7.
Ill Oshinsky v. Gumberg (1919) 176 N. Y. S. 406.
811 Kimball v. John Budd Co. (1925) 212 N. Y. S. 404.
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word ' ' case ' ' being interpreted to include the issues as
to which the party had the burden of proof under the
pleadings. The following quotation is representative of
the reasons which the courts set forth as justifying re
strictions upon discovery : ' ' The provisions for such
examinations are not intended to enable a party to dis
cover what his opponent 's testimony will be, so that he
may obtain witnesses to contradict it. Experience shows
that if a party discovers what his opponent 's testimony
will be, and has time enough, he is often successful in
discovering also witnesses for contradiction. ' ' 28 The
four departments of the · Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court at present enforce a fairly uniform
rule in regard to the scope of an examination before
trial, in other than tort cases. It is this : Ordinarily
the examination will be confined to the issues concerning
which the party applicant has the burden of proof under
'
the pleadings.24
Some of the New York courts use the rule that a party
is entitled only to discovery of facts material and neces
sary to his cause of action or defense as the basis for
imposing special restrictions upon discovery in automo
bile accident litigation. There is a conflict of ·opinion
among the several departments of the Appellate Division
concerning the exact scope of examinations for discovery
in this type of litigation. The question at issue is
whether the examination should be limited to such items
·

28 Sheehan v. The A. & B. Turnpike Co. (1889) 8 N. Y. S. 14. See
also Beach v. Mayor (1878) 4 Abb. N. C. 236; Chapin v. Thompson
(1878) 16 Hun 53 ; Knight v. Morgenroth (1904) 87 N. Y. S. 693.
24 First Department: Ganni v. Stallman (1922) 193 N. Y. S. 97 ;
Standard Bank v. American Union Bank (1922) 197 N. Y. S. 148 ; New
York City Car Advertising Co. v. E. Regensburg -& Sons (1923) 200.
N. Y. S. 152; . Curtis v. Searles (1923) 200 N. Y. S. 602. Second depart·
ment: Parkin v. Unity Protective Ins. Ass'n (1926) 219 N. Y. S. 27;
Fromm v. Grisman (1922) 197 N. Y. 8 . 156; Safrin v. Safrin (1923) 200
N. Y. S. 51; Kimball v. John Budd Co. (1925) 212 N. Y. 8. 404; O 'Boyle
v. Home .Ins. Co. (1929) 234 N. Y. B. 259. Fourth Department: Tich·
nor Bros. Inc. v. Bickle (1926) 214 N. Y. S. 547; Schmitt v. Baptist
Temple, Inc. (1929) 234 N. Y. S. 888.
,

·
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as ownership and control of the vehicle or should extend
also to the facts of liability and damage. Prior to the
adoption of the Civil Practice Act there was substantial
authority to the · effect that a general examination would
not be allowed, the reason being that it "would amount
to nothing more than a cross-examination of plaintiff
and an inquiry into his case. " 25 Under the Civil Practice
Act the First Department has committed itself to the
same rule.88 Reasons assigned for adhering to the rule
are that the Civil Practice Act changed only the pro
cedure and not the right to examinations before trial, and
that " considerations of sound public policy" do not
· favor general examinations before trial in negligence
cases. The Second Department has consistently ad
hered to the contrary view · and has sanctioned general
examinations.27 This allows an inquiry into the facts of
liability, whereas the rule enforced in the First Depart
ment does not. The reasons given for allowing a general
examination are thaf the Civil Practice Act was intended
to liberalize the practice, that anything which will bring
out facts before the trial should be encquraged, that the
experience of the bar with the more liberal practice has
been favorable, and that the fact that the action is in
tort is no reason for limiting the examination. It results
from this conflict that in New York City (First Depart
ment) the strict rule is followed while nearby Brooklyn
( Second Department) has the liberal rule. The Rochester
practice seems to follow that in Brooklyn more nearly
than that in New York City, although it is somewhat less
liberal than the practice in Brooklyn.aa The possibility
ll6 Kessler v. North River Realty Co. (1915) 155 N. Y. S. 799, 800.
J6 Shaw v. Samley Realty Co. (1922) 194 N. Y. S. 531.

8'7 Samols v. Mayer (1923) 199 N. Y. S. 754; Middleton v. Boardman
(1924) 206 N. Y. S. 725 ; Storm v. Gair (1925) 207 N. Y. S. 925; Major
v. Coles (1926) 214 N. Y. S. 877.
88 Cf. Judge Rodenbeck's liberal opinion in Swift v. General Baking
Co. (1927) 220 N. Y. S. 554; Cameron v. Rochester & S. R. Co. (1925) 210
N. Y. S. 241 ; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Shearman (1924) 204 N. Y. S. 673.
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of a uniformity of practice throughout the state seems
rather remote since the Court of Appeals has refused t o
lay down a u.niform rule, o n the ground that the matter
is discretionary with the Supreme Court.119 Eve:p. in
courts where the stricter rule is .followed, a more liberal
examination may be allowed if ' ' special circumstances ' '
are shown to exist.80 The general test as to what con
stitutes such special circumstances is whether the plain
tiff would "be unable to prove a cause of action without
an examination of the defendant. " 81 The " necessity"·
factor may sometimes operate to enlarge the s cope of the
examination, and sometimes, though lesl? frequently, it
may operate to restrict it.82 The fact that the party
seeking discovery already has knowledge of the facts
sought,88 or that he has witnesses who could testify to
the facts,84 is not conclusive proof that the discovery
is unnecessary, inasmuch as a legitimate purpose of discovery is to obtain adinissions.85
·

Special restrictions upon the scope of the examination
similar to those which are applied in negligence cases
are also applied in other types of tort actions in New
York. The scoP,e of the examination is restricted in such
actions as deceit;86 libel,87 and malpractice.88
. 89 Middleton

v. Boardman (1924) 240 N. Y. 552, 148 N. E. 701.

80 Illustrative examples of " special circumstances " may be found

in the following eases: Palmer v. Hampton (1927) 220 N. Y. S. 768 ;
Laurino v. Pratt (1927) 226 N. Y. S. 848 ; Sehonhous v. Weiner (1930)
246 N. Y. S. 73 ; Oshinsky v. Gumber (1919) 176 N. Y. S. 406.
81 Krumeieh v. Sundelson (1928) 229 N. Y. S. 488, 489.
88 Citizen 's Trust Co. of Utica v. Prescott & Sons, Inc. (1927) 223
N. Y. S. 184.
88 Klapp v. Merwin (1924) 203 N. Y. S. 694; Drake v. Line-A-Time
Mfg. Co. (1929) 233 N. Y. S. 481.
84 Green v. Selzniek (1927) 221 N. Y. S. 63.
811 Maria v. Bower (1929) 134 Misc. 800, 236 N. Y. S. 291. A similar
rule was recognized under the code. Terry v. Ross Heater & Mfg. Co.
(1917) 167 N. Y. S. 747.
86 Sands v. Comerford (1925) 207 N. Y. S. 398.
87 Hermann v. Osborne Co. (1927) 128 Misc. 859, 220 N. Y. S. 306;
Bergstrom v. J;l.idgway Co. (1910) 138 App. Div. 178, 123 N. Y. S. 29;
_
Albanos v. News SyndiCate
Co. (1927) 130 Mise. 566, 224 N. Y. S. 331 ;
Lattimer v. Sun-Herald Corp. (1924) 203 N. Y. S. 734.
88 Krumeieh v. Sundelson (1927) 131 Misc. 9, 225 N. Y. S. 667; Schon·
hous v. Weiner (1930) 246 N. Y. S. 73.
.
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The New York practice illustrates the ineffectiveness
of restrictions upon the scope of the discovery as an aid
in arriving at the truth. The following discussion is
based upon interviews with representative lawyers in
New York City and Rochester, and upon a comparison
of their views with those found in the states in which an
unrestricted examination is allowed. The experience of
lawyers in states in which an unrestricted examination
is allowed is that where each party pins his adversary
down to a definite and detailed story in advance of trial,
the truth is discovered and perjury · curtailed. The mu
tuality of discovery is the saving factor. In New York,
on the contrary, one party, the plaintiff, can find out his
opponent 's expected testimony as to one side of the
controversy, and perhaps, by fishing, get glimpses of the
other side also. Is there anything to prevent the plain
tiff from manufacturing a story to meet this Y Elsewhere
the saving feature is that he is prevented from such
tactics by virtue of the fact that he has already bound
himself as to his detailed position with regard to the
facts. The defendant may have a similar right to dis
covery as to his affirmative defenses, but this is by no
means sufficient to bind his adversary definitely. Or per
chance he has no affirmative defense.
Again, it may be possible for either party to get un
restricted discovery from adverse witnesses on the
ground that they reside more than one hundred miles
from the place of trial. The experience elsewhere has
been that little harm comes from a party examining his
opponent 's witnesses if it is possible to bind such party
to his own story before he starts on his quest for infor
mation. Without this safe-guard there are considerable
possibilities of unfair advantage.
Another result of the lack of a full and mutual dis
closure is that the plaintiff may be allowed to seek ma
terial with which to build up a case to such

an

extent

·
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that it amounts to a species of blackmail. There is no
reciprocal right of the defendant to a weapon with which
to meet a nonmeritorious case. The result is that instead
of discovery being regarded as an instrument of truth,
it is regarded as a tactical wea�n. Instead of the pro
cedure encouraging settlements by disclosing the exact
status of the controversy, it is employed quite differently
as a mode of forcing settlements. If there is a suit
against a prominent business man or a prominent society woman the first move is for an examination before
trial, not so much for the purpose of discovering the truth
as upon the theory that such a person will prefer to settle
rather than to suffer the humiliation of the examination.
To �nforce the New York rule as to the s cope of the
examination it has been necessary to require that the
applicant set forth the subject-matter of his intended in
quiry. This has the effect of notifying the opposing at
torney as to the points on which he should instruct his
client to disclose as little as possible. Indeed it serves
as a sort of invitation for such coaching. The contrary
experience in states where the applicant is only required
to state that he desires an examination without disclos
ing the points thereof, has been that lawyers do com
paratively little coaching of the witness in preparation
for facing the examination. They are not careful in this
regard until the necessities of the trial appear.

The

New York rule serves to counteract this natural tendency
and, accordingly, to give less a ssurance of spontaneous
testimony.
The New York rule as to the scope of the examination
has been the means of effecting severe limitations upon
the use of discovery in that type of litigation · in which
it has found its greatest usefulness elsewhere, namely,
personal injury actions.

Similarly, it restricts employ

ment of discovery examinations by the class of litigants
who elsewhere hav-e fo'Und the

de'Vice moat helpful;

\
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namely, defendants. Thus, from two different angles,
the practical utility of discovery procedure is curtailed.
In some states discovery has had a salutary effect on
pleading in that it has divided the labor of the reduction
of the controversy to precise issues. In Ne�York the

situation is exactly the reverse, in one particular, at
least. Since the defendant can have no discovery ex
cept on his affirmative defenses, he often puts in fictitious
defenses for the sole purpose of securing an examination
of his adversary. Indeed several New York lawyers
pointed to this as one of the chief defects in the present
system.
Finally, the theory that the right to discovery is with
in the discretion of the court and that each case has its
peculiar status as regards discovery, serves as an in
vitation for needless presentation of disputes to an al
ready overburdened court. The experience elsewhere
�as been that when lawyers know what their opponents
can have, as a matter of right, they will accord them the
same voluntarily. And when the basis of adjustment is
the ordinary law of evidence there is sufficient definite
ness of knowledge to allow the lawyers to settle a
majority of the disputes among themselves without re
sort to the court.
It is a mistake to suppose, as some courts apparently

have done, that the New York rule that a party can have
discovery only of facts relating to the issues of which .
he has the burden of proof under the pleadings is sub
stantially the same as the chancery rule that a party
could not be compelled to disclose his evidence or the
manner of proving his own case. As a matter of fact,
the chancery rp.le was not as illiberal as the New York
rule. Wigram stated the chancery rule thus : ' ' The
right of a plaintiff in equity to the benefit of the defend
ant 's oath is limited to a discovery of such material facts
as relate to the ' plaintiff 's case '_..:arid does hot exterid
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to a discovery of the manner in which, or of the evidence
by means of which the defendant 's case is to be estab
lished, or to any discovery of the defendant's evi
dence. ' ' 89 Similarly, Hare said that, ' ' The defendant
is not compelled to discover his evidence if it cannot tend
to establish affirmatively the cru;e of the plaintiff. ' ' iO
The chancery rule did not restrict the examination to the
issues of which the party had the burden of proof under
the pleadings. The correct interpretation of the rule
has been set forth by Bray, the leading English authority
on discovery : ' ' It is, however, plain from the general
scope of the book (Wigram, on Discovery) that the
meaning which he attaches to the expression ' the party 's
own evidence ' is not in principle different from that of the expression ' matter in question in the action ' here
adopted.. It must also be remembered that under the
chancery practice a plaintiff ex necessitate rei had to
deliver his interrogatories before the defense was put in,
and therefore their relevancy could only be referred to
the plaintiff's statement of his case in the bill. ' ' '1
Several other jurisdictions besides New York restrict
the scope of discovery examinations. The question has
not yet been dec\ded under the new Michigan rules for
discovery as to whether or to what extent the New York
decisions limiting the scope of the examination will be
followed. There is some danger of such an undesirable
result because the rules are modeled after the provisions
of the New York Civil Practice Act, and employ the
words " material " and "_necessary, ' ' the very words
which have been seized upon by the New York courts as
the , basis for restricting the scope of the examination.
I
One of the draftsmen of the Michigan rules of court has
. 89 Wigram on lAw of Discovery, 13 Law Library Series 41.

40 Hare on Discovery, 198. For similar definitions see Bray 's Law of
Dise:overy, 4�4; W.JK!!!J¥" e on E�ide�ee, vol. 3, see. 1846, 1856; Story,
Equ1ty Pleadmg \llrtli M.) see; ·572. �
tl Bray 's Law of Discovery, 12.
· ·
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said concerning the rule on discovery : " Unfortunately
it has been given a rather narrow interpretation by the
New York courts, which have held that the examining
party may interrogate regarding his own case only, but
. not regarding the case of the other party. It is to be
hoped that the courts of Michigan will give the rule a
wider scope. " 41
There is a distinct division of authority as to the
allowable scope of interrogatories in the Federal equity
courts under Equity Rule 58. The greater number of
decisions, however, limit discovery to facts in support
of the case of the applicant.

As in New York, the

"necessity " factor has played a part in limiting dis
covery.

The general theory of the federal courts which

adhere to the strict rule as to the scope of the exainina
tion is illustrated by the leading case of J. H. Day Com

pany

v.

Mountain City Milling Company, in which San

ford, .T., says : " After careful consideration I think it is
clear that the 58th Equity Rule was intended merely to
change the procedure in reference to obtaining discovery
and to extend this right to a defendant as well as to a
plaintiff, and was not intended to change the long estab
lished rule in reference to the subject matter of such
discovery or to extend such right in favor of either party
beyond the matters relating to his own ground of action
or defense, respectively, and enable him to obtain dis
covery in reference to matters relating solely to the
ground of action or defense of the other party. ' ' 48
41 Sunderland, The New Miehigan Court Rules, 10 Mieh. State Bar ,
Jour. 586, 592.
48 225 Fed. 622, 624. Aeeord: F. Speidel Co. v. Barstow Co. (1925) 232
Fed. 617 ; Wooleott v. Nat. Elee� Sign Co. (1916) 235 Fed. 224; Gas Prod.
Co. v. Am. Ref. Co. (1926) 12 F. (2d) 98; Buron Weston Co. v. Brown
Paper Co. (1926) 13 F. (2d) 412; P. H. MeGarry & Co. v. South. Pae.
Co. (1925) 4 F. (2d) 421. The infiuenee of the similar English rule is
apparent in some of these deeisions. See also the English influenee at
the ineeption of the rule from the correspondenee between Mr. Jus·
tie Lurton and Lord Chancellor Loreburn, found in liopkins ' New Fed·
eral Equity Rules (6th ed.) p. 32.
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The liberal view which obtains in some federal courts
is set forth by Trippet, J. : " Some of the courts seem
inclined to throw difficulties in the way of discovering the
truth as provided by the rule under discussion, and
oppose the evident purpose of it. The old rules are abol
ished. There is no reason why the procedure now should
be hampered by restrictions imposed by any previous
rules of procedure. The truth should always be sought
after, and the courts should eageriy enforce any method
of securing the truth. It makes no difference whether
the facts are as much within the knowledge of the plain
�iff as of the defendant. The. facts have to be proven,
and if the plaintiff can get an admission from the de
fendant, it saves the necessity of proving the facts,
except by such admission of the defendant. The rule
expressly provides that the plaintiff may propose inter
rogatories to elicit facts material to the support or de
fense of the case. To say that the plaintiff shall not
inquire about the facts that may relate to the defense is
to construe the rule in plain derogation of its language
and purpose. • • • The plain object of this rule is
to dispose of issues in advance of the trial by compelling
the parties tq make admissions. This rule, properly
enforced, will compel the parties to be honest concerning
their pleadings, and parties to litigation ought to be com
pelled to be honest by putting them on oath and requiring
them to be specific about the facts at issue. There is no
reason why the parties should wait until the day of tr�al,
and then bring in witnesses to prove facts that the par
ties may be compelled to admit under oath· prior to the
trial. The truth is always the truth and telling the truth
will not hurt anyone, except in so far as he ought to be
hurt. The only protection that should be afforded any
litigant from answering any interrogatories, which call
for material facts for the plaintiff or the defendant, is to
protect him in his constitutional rights, such as to be

1
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compelled in a criminal case to be a Witness against
himself, and in matters of public policy, where the statute
prohibits disclosures, etc. Such a practice as here in
dicated would tend to shorten trials, and materially aid
the administration of justice, and that is the very pur
pose of the rule under discussion. ' ' 44
Under the Washington statute interrogatories for dis
covery are confined to matters " material to the support
or defense of the action. ' ' 46

In its narrower construc

tion this has been taken to limit discovery to evidence
in support of the issues as to which the party proponent
'
has the affirmative under the pleadings. For instance,
the Washington Supreme Court has held that " since
they were propounded by the defense, they must call for
matters material to the defense.

Those here propounded

had no tendency in that direction.

They rather required

the plaintiff to state with particularity what evidence she
intended to give in support of her complaint.

•

•

•

Seemingly, it ought not to require argument to demon
strate that the statute furnishes no sanction for inter
rogatories such as these. " 48

It is even possible, under

this statute, to refuse discovery as to evidence in support
of the case of the party applicant, for it has been held
that :

"It is not the purpose of the statute to enable the

one party to a lawsuit to require the other party thereto
to supply him with all the facts and documents that may
be material to his side of the case, or even to secure ad
missions against interest.

Its purpose is to enable him

to discover material facts and documents solely within
44 Quirk v. Quirk (1919) 259 Fed. 597, 598. Accord: Perkins Oil Well
Cementing Co. v. Owen (1923) 293 Fed. 759; Texas Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co.
(1926) 12 F. (2d) 317.
46 Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) see. 1226.
48 Hill v. Hill (1923) 126 Wash. 560, 561, 219 Pae. 18, followed in
Schmit v. Campbell (1926) 140 Wash. 376, 249 Pae. 487, and in Kelly
Springfield Tire Co. v. Lotta Miles Tire Co. (1926) 139 Wash. 159, 245
Pae. 921 : " It does not enable him to pry into the opposite party 's
ease. "
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the knowledge, possession, or control of the other party
to which he has not access. ' ' 47
The New Jersey provision for written interrogatories
in actions at law has been so construed as to limit the
scope of the discovery to facts in support of the issues
upon which the applicant for discovery has the burden
of proof.48 Questions about · th� following items have
been held improper in automobile negligence cases in
New Jersey : extent of injuries ; time of confinement in
hospital ; the value of the automobile before and after
the accident.49
South Carolina courts have restricted the scope of the
examination for discovery. The supreme court, upon
several occasions, has said that it would not compel " a
disclosure before trial of the evidence by which the op
posite party Will support his own allegations. ' ' 110 These
cases are based upon the amendment of 1923 requiring
an order upon good cause shown before an adversary
can be examined. The statute represents legislative pro
test against the liberal rule laid down in the Fox case in
1922 wherein it was held that a party to an action was
entitled, as a matter of right, to examine his adversary
before trial. As Mr. Justice Fraser has pointed out in
his dissenting opinion in that case : "If the right to
examine the adverse party is an absolute right, then
the scope of the examination cannot be restricted. ' ' 111
There is a rule of court in England to the effect that
discovery may be allowed or disallowed, depending upon
whether it is "necessary either for disposing fairly of
4'7 Brooke v. Boyd (1914) 80 Wash. 213, 141 Pac. 357.
48 Wolters v. Trust Co. (1900) 65 N. J. L. 130, 46 Atl. 627 ; Watkins

v. Cope (1913) 84 N. J. L. 143, 86 Atl. 545; Neske v. Burns (1930) 8
N. J. Misc. 160, 149 Atl. 761.
49 Neske v. Burns (1930) 8 N; J. :Misc. 160, 149 Atl. 761.
&O People's Bank v. Helms (1927) 140 S. C. 107, 112, 138 S. E. 622 ;
U. S. Tire Co. v. Keystone Tire Sales Co. (1929) 153 S. C. 56, 150 S. E.
347.
Ill Fox v. Clifton Mfg. Co. (1922) 122 S. C. 86, 114 S. E. 700.
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the cause or matter or for saving costs. " 58 It is this
provision which the English court has used to restrict
the scope of the inquiry in automobile accident cases. In
a recent decision Scrutton, L. J., explains the English
practice in this regard : "In most accident cases both
parties are able to call witnesses, and therefore to inter
rogate upon small questions of fact relating to the de
'
tails of the accident cannot be necessary for the fair
trial of the action, and interrogatories should not be
allowed. • • • These considerations are probably
sufficient to disentitle the party to interrogate in most
accident cases. But there should be no other fetter. ' ' 58
The last sentence quoted refers to a prior English rule
to the effect that interrogatories would not be allowed
at all in automobile accident cases except for " very
special reasons. " 54 Although the English court does
not adhere to the view that a party is limited in discovery
to the issues upon which he has the affirmative,66 yet it
restricts the examination in accident litigation by use
of the "necessity " factor.
The Connecticut statute provides that discovery
shall deal with matters "material to the support or de
fense of the suit. '' 66 The Connecticut Judicial Council
has interpreted this provision as meaning : ' ' Discovery
may be had of facts supporting the mover 's cause of
action or defense either in chief or on rebuttal, but not
of facts pertinent only to the adverse party's cause of
action or defense. Thus, in an action for negligence the
facts showing defendant 's co.nduct at the time of the acci
dent may be discovered by the plaintiff, for he must
establish the defendant's negligence. The defendant,
however, in action for negligence may have discovery
58 Annual Praetiee (1930) order 31, rule 2.
58 Griebart v. Morris (1920) 1 K. B. 659, 666.

114 See Interrogatories in Running Down Actions (1928) 72 Sol. Jour.

421.

55 Bray 's Law of Discovery, 458, 465,
56 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) see. 5764.

531-533.
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of facts tending to show that the plaintiff's conduct was
negligent. ' ' 67
..
\

DISCLOSURE OF NAMES OF WITNESSES WHOM PARTY WILL
INTRODUCE
Chancery in granting bills of discovery adhered to the
rule that a party could not be compelled to disclose the
names of witnesses whom he intended to introduce at the
trial.68 It was supposed that any contrary rule might
encourage a party to tamper with his adversary's wit
nesses. The rule has been preserved under modern dis
covery practice in many jurisdictions.69 A somewhat
unusual reason for retention of the rule has been given
by the Committee on Legislation of the Massachusetts
Bar Association : ' ' A danger applies to the disclosure
of the names ..of witnesses, in the use of the system, not
merely to ascertain the names of witnesses not known to
the interrogating party, but to find out which of his
witnesses are known to the other party with a view to
gambling for a settlement or surprise if he is ignorant.
The way to avoid this abuse seems to be for the court,
before ordering a party to disdose the names of all of
his witnesses, to require as a condition precedent that
the interrogating party disclose the names of all of his
witnesses in order that the court may know whether
' justice requires ' a disclosure from the other party. ' ' 60
In sharp contrast with the theory underlying this reason
is the terse statement of the late William Howard Taft,
while he was Judge of the Superior Court of Cincinnati,
Ohio : ' ' Witnesses do not belong to one party more than
to another. ' ' 81
57 Seeond Report (1930) p. 66.
68 Bray 's Law of Diseovery, 471.
59 In addition to the statutes whieh

are set forth in the appendix
at the baek of this volume, see Ex Parte Sehoepf (1906) 74 0. s. 1.
60 The report of this eommittee is to be found in the Simplifieation of
Proeedure Series, vol. 4, No. 46, Library of the Assoeiation of the Bar
of the City of New York.
81 Shaw v. Ohio Edison Co. (1887) 9 0. Dee. Rep. 809, 812.
·

·
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Inroads have been made upon the rule that a party
need not disclose the evidence of his own case in some
jurisdictions. The Massachusetts statutes, for instance,
were amended to provide that the court may order a
witness to disclose the names of witnesses " i£ justice
requires ' ' it.68 The English court has held that in a
libel action a plaintiff can be forced to disclose the names
of persons to whom the libel was published even though
such persons would be witnesses for the plaintiff, the
reason being that the names of such persons are a sub
stantial part of the facts of the case.68 The names of
employees of a defendant who were immediately con
nected with the transaction in question can be compelled
in New Jersey.l14 A similar rule to the effect that dis
covery can be had of the name of a person who was an
active participant rather than a mere stranger to the
affair in dispute is enforced by some of the Toronto
examiners. The Missouri Supreme Court has hinted
that it might allow a similar exception. In a case where
in it was sought to compel the claim agent of a large
corporation to tell the names of those persons known to
him to have witnessed an a<Jcident, the court said : " We
have not before us at this time the question whether one
eye-witness may not be asked who the other eye-witnesses
of an accident were. That information might be useful
in chief to identify and earmark the transaction, or in
rebuttal. But we do have the question whether one liti
gant may compel the employee of the other to disclose
the names of those persons his master may, might, or
purposes to use as witnesses. We are of opinion he is
not entitled to such discovery, absent a statute requiring
611 Mass. Laws of 1913, ch. 815, preserved in Mass. Gen. Laws (1921)
ch. 231, sec. 63, and in the amendment of 1922, Acts 1922, ch. 314. The
history of this liberalization is found in the report of the Committee on
Legislation of the Massachusetts Bar Association cited in ·the next to
the last preceding footnote.
68 Marriott v. Chamberlain (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 154.
64 Neske v. Burns (1930) 8 N. J. Misc. 160, 149 Atl. 761.
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it. Such was the rule relating to discovery in chancery
from which the rationale of this character of deposition
is borrowed. ' ' 66 In New Hampshire the servant of a
corporation whose duty it i s to procure and report in
writing the names of witnesses to an accident, may be
compelled to disclose such information, when he is sum
moned to give a deposition in an action against his em
ployer.66 The reason assigned for this ruling is that the
statutory exemption from discovery is limited in its
terms to parties. In actual practice the rule is largely
avoided by the expedient of the corporate investigator
surrendering all of his reports to the corporate counsel,
so as to make them privileged matter.
The Wisconsin court has gone further than any other
in the direction of abolishing the restriction upon dis
covery of the names of witnesses. The problem as to
whether a party could be compelled to disclose the names
of his witnesses first came before the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in an incidental way and was not expressly de
cided.67 Some years later it was presented again. In
this later case the court said : "It is further insisted
that a group of questions asking for names and ad
dresses of witnesses were improper. For example, ques
tion No. 405 reads : 'You say you had some reports con
cerning the facts alleged to which I have called your
attention. Who were those reports from Y ' Q. No. S71 :
'Where can Mr. Jack Bates, one of your employees whom
,

611 State ex rei. Evans v. Broaddus (1912) 245 Mo. 123, 142, 149 S. W.
473. The court distinguishes Devoy v. Transit Company (1905) 192
Mo. 197, 220, 91 S. W. 140, wherein it is said: " The deposition of
respondent could have been taken timely and he could have been forced
to uncover his witnesses. " See also State ex rei. Mo. Pae. Ry. v. Hall
(Mo. 1930) 27 S. W. (2d) 1027.
66 Petition of Bradley (1901) 71 N. H. 54, 51 .Atl. 264.
67 Phipps v. Wisconsin Central Ry. (1907) 130 Wis. 279, 110 N. W.
207. In the brief of counsel in a later ease this statement is found:
' ' The question came up incidentally in that ease but was not passed
upon, and an examination of the record there shows that the court
below while compelling an answer to many questions expressly omitted
the names of the party 's witnesses. ' ' Wis. Cases and Briefs, vol. 1104,
No. 129, p. 29.
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you got to call on Mr. Spiegel, be addressed so that he
can be reached ? ' Q. 444 : ' What is the chemist 's name f '
There was no abuse of discretion in ordering these ques
tions answered under the authorities hereinbefore cited.
Counsel cites, on this point, Collins v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry. Co., 150 Wis. 305, 136 N. W. 628. In that case it was
held on trial of the case not error to exclude a question
on cross-examination of plaintiff as to whether he had
subpoenaed a certain named witness, and as to whether
he knew that such person would be a witness. The case
has no bearing here. ' ' The court then distinguished the
Massachusetts cases saying that they "turned upon a
statute providing that the party interrogated shall not
be obliged to disclose the names of the witnesses by
whom, or the manner in which he will prove his own
case. ' ' 68 A further contention of the lQsing party was
that ' ' the names of witnesses are not facts, nor are they
points set out in the complaint. " 69

This latter conten

tion raised the question of relevancy under the provision
of the Wisconsin statute that a party shall not be com
pelled to disclose matters not relevant to the issues.
Some of the Wisconsin commissioners compel the dis
closure of names of witnesses, while others do not.

A

bill was introduced before the Wisconsin legislature in

1930 providing that one party might, by court order, ob
tain the names of his adversaries ' witnesses.

The chief

objection offered by the opponents of the" bill, which was
d�feated, was that it would enable lawyers for insurance
companies to prepare cases with a minimum of effort by
utilizing the preparation of their opponents.

Judges

and examining officers . frequently refuse to compel dis
covery upon the ground that inquiries as to what wit
nesses a party intends to call are irrelevant, rather than

68 Horliek 's Malted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel & Co. (1913) 155 Wis. 201,
144 N. W. 272, 278.
69 Wis. Oases and Briefs, vol. 1104, No. 129.
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upon the ground that there is an absolute privilege. This
is the reason assigned by the Wiscmi&in commissioners
who refuse to compel disclosufe.70 Such a basis of ex
clusion may indicate a want of confidence in the reality
of the supposed danger of tampering with witnesses. At
least it furnishes a relative standard as a substitute for
what was formerly an absolute privilege, thereby en
couraging devices for avoiding the rule. Realizing the
irrelevancy of such blunt questions as, Who are your
witnesses ? or, Have you any witnesses ?, lawyers are
led to ask : Whom did you see at the scene of the acci
dent ?, Was there anyone near you that you knew when
you were injured � Who was riding with you ?, and simi
'
lar disguised questions of all sorts. By laying the proper
foundation it is often possible, within the limits of rel
evancy, to obtain the desired information. Two simple
illustrations taken from trial court records illustrate the
tactics which are employed to obtain the names of wit
nesses :
(1) In a frraud action :
Q. Where was it that the defendant made these
representations ?
A. The Lakeview Apartments.
Q. In your apartment ?
A� No, a friend 's apartment when I was there.
Q. You and he were at this friend 's apartment ?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was this friend?
(2)- In an automobile accident action :
Q. Did Elizabeth see the motor car coming ?
A. There was no motor car coming when she was
going across the street.
Q. Who did see it ?
A. Well, I suppose the traffic cop would see it and
some person else.
'70 See also Montgomery Light and Traction Co.
Ala. 358, 72 So. 545.
,

v.

Harris (1916) 197
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Q . Did they say it was going fast ?
A. Yes.
Q. Who are they 1
DISCLOS�RE OF DocUMENTS BY WRICH pARTY WILL PROVE
CASE
Chancery adhered to the rule that a party could not
be compelled to disclose the documents by which he in
tended to prove his own case.n The chief application of
the rule was to documents which proved title to land.78
Some jurisdictions apply the same rule to modern dis
covery practice. .In England it is held that a party need
not disclose documentary evidence of his own case and
especially that he need not disclose his title papers.78
Documents are privileged from inspection if they relate
exclusively to the party 's own case and contain nothing
supporting or tending to support his adversary 's case.74
The party 's statement as to the matter is conclusive un
less the court is satisfied from certain sources of informa
tion or upon his own inspection of the documents that
the party has falsely or mistakenly claimed the privi
_lege.71' There are certain well recognized limitations on
the extent of the privilege. In an action where the title
to land is in question, for example, a party must dis
close the nature of his title, as distinguished from the
evidence thereof, where that title is a fundamental part
of the case.76 An exception is also made in the case of
documents referred to in the pleadings, for these must
always be disclosed. Discovery of all documents which
relate .as much to the case of one party as to. the case of
the other may be compelled.'7'7 Some jurisdictions which
71 Wigram on the Law of Discovery,
'78 Combe v. London (1840) 4 Y. & C.
'78 Bray 's Law of Discovery, 445.

13 Law Library Series, 41.
139, 155.

'fi A. G. v. Newcastle (1899) 2 Q. B. 278.
Practice (1929) 508, 532.
'76 Stringer, The A. B. 0. Guide to Practice (1928) 68.
'7'7 Bayley v. Griffiths (1862) H. & 0. 429.

'76 Annual
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are much more liberal than England regarding the gen
eral scope of a discovery examip.ation restrict discovery
of documentary evidence about as England does. This
is the case in Massachusetts,'78 Ohio,79 New Hampshire,80
and Ontario.81
78 Mass. den. Laws (1921) ch. 231, sec. 63.
parte Schoepf (1906) 74 0. S. 1, 77 N. E. 276.
80 Eaton v. �armer (1865) 46 N. H. 200.
81 Ontario Judicature Act (Holmested, 1915) p. 835.
'79 Ex

CHAPTER XVI
APPLICATION OF ORDINARY RULES OF EVI
DENCE TO DISCOVERY EXAMINATIONS
PRIVILEGE

Every objection which would be tenable as of right at
the trial is tenable when the examination is held before
the trial. It is as well a futile as an unjust thing to
allow the discovery of evidence which can be excluded
at the trial on the ground that it is privileged. There is
no necessity to inquire into reasons behind the rules of
privilege, for the paramount policies have already been
decided in connection with the law of evidence generally.
The safer course is to rely on the decisions in the law of
evidence which have been developed over a much longer
period of time and which have withstood the scrutiny
of a more careful scholarship. The question to be asked
is, would a similar objection be tenable upon the actual
trial of the case ¥ Courts generally have applied such a
theory of decision in regard to objections which raise
questions of privilege.1
Three objections as of right, or grounds of privilege,
upon discovery examinations are generally recognized in
England, the United States and Ontario. These are :
(1) as being criminatory or penal ; ( 2 ) as being within
the doctrine of professional privilege ; (3 ) as bel Kelly v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. ( 1884) 60 Wis. 480, 19 N. W. 521;
Warren v. Decoste (1929) 269 Mass. 415, 169 N. E. 505, 509; Lee v.
Blumer (1920) 189 Iowa 1145, 179 N. W. 625; Winneshiek County State
Bank v. District Court (1927) 203 Iowa 1277, 212 N. W. 391; Sloss
Sheffield Steel Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1910) 167 Ala. 557, 52 So.
751 ; Watkins v. Cope (1913) 84 N. J. L. 143, 86 A. 545.
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ing injurious to the public interests.11 A comparison of
the rules given by Bray on Discovery . and Wigmore on
Evidence, respectively, indicates how closely the rules
applied to discovery parallel those which have a recog
nized standing in the law of evidence.8 Detailed cita
tions to decisions which apply these rules to discovery
examinations are purposely - omitted at this point. It
seems futile to clutter up the law of discovery with mat
ters which, if not more appropriate to the law of evi
dence, at least have been more thoroughly tested in that
branch of the law. Take for example the matter of privi
lege from self-incrimination. Is it reasonable to suppose·
that a privilege which has been accorded constitutional
sanction in most jurisdictions would differ greatly
whether applied to examinations before or at the trial Y 4
While a party can safely refuse to disclose privileged
matter regardless of the type of discovery procedure
which obtains, there are differences as to the practical
ease with which a party can protect his privilege in the
several jurisdictions. Lawyers in states in which the
pfficer in charg.Ie of the examination has no power to
compel answers, but in which it is necessary to resort to
the court, say that opposing lawyers instantly respect
objections of privilege. A party can protect himself, for
he knows that the examining lawyer dares not ask the
8 Bray, Discovery, 298-551 ; 7 Standard Encyclopedia of Pleading and
Practice, 560 ff. ; Canadian Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario Ed.) vol. 3,
p. 746 ff.
8 Compare Wigmore on Evidence, IV, 2250 ff. (as to privilege from
self-incrimination) ; Id. V, 2290 ff. (as to professional legal privilege) ;
40 Cyc. 2391 (as to matters injurious to public interests) ; with the mat
ter set forth in the last preceding citation.
4 Representative decisions are: F. Speidel Co. v. N. Barstow Co.,
(1916) 232 Fed. 617 ; Quirk v. Quirk (1919) 259 Fed. 597 ; French v.
Venneman (1860) 14 Ind. 282 ; Whicher v. Davis (1899) 70 N. t H. 237,
46 A. 458; Sloss-Sheffield Steel Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1910) 167
Ala. 557, 52 So. 751 ; Plunkett v. Hamilton (1911) 136 Ga. 72, 70 S. E.
781 ; De Camp v. Archibald (1893) 50 0. S. 618, 35 N. E. 1056; Ex parte
Schoepf (1906) 74 0. S. 1, 77 N. E. 276; Volusia County Bank v. Bigelow
(1903) 45 Fla. 638, 33 So. 704; Knight v. Empire Land Company (1908)
55 Fla. 301, 45 So. 1025 ; Ex parte Mumford (1874) 57 Mo. 603.
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court to compel a disclosure of privileged matter. Law
yers in states in which the notary has power to punish
for contempt also respect objections of privilege as a gen
eral rule, but there have been occasional instances of
abuse under this type of procedure.
The New Jersey court, for a season, adhered to the
rule that a lawyer had no right to instruct his client to
refuse to answer a question at a discovery examination,
even though an answer to the question might incriminate
the client. Said Chief Justice Gummere to a lawyer who
had advised his client to refuse to answer certain ques
tions : "It does not concern you, as an attorney, one
iota whether the answer of your client to a question put
to him will incriminate him or whether it will not. The
fact that the answer may incriminate him does not make
the answer incompetent. If it will incriminate him he
may refuse to answer upon that ground ; but whether
he will refuse to answer on that ground is a matter for
him personally to determine, without advice from his
lawyer or from the court. It is a personal privilege,
which he may assert or waive, as he sees :fit.1 A ques
tion is not objectionable at all merely because the answer
will tend to incriminate ; and counsel has no business-I
mean legal business-to object for any such reason to a
·
question which is competent. Much less is there any
justification for his action in advising his client to re
fuse, to answer a question for such a reason. " 5 From
this and similar language in the Chief Justice 's opinion
the New Jersey lawyers got t!J.e idea that a lawyer was in
danger of contempt if he instructed his client to refuse
to answer any question however improper it might be.
Five years later the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
a party examined before trial could not be held in con
tempt for refusal to answer a question, unless the court
had ordered an answer, and that counsel who directed
5 Brown

& Seccomb

v.

Shafman (1923) 2 N. J. Misc. 13, 14.
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such a refusal to answer could not be held in contempt.6
The court said : ' ' Our view is that, when the party is not
examined before the judge him§elf, if he or his counsel
deem a question improper, then, as the commissioner or
master is not clothed with the judicial power of com
pelling an answer, the party may refuse for the time be
ing to answer, and the court or a judge is then to decide
on the propriety of the question. As a rule, reputable
counsel when in court, or even before. a commissioner, will
refrain from putting questions plainly incompetent, and
from advising their clients to refuse an answer to ques
tions unless they are plainly incompetent ; and cases in
which the parties reach an impasse on such an issue are
too few to be of importance. When they do occur, the
remedy is the extremely simple if somewhat inconvenient
one of the judge taking over the examination himself ;
and when this is done the trouble vanishes at once. But
normally the purposes of justice are subserved by an
appeal to the judge, who will pass on contested ques
tions and give the parties the benefit of his view of the
situation. " 7 '
RELEVAN CY
Objections that questions are irrelevant, if made at the
trial, are addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
.
While the same general rules as to relevancy control at
discovery examinations as at the trial, the practical appli
cation of these rules differs. Relevancy always pre
supposes a standard, i. e. relevant to what ? Moreover it
is equally clear that the standard must be a factual one,
for no question can be relevant to a pure question of
law. The standard is more certain by the time trial is
reached because the issues of the case · have been deter
mined. The basic rule that the interrogation must be
·

6 Baekel

'7 ld.

v.

286.

Linn (1928) 104 N. J. L. 243, 140 Atl. 285.
'

150

DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL

relevant to some matter in dispute between the parties
applies to discovery examinations, but with this differ
ence arising from the necessity of the case, namely, the
matter in dispute is not likely to have been as accurately
determined as it would be at the trial. For this reason
some courts adopt the test thatdiscovery may be allowed
if it is material for the determination of any matter
in question about to come on for trial between
the parties to the action.8 Other courts say that the test
is not whether the matter inquired of will be competent
at the trial, but merely whether it may be.9 Still other
courts adopt a " reasonably relevant " test.10 Such rea- 1
soning has particular application when discovery before
pleading is allowed. The only available standard is the
more or less hypothetical case which the party seeking
discovery sets up in his affidavit.11
Where ordinary deposition, procedure is used for dis
covery purposes there is great liberality as far as rel
evancy is concerned for the reason that the statutes con
template that the witness should answer all questions
except those involving privilege, and that he should save
all objections until the trial. The question arises whether
a party or witness can safely refuse to answer a question
merely because it is irrelevant. The answer necessarily
is two-fold : The party · or witness can safely refuse to
answer if the notary in charge of the examination has no
power to punish for contempt. When the matter is taken
to the trial judge upon motion to compel an answer the
objection that the question is not relevant can be duly
presented. If the notary has no power to punish for
8 Free v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1907) 135 Iowa 69, 110 N. W. 143.
See also Bray, Discovery, 11.
9 Lyell v. Kennedy (1884) 50 L. T. 730 ; Boston & Maine R. R. v.
State (1910) 75 N. H. 513, 77 Atl. 997. Contra: Ex parte Schoepf
(1906) 74 0. S. 1, 77 N. E. 276.
10 Volusia County Bank v. Bigelow (1903) 45 Fla. 638, 33 So. 704.
11 Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. Spiegel Co. (1913) 155 Wis. 201,
144 N. W. 272; Kelly v. Ry. Co. (1884) 60 Wis. 480, 19 N. W. 521.
·
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contempt the witness does not need to obtain permission
to refuse an answer to impertinent queries ; he may do
so as of course. If, however, tb,e officer has power to
punish but not to relieve from answering except upon
grounds of privilege, the witness runs some danger in
refusing to answer upon the mere ground of irrelevancy. 111
The Ohio Supreme Court has said : "If the witness
assumes to decide these questions for himself at the
time, unless the interrogatory involves a question of
privilege, he must do so at his peril. If he should be
right in his decision he would lose nothing ; if wrong, he
must suffer the consequences. ' ' 18 This is the general
theory adhered to by courts in states ,in which the officer
taking the deposition has power to punish for contempt.
A witness who is examined for discovery, just as a wit
ness whose testimony is taken for purposes of preserva
tion of evidence, should answer all questions except those
involving privilege. While there is a possibility of ob
taining relief from the penalty if the witness refuses to
answer question� which clearly are impertinent,l4 there
are, as a practical matter, virtually no limits as to rel
evancy under this type of procedure.15 One of the fac
tors which called forth the provision for special com
missioners to supervise the examinations in Missouri was
that insufficient protection was afforded a witness who
refused to answer upon the ground of irrelevancy.16
Statistics indicate how infrequently lawyers actually
object to questions during the course o:fa discovery exam
ination. The records of 100 examinations for discovery
were inspected in Wisconsin, 50 each in Milwaukee and
111 Of. Ex parte Woodworth (1893) 6 Ohio Dee. 19.
18 Re Rauh (1901) 65 0. S. 128, 61 N. E. 701.
14 Ex parte Krieger ( 1879) 7 Mo. App; 367 ; Tyson

v. Savings and
Loan Association (1900) 156 Mo. 588, 57 S. W. 740; Ex parte Livingston
(1882) 12 Mo. App. 80.
1li Ex· parte Mumford (1874)" 57 Mo. 603.
16 State ex rel. Wilson v. Barney (1916) 193 Mo. App. 326, 334, 18q
S. W� .23.
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Madison. In these 100 examinations there were 13487
. folios of questions and answers, and only 785 objections
to questions. This means that on the average only one
objection was offered during the taking of each seventeen
folios of the examination. Moreover no ruling was given
to the great majority of the objections which were noted.
A large portion of them evidently were raised merely as
warnings to opposing counsel. Similarly, in Ontario
only 83 out of 18437 questions which were asked during
the course of 76 examinations for discovery were ob
jected to. Less than ten per cent. of the objections were
sustained by the special examiner. Not a single objec
tion was registered in 50 out of the 76 examinations which
were inspected. In a will contest case, for instance,
where many objections might be expected, there was no
objection to any of the 804 questions which were pro
pounded. Similarly fraud, malpractice, and alimony ac
tions were among those in the list in which no objections
were registered. It is impossible to offer similar figures
for all states for the reason that it is not always neces
sary to note the objection. 17 But lawyers say that ob
jections are comparatively infrequent ; that for tactical
reasons, it is preferable to let irrelevant matters come in
rather than to object.
The only complaint . that harm is done by the dis
closure of impertinent matters. comes from lawyers in
jurisdictions where officers in charge of the examination
have power to punish for contempt. In other states law
yers take the position that, as long as they can prevent
the disclosure of harmful, irrelevant matter, they will
not worry about irrelevancy in the usual case. Conse
quently the conscious practice of many lawyers is to
entirely refrain from objecting, unless the questions re· late to privileged matter. They explain that little harm
is done by the disclosure of immaterial matter so long as
l't<Jf. N� Y. Rules of Civil Practice 122, for instance.

/
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it can be excluded from the jury 's consideration at the
trial. The chief cause of complaint arises when a notary
compels an answer which discloses matter the privacy
of which should be respected. This can only happen in
states in which the notary has power to punish for con
tempt.
Rules of evidence in regard to' relevancy are tacitly
rather than expressly applied at discovery hearings.
Objections usually are addressed to the examining law
yer. They serve as a word of warning that the question
ing has reached the limits of its proper scope. Often
times a question is argued informally among the lawyers
and an adjustment effected. The norm which the law
yers keep in mind is the general law of evidence, but
there is recognition that the standard should be liberally
applied in reference to discovery. Hence there is a prac
tical disregard of the more technical rules.
Jurisdictions which apply the New York rule that the
examination cannot extend to the ,issues of which the
adverse party has the affirmative under the pleading have
little trouble with the question of relevancy. It is taken
for granted that the questions must be relevant to the
issues of the case because they must first of all be rel
evant to the matters upon which the examination is
sought, which is only that portion of the issues as to
which the applicant has the burden of proo£.18 'fhis
feature is made doubly perspicuous in New York by the
fact that the general scope of the inquiry is settled be
fore the examination starts.
18 Hempel v. Heekseher (1928) 225 N. Y. B. 634; Sands v. Comerford
(1925) 207 N Y. B. 398. See also Miller & Pardee v. Sweet Mfg. Co.
(1924) 3 F. (2d) 198 ; Standard Oil Co. v. Univ. Oil Prod. Co. (1927)
21 F. (2d) 159.
..

CHAPTER XVII
PENALTIES FOR UNJUST REFUSAL TO DISCLOSE
Most jurisdictions provide that a party who refuses
to disclose, when ordered by the court to do so, may be
punished by having his pleading stricken. Such a pen
alty is derived from the chancery practice. 1 The ques
tion has been raised in some jurisdictions whether there
are not constitutional limitations upon the power of a
court to strike a party 's pleading for failure to disclose.
The question was first raised in the case of Hovey v.
Elliott.• In that case the United States Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice White, held that such a
penalty lacked due process of law. But the particular
disobedient act was a refusal to pay certain money into
court. The circumstances show rather clearly that the
punishment was given as for contempt. The court con
sidered thoroughly the history of punishment for civil
contempt, and less thoroughly the ancient chancery prac
tice of taking the bills pro confesso upon refusal to dis
cover by answer. A decade later in a case in which a
similar punishment was meted out, but this time for
unjust refusal to discover books and papers, the Supreme
Court. distinguished the earlier case in a way which was
in accord with the historic rules as to the penalty in dis
covery proceedings in chancery. The gist of the dis
·
tinction . was that the earlier case only prohibited the
striking of a pleading as a contempt penalty and did not
1 Langdell,

Summary of Equity Pleading, 84.
u. s. 409.

8 (1897) 167
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prevent its use in imputing an admission of a want of
merit in the pleading by refusal to discover.8 Since then
the practical application of the doctrine of the Hovey
case has been still further limited by the Supreme Court '
and the lowen federal courts have practically disregarded
the case in so far as discovery .•proceedings are con
cerned.6
Many of the state courts have upheld the default pen
alty without any quibbles over constitutional questions.6
Others have expressly decided that there is no want of
due process.7 The New York Court of Appeals has pre
tended to follow the federal decisions in the matter.
The exact position taken is evidenced by a quotation
from an opinion by Pound, J. : " The line may thus be
definitely drawn between the proper punishment for sup
pressing evidence and the improper punishment as for
contempt merely. ' ' 8 The California court has held that
the plaintiff's pleading may be stricken but that the de
fendant 's may not. The latter is said to be unconstitu
tional as restricting the right of defense.9 The default
penalty has been held constitutional in Washington upon
the ground that failure to answer may be construed as
an admission. Hence it is held that the penalty can be
applied only when the facts elicited are material and go
to all of the issues of the case.10 Lawyers in ,various
v. Arkansas (1908) 212 U. S. 322.
U. 738.
Havraise Peninsulaire de Navigation a Vapeur (1927) 22 F. (2d) 904.
6 See a long list of such eases cited in the ease in the preceding :foot
note.
7 Kwiatkowski v. Putzhaven (1919) 189 Ind. 119, 126 N. E. 3 ; Ed
monds v. Federal Securities Co. (1930) 131 Kan. 11, 290 Pae. 3 ; Miles v.
Armour (1911) 239 Mo. 438, 144 S. W. 424.
8 Feingold v. Walworth Bros. (1924) 238 N. Y. 446, 454, 144 N. E.
675. See also comment of Dean Wigmore on the ease in 19 Illinois Law
Rev. 594.
9 Summerville v. Kelliher ( 1904) 144 Cal. 155, 77 Pae. 889 ; Oneill v.
Thomas Day Co. (1907) 152 Cal. 357, 92 Pae. 856.
10 Lawson v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. (1906) 44 Wash. 26,
86 Pae. 1120; Capps v. Frederick (1906) 44 Wash. 38, 86 Pae. 1128.

8 Hammond Packing Co.

4 Roller v. Murray (1914) 234
S.
II Wittenberg Coal Co. v. Compagnie

·

·
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states say that there are several considerations which are
worthy of note in regard to the practical enforcement of
the default penalty. First, courts are very reluctant to
actually enforce punishment. 11 But it is possible some
times to obtain a modified form of the penalty, namely, a
stay of proceedings until discovery is granted. Such an
expedient is encouraged under the New York practice
by the rule that proceedings may be stayed if notice of
the examination has been served upon the attorney for
the party to be examined, whereas a party can be de
faulted only after he has been served with subpoena.12
It is said further that the very threat of the penalty has
the effect of encouraging a full and voluntary disclosure ;
that the indirect effect of the sanction is salutary. Judges
say that, as a practical matter, it is easier to strike the
party 's pleading than it is to put him in jail for con
tempt. There is seldom any necessity of a final appli
cation of either penalty, but the gesture of the former is
more easily accomplished. Indeed, such reasoning
prompted the introduction of the penalty in Ontario, for
it was thought that it provided a convenient escape for
the court when it appeared undesirable to put the party,
in jail.
All of the states whieh have a procedure for dis
covery, except Connecticut, provide as one of the penal
ties that the party may be punished as for contempt.
Attachment for contempt is the only way a recalcitrant
witness can be punished, for he has no pleading to be
stricken. Lawyers in jurisdictions in which this penalty,
and only this, obtains say that it offers a sufficient sanc
tion for a full discovery.
·

11 .An analysis of the eases in the .American Digest under " Discovery, "
Key-Nos. 70, 77, 107, will show that this is so.
18 Bloek v. Guaranty Trust Co. (1922) 198 N. Y. S. 305 ; Levine v.
Moskowitz (1923) 200 N. Y. S. 597. See also Rothschild, The Simpli
fication of Civil Practice in New York, 23 Col. L. Rev. 732, 738, 741.
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Louisiana has adopted the view of the civil law and,
accordingly, provides a pro tanto punishment. If a party
wrongfully refuses to answer interrogatories the par
ticular interrogatories, rather than the whole cause, are
taken for confessed. 18 Texas formerly had a similar
prov1s1on. But curiously enough, that which was in
tended as a pro tanto penalty turned out to be even more
stringent in its practical operatipn than are penalties
which are supposedly very harsh. Prior to 1897 if a
party who was being examined for discovery refused to
answer a question the notary simply noted down the
refusal and the question, which might be in leading form,
was deemed admitted. If the examining lawyer met with
one refusal he could put the same question in such varied
forms as to place his adversary in a very unfavorable
position. Usually the lawyer would continue to ply
questions until the party in desperation would give an
answer rather than suffer such an imputed .admission.
A Kentucky lawyer uses a rather novel expedient when
a party whom he is examining refuses to answer. It is
in the direction of the Texas practice. As soon as the
party refuses to answer, the examining lawyer makes
an avowal as to what he thinks the party would testify if
he did answer. Of course the avowal has no legal status.
But sometimes , it does incite the party to give his own
answer, and the general psychological effect, it is said,
is advantageous to the examiner.
,
Pro tanto penalties are effected by some of the special
statutes for production and inspection of document s :
if inspection is unjustly refused the court may exclude
the document from evidence or may instruct the jury to
believe it to be such as the applicant for discovery affirms
that it is.
18 Rev. Code

of

Prac. (Marr, 1927) sec. 349.

CHAPTER XVIII
USE AT TRIAL OF RECORD OF EX�ATION
FOR DISCOVERY
wHO MAY uSE RECORD

·

There are three different types of provisions as to who
may use the record of the discovery examination at the
trial. Some ;Wrisdictions allow the taker only to use it.
Others allow use by either party. The third type of
provision is that neither party may use the deposition of
a witness as original evidence unless the witness is un
available for oral testimony, although the opponent of
the party who calls the witness at the trial may use the
deposition to contradict the witness ; that the taker only
may use the deposition of an adverse party as evidence
of an admission ; and that either party may use it in the
event the deponent is unavailable for oral testimony at
the trial.
The following jurisdictions allow use by the taker
only : Wisconsin, Massachusetts, England, Ontario,
Washington, Virginia, Indiana and New Jersey. 1 The
earlier Wisconsin provision was that either party could
use the deposition at the trial. Later this was changed
so as to allow use only by the party taking. Even then
a few decisions seemed to indicate that once the depo
sition had been offered in evidence either party could
1 Ontario Judicature Act (Holmested, 1915) page 806 :If. ; Denny v.
Sayward (1894) 10 Wash. 422, 39 Pac. 119 ; Moore v. Palmer (1896) 14
Wash. 134, 44 Pac. 142 ; Faut v. Miller (1867) 58 Va. 187 ; Annual Prac
tice (1930) order 31, rule 24; Bray's Law of Discovery, 600. See also
the statutes listed in the appendix and the cases in the next several
footnotes.
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use it,8 but the Revisor of Statutes in 1927 purposely
modified the language of the statute so as to remove this
possibility.8 The trend of development in Massachusetts
has been in exactly the opposit'e direction. While the
present provision is that only the proponent of the in
terrogatories can use the answers thereto at the trial,�
there is a considerable sentiment amongst the Massa
chusetts bar for an amendment to the statute to the effect
that either party be allowed to use. The proponents of
the change argue that it would make a party more care
ful as to the particular questions he propounds and thus
eliminate considerable surplusage in interrogatories.
Opponents of the change point out that it would increase
the amount of self-serving material in the answers, and
that it is founded upon a misconception of the basic pur
poses of discovery. Massachusetts lawyers have con
sidered the problem whether the examination should not
be usable in behalf of the party making the answers in
the event that he dies after answering and before the
trial. Recently the Massachusetts Judicial Council has
recommended 81 statutory change to the effect that : ' ' If
a party who has filed sworn answers to interrogatories
dies, so much of such answers · as the court finds have
been made upon the personal knowledge of the deceased
shall not be inadmissible as hearsay or self-serving if
offered in evidence by a representative of the deceased
party. ' ' 11 The possibility that the examination may be
used by the taker after the deponent has died and that
a very partial story may be presented to the jury, a story
lacking the direct testimony of the deponent, has troubled
the Wisconsin bar. This has led to the suggestion that
the taking of an adverse examination be made an addia Lamberson v. Lamberson (1921) 175 Wis. 398, 184 N. W. 708; Lange
v. Heckel (1920) 171 Wis. 59, 175 N. W. 788.
a Revisor 's Notes (1927) on ch. 326, sec. 12.
t Freeman v. United Fruit Co. (1916) 223 Mass. 300, 111 N. �. 789 ;
Bradley Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Cutler (1925) 253 Mass. 37, 148 N. E. 101.
II Sixth Report, p. 15.
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tional cause for taking depositions under the general
deposition statute. Another suggestion made by some
Wisconsin lawyers is that the deposition statute be so
amended as to allow taking of a deposition without show
ing cause, with use thereof being conditioned upon the
witness ' unavailability at the trial. This is the plan in
states wherein the ordinary deposition procedure is the
means of obtaining discovery before trial.
Under the Ontario discovery procedure only the exam,
ination of a party can be used as original evidence.
Examinations of corporate officers, assignors, and other
persons from whom discovery may be had, but who are
not themselves adverse parties, are confined to the pur
pose of discovery only and cannot be used at the trial
against the parties to the action. This is explicitly pro
vided as to examinations of corporate officers and serv
ants and has been held equally applicable to other per
sons not parties who have been examined for discovery.6
This merely limits use of the examination as original evi
dence. It does not prevent use to contradict the witness
or to refresh his memory. This, again, is in the direction
of the practice under the ordinary deposition procedure
which obtains in other jurisdictions.
The following jurisdictions allow either party to use
the examination of a party, or representative of a party,
at the trial : New York, South Dakota, Michigan, North
Carolina, North Dakota, New Jersey, Quebec, and Louisi
ana.'7 The theory is adhered to in both Louisiana and
Quebec that the answers to interrogatories for discovery
become automatically a part of the record of the case
6 Rule 327; Ontario Judicature Act (Holmested, 1915) p. 806.

'7 This

applies to the oral examination only in New Jersey. Only the
interrogator can use answers to written interrogatories. Compare N. J.
Comp. Stat. (1910) p. 4097, sec. 140, p. 4099, sec: 146, chancery rule 84,
found in 1 N. J. Misc. 756. See in addition to the statutes which are
listed in the appendix, Phillips v. Land Co. (1917) 174 N. C. 542, 94
S. E. 12; Beck v. Wilkins Ricks Co. (1923) 186 N. C. 210, 119 S. E. 235 ; ,
National Fire Ins. Co. v. Shearman ( 1 928) 227 N. Y. S. 522. See also
note in 1 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 94, for provisions under early codes.
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and that hence no formal introduction as evidence is
necessary. Mr. Justice Surveyer, of Montreal, has said·
the .following concerning the Quebec practice : " Mr.
Justice Mignault, whom I consutted with regard to the
deficiencies of our Code, wrote me· on this subject : ' A
• • • reform which would b e very useful would b e to
render the discovery really a discovery. In the province
of Quebec, the preliminary interrogatory forms a part of
the proof which embarrasses the liberty of the attorney
of the opposite party, because he exposes himself to the
introduction in the procedure of testimony which his
adversary otherwise could not make· except with a com
mencement of proof in writing. In the other provinces,
the adversary is freely questioned and then there is
introduced into the proof of the case the parts of his
deposition which are believed useful, saving the adver
sary 's right to demand the addition of the replies which
explain those which have been produced. ' I am not cer
tain if, in view of our laws of evidence, the system for
merly in force in the jurisdictions of which I spoke is
not preferable for us. Following this system, the judge
presiding over ' the case asks you whether or not you
intend putting your preliminary interrogatory on the
record. In the affirmative, it forms part of the record.
If you are not satisfied, you are free to re-examine the
party during the inquiry on the points where he replied
favorably, saving, if it is less favorable the second time,
to remind him of his previous declarations in accordance
with article 329. " 8
Texas, under the regular deposition procedure, allows
depositions of parties and witnesses alike to be used at
the trial by either party regardless of whether the de-'
ponent is .present in court. . This procedure differs from
that which obtains in other states in which a use has
been made of the procedure for purposes of discovery
'

8 La Revue du Droit, vol. 2,

p.

204 ff.
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before trial in this respect, namely, there are neither
restrictions upon the taking of depositions nor upon the
use thereof. In a number of other states depositions may
be taken as a matter of right, but their use at the trial is
limited to instances in which the deponent is unavailable
as a witness. But in Texas depositions are often used
when the deponents are present in court. While some
of the lawyers are of the opinion that it is within the
discretion of the court whether a party will be allowed
to read the deposition of a witness who is present in
court in lieu of placing him upon tl;te stand, it is agreed
that as a practical matter it is usually allowed. This
practice is not a salutary one. The preferable mode of
giving testimony is upon an oral examination in open
court. Only when a witness is unavailable for the pur
pose of giving his oral testimony in open court should
written statements be received from him. There is a
difference between taking depositions for the dual pur
pose of preserving testimony in the event that the wit
ness should become unavailable and of pinning him down
to a definite story before trial on the one hand and tak
ing depositions as the regular mode of adducing evidence
on the other hand. In the former event the deposition
serves merely as a dress-rehearsal for a trial conducted
in the orthodox manner ; in the latter it .fosters all of the
vices which are attendant upon a trial of the case on
paper only. Specific vices attributable to this rule are
pointed out by the Texas bar. Suppose, for example,
that a lawyer takes the deposition of a witness, that he
gets a favorable statement from him, and that the ad
verse party does not see fit at the time to cross-examine
the witness to any extent. The chances are that the
lawyer will read the deposition to the jury and keep the
witness off of the stand so that he may not be subjected
to further cross-examination. Of course the adverse
party could call the witness but in doing so he would
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make the witness his own. The unfairness of such a prac
tice is made more perspicuous when the witness happens
to be a person of poor courtroom appearance or of weak
voice and when the lawyer reads .•the deposition with- the
added force of his own personality. There is a tendency
upon the part of witnesses whose deposition has been
taken to be reluctant to appear at the trial. They reason
that there is no necessity that they should give further
of their time when their depositions can be used instead.9
All states which employ the regular deposition pro
cedure as the mode of discovery before trial, except
Texas, have the following rules in regard to use of the
deposition at the trial : ( 1 ) Neither party may use the
deposition of a mere witness as original evidence un
less the witness is unavailable for oral testimony, but the
opponent of the party who calls the witness at the trial
may use the deposition to contradict the witness. ( 2 ) The
taker only may use the deposition of an adverse party
(but not of a mere witness) as evidence of an admission.
(3) Either party, regardless of who has taken the depo
sition and rega,rdless of whether it is the deposition of
a party or of a witness, may use the deposition in the
event the deponent is unavailable for oral testimony at
the trial. 10

PURPOSE FOR wHICH RECORD MAY BE uSED
There are two principal purposes for which depositions
may be used at the trial. The :first and most frequent use
is for the purpose of coD;tradicting the deponent when
9 The deposition of a party can be used by either party, but the
deposition of a witness can be used by either party . only when there has
been cross-interrogation. Tex. Stat. (1928) arts. 3764, 3769.
10 For general statements of the above rules see, in addition to the
statutes and the next several footnotes, the following decisions: Great
Western Despatch South Shore Line v. Glenny (1884) 41 0. S. 166 (see
also 14 Ohio Jurisprudence, p. 66 ff.) ; The Phenix Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Cl�;trk (1877) 58 N. H. 164 ; Carter v. Beals (1862) 44 N. H. �i;
In re Hammond (1909) 83 Neb. 636, 12� N. W. 203; Banks v. Refrigerat
ing Co. (1911) 236 Mo. 407, 139 S. W. 545.
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he testifies at the trial. Dean Wigmore has said :
' ' • • • use of a deposition to show in it a contrary state
ment of the deponent, who has already testified on the
stand, is allowable even though the witness be present
and available ; for the deposition is here used not as
substantive testimony, but only as containing a state
ment inconsistent with the same witness 's testimony al
ready given. ' ' 11 Lawyers in Boston, Massachusetts, say
that even answers to written interrogatories for dis
covery are more frequently used for purposes of contra
diction than as original evidence.
The second important mode of use is for the purpose
of proving an admission. Dean Wigmore has stated the
general rule thus : " The general principle that the wit
ness must be shown unavailable for testifying in court
does not apply to use of his party-opponent 's deposition
(taken, as usual, under statutes allowing in common law.
courts a process similar to a bill for discovery ) -for the
simple reason that every statement of an opponent may
be used against him as an admission without calling him ;
the opponent 's sworn statement, though called a depo
sition, is no less an admission than any other statement
of his. " 18 Lawyers sometimes exhibit to the jury a
refusal upon the part of the witness at the discovery
examination to answer particular questions with the pur
pose of showing that the witness sought to conceal some
thing. Such a practice seems to go unquestioned in most
states, but the Massachusetts court has held that it is
improper to refer to a party 's refusal to answer interrog
atories before he has been ordered to answer by the
court. 18
11 Wigmore on Evidence, III, 1416.
18 Wigmore on Evidence, III, 1416. In addition to the cases cited
therein see : Rettlia v. Salomon (1925) 308 Mo. 673, 274 S. W. 366 ;
Douet v. Prudential Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1930) 23 S. W. (2d) 1104; Sin·
clair v. Columbia Telephone Co. (Mo. App., 1917) l95 S. W. 558; Robin·
�n v. N�w England Cable Co. (1920) 79 N. H. 228) 111 A. 2g9,
18 IDurington v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (1913) 214 Mass. 300, 101
N. E. 977.
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There is usually no necessity of using the examination
for discovery at the trial. Indeed, it is more frequent
than otherwise that the sole purpose of the inquiry is for
discovery and that no subsequent use is made of the
deposition. The usual rule is that the proponent has the
option of using all or any part of"the deposition, subject
in the latter event to the right of the adverse party to
demand the reading of other parts which are relevant to
those which have been read.14 Alabama and Virginia
require that all of the answers to written interrogatories
be introduced, if any part are.16 The whole of a depo
sition must be introduced in California and in Indiana
if the purpose is to prove an admission, but a part may
be used for the purpose of contradicting the witness.16

There has been considerable trouble in Missouri con
cerning the correct way of using a deposition for purposes
of contradiction. In 1922 the Supreme Court criticized
the practice of using detached portions only of deposi
tions. Said the court : " We have, in no uncertain terms
condemned the practice, that sometimes finds its way into
court, of counsel, on cross-examination, reading a de
tached portio.n of the deposition or instrument and then
asking the witne'ss whether he made such a statement. ' ' n
14 In addition to the statutes see: Converse v. Meyer (1883) 14 Neb.
190, 15 N. W. 340; Security Bank v. Brown (1923) 110 Neb. 237, 193
N. W. 336; Robinson v. New England Cable Co. (1920) 79 N. H. 228,
111 Atl. 269; Whitman v. Morey (1885) 63 N. H. 448, 2 Atl. 899 i Ceto·
fonte v. Coke Co. ( 1910) 78 N. J. L. 662, 75 Atl. 913, 27 L. R. A.
N. S. 1058; Beakly v. Board (1911) 81 N. J. L. 637, 80 Atl. 457; National
Fire Ins. Co. v. Shearman (1928) 227 N. Y. S. 522; William L. Schupp
& Sons v. Barnett (1924) 206 N. Y. S. 553 ; Gutzman v. Clancy (1902)
114 Wis. 589, 90 N. W. 1081; Freeman v. United Fruit Co. (1916) 223
Mass. 3 00, 111 N. E. 789; Bradley Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Cutler (1925)
253 Mass. 37, 148 N. E. 101;. Great Western Despatch South Shore Line
v� Glenny (1884) 41 0. S. 166; Allend v. Spokane Falls & N. R. Co.
(1891) 21 Wash. 324, 58 Pac. 244; Sawdey v. Spokane Falls & N. R.
Co. (1902) 30 Wash. 349, 70 Pac. 972 .
.111 Warren, Burch & Co. v. Gabriel & Co. (1874) 51 Ala. 235; Faut v.
Miller (1867) 58 Va. 187 ; Vaughn v. Garland (1840) 38 Va. 251.
1 6 Bank of Finnell (1901) 133 Cal. 475, 65 Pac. 976; Scott v. Indian
apolis Wagon. Works ( 1874) 48 Ind. 75; Cook Brewing Co. v. llall ( 1899)
22 Ind. APJI• 656, 52 N. E. 1002.
1'7 Littig v. Urbauer-Atwood Heating Co. (1922) 292 Mo. 226, 247, 237
'
s. w. 779.
·
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- The court pointed out that the correct mode of use was to
show the deposition to the witness, ask him if he had
signed it and then introduce the whole thereof in evi
dence. Such a practice, however, was not satisfactory to
the lawyers, the easier and more effective mode being to
ask the witness whether he had not previously made
such and such statements. The Supreme Court in 1926
ameliorated its former ruling to the extent that it is now
req�ired that ' ' the party attempting impeachment must
refrain from garbling facts, must be fair to the witness,
the court and the jury, in the examination, and must read
in evidence all portions of the deposition that bear on
the particular questions and answers about which the
witness is interrogated. " 18 As a practical matter the
impeaching party now uses such portions of the deposi
tion as he cares to and the adverse party then reads the
additional portions which he deems explanatory of those
already read. 19 The present practice is more satisfac
tory to the bar. It also provides a more effective way of
exposing a lying witness.10
There is some complaint among the lawyers of several
states that the examination for discovery is sometimes
allowed to be used at the trial in such a way as to jeopard
ize its orderly conduct. Wisconsin is the only state in
which this compla1.nt is especially widespread. Two
types of abuses were pointed out. It is said that the

deposition is used as a weapon with which to argue with
the witness and play up inconsistencies of an immaterial
nature between the testimony given at the trial and that
given at the discovery hearing ; and that the deposition is
used as a means of covering the same point twice, so as

18 Peppers v. Railway Co. (1926) '312 Mo. 1104, 1116, 295 S. W. 757.
19 Of. Rettlia v. Salomon (1925) 308 Mo. 673, 681, 274 S. W. 366.
20 Dean Wigmore 's comment on the Littig ease is: " This is unsound;
a lying witness could not be exposed under such restrictions, e. g. Sir
Charles Russell could never have exposed the forger Piggott, in the
cross-examination quoted ante see. 1260. ' ' Wigmore on Evidence, IV,
2103, note 1.
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to impress the jury and encumber the record. Most law
yers say that the remedy for the latter abuse is with the
trial judge who can put a stop to the reading of the
examination where the ground had already been covered.
Some lawyers, however, feel that the former abuse re
quires a specific rule. The Advisory Committee on Rules
has been considering a proposal to the effect that, " In
case the witness shall have been adversely examined be
fore trial, his examination at the trial shall be limited to
such facts as were not inquired about on the former
examination, unless the scope of the examination be ex
tended by permission of the court. " It has been sug
gested that the proposed rule be modified to the extent
of putting the onus of objecting to the use of the depo
sition on the opponent, rather than requiring the pro
ponent to obtain permission. The majority opinion
among the lawyers seems to be that such a rule, in any
form, would do more harni than good� They fear any
tampering with the present rigorous cross-examination.
They point to its effectiveness in revealing the truth.
The proposed rule might also have the unsalutary effect
of subordinating oral testimony to written testimony and
of discouraging examinations ,before trial.
The usual rule is that any objections to the questions
and answers may be made for the first time at the trial
when it is sought to introduce the examination in evi
dence, except those going to the form of the question.81
The same rule applies as to the competency of the
deponent, except that some courts have held that a party
who takes a deposition waives the objection that the wit
ness is incompetent.88 Suppose the trial judge has al
ready decided objections to particular questions and
81 In re Hammond (1909) 83 Neb. 636, 120 N. W. 203. The rule under
the written interrogatory procedure in Indiana is contra, Combs v.
Union Co. (1896) 146 Ind. 688, 46 N. E. 16; B. & 0. R. R. Co. v.
Berdon. (1924) 195 Ind. 265, 150 N. E. 407.
88 Gowdy v. Gowdy (1930) 230 Ky. 545, 20 S. W. (2d) 170. See also
note in 18 Ky. L. Jour. 302.
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.. answers at the discovery examination. Does such ruling
precl.ude him from rejecting evidence at the trial which
he has admitted at the discovery hearing 1 On principle
it would seem that the trial judge can decide de novo
whether the answers are admissible in evidence, because
the standards i� regard to discovery are more liberal
than in regard to evidence at the trial. But some of the
trial judges in Massachusetts, at least, have decided
otherwise.
CoNCLUSIVE EFFECT UPoN' PARTY WHo UsEs RECORD
The uniform rule is that introduction in evidence of
the examination of the adverse party does not preclude
the party who so introduces it from rebutting the testi
mony by other evidence.28 The theory is that the situ
ation is analogous to that where one witness called for
a party contradicts the testimony of a previous witness.24
Similarly, the New York Civil Practice Act provides that
the examination when read in evidence ' ' has the same
effect, and no other, as the oral testimony of a witness
would have. " 25 The truth of the testimony stands as
against the party introducing until contradicting evidence
is introduced.26
The usual rule is that a party does not lose the right
to impeach the credit of a witness by taking his deposi

tion, but that the party who uses the deposition, regard
less of who took it, does lose the right since, by using the

deposition, he makes the deponent his own witness. This
rule does not prevent contradiction of the deposition by
other testimony ; it merely prevents attacks upon the
1!8 Woodman v. Powers (1922) 242 Mass. 219, 136 N. E. 352 ; Washburn
v. Owens ( 1927) 258 Mass. 446, 155 N. E. 432; Sawdey v. Spokane Falls
& N. R. Co. (1902) 30 Wash. 349, 70 Pac. 972.
114 Goodman v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. (1917) 82 N. J. L. 450, 81 Atl.
848.
115 Section 305.
ll6 Minihan v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (1908) 197 Mass. 367, 83 N. E.
871 ; Boudrean v. Johnson (1922) 241 Mass. 12, 134 N. E. 359.
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credit of the deponent. Nor should it have even this
effect in the event that the deponent is an adverse party. ·
The same reasons which 'are set forth by Dean Wigmore
against application of the rule that• a party who calls a
witness cannot impeach him, to the situation where the
witness is a party-opponent, can be relied upon here :
" If there is any situation in which any semblance of rea
son disappears for the application of the rule against
impeaching one 's own witness, it is when the opposing
party is himself called by the first party, and is sought
to be compelled to disclose under oath that truth which
he knows but is naturally unwilling . to make known. To
say that the first party guarantees the opponent 's cred
ibility is to mock him with a false formula • • • ' ' "
Of course the question may be raised whether the prob
lem will arise in connection with discovery : i. e., will the
party introduce his adversary 's deposition as original
evidence unless he deems the testimony true f Does he
not use it for the very purpose of proving an admission T
If so, why should he desire to attack the credit of the per
son who gave the litdmission � Such argument overlooks
the fact that the party who introduces the deposition may
rely upon the truth of parts thereof as admissions, and
yet desire to impeach the credit of the deponent as a
whole. Yet it is true that one link in the reasoning in
regard to the trial situation, namely, that the party can
not tell whether his opponent will speak truly or falsely
when he calls him as a witness, is missing as far as dis
covery is concerned. The party already knows his op
ponent 's testimony before he introduces it.
rt

Wigmore on Evidence, II, 916 (with citations to cases) ;

m,

1856

a.

CHAPTER XIX

COST OF DISCOVERY EXAMINATION
There are certain fixed charges for serving the sub
poena, swearing the witness, and certifying the record of
the examination. The exact amount allowed for 'each of
these incidentals varies in the different states. While
the amount for serving the subpoena usually is small the
very fact that there is any charge is one of the things
which encourages the taking of examinations by stipula
tion. There is usually a requirement that witness ' fees
be tendered or paid. Three plans are in use as to the
fees for taking down the testimony : ( 1 ) The compensa
tion may be upon the basis of the amount of the testi
mony which is taken down, i. e., either by the page, folio
or hundred words. This is the most extensively used
plan. Representative allowances under this plan are :
Wisconsin, twelve cents per folio ; New Jersey, twenty
cents per page ; Missouri, fifteen cents per hundred
words ; Ohio and Nebraska, ten cents per hundred words.
(2) The compensation may be upon the basis of the
amount of testimony, plus a fee to the officer for the
general conduct of the examination. Some form of this
plan is necessary in the states wherein a trained officer is
employed in addition to the stenographer. (3) The com
pensation may be upon the basis of the time consumed
in taking down the examination. Only Ontario employs
this plan. If there is no request for copies the only
recompense is two dollars per hour. The· comparative
smallness of the fee is revealed by the . testimony of re
porters that approximately thirty-five to forty folios are
taken down on the average per hour.
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In · Wisconsin and in Missouri where a commissioner
with legal training supervises the examination the fees
run slightly higher. The fees allowed in Wiscomlin are
as follows : three dollars per diem for the commissioner ;
twelve cents per folio for taking down and writing up
the original ; five cents · to eight cents for copies. The
rate varies in different localities. The commissioner gets
his per diem fee and in addition a portion of the fees
for stenographic service. The division of fees between
the commissioner and the reporter varies in different
places and among different officers. In Madison the
usual division is ten cents to the reporter and two cents
to the commissioner on the original, with copies at five
cents each going entirely to the reporter. Of course the
commissioner keeps all of the per diem charges as well
as the other incidental charges, if any. In Milwaukee
there is a variance but the average division seems to be
eight cents to the reporter and four cents to the com
missioner on originals, and four cents to the reporter and
two cents to the commissioner on copies. Sometimes a
flat fifty-fifty division obtains . . In Milwaukee the busi
ness of court commissioners is not unprofitable, some
thing like one hundred thousand dollars being the
combined earnings of the various commissioners. A dif
ferent plan for the payment of the commissioner is fol
lowed in Missouri. If either party requests the appoint
ment of a commissioner, the latter must be paid an addi
tional per diem charge, which supposedly shall not
exceed ten dollars. 1
The average . cost per examination, excluding the cost
of copies, seems to be between ten dollars and fifteen
dollars in the states wherein the ordinary deposition pro
cedure is used. Both the testimony of lawyers and in
spection of records with the notary's fees marked there
on indicates that this is' the average cost. Some lawyers
·

1 Of. Manning

v.

Roberts (1900) 83 Mo. App. 627.
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said that the average cost was nearer to twenty dollars
per examination than to either fifteen dollars or ten dol

lars. That the average figure in these states will not run
over fifteen dollars is indicated by statistics concerning
costs in Wisconsin, for there the fee rate is higher than in
the states which use the deposition procedure. In Madi
son, Wisconsin, the average cost,. excluding copies, among
seventy-two examinations which were inspected was fif
teen dollars and ninety-one cents, whereas the similar
figure for fifty-eight examinations in Milwaukee was fif
teen dollars and two cents. The highest cost found was

sixty-six dollars and sixty cents, and the lowest, four
dollars and twenty cents. Two devices for reducing ex

pense in discovery examination are being used, especially
in the smaller cities and towns. These are use of the
stenographer of the examining lawyer 's office, by agree

ment, rather than use of a special officer, and elimination
of the necessity of having the stenographer 's shorthand
notes transcribed.
It is uniformly provided that the applicant for discov

ery shall pay all costs of the examination in the first
instance. The usual rule is that the costs of the deposi
tion may be taxed to the losing party only in the event
the deposition is used at the triaP The right to tax in

Missouri is dependent upon whether the depositions are

filed rather than upon whether they are used. This rule
has caused the cost element to play an unusually prom

inent part in discovery examinations . . More objection

is made by Missouri lawyers to the expense of deposi
tions than to any other feature. Complaint is less notice
able in other states where the theOI'Y is that until the
dep osition is used at the trial all expense incident there

to should be considered as a part of the cost of preparaI In addition to the statutes see: Citizens Nat. Bank v. Alexander
(1905) 34 Ind. App. 596, 73 N. E; 279.
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tioil fo� trial and should be borne by the party taking
.,
the deposition.
An illustration of the manner in which costs may be
handled as a weapon to secure the effective administra
tion of other incidents of an examination for discovery
is afforded by the Missouri experience. If a party in
taking a deposition requests the officer in charge to com
mit the witness for a refusal to answer a question, and
the circuit court' later decides that the refusal of the
witness was justified, t4e court may force the party who
requested the commitment to pay the witness all costs in
curred by him in effecting his discharge, and in addition an attorney 's fee not exceeding twenty-five dollars,
and may delay any further examination of the witness
until such costs are paid.8 In Massachusetts the court
may direct who shall bear the cost either by general rule
or by special order in each case. In Ontario the costs
of an examination are borne in the first instance by the
party taking and cannot be taxed as disbursements un
less the taxing officer so directs.4 He may allow either
all or only a part to be taxed. Whether the deposition
was used at the trial or not is not controlling as to

whether the cost of the examination was reasonably in
curred.11 In 1894 a rule was passed making costs of a
discovery examination to be borne in any event by the
party taking same unless otherwise ordered by the trial

judge, but this rule was later changed so as to leave the
matter in the discretion of the taxing officer as it is at
present.6 As a matter of practice costs of discovery are
usually taxed to the losing party. But tlie possibility

that they may not be allowed has been found to be a salu
tary protection.
8 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) see. 5460; In re Whieker (1914) 187 Mo. App.
96, 173 s. w. 38.
4 Rule 654.
II Ontario Judicature Act (Holmested, 1915) p. 1326.
'
6 Cf. 39 Canada L. Jour. 772.

·
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Defendants pay the greater portion of the costs of
discovery examinations as a practical matter. Repre
sentatives of insurance, railway and traction companies,
make the most frequent use of the procedure. They
regard costs as secondary to the successful defense or
settlement of the action. If they are successful in de
fending the action it usually happens that they cannot
tax for depositions which they have taken, either be
cause there has been no use of them at the trial, or be
cause it is impossible to recover the costs from the plain
tiff. If a settlement is effected, it is usually provided
that the defendant will assume all costs.

CHAPTER �
RBVIBW OF RULINGS MADE UPON DISCOVERY
EXAMINATION
The following two principles are generally accepted :
(1) Rulings granting or denying discovery usually are
not proper subjects of a separate appeal ; ( 2 ) Rulings
which enforce a penalty for contempt or which strike a
pleading are appealable. The general rule in regard
to interlocutory orders is the basis of the first principle.
The policy behind the rule has been stated by the North
Carolina Supreme Court thus : " To stop the trial ·of a
cause, pending an appeal to this court, upon every iso
lated question of practice, or the admissibility of evi
dence, or the competency of a witness, and the like,
would indefinitely protract litigation and swell its cost. ' ' 1
The second principle is based upon the theory that an
order which enforces a penalty is to be regarded as a
final order and therefore is subject to a separate appeal.
These principles are so widely accepted that it will be
profitable to note only the exceptions.•
While a ruling which disallows specific questions usu
ally is not appealable as a separate item a clear abuse
of discretion may make an appeal possible.• The chief
1 Vann v. Lawrence (1893) 111 N. C. 32, 15
I For applications of the general rules see:

S. E. 1031.
Phipps v. Wis. Cent. Ry.
Co. (1907) 130 Wis. 279, 110 N. W. 207; Neacy v. Thomas (1912) 148
Wis. 91, 133 N. W. 580; Fertilizer Co. v. Taylor (1893) 112 N. C. 141,
17 B. E. 69; State v. Superior Court (1910) 56 Wash. 649, 106 Pac. 150;
Ex parte Jilz (1876) 64 Mo. 205; Landman v. Rashman (1928) 195
Wis. 33, 217 N. W. 649 ; Johnson v. The Harriett Mills, Inc. (1928) 196
N. C. 93, 144 B. E. 534; Holt v. Warehouse Co. (1895) 116 N. C. 480,
21 B. E. 919.
8 Horlick 's Malted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel Co. (1913) 155 Wis. 201,
144 N. W. 272; ·American Food Products Co. v. American Milling Co.
(1912) 151 Wis. 385, 138 N. W. 1123.
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application of this exception is to be found in cases
.wherein the order of the trial court has ·amounted to a
virtual denial of any discovery.4 The North Carolina
court has evidenced unusual liberality in regard to ap
peals. While the ordinary rule is that separate appeals
will not be countenanced," appeals have been allowed

in spite of the rule in several cases ; once where a ques
tion of " first importance " was deemed to be involved,6
and again where the order for the examination was not
founded upon proper affidavits. 7 Indication has been
given that appeals will be allowed whenever substantial
rights are involved.8
The rule that a penalty for contempt is appealable
seems to be followed generally except in the federal
courts. While an order striking a pleading is regarded
by the federal courts as final and reviewable separately,9
an order, even though wrongfully made, which punishes
for civil contempt is regarded as interlocutory. 10

The federal circuit court of appeals and the Supreme
Courts of Washington and Iowa, respectively, have held
that the extraordinary methods of review cannot be used
as a means of obtaining separate review of discovery
rulings.1 1 If the Missouri circuit courts attempt to in

terfere with the right of a party to take depositions by
4 Kuryer Pub. Co. v. Messmer (1916) 162 Wis. 565, 156 N. W. 948;
State ex rei. Methudy v. Killoren (Mo. App. 1921) 229 S. W. 1097.
6 Johnson v. The Harriett Mills Inc (1928) 196 N. C. 93, 144 S. E. 534.
6 Ward v. Martin ( 1918) 175 N. C. 287, 95 S. E. 621.
7 Chesson v. Washington County Bank (1925) 190 N. C. 187, 129 S. E.
403.
8 Monroe v. Holder (1921) 182 N. C. 79, 108 S. E. 359.
9 Carpenter v. Winn ( 1908) 165 Fed. 636; Francisco v. Chicago &
A. R. Co. ( 1906) 149 Fed. 354.
10 Doyle v. London Guaranty & Accident Co. (1907) 204 U. s: 599.
11 Keaton v. Kennamer ( 1930) 42 F. (2d) 814 (writ of prohibition) ;
State v. Superior Court (1910) 56 Wash. 649, 106 Pae. 150 (certiorari) ;
Winneshiek County Bank v. District Court (1927) 203 lowa 1277, 212
N. W. 391 (certiorari) . There i s a vigorous dissent in the last ease on
the ground that if the order is oppressive certiorari should lie under
the general constitutional power of the court " to secure justice to par
ties. " Cf. Ward v. Martin (1918) 175 N. C. 287, 95 S. E. 621.
..
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issuing an injunction, the Supreme Court will grant a·
writ of prohibition against such injunction.1 2
If a court wrongfully allows or disallows discovery
of particular items of evidence find the case goes on to
a final judgment may error be predicated upon the dis
covery rulings ¥ If so, must prejudice be, shown or is the
mere wrongful allowance or disallowance of discovery
in itself prejudicial Y The second question really is the
point of dispute, for the first question generally is an
swered in the affirmative. In Washington it has been
held that actual prejudice must be shown and that an
erroneous ruling is not ipso facto prejudiciaJ.l8 The
Indiana court has held that there is no prejudice if the
facts which were sought and wrongfully denied upon the
discovery examination are later proved by the evidence
at the trial. 14 The Massachusetts court takes a different
view, as indicated by the following quotation from an
opinion by Rugg, C. J. : ' ' The principle of trial evi
dence, to the effect that ordinarily no exception will be
sustained to the refusal to allow a question to be put

unless the substance of the answer expected in reply
is stated to the court, does not apply to interrogatories.
Where questions are asked of a witness at the trial, if
there has been proper preparation counsel usually has
more or less well grounded reason for anticipating the
testimony to be given. Interrogatories commonly are
propounded to an adverse party for the purpose of as
certaining material facts in advance of the trial. The

interrogator may be in. utter ignorance of the informa
tion likely to be disclosed, and be unable t o make any
offer of proqf. His right to interrogate does .not depend
primarily upon the question whether the answers will
18 State ex rei. Methudy v. Killoren (Mo. App., 1921) 229 S. W. 1097.
18 Moberg v. McCauley ( 1929) 150 Wash. 494, 273 Pae. 739 ; Gostina
v. Whitham (1928) 148 Wash. 72, 268 Pac. 132.
14 Meyer v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. ( 1895) 144 Ind. 439, 43 N. E.
448; Alesworth v. Brown (1869) 31 Ind. 270.
·
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help or harm him in the ultimate decision of the case.
On the other hand, exceptions ought not to be sustained
unless there is solid foundation for belief that substan
tial injury has resulted. Interrogatories should not be
suffered to become a training field for the saving of
exceptions possessing only a theoretical merit having
no relation to the practical administration of justice. ' ' 16

While appeals in New York from the trial courts to
the appellate divisions (intermediate courts of appeal )
of the four different departments of the supreme court
may be had, appeals to the Court of Appeals (highest
appellate tribunal) , on matters of discovery are gen
erally not countenanced.1 6 Only where such questions
as want of due process of law are raised, will appeal
lie.17
111 Cutler v. Cooper (1920) 234 Mass. 307, 125 N. E. 634, 637.
16 Middleton v. Boardman (1924) 210 N. Y. App. Div. 467, 206 N. Y. S.
725, appeal dismissed 240 N. Y. 552, 148 N. E. 701.
17 Feingold v. Walworth Bros. (1924) 238 N. Y. 335, 144 N. E. 675.
·

CHAPTER ·•XXI
DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS

AscERTAINING WHAT DocuMENTs ARE IN PossEssiON oF
ADVERSE pARTY
The two primary problems connected with discovery
of documents are : (1) How may a party ascertain what
documents are in the possession of the adverse party
relating to the action ? (2) Having ascertained what
documents are in the possession of the adverse party,
how may he obtain an inspection of them before trial !
Provision has been made in a majority of the jurisdic
tions of this country for the latter of these two problems
but the first one has been ignored. Insufficient remedy
is afforded the party who is unable to specify particular
documents in the possession of his adversary and yet
desires to asc�rtain what documents are in his posses
sion. New York has attempted to correct this situation
but the procedure is much less effective than that which .
is used in England and in Ontario. The applicant for
discovery must file an affidavit stating his belief that
certain specified documents are in the possession or
control of the adverse party and make a' motion for an
order that his opponent be required to disclose by affi
davit whether or not he has these specified documents.1
In some states it is possible, apart from statutory au
thorization, to interrogate as to the docu�ents which the
adverse party possesses during the course of the ex
amination for discovery, and to adjourn the examination
1 New York Civil Practice Aet, see. 328 ; Schmoll Fils Associated
v. Baltic American Lines (1931) 247 N. Y. S. 305.
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· for the production of the documents, the possession of
which is admitted. Under the Massachusetts written
interrogatory practice it is possible for the proponent
of the interrogatories to ask : ' ' Do you have · in your
possession or power such and such documents ? If so,
will you furnish a copy of such document, or state the
time and place that it may be inspected ¥ " Or he may
ask as a prefatory question to the entire interrogation :
"Will you look into all the books and papers which you
have relating to this action so that you can make com
plete answers to the following questions � ' ' A consider
ably more effective procedure has been established in
England, Ontario and other British jurisdictions.2 The
theory underlying the procedure is that there should ,be a
disclosure, as of course, of the identity of all documents
relating to the action and that there should be a dis
closure of the contents of the documents unless they are
privileged. The English practice is for the party who
, desires discovery of documents to apply to the court,
or to a master in chambers, for an order requiring his
opponent to give an affidavit of documents.3 An order
of court no longer is required in Ontario, but the dis
covery may be had upon mere notice to the party. The
only reason from a policy standpoint that it is not re
quired in every case that each party grant disclosure as
of course of his own documents is that, in some cases, it
might not be desired by the opposite party, in which
event the costs might be increased unnecessarily.
2 The English and Ontario provisions are set forth in the appendix at
the back of this volume. Citations to the similar provisions in other
British jurisdictions are : Alberta, Rules of Court (1914, as amended to
1923) 364-378 ; Australia, County Court Practice, 130, 133 ; British
Columbia, Court Rules (1925) order 31; Manitoba, Acts Relating to
Court of King's Bench (1914) 424-440; New Brunswick, Judicature Act
and Rules of Court (1909), order 31; New Foundla\).d, Cons. Stat. (1919)
ch. 83, order 31; Nova Scotia, Judicature Act (1920) order 30; Quebec,
Code of Civ. Prac. (1922) 286-290 ; Queensland, Supreme Court Practice
( 1921) order 35; Saskatchewan, Cons. Orders and Rules of the Court of
R;ing 's Bench (1921) order 21; Victoria, Sup. Court Rules (1916) order
31.
3 Stringer, The A. B. C. Guide to Practice (1928) p. 66.
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The affidavit of documents, as will be seen from the
following form, must set forth respectively : ( 1 ) all the
documents which the party has which he does not object
to producing ; ( 2 ) all documents \\1hich he has, but which
he objects to producing, and the ground for such objec
tions ; and (3) all documents which the party formerly
had in his possession or power but are now elsewhere,
together with a rigid accounting for the same.• The fol
lowing form is used :
' ' In the High Court of Justice.
Division.
Between A. B.,
Plaintiff,
and
C. D., E. F., and G. H., Defendants.
I, the above named defendant, C. D., make oath and
say as follows :
1. I have in my possession or power the documents
relating to the matters in question in this suit set forth
in the first and second parts of the first schedule hereto.
2. I object to produce the said documents set forth
in the second pa11t of the said :first schedule hereto (state
grounds for objection) .
3 . I have had, but have not now, in my possession or
power the documents relating to the matters in question
in this suit set forth in the second schedule hereto.
4. The last-mentioned documents were last in my
possession or power on (state when, and what has be
come of them, and in whose possession they now are) .
5. According to the best of my knowledge, informa
tion and belief I have not now, and never had in my
possession, custody, or power, or in the possession, cus
tody, or power of my solicitors or lj.gents, solicitor or
agent, or in the possession, custody or power of any other
persons or person on my behalf, any deed, account, book
4 For a fine practical description of the composition of the affidavit
of documents see the note of Sir Willes Chitty in 58 Law Journal 574.
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of account, voucher, receipt, letter, memorandum, paper,
or writing, or any copy of or extract from any such docu- ·
ment, or any other document whatsoever, relating to the
matters in question in this suit, or any of them, or
wherein any entry has been made relative to such mat
ters, or any of them, other than and except the docu
ments set forth in the said first and second schedules
hereto. ' ' 5
As a matter of practice in Ontario, very few docu
ments are entered in the schedule provided for those
which the party objects to producing. Out of more than
a hundred such affidavits inspected in the central office
at Osgoode Hall, Toronto, in which hundreds of docu
ments were listed, only three documents were specified,
as to which production was objected to. Two of these
were stated to be privileged as communications between
counsel and client while the third entry was listed as
"bank books " without any reason for the objection being
assigned. In all other cases this particular schedule
was either left blank or, as more often, filled only by
the printed word ' ' NIL. ' ' In a fraud action, for in
stance, the plaintiff and five defendants each filed sepa
rate affidavits of documents, listing altogether more than
300 items, yet no objection was made to the production
of any of them.
The affidavit of documents may not be contradicted
by counter-affidavits. If a party has reason to believe
that the affidavit of documents omits certain books or
papers he may apply for a further affidavit as to these
specific books or papers, according to the English prac
tice. But when this further affidavit has been made it
is practically conclusive of the matter, and the court
usually will not disregard the oath.6 The Ontario rule
is that only when the documents actually produced, or
5 Annual Practice (1932) 1539.

6 See

annotation in Annual Practice (1932)

p.

529.
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admissions of the party himself� disclose additional docu:.
ments, may the affidavit be ·attacked.' In practice, how
ever, it is quite usual to :find a party seeking disclosure
of documents not listed in the affidavit. When he :finds
such the examination is adjourned until the documents
are produced. The following excerpt from an actual
record shows just how the matter is presented :
Q . Have you got any record anywhere of that money?
A. Yes, possibly I have.
Q . I am asking if you have. If you have, I want it
produced here now.
A. I have not got it here now.
Q . Is it mentioned in your affidavit on production 1
A. I don 't know that it is.
Q . Show it to me-you signed the affidavit f
A. It is some time ago. It is hard to remember every
thing that is in here.
Attorney for, party : I don't think there is anything
in the affidavit on production.
INSPECTION oF DocUMENTS
After a party has ascertained what documents relating
to the action are in the possession of his adversary he
may desire to inspect them before trial. There are two
ways by which he should be able to make inspection. He
should be able to require their production and inspect
them as an incident of, and during the progress of, an
. oral examination for discovery or he should be able to
inspect them separately, by virtue of a special statutory
provision for inspection of documents.
The Ontario practice is illustrative of the way in
which the affidavit of document procedure can be in
tegrated with the general procedure for an oral examina
tion before trial. By the affidavit ot documents a party
'7 Canadian

Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario Ed.) vol. 3, p.

731.
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can ascertain the identity of documents which may be of
help to him in preparing his case. Then he can compel
production for inspection of the particular books and
papers which he desires to see. According to the literal
rule production and deposit for inspection must be made
·at the office where the proceedings are being taken. In
practice, however, it is customary for the inspection to
be arranged by the solicitors in the manner most con
venient to all concerned. Usually after the inspection
the party knows which documents he will want produced
at the oral examination for discovery and the opposite
party either agrees to bring these along or is directed
by the notice of appointment to do so. At the examina
tion the documents actually referred to are marked as
exhibits and returned to the party until the trial. In
almost all cases wherein oral examinations for discovery
are had affidavits and production of documents are first
required. This was true in forty-three out of the fifty
consecutive cases, the records of which were studied in
Toronto. In addition affidavits of documents are re
quired in many cases wherein no oral examination is
used.
In most of the states which allow use of the ordinary
deposition procedure for purposes of discovery before
trial, it is possible for the party to require, by the service
of a subpoena duces tecum, that the party to be examined
bring with him specified books and papers. This is the
practice in Ohio,8 Nebraska,9 Indiana and Kentucky.10
The Missouri court, on the contrary, has held that a
party cannot be forced to produce his books and papers
for inspection as an incident of an examination for disB Ra Raugh (1901) 65 0. S. 128, 61 N. E. 701 ; Ex parte Schoepf (1906)
0. S. 1, 77 N. E. 276.
9 Old Line Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Witt (1913) 92 . Neb. 743, 139
N. W. 641.
10 This is the actual practice in Indiana and Kentucky, alt�o�gh
there are no clear-cut decisions on the matter.
74

.
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covery before either a notary or a commissioner. 11 There
is a difference of opinion among the lawyers of New
Hampshire as to whether a party whose deposition is
being taken can be forced to produce his documents for
inspection. 12 In 1889 the Wisconsin statute on discovery
was so amended as to authorize the officer in charge of
a discovery examination to compel the party examined
to produce his books and papers, by contempt proceed
ings. Inspection is easily obtained under this plan. The
form of the notice for an adverse examination contains
the words : "You are further commanded that you bring
with you and have at the time and place above named, "
followed by an appropriate blank. Known papers are
specified and a blanket clause covering ' ' all other papers
relating to the action ' ' is added. It is permissible at the
examination to interrogate thoroughly as to what other
documents the party has in his possession or power. If
others are disclosed the examination can be adjourned
until they are produced. If the books are too large to
carry or if the inspection would consume too much time,
there is usually a stipulation allowing inspection at the
party 's offices. Usually the documents are not copied,
nor are they kept with the record. Rather they are re
ferred to, marked for identification, and returned to the
party until the trial.
There is a conflict among the New York decisions as
to how largely discovery and inspection of documents
may be had in connection with an oral examination of a
party for discovery before trial. The extreme degree
of liberality is evidenced by the Appellate Division of
the Second Department which, in a recent memorandum
decision, seems to hold that" production of papers may be
11 State ex rei. Stroh v. Kiene (1918) 276 Mo. 206, 207 S. W. 496;
State ex rei. McCulloch v. Taylor (1916) 268 Mo. 312, 187 S. W. 1181.
lll The view that a party can be forced to produce seems to be BUB·
tained in Boston & Maine R. R. v. State (1910) 75 N. H. 513, 77 A. 996.
The contrary vie'Y is attributable to the wording of N. H. Public Laws
·
(1926) ch� 33&, sec. ·25;
·

.

·

.

·
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required at the examination by a mere notice to pro
duce. 18 At the other extreme is a decision from the
Appellate Division of the Fourth Department to the
effect that proceedings for the discovery and inspection
of documents are entirely separate from examinations of
parties and witnesses. 14 The view more generally fol
lowed and. the one which seems more in accord with the
statutory provisions is that, while there may be no pro
duction and inspection if the examination for discovery
is initiated by notice, there may be a combined court
order allowing both the examination and the inspection. 16
Under such a view the proper procedure is to name the
books and papers of which inspection is desired in the
application for an order for the examination so that
the court can combine the two things in its order. 16 There
have been several rulings to the effect that production
of documents at an adverse examination before trial may
be compelled by subpoena duces tecum but that the only
use which can be made of the documents after they are
produced is to identify them or refresh the memory of
the witness by them.1'7 The actual practice in New York
as to discovery of documents is very illiberal.
Most jurisdictions also provide procedure for the in
spection of documents other than and apart from pro
cedure for discovery of testimony generally. The Eng
lish practice is for the party applicant to serve a notice
18 Meretsky v. Wolff (1928) 229 N. Y. S. 776. (Possibly the docu
ments were sue}!. as to come within sec. 327 of the Civil Practice Act,
but it is not so specified.)
14 Citizens ' Trust Co. of Utica v. R. Prescott & Son (1927) 223 N. Y. S.
184. Note that the only case cited in support of this decision does not
go so far as a matter of fact.
16 Fey v. Wisser (1923) 202 N. Y. S. SO; Bartholomay Co. v. Regan
(1924) 205 N. Y. S. 745; Ritzwoller v. Lurie (1923) 198 N. Y. S. 754;
Zeltner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. (1927) 220 N. Y. S. 356; Schmoll Fils
Associated v. Baltic American Line (1931) 247 N. Y. S. 305.
16 Fey v. Wisser (1923) 202 N. Y. S. 30; New York Civil Practice
Act, sec. 296; Rules of Civil Practice 122.
17 Kertz v. Liberty Bapk of Buffl!lo (1929) 233 N. Y. S. 472; N. Y.
City Car Adv. Co. v. Regensburg ,& Sons (192�) 200 N. Y. s, 152; Klapp
v. Merwin (1924) 203 N. Y. s. 694. See nbte in 1 N. Y. Civ. Ptoe. R.
17'6 to't rulings 'llnder tl1e code.
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upon the party who has admitted.. possession of relevant
documents to produce them for inspection. If production
is refused an order may then be applied for.18 The court
then makes an order for inspection in such place and in
such manner as he thinks fit, unless the document is privi
leged or unless inspection is unnecessary either for dis
posing fairly of the cause or for saving costs.19 A ma
jority of the jurisdictions of this country have provision
for production and inspection of documents. But in many
of them the procedure is clumsy, and the limitations upon
its use make it very ineffective. The most serious limi
tation concerns the time of tl;te discovery. In the federal
law courts and in quite a few of the states the statutes
seem to intend only production at the trial and not in
spection before the trial. The federal statute is repre
sentative of these provisions : ' ' In trials of actions at
law, the courts of the United States may, on motion
and due notice ,thereof, require the parties to produce
books or writings in their possession or power, which
contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and
under circumstances where they might be compelled to
produce the same by the ordinary rules of proceeding in
chancery. • • • ' ' 80 For . more than a century trial
courts disagreed as to whether this allowed inspection
before trial or was limited to production at the trial, but
the United StatE�s Supreme Court has now finally decided
that it is the latter.11
The procedure for obtaining production and inspection
of documents varies as to details in different jurisdic
tions.•• The following jurisdictions have statutes which
provide that the court, on application and notice, may
order the party to give inspection and copy of docu18 Annual Practice (1930) order 31, rule 15 ff.
19 Id. rule 18.

10 U.

S. C. A. tit. 28, sec. 636.

81 Carpenter v. Winn (1911) 221 U. S. 533.

II The statutes are set forth
volume.

in

the appendix at the back of this
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mentary evidence, without need of a prior demand : Ala
bama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Caro
lina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Porto Rico,
South Carolina, South Dakota, United States Admiralty,
United States Court of Claims, United States Law, Utah,
Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Statutes in the
following states require that the party applicant first
make a demand on the adverse party, which upon his
refusal may be followed by a motion for an order for
inspection : Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma
and Wyoming. The following states require the appli
cant for discovery of documents to file a petition or
, application in writing : Arkansas, Iowa, Michigan, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Virginia.
Special provision is made in many jurisdictions for in
spection of documents which are referred to in the
pleadings. Inspection of such documents is a matter of
right.18 In some of the jurisdictions of this country this
includes only such documents as are the foundation of
the action, but in England and some states of this coun
try it includes all documents referred to in either plead
ings or affidavits. This latter has proved so highly
desirable that its application has been extended, by con
struction, beyond its patent intent to include affidavits
of documents also.•• In Victoria the statute goes even
further and makes inspection a matter of right as to all
documents referred to in writ, pleading, particulars or
affidavit.86
28 A list of the statutes may be found in Wigmore on Evidence, vol.
III, sec. 1859 a, note 4.
M Bray, Digest of the Law of Discovery, sec. 66.
a& Victoria Supreme Court Rules (1916) order 51, sec. 15.

CHAPTER XXII
EXAMINATION OF PROPERTY AND PERSON
Dean Wigmore has summed up the respective view
points and practices of the courts of common law and
of chancery thus : ' ' So far as concerned chattels and
premises in his possession or control, the adversary in
common law actions, like the true gamester that the law
encouraged him to be, held safely the trump cards of the
situation, free from any legal liability of disclosure be
fore trial ; in this respect there was not recognized even
the . limited right of inspection which after the days of
Lord Mansfield had been conceded for documentary evi
dence. But in chancery, under the same wholesome prin
ciple and practice by which bills of discovery were al
lowed for ascertaining the opponent 's testimony and the
documents in his possession the inspection of chattels
and premises in his possession or control was obtainable
wherever fairness seemed to demand it. ' ' 1
It is the practice now in England for the court, or
a master on a summons for directions, upon the applica
tion of a party after notice to his opponent, to order
the inspection of any property or thing which is the
subject of the cause or matter, or as to which any ques
tion may arise therein. The court or master may also
authorize persons to go on the land or property and
inspect it or to make any necessary observations and
experiments, or take any necessary samples.1 In a
proper case the court will allow photographs to be taken,
if this is necessary to preserve the evidence for trial.1
1 Wigmore on Evidence, lli, 1862.
I Annual · Praetiee (1932) order 50,
8 Lewis

.

rules 2-6.
v. Ltd. Londesborough (1893) 2 Q. B. 191.
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Similar rules also obtain in most of the Canadian prov.
mces.'
Several American states have statutes which provide
for the inspection of property, which are rather limited
in scope. In some of them, the provision is apparently
limited to special kinds of actions, as for instance the
California provision that the court may order inspec
tion in actions for the recovery of real property or for
damages for an injury thereto.6 A still more conspic
uous limitation is like that noted in connection with
statutes authorizing inspection of documents, namely, it
is not clear whether the statutes contemplate inspection
before trial or not. In New York and Wisconsin and
Michigan, however, it is clear that the inspection may be
had before trial. 6 The New York statute provides : " A
court of record, other than a justices ' court in a city, by
order may compel a party to an action pending therein to
produce and discover, or to give to the other party, an
inspection and copy, or permission to take a copy or
photograph of a book, document or other paper, or to
make discovery of any article or property in his pos
session or under his control, relating to the merits of the
action, or of the defense therein. The procedure for
obtaining such order shall be regulated by rules. " The
Wisconsin statute is as follows : " In any civil action
or proceeding in a court of record the court or the pre
siding judge may, after issue joined, and on application,
order a party to permit an opposite party and his wit
nesses to inspect any property, the inspection of which
may be deemed material and necessary. ' ' The New
Michigan Court Rules provide : "In any action for dam4 Ontario, Cons. Rules of Practice (1913) rule 266; Ross on Discovery
(Boulton, Can. Ed.), 126.
6 Cf. Wigmore on Evidence, III, sec, 1862, and note 8, in which a
number of such special statutes are cited.
6 New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 324, Rules of Civ, Prac.,
rules 14(}-142; Wis. Stat. (1927), ch. 269, sec. 57. See also American
Judicature 's proposed Rul�s of Civil Procedure Act, Art. 21, sec. 16.
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ages for injuries to person or property, or to recover
upon any policy of insurance respecting sickness or
bodily injuries or damages or injuries to property, physi
cal examination by physicians of the person sick or in
jured, or by the defendant or his agent of the property
damaged or injured, may be ordered in advance of the
trial, on motion with due notice, upon such just and rea
sonable terms and conditions as the court may pre
scribe. ' ' 7
It is of great facility in determining the exact nature,
extent and probable duration of the injury in personal
injury cases that the defendant be allowed to have an
examination of the plaintiff by a competent physician.
On the other hand, it is necessary that the examination
be so conducted and supervised that no abuse or unnec
essary violation of the rights of personal privacy may be
allowed.
A decided majority of the decisions are to the effect
that a court has power upon the trial to require the plain
tiff to submit' to a physical examination by p4ysicians
selected by the court.8 On principal it would seem that
no substantial injustice would be done the plaintiff by
moving up the time for such an examination, and allow
ing it to be ordered before the trial. This would prove
a time saving expedient as far as the court and jury
are concerned. But, apart from statute, the courts have
been rather equally divided as to whether or not there
is inherent power in the courts to compel submission to
such an examination before trial. 'J:.1here is one line of
authority, headed by the United States Supreme Court,
which has held quite flatly that courts have no such
power.9 Other courts have taken the position that the
7 Michigan Court Rules (1930) rule 41, sec. 5.
8 Belt Electric Line Co. v. Allen (1898) 102 Ky. 551, 44 S. W. 89,
and numerous cases cited in Wigmore on Evidence, IV, 2220, and in 23
L. R. A. (N. S.) 465.
9 Railway Co. v. Botsford (1890) 141 U. S. 250. See also the opinion
of Holmes, C. J., in Stock v. Railroad (1900) 177 Mass. 155, 58 N. E.
686; McQuigan v. Railroad Co. (1891) 129 N. Y. 50, 29 N. E. 235.
.

.
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discovery of truth and the prevention of fraud is so nec
essary in administering justice in personal injury cases
that the slight inroad on the right of personal privacy
must be tolerated and that the courts have inherent
power to allow physical examinations.10
After the New York Court of Appeals had held that
trial courts had no power, apart from statute, to order
a physical examination of a party before trial, the legis
lature promptly enacted a statute which conferred this
power upon the courts. The New York statute provides :
"In an action to recover damages for personal injuries,
if the defendant shall present to the court satisfactory
evidence that he is ignorant of the nature and extent
of the injuries complained of, th� court, by order, shall
direct that the plaintiff submit to a physical examina
tion by one or more physicians or surgeons to be desig
nated by the court or judge, and such examination shall
be had and made under such restrictions and directions
as to the court or judge shall seem proper. If the party
to be examined shall be a female she shall be entitled to
have such examination before a physician or surgeon
of her own sex. The order for such physical examina
tion, upon the application of the defendant, may also
direct that the testimony of such party be taken by
deposition pursuant to this article. ' ' 11 Subsequently
five other states have adopted similar measures. 11 The
constitutionality of such measures has been upheld in
New York 13 and New Jersey.u The New Jersey statute
was attacked on the ground that if the examination were
allowed before trial, it would constitute an infringement
10 The cases are fully listed in 14 L. R. A. 466, and 23 L. R. A.
N. S. 465.
11 New York Civil Practice Aet, see. 306.
111 Ariz. Session Laws, 1921, .eh. 131; Mich. Court Rules (1931) rule
41, see. 5; N. J. Comp. Stat. (1910) p. 2226; S. D. Session Laws, 1921,
eh. 179; Wash. Codlp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) sees. 1230-1231.
18 Lyon v. Railway Co. (1894) 142 N. Y. 298, 37 N. E. 113.
1t McGovern v. Hope (1899) 63 N. J. L. 76, 42 Atl. 830.
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of the constitutional right of a party in a civil suit to be
confronted by witnesses, but the court rejected the con
tention. No such provision is to be found in the general
rules regarding discovery in England, but a special stat
ute was enacted in 1868, which still is in force, whereby
a person who is injured in a railway accident can be
compelled to submit to a physical examination. 15 Ontario
allows physical examinations in all personal injury
actions.16
The following practical problems have arisen in the
various jurisdictions in regard to the conduct of the
medical examination : May an X-ray examination be re
quired T Is a female party entitled to demand a physi
cian of her own sex Y May the physician ask questions
of the pa�ty while he is making the physical examina
tion T There is a division of authority as tp the use of
the X-ray in Ne,w York, although the predominant view
seems to be that it is permissible. 17 Only in New York is
a female party entitled to demand that the examination
be conducted by a physician of her own sex. 18 The ex
amining physician, under the Ontario practice, is not
allowed to ask questions of the person whom he is ex
amining. The court, in so construing the rule, said : ' ' To
permit the plaintiff to be physically examined is a suffi
cient invasion of his personal rights without giving the
surgeon the right to hold an inquisition on him. " 19
15 31 & 32 Viet., ch. 119, sec. 26.
16 Canadian Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario Ed.) III, 792.
1'7 Gilbert v. Iqar (1928) 228 N. Y. S. 183 (the court will

take judicial
knowledge that there is little or no danger from such examinations at
the present time) ; Boyland v. Libman (1927) 220 N. Y. S. 632; Hollister
v. Robertson (1924) 203 N. Y. S. 514. Contra : Lacqua v. General Linen
Supply & Laundry Co. (1929) 237 N. Y. S. 197; Van Orden v. Madow
(1923) 201 N. Y. S. 954.
18 Young v. Fairfax (1923) 200 N. Y. S. 815.
19 Falconbridge, J., in Clouse v. Coleman (1895) 16 P. R. 496. See
generally as to the Ontario practice, Ontario Judicature Act (Holmested,
1915) page 234; Ross on Discovery (Canadian Ed.) page 125.

CHAPTER XXIII
PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING ADMISSIONS

NoTICE TO AnMiT ExiSTENCE OF FACTS
England and several American jurisdictions provide a
special procedure by which either party may call upon
his adversary to admit, for purposes of the trial only,
the existence of facts. The penalty for unjust refusal
to admit is the cost of proving the items concerning which
admissions were asked and refused. A chief reason for
the adoption of this procedure in England is that written
interrogatories have proved a somewhat inadequate
means of discovery before trial, and have proved burden
some upon the parties and the court. One of the attrac
tions of this special admission procedure is that it is
extra-judicial in its operation. Massachusetts judges
have encouraged use of the device for the express pur
pose of relieving themselves of a part of the administra
tive burden in connection with interrogatories. A Boston
judge instructed the members of the bar who practiced
before him that he would not allow interrogatories in the
event the same result could be obtained by notices to
admit. The following quotation from Kekewich, J., indi
cates the use of the procedure in England and its relation
to other pre-trial devices : ' ' The modern practice of
exacting particulars and admission of facts not really
in dispute, added to the large means of discovery by dis
closure of documents and, where occasion requires it,
inspection of premises or machinery, has rendered un
necessary and inconvenient interrogatories of the ancient
type which were always open to objection. My practice
is to decline applications for leave to administer inter194

.
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rogatories where the object is to demand admission of
fact alleged by the interrogating party, and denied or not
admitted by the opponent, or to obtain information which
may equally well be supplied by particulars. As regards
admissions of fact, it is often urged, as it was here, that
a litigant will hestitate to state on oath what he will
without hesitation state in pleadings, and that there is
difficulty in otherwise obtaining admission of facts, even
though not really in dispute ; and it is further urged that
an admission by an affidavit in answer to interrogatories
is useful in limiting the issues to be tried, and therefore
in reducing the time occupied by the trial and the costs.
I recognize the importance of this in the abstract ; but
practically I find that the interrogated party seldom
makes such clean admissions as secure the advantages
aimed at, and, failing that, little if anything is gained.
As regards facts not really in dispute, I believe that the
power of requiring admissions is not sufficiently used.
If parties insist, as they generally do, on asking 'their
opponents to admit facts, dates and events about which
there is room for doubt or argument, of course the en
deavor to obtain admissions breaks down ; but if the
demand is limited to facts not really in dispute, that is,
which can be admitted cleanly, or subject to some simple
qualifications, I find that it is generally acceded to, and
the power which the court has of throwing the costs on
any one who has increased them by declining reasonable
admissions is not forgotten. ' '

1

The notice to admit facts is employed in England,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, New Jersey and
Wisconsin. The English provision is as follows :
' ' Any party may, by notice in writing, at any time not
later than nine days before the day for which notice of
trial has been given, call on any other party to admit,
for the pull>oses of the cause, matter,

1 Clarke v.

Clarke (1899) 34 w. N. 130, 131.

or issue only; any
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specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice. And in
�se of refusal or neglect to admit the same within six
days after service of such notice, or within such further
time as may be allowed by the court or a judge, the costs
of proving such fact or facts shall be paid by the party
so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the
cause, matter, or issue may be, unless at the trial or hear
ing the court or a judge certify that the refusal to admit
was reasonable, or unless the court or a judge shall at
any time otherwise order or direct. Provided, that any
admission made in pursuance of such notice is to be
deemed to be made only for the purposes of the partic
ular cause, matter, or issue, and not as an admission to
be used against the party on any other occasion or in
favour of any person other than the party giving the
notice : provided also, that the court or a judge may at
any time allow any party to amend or withdraw any
admission so made on such terms as may be just. ' ' 2
The Massachusetts statute is as follows :
' ' In any action at law or suit in equity a party by
written notice filed in the clerk 's office and served by copy
on the other party or his attorney, not less than ten days
before the trial of the action or suit, may call upon the
other party to admit, for the purposes of the case only,
any material fact or facts or the execution of any mate
rial paper or document which he intends to use at the
trial. The court may delay the trial until such notice
is answered and on motion before trial may strike out of ·
such notice or any answer filed in response thereto any
matter which is irrelevant, immaterial or improperly in
cluded therein. If no answer is filed in the clerk 's office
within ten days after the filing therein of said notice or
within such further time as the court may on motion
allow, the truth of the fact or facts or the execution of
th� paper .or document shall, for the purposes of the case,
be held to be admitted. Suc11 notice, in so · far as· it
2 Annual

Prac. (1932) order 32, rule 4.
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relates to a material fact or document, and any answer
filed in response thereto shall, if offered by the party
who filed such notice, be admitted in evidence. If the
party upon whom such notice is served refuses to admit
any fact or the execution of any paper or document men
tioned in the notice, the reasonable expense of proving
such fact or the execution of such paper or document, as
determined after summary hearing by the justice pre
siding at the trial, shall, unless the justice certifies that
the refusal to admit was reasonable, be paid by said
party to the other party and the amount thereof shall be
added to the taxable costs of the party in whose favor
such amount is awarded or deducted from the amount of
any judgment. or decree against him. ' ' 8
The new Michigan Court Rules make the following
provision for admission of facts :
' ' Any party, by notice in writing, given not later than
ten days before the trial, may call on any other party to
admit, for the purposes of the cause, matter or issue
only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice.
In case of refusal or. neglect · to admit the same within
four days afte!i service of such notice, or within such
further time as may be allowed by the court or a judge,
the expenses incurred in proving such fact or facts, in
cluding a reasonable counsel fee for the time and attention devoted thereto, must be ascertained at the trial
and paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, what
eve� the result of the cause, matter or issue may be,
unless at the trial or hearing, the court or a judge certify
that the refusal to admit was reasonable, or unless the
court or a judge, at any time, shall order or direct other
wise. Any admission made in pursuance of such notice
is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the
particular cause, matter or issue, and not as an admis
sion to be use� against the party on any other occasion
or .in favor of any person other than the party giving
a

Mass. Clim. Stats. (1927) ch, 231, see. 69.

·
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the notice. The court or a judge, at any time, may allow
any party to amend or withdraw any admission so made
on such terms as may be just. " 4
The New York Civil Practice Act provides that :
' ' Any party, by notice in writing, given not later than
ten days before the trial, may call on any other party
to admit, for the purposes of the cause, matter or issue
only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice.
In case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within
six days after service of such notice, or within such fur
ther time as may be allowed by the court or a judge, the
expenses incurred in proving such fact or facts must be
ascertained at the trial and paid by the party so neglect
ing or refusing, whatever the result of the cause, matter
or issue may be, unless at the trial or hearing the court
or a judge certify that the refusal to admit was reason
able, or unless the court or a judge, at any time, shall
order or direct otherwise. Any admission made in pur
suance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only
for the purposes of the particular cause, matter or issue,
and not as an admission to be used against the party on
any other occasion or in favor of any person other than
the party giving the notice. The court or a judge, at
any time, may allow any party to amend or withdraw any
admission so made on such terms as may be just. ' ' 6
The New Jersey statute is as follows :
' ' Any party may call upon any other party, by written
notice, to admit (but only for the purposes of the cause) ,
the existence, due execution, signing o r mailing of any
document ; and to admit .any other specific facts relevant
to the issue mentioned in the notice. In case of refusal
or neglect to make such admission within such time as
may be fixed by rules or special order, the reasonable
expense of proving the same (to be taxed by the court)
shall be paid by the party so notified, whatever the result
4 Mieh. Court Rules (1931> rule 42, sec. 2.
I New York Civil Practice Aet, sec. 323.
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of the trial may be, unless the trial judge shall certify
that the neglect or refusal was reasonable. But the court
may allow any party to amend or withdraw such admission on terms. ' ' 8
The Wisconsin statute is as follows :
' 'Any party to an action may, by notice in writing de
livered not later than ten days before the trial, call upon
any other party within five days after receiving the
notice, to admit or deny under oath, or to state under
oath what the fact is, according to the best of his knowl
edge, information and belief with regard to, or to state
under oath that he has no knowledge or information suf
ficient to form a belief with regard to : (a) The existence,
due execution, correctness, validity, signing, sending or
receiving of any document, or, (b) The correctness of
any specific fact or facts material in the action and stated
in the notice.
' ' Such admission if made shall be taken as conclusive
evidence against the party making it, but only for that
particular action and in favor of the party giving the
notice ; it shall not be used against him in any other
action or proceeding or on any other occasion, and shall
not be received in evidence in any other action or trial.
"If the party receiving such notice fails to comply
therewith within the time specified, the facts therein
stated shall be taken to be admitted.
' ' In case of refusal to make such admission, the rea
sonable expense of proving any fact or document men
tioned in the notice shall be paid by the party so notified
in any event, unless the court is satisfied the refusal was
reasonable·.
' ' The court may allow the party making any such
admission to withdraw or amend it upon such terms as
may be just, and may, for good cause shown, relieve a
party from the consequences of a default. ' ' 7
·

·

8

N. J. Laws (1912) ch. 231, sec. 18.

7 Wis.

Stat. ( 1927) ch. 327, sec. 22; see proposed amendments in Re·
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The notice to admit facts is required to be served at
least nine days before the day set for trial in England,
and at least ten days in Massachusetts, New York and
Wisconsin. The New Jersey statute does not specify
the time within which the notice must be served. The
usual rule is that the notice may be served informally by
counsel upon opposing counsel. Recently the Massa
chusetts Supreme Court has required that notices to
admit be served by an officer of the court.8 This ruling
has proved decidedly unpopular with the bar, for as the
Massachusetts Judicial Council has said, '.' This inter
pretation reverses the practice of thirteen years and ap
pears to require the unusual method of notifying the
attorney of the other side by an officer. The new inter
pretation of the statute has caused much confusion and
uncertainty and involves the additional expense of serv
ice in making use of a statute which was intended to
. reduce expense. ' ' 9
One of the most troublesome points in the actual use
of the procedure concerns the type of fact which is the
proper subject of a request to admit. Is it intended that
a party may call upon his adversary to admit detailed
· items of evidence, about which there is room for argu
ment and doubt, or is it intended that notices to admit
shall include only items which are either true or false 1
The different jurisdictions exhibit a variety of practice
in this regard.
The following excerpt from the opinion of Kekewick,
J., indicates that the problem has been encountered in
England and that no definite rule has been reached :
' ' If parties insist as they generally do, on asking their
opponents to admit facts, dates and events about which
there is room for doubt or argument, of course the enport of Advisory Committee on Rules to the Supreme Court (1930)
item 19.
s Boston Morris Plan Co. v. Barrett (1930) 272 Mass. 487, 172 N. E.
603.
9 Sixth Report (1931) p. 14;

PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING ADMISSIONS

201

deavor to obtain admissions breaks down ; but if the
demand is limited to facts not really in dispute1 that is,
which can be admitted cleanly, or subject to some sim
ple qualifications, I find that it 'is generally acceded to
•

•

• " 10

The New York court has criticized the practice of
covering the whole field of evidence under notices to
admit : " In the present case we have what probably is
to date the most comprehensive notice and demand made
under section 323� This notice covers 115 folios, and
contains 226 separately numbered paragraphs. It ap
parently covers to a great extent the field of the defend
ant 's proof. To allow all these demands would be call
ing upon the plaintiff to prove his adversary 's case, to
disprove his own, and at the same time to payt all the
expense. Some of the demands, if allowed, would call
upon plaintiff to go to trouble and expense to acquire
the knowledge to admit facts that are peculiarly within
the knowledge of the defendant itself ; some call for what,
insofar as the papers before me show, is purely opinion
evidence, or evidence that would be inadmissible at the
trial. Others of the demands call for what, for want of
a better term, we shall call half a fact, which standing
alone, might have to the court or jury an entirely differ
ent meaning than if the whole fact were presented. ' ' 11
Some Wisconsin lawyers are using the device in ex
actly the same fashion which the New York court has
criticized. They call upon their opponents to admit
practically every item of evidence. Several cases were
found in which as many as one hundred specific admis
sions had been requested. The chief use of admission
procedure in such a form is as a tactical weapon, rather
than as a means of eliminating undisputed items of proof.
Thus far, however, the Wisconsin courts have not con
demned the practice.
10 Clarke v. Clarke (1899) 34 W. N. 130, 131.
11 Koppel Industrial Car & Equipment Co. v.

195 N. Y. S. 24.

Portalis & Co. (1922)
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'
The following two forms indicate the practice which
is contemplated in England and in Massachusetts. The
model English form is as follows :
" Take notice that the plaintiff ( or defendant) in this cause
requires the defendant (or plaintiff) to admit, for the pur
poses of this cause only, the several facts respectively here
under specified ; and the defendant (or plaintiff) is hereby re
quired, within six days from the service of this notice, to · ad
mit the said several facts, saving all just exceptions to the
admissibility of such facts as evidence in this cause.
Dated, &c.
G. H., solicitor ( or agent) for the plaintiff (or defendant) .
To E. F., solicitor ( or agent) for the defendant ( or plaintiff) .
The facts, the admission of which is required, are1. That John Smith died on the 1st of January, 1890.
2. That he died intestate.
3. That James Smith was his only lawful son.
4. That Julius Smith died on the 1st of April, 1896.
5. That Julius Smith never was married. ' ' 11

The following excerpt from the record of a Massa
chusetts case indicates the form of the statement of the
facts of which an admission is requested :
" (1 ) That on June 23, 1930, the defendant was the owner
of a motor vehicle bearing Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Registration No . . . . . . . .
(2) That on June 23, 1930, a certain motor vehicle bearing
Mass. Motor Vehicle Registration No . . . . . . . . was registered
in the name of the defendant.
(3) That on June 23, 1930, a motor vehicle bearing Massa
chusetts Motor Vehicle Registration No . . . . . . . . stood in the
name of the defendant.
( 4) That on June 23, 1930, J. L. D.-was in the employ of
the defendant.
(5) That on June 23, 1930, at about 4 :30 P. M. a motor
vehicle bearing Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Registration
No . . . . . . . . was being operated by J. L. D.
(6) That on June 23, 1930, at about 4 :30 P. M. a motor
vehicle bearing Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Registration
11 Annual Prae. (1930) Appendix B, form 12.

'
No . . . . . . . . was operated by an employee of the defendant in
the course of his employment. ' ' 18

The statutes provide that the party who is served with
a notice to admit facts must either admit or refuse to
admit them within a certain time after the notice is
served. The time requirement varies : in England and
New York it is six days ; in Massachusetts, ten days ; and
in Wisconsin and New Jersey, five days. Orily Wis
consin requires that the admission be made under oath.
The form of admission which is used in England is as
follows :
" The defendant (or plaintiff) in this cause only, hereby
admits the several facts respectively hereunder specified, sub
ject to the qualifications or limitations, if any, hereunder speci
fied, saving all just exceptions to the admissibility of such
facts, or any of them, as evidence in this cause.
' ' Provided that this admission is made for the purposes (If
this action only, .and is not an admission to be used ag�t
the defendant ( or plaintiff) on any other occasion, or by any
one other than the plaintiff (or defendant, or party requiring
the admission) .
Delivered, &c.
" E . F., solicitor ( or agent ) for the defendant (or plaintiff ) .
" To G. H., solicitor (or agent) for the plaintiff (or defend
ant) . "
Qualifications o r Limitations,
if Any, Subject to Which
They Are Admitted

Facts Admitted

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

That John Smith died on
the 1st of January, 1870.
That he died intestate.
That James Smith was his
lawful son.
That Julius Smith died.
That Juli� Smith never
was married.

1.
2.
3.
4.

But not that he was his
only lawful son.
But '"llot that he died on
the 1st of April, 1896.

5.

18 Su1folk Superior Court Record No.

249952.
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England, New York and New Jersey provide that
where the adverse party neither admits nor refuses to
admit within the prescribed time, such action shall consti
tute a refusal to admit. Massachusetts and Wisconsin,
on the contrary, provide that a failure to either admit
or deny shall be treated as an admission. Thus a fail
ure to admit is more drastically penalized than a refusal
to admit.
The statutes uniformly provide that the reasonable
cost of proving a fact, an admission of which is unjustly
refused, shall be taxed against the party making the
refusal, regardless of the outcome of the trial. The trial
judge is supposed to decide summarily ( 1 ) whether the
refusal to admit was reasonable and justifiable, and ( 2 )
what cost shall b e allowed.
The question has arisen in England and in New York
)
as to whether a party may apply to the trial court for
��lief when he thinks he has been served with an im
'
, · ' proper notice to admit. The English practice is indi'
, cated by the following excerpt from an opinion by Field,
J. : " I cannot strike out proceedings, unless there is ex
press power to do so. There is a specific power given
by the Rules to strike out interrogatories and pleadings ;
there is no power given to strike out a notice such as
this. On the contrary a remedy is provided by the rule,
which makes such an application unnecessary ; namely,
that the notice can be left unanswered. If the refusal to
admit is reasonable, the party so refusing will suffer
nothing from the notice having been served upon him. ' ' 14
It has been held in New York that the only appropriate
and allowable motions in connection with demands to
admit are : ( 1 ) for an extension of time ; ( 2 ) for per
mission to amend or withdraw an admission. 16 There
was an indication at first that applications to strike no'

'

14 Crawford v. Chorley (1883) 18 W. N. 198.
16 Colonial Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Hosiery
.

N. Y. S. 854.

Mfrs. Corp. (1923) 199
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tices -to admit might be entertained. 16 Later, however,
this position was expressly repudiated, on the ground
that it would cast too great a buMen on the trial judges,
and on the further ground that a party has sufficient
protection if he waits until the trial and presents the
facts in support of his contention that the refusal to ad
mit was reasonable. 17
Under the English practice it is possible for the party
to add certain limitations and qualifications to the ad
missions which he makes. The -Supreme Court of New
York County, on the contrary, has held that a qualified
admission is no admission and may be treated as a re
fusal to admit.18 The Wisconsin statute gives the party
the right to admit, deny, or " state what the fact is. "
This innovation has not proved satisfactory. Sometimes
a party is served with a notice to admit facts which cover
practically all of the evidence of the case. He, in turn,
instead of admitting or denying, takes advantage of his
right to ' ' state what the fact is ' ' and seeks to evade in
a mass of word!il. The fact that the answer must be un
der oath encourages such a practice. The result is that
the answer is even more voluminous than the a:lready
lengthy notice to admit. 19
Lawyers in New York, Wisconsin and Massachusetts
say that the procedure is not used by the bar as a whole
but thai some lawyers have found it very helpful. The
following are typical instances of effective and legitimate
use which various lawyers say they have made of the
device : (1) in a case involving a shipment by express,
16 Koppel Industrial Car & Equipment Co. v. Portalis & Co. (1922)
195 N. Y. S. 24.
17 Banca Nazionale di Credito v. Equitable Trust Co. ( 1927) 224 N.
Y. S. 611.
18 Corr v. Hoffman (1927) 220 N. Y. S. 65.
_ 19 The Advisory Committee on Rules to the Supreme Court has rec
ommended that the two features which have caused this trouble be
eliminated, namely, the allowance that the party state what the fact
is, and the requirement that he make his answer under oath. Report
(1930), item 19. Of. Bulletin . XIV of the American Judicature Society,
p. 153.
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to prove that certain routine inspections were made at.
each stop between Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Rochester,
New York ; ( 2 ) to prove a municipal ordinance ; ( 3) to
prove that a certain highway on which an accident had
occurred was a public highway ; (4) to prove the owner
ship of a certain automobile ; ( 5 ) to prove an employer
employee relationship. A member of the Wisconsm
bar has related still another effective type of use in
an address before the Board of Circuit Judges of Wis
consin in 1927 : ' 'Almost immediately after its publica
tion, I saw a very effective use of this statute. An action
had been brought on a contract in which the defendant
had agreed to indemnify the plaintiff against failure of
title to certain lands covered by a mortgage sold to the
plaintiff. The mortgagor had made an entry under the
homestead laws ; but had died before the time when he
would have been entitled to a patent. It was alleged in
the complaint that his sole heir was a minor son. It was
alleged in the answer that his heirs were a brother and
a sister, that a patent had subsequently been issued to
the heirs and that these heirs were ready to confirm the
lien of the mortgage. That a minor could not do. The
plaintiff had been endeavoring to locate the former wife
of the mortgagor ; and finally succeeded in doing so in
one of the Pacific states. The defendant 's attorneys
were immediately so advised and called upon to admit the
fact and told that the demand was made with the inten
tion of asking the imposition on the defendant of the
entire expense of proving the fact if the demand were not
complied with. Within forty-eight hours, they replied
stating that they were ready to sign a . stipulation as to
the fact. This left in the case no substantial issue ex
cept that of damages ; and an agreement on the subject
of damages was arrived at and the case was disposed of
without trial. If it weTe not for the fact that this
remedy was thus open; the plaintiff would have been
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compelled to employ counsel, to instruct them, to have
them communicate with the witness and to prepare for
the taking of the deposition, to issue a notice and to for
ward instructions to the officer before whom the deposi
tion was to be taken and, in addition, to pay the fees of
the officer and of the witness. Under this statute, the
plaintiff whether successful in the action or not, would
have been entitled to an order allowing to him the entire
expense, including a reasonable allowance for the serv
ices of his attorneys and their corresponding counsel. ' ' 110
NOTICE TO ADMIT EXECUTION OR GENUINENESS OF
DocuMENTS
England,111 and some twenty of the United States 118
have statutes or rules allowing a party to call upon his
adversary for an admission of the execution or the gen
uineness of writings. This differs from the notice to
admit facts only to the extent that documents, and not
facts generally, are the subject of the admission.
The following statutory provisions in England, New
York and Michigan, respectively, are representative of
those in the various jurisdictions. The English provi
sion is :
" Either party may call upon the other party to admit
any document,• saving all just exceptions ; and in case of
10 Hardgrove, Reduction of Trial Issues Under Wisconsin Practice,
Proceedings of the Wisconsin Board of Circuit Judges (1927) 35, 47. In
this address Mr. Hardgrove pointed out a number of othE!r possible
uses for the procedure.
Ill Annual Prae. (1930) Order 32.
II Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) see. 5776, Rules Under the .Practice Act,
rule 9, see. 233; Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws Ann. (1927) see. 4554; Kans.
Rev. Stat. Ann. ( 1923), eh. 60, art. 2840; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) eh. 92,
see. 122; Mass. Ge:q.. Laws (1921), eh. 231, see. 69; Mich. Court Rules
(1931) rule 42; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1919) see. 1379 ; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1922)
see. 8901; N. J. Comp. Stat. (1910) p. 2097; N. Mex. Ann. Stat. (1915)
see. 4218; New York Civ. Prae. Act, see. 322 ; N. C. Cons. Stat.
(1919) see. 1825; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913), see. 7860; Ohio Gen.
Code ( Throckmorton, 1926) see. 11550; S. C. Code (1922), see. 691; S. D.
Rev. Code (1919) see. 2711; U. S. Equity Rule 58; Utah Comp. Laws
(1917), see. 7178; Wis. Stat. (1927) eh. 327, see. 22 ; Wyo. Comp. Stat.
Ann. ( 1920) see. 5854.
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refusal or neglect to admit, after such notice, the costs
of proving any such document shall he paid by the party
so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the
cause or matter may be, unless at the trial or hearing
the court or a judge shall certify that the refusal to
admit was reasonable ; and no costs of proving any
document shall be allowed unless such notice be given,
except where the omission to give the notice is, in the
opinion of the taxing officer, a saving of expense. ' '
The New York provision is :
" The attorney for a party, at any time before the
trial, may exhibit to the attorney for the adverse party,
a paper material to the action and request a written
admission of its genuineness. If the admission is not
given within four days after the request, and the paper
is proved or admitted on the trial, the expenses incurred
by the party exhibiting it in order to prove its genuine
ness must be ascertained at the trial and paid by the
party refusing the admission, whatever the result of the
cause, matter or issue may be ; unless it appears to the
satisfaction of the court that there was a good reason
for the refusal. ' '
The Michigan provision is :
' ' Either party may exhibit to the other or to his attor
ney at any time before the trial, any paper material to
the action, and request an admission in writing of its
. genuineness. If the adverse party or his attorney fail
to give the admission within four days after the re
quest, and the delivery to him of a copy thereof, if such
copy be · required, and if the party exhibiting the paper
be afterward required to prove its genuineness, and the
same be finally proved or admitted on the trial, thtl ex
pense of proving the same, including a reasonable coun
sel fee for the time and attention devoted thereto, to be
ascertained and summarily taxed at the trial, shall be
paid by the party refusing the admission, unless it shall
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appear to the satisfaction of the court that there were
good reasons for the refusal, and an attachment or exe
cution may be granted to enforce payment of such ex
pense. ' '
The party who desires admissions, or his attorney,
should exhibit to his adversary or his attorney the paper
or document and request a written admission of its gen
uineness. In case of unjust refusal or neglect to so ad
mit the costs of proof fall on the party so refusing or
neglecting.
The following form is provided for admission of docu
ments in England : 88

NoTICE TO ADMIT DocuMENTS
In the High Court of Justice
Division
,

Between

A. B.,

Plaintiff
and

C. D., E. F., and G. H., Defendants.
Take notice that the plaintiff ( or defendant ) in this cause
proposes to adduce in evidence the several documents here
under specified, and that the same may be inspected by the
defendant ( or plaintiff) , his solicitor or agent, at . . . . . . . . ,
on . . . . . . . . , between the hours of . . . . . . . . ; and the defendant ( or plaintiff) is hereby required, within forty-eight hours
from the last mentioned hours, to admit that s�ch of the said
documents as are specified to be originals were respectively
written, signed, or executed, as they purport respectively to
have been ; that such as are specified as copies are true copies ;
and such documents as are stated to have been served, sent, or
delivered, were so served, sent, or delivered respectively ; saving
all just exceptions to the admissibility of all such documents
as evidence in this cause.
Dated &c.

(Signed)

G. H., solicitor ( or agent) for plaintiff ( or defendant )
To E. F., solicitor ( or agent) for defendant ( or plaintiff) .
88

See

Annual Prac. ( 1930) Appendix B, form 11.
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( Here describe the documents, the manner of doing which may
be as follows :)

ORIGINALS

Dates

Description of Documents
Deed of covenant between

A. B. and C. D.

first part and E. F. second part.
Indenture of lease from

January 1, 19-

A. B. to C. D.
A. B. and

February 1, 19-

Indenture of release between

February 2, 19-

C. D. first part, &c.

March 1, 19-

Letter-defendant to plaintiff.
Policy of insurance on goods by ship ' ' Isa
bella " on voyage from Oporto to London

December

3, 19-

Memorandum of agreement between C. D.,
captain of said ship, and E. F.

January 1, 19-

Bill of exchange for £100 at three months
drawn by

A. B . on and accepted by C. D.,

endor8ed by E. F . and G. H.

May 1, 19-

COPIES

Description of Documents

Register of baptism of

Dates

Original or Duplicate
Served, Sent or Deliv
ered When, How and
by Whom

A. B.

in parish of X

Jan. 1
Sent by general post,

Letter-plaintiff to defendant
Notice to produce papers

Feb. 1

February 2, 19-

Mar. 1

Served Mar. 2, 19- on
defendant 's attorney
by E. F. of

Record of a judgment of the Trinity
Court of Queen 's Bench, Term, lOth
in an action F.

S. v. F. N.

Viet.

Letters patent of King
Charles II in the Rolls Jan. 1,
Chapel ·

1680

CHAPTER XXIV
USE OF DISCOVERY IN PREPARATION OF TRIAL
BRIEF
A division of labor is effected in many law firms so
that much of the work of preparing for trial is done by
men other than those who conduct the actual trial.
Younger members of the staff do most of the preparation
for trial and the older and more experienced members
handle the trial proper. The former compile what is
known as a trial brief. Such a brief usually contains an
analysis of the pleadings and issues of the case, memo
randa of the relevant points of law, statemente� from wit- nesses, list of the papers and documents which will be
introduced, suggested questions to be asked during the
examination of the witnesses and drafts of such motions
and instructions as may become necessary. The trial
lawyer then uses this brief as a basis for conducting the
case. Often the clerk who has prepared the particular
brief accompanies his senior to court and aids him there.
This serves the additional purpose of giving the clerk
an opportunity to see how well his work measures up to
the needs of the occasion and to get some little trial
experience.
Procedure for discovery fits in well with the system
which is thus employed in law offices. It affords means
of preparation which are quite necessary in the compila
tion of a trial brief. The very fact that the adverse
party can be examined is in itself a great help. The
record of the examination forms an excellent basis for
cross-examination at the trial. Many lawyers take an
adverse examination and then rearrange and rephrase
211
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the questions in such a fashion as to make the trial cross
examination more effective and more businesslike. Nec
essary documentary evidence in the possession of the
adverse party can be obtained and arranged so that de
lay and confusion at the trial may be avoided. There is
also provided a means of compelling statements from
witnesses who refuse to give them voluntarily and a
, means of preserving the testimony of important wit
nesses against the contingency of death or removal.
Even law firms and individual lawyers who do not
employ an elaborate trial brief system have found that
discovery examinations furnish an excellent basis of
preparation for trial. The following statement from an
active trial lawyer in a large city in the middle west is
representative of the way in which such an examination
can be used : " When a case is called for trial I ask that
the file record of the case be brought to me. Decidedly
the most enlightening part and the part which will give
me an insight into the case in a hurried fashion is the
adverse party 's deposition. Without it I would have
difficulty in effecting any intelligent sort of handling of
the case. ' '
The trial brief system offers a possible way by which
disclosure of the principal points of a controversy and
of the principal items of evidence can be made known
prior to the trial. At least one federal judge requires
the lawyer on each side to furnish him before trial with
a short statement of the issues, what it is proposed to
prove and the principal items of evidence which will be
adduced. This enables the judge to get a fairly accurate
knowledge of the character of the case and affords him
a more intelligent basis upon which to decide questions
which may arise at the trial. Suggestions have been
made at various times that lawyers for the plaintiff and
defendant exchange trial briefs prior to the trial as well
as furnish them to the court. Quite early Jeremy Bent-
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ham proposed what he termed " An anticipative survey
of the budget of evidence on both ·sides. ' ' 1 Recently a
visiting French lawyer, Pierre le Paulle, the delegate of
the French Society of Comparat,lve Law to the American
Bar Association, suggested that there _should be some
device to require ' ' the parties to prescribe by writing .
before the trial the facts they want to prove by wit
nesses," and " oblige the lawyers to communicate the
written evidence they have to their colleagues on the
other side. " 11 Similar proposals have been to the effect
that each party be required to file a trial brief, setting
forth the facts which would be proved by the witnesses.
The object of such a brief, of course, would be to en
lighten both the court and the adverse party and to guar
antee preparation for trial upon the part of each lawyer.
The most recent form of this sugg�stion is represented
by the following bill which was recently proposed in the
California Legislature :
' ' In every civil action, within ten days after issues of
fact are joined, plaintiff shall file with the clerk of the
court, without service, a statement of issues and wit
nesses, with affidavits of all witnesses to be used by plain
tiff at the trial with as many copies of each as there are
defendants. Said statement shall recite in brief num
bered paragraphs what plaintiff considers to be the prin
cipal issues of fact, with the names under each issue of
the witnesses by whom plaintiff expects to prove such
issue. Within thirty days after issues of fact are joined,
each defendant shall file a like statement of issues and
witnesses, and affidavits of all witnesses to be used by
defendants at the trial, with as many copies of each as
there are plaintiffs.
1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (Bowring 's Ed.) vol. 7,
p. 368. Cf. a similar proposal by Lord Denman, Arnould 's Life of Lord
Denman, I, 210.
2 LePaulle, Administration of Justice in the United States, 4 Docket
3192.
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' ' Said affidavits shall state in brief numbered para
graphs the principal facts known to such witness relevant
to the said issues, including the date and parties to all
documents and writings relevant thereto known to the
witness.
' ' The clerk shall treat all such statements and affidavits
as confidential and not permit examination of any of
them until all are filed ; after which time he shall, as soon
as convenient, furnish to each party a copy of the state
ments and affidavits filed by his opponent.
' ' Persons having knowledge of facts, documents and/or
writings relevant to the said issues, shall, upon request
of and upon reasonable notice by a party or his attorney,
make affidavit thereto. A party or his attorney may, in
case of need, compel the attendance of such a witness
before such party or attorney or a notary public, by sub
poena at. a time and place appointed, to then and there
make said affidavit.
"Upon receipt of such copies of statement and affi
davit, or affidavits, it shall be the duty of each party to
the action to earnestly and actively seek a satisfactory
settlement with the other party or parties thereto, to the
end that a trial may be avoided. If it is not possible
after diligent effort to settle the controversy in whole
or in part, the questions of fact remaining in controversy
may be tried, and any party to the action may move to
set the action for trial. No motion to set for trial may
be made until after all such statements and affidavits
have been exchanged by the clerk, and said efforts to
settle have been made and proven unsuccessful, and said
facts are shown to the court.
' ' Thereafter, the court shall compare statements and
affidavits in reference to the issues remaining in con
troversy, and designate the portions thereof considered
by the court to be important in determining said issues.
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' ' At the trial the court shall require the testimony of
witnesses to be directed especially to the designated im
portant facts relating to the issues upon which the wit
nesses appear by their affidavits or testimony to dis
agree. Unless for good cause sho.wn, a witness shall not
be permitted to testify unless the said affidavit of said
witness as described in section 597 has been previously
filed and copy furnished, nor shall a witness be permitted
to testify to important facts not contained in said affi
davit. Upon good cause appearing however, any such
witness may be permitted to testify, upon such terms and
conditions, and under such circumstances as the court
may determine to be just. ' ' .8
84

Southern Cal. L. Rev. 193.

CHAPTER XXV
USE OF DISCOVERY IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PRACTICE
Summary judgment procedure is a device by which
judgment may be entered summarily for the plaintiff in
certain types of actions, on motion setting forth his de
mand and his belief that there is no defense to it, unless
the defendant shows that he has a bona :fide defense.
The procedure has great usefulness in actions for a debt
or Ilquidated demand in money. 'Its chief virtue is its
effectiveness in securing speedy justice for creditors.
It has long been an established feature of English prac
tice and its popularity with the bar of this country is
increasing rapidly. The usefulness of the device in Eng
land is indicated by the fact that in the year 1930, 5,535
summary judgments were rendered in the King's Bench
Division of the High Court of Justice, while only 1,226
judgments after trial were entered. 1 Similarly, in 1929,
summary judgments outnumbered judgments after trial
to the extent of 4,409 to 1,310.1 The Ontario summary
judgment procedure likewise is extensively used. In five
hundred consecutive case records which were analyzed in
Toronto, cases in which summary judgment was re
quested outnumbered other cases in the ratio of approxi
mately three to two. There was no contest by the defend
ant in the great majority of the former cases and judg
ment was granted forthwith. Use of summary judg
ment procedure has become increasingly extensive in
New York. The provision took effect October 1, 1921.
1 Civll Judicial

l id.

Ste.tisties for England and Wales (1930)
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Only 11 motions for summary judgment were brought
during the three months remaining in 1921. In 1922
there were 174 motions ; in 192� there were 447 ; and in ·
1924 there were approximately 700.8 Summary judg
ment procedure is proving popular with the MiQhigan
bar. During the eight months· from August 1, 1930 to
March 31, 1931, 526 applications for summary judg
ments were made in the circuit court for Wayne County
(Detroit), Michigan. Of these applications 409 were
granted and 1,17 refused. During the same period of time
there were 633 jury trials, and 1201 non-jury trials.'
These various statistics indicate that summary judgment
procedure affords a remedy for congested court cal
endars and delay in the . triBJ of cases.
A way has been suggested by which summary judg
ment procedure can be made even more effective than it
is at present. The American Judicature Society has sug
gested that discovery examinations be employed as a
means of ascertaining whether the defendant has a bona
fide defense. 'Several jurisdictions already allow a lim
ited use of discovery as an aid to summary practice.
The procedure recommended by the American Judicature
Society would allow the plaintiff, as soon as the defend
ant has filed his defense or notice of defense, to move for
judgment upon discovery. The court would then order
an examination of the defendant for discovery and upon
the basis of the examination decide whether summary
judgment should be rendered.5 The procedure for sum
mary judgment which is now in use in England and in
several American jurisdictions is in effect a judgment
upon discovery.6 Under this practice in England the
8 Boesel, Summary Judgment, Proceedings of the Wisconsin Board
of Circuit Judges (1926) p. 27.
, ' These figures were obtained from statistics furnished the Judicial
Council of Michigan by the clerk of the Circuit Court for Wayne County.
& Am. Jud. Soc., Rules of Civ. Pro. (1919) art. 23.
6 Annual. Pr�ctice (1929), , ot:der s1 rul� 6; �rd,er, 14t rylle 1; N• ,-:Y•
" �'f N'ew ,Jersey �ullreme Court; l'liles
�:ules. !>�, Ci,v. Prae., :.;Uie HS; .Rules
S0-84, found in 2 Mise. 1225; Michigan Court ltutes (1931) iuie M.
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creditor, instead of going through all the formalities of
pleading, specially endorses the summons with a descrip
tion of the debt, and files an affidavit made by himself, or
any other person who can swear positively to the facts,
verifying the claim and stating the belief that there is no
defense. It is then up to the defendant to satisfy the
judge by affidavit, by his own oral evidence, or otherwise,
that he has a good defense to the action on the merits,
or disclose such facts as may be deemed sufficient to
entitle him to defend. If he does not do so judgment is
rendered against him.7 The practice in the United States
is somewhat different, the case proceeding as any ordi
nary action up until the time the answer is filed. After
that the procedure is substantially similar to that used
in England. Some American statutes have provided less
effective procedures, whereby judgment is rendered un
less the defendant files an affidavit of merits.8
While the present form of summary judgment in most
jurisdictions is a judgment upon disclosure, just as that
advocated by the American Judicature Society is a judg
ment upon disclosure, the two procedures differ in the
means of effecting the disclosure. Under the present
practice the disclosure is effected by affidavits, or by oral
proof before the court. Under the scheme suggested the
disclosure would be effected by an examination for dis
covery. The latter should prove a more thorough means
of eliciting the truth. The chief trouble with the present
American summary judgment procedures, especially
those which merely require the defendant to file an affi
davit of merits1 is that they do not necessarily disclose
7 Annual Practice (1929), order 3, rule 6; order 14, rule 1. For the
practical operation and efficiency of this procedure see: Sunderland, An
Appraisal of English Procedure, 24 Mich. L. Rev., 109, . 111 ; Report of
Robert G. Dodge on Certain Features of English Practice for the Massa
chusetts Judicial Council, 11 Mass. L. Q. 671 70; Stringer, The A. B. C.
Guide to Practice, 186; Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment,
38 Yale L. Jour. 423.
8 See Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 Yale L. Jour.
423, for a det!J,iled s.urvey of ail of thE\ jurisdietiQM,
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whether or not there is a real defense. This defect would
be remedied by a more thorough method of examining
the defendant.
Several jurisdictions have allowed a greater use of
discovery in connection with summary practice. The
first American summary judgment procedure, that which
was adopted in South Carolina about 1800 and which was
a conspicuous feature of South Carolina judicature until
the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1870, em
ployed a method of obtaining discovery in connectiop
therewith. One of the rules of court for the successful
administration of the summary judgment provided : " If
the plaintiff in an action by summary process shall desire
to have the benefit of the defendant 's oath, he shall state,
in writing, the points to which he shall require his oath,
and serve him with a copy thereof, with notice of such
intention, at least one day before the hearing of the
cause ; and the defendant may either give his answer in
writing, to be sworn to before the clerk, or ore tenus in
open court ; and if a defendant shall desire the benefit of
the plaintiff's oath, he shall proceed to require it in the
same manner. ' ', 9
Discovery is used in connection with summary prac
tice in Ontario. In specified types of actions where a
debt or liquidat\)d demand in money is the subject of the
action the plaintiff may specially endorse the originating
summons with a statement of his claim. Contrary to the
English practice there is no need for the plaintiff to file
an affidavit stating that in his belief the defendant has
no just defense. No complaint was found among Ontario
practitioners to this innovation. They say that the pre
sumption should always be against the defendant in ac
tions to which summary procedure is applicable. The

·

9 Cited by Professor Millar in his, Three American Ventures in Sum
mary Civil Procedure, 38 Yale L. Jour. 193, 199. Professor Millar is
unstinted in his praise of this procedure and, in particular, of the
discovery feature of it.
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defendant is required to file an affidavit that he has a
good defense upon the merits and showing the nature of
the defense together with the facts and circumstances
which he deems entitle him to defend. 10 The plaintiff is
allowed to cross-examine as to its contents. Often plain
tiff examines the defendant before a special examiner in
the same mode as if for discovery. Sometimes there is a
stipulation between parties that the one examination
shall serve for discovery also should the defendant be
allowed to defend the action and summary judgment be
refused. This connection between discovery generally
and summary judgment has proved very effective. The
principle is adhered to that the examination as for dis
covery in aid of summary procedure is for the sole pur
pose of further probing the defendant as to whether he
has any real defense to the action.
Under the Indiana practi�e a party is allowed to use
the evidence obtained by discovery as the basis for a
motion to strike the pleading of an opposite party on the
ground that it is sham, false, frivolous, or intended for
delay.U - However, discovery by written interrogatories
only, and not discovery by an oral examination is so
usable. The latter expedient has been declared unavail
able simply as a matter of statutory construction and
without regard to questions of policy. 18 The practice
would seem especially useful in actions for liquidated
sums, as for instance actions on promissory notes, 18 but
it can be used in other actions as well. 14 It furnishes a
convenient weapon with which to attack a general de10 Rules 33, 56. See Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment,
38 Yale L. Jour. 423, 436 for a good description of the Ontario practice.
11 Ann. Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1926) sec. 409.
18 Stars v. Hammersmith (1903) 31 Ind. App. 610, 67 N. E. 554.
18 Lowe v. Thompson (1882) 86 Ind. 503; Hollander v. Fletcher (1916)
62 Ind. App. 149, 112 N. E. 847.
lt Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. Fraze (1898) 150 Ind. 576, 50 N. E. 576
(action for damages for personal injury) ; Tilden v. Louisville Company
(1901) 157 Ind. 532, 62 N. E. 31 (action for damages . for personal in·
jury) ; Jones v. State (1928) 200 Ind. 328, 163 N. E. 260 (election con·
teat case).
·
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nial.15 The court will strike the pleading as sham only
when it is clear that there is no defense. It is not suffi
cient simply to elicit answers tending to show that the
pleading is false, for the court will construe all doubts
in favor of the pleader. 18 The latent possibilities of this
procedure are ignored by many Irtdiana lawyers. Some
lawyers said they had never known a pleading to be
stricken on the ground that it was sham. There is, how
ever, a use of interrogatories to anticipate and prevent
the effect of a sham pleading. By this use it is possible
to avoid the effect of an unverified general denial. A
few questions of the following character are attached to
the petition in debt collection actions for the purpose of
encouraging allowance of judgment by default :
1. What merchandise, if any, has been sold by plain
tiff to you, or any one for you, at your request up to the
present time sine
Y

2.

What merchandise, if any, has been delivered by
plaintiff to you, or anyone for you, at your request up
Y
to the present time sine
3. What, if anything, was the cost price to you for

merchandise, if any, that has been sold and delivered by
plaintiff to you or anyone for you, at your request, up to
the present time sine
7

How much, if anything, have you paid to plaintiff
up to the present time since
Y
5. How much, if anything, is ,now due and owing by
you to plaintiff Y

4.

6. What, if any, allegations of plaintiff 's complaint
are incorrect T

The practical advantages of this expedient are that :
if the defendant answers the questions honestly and fully,
it may be the means of getting what is virtually summary
judgment ; if the defendant answers evasively or answers
. 15 Jones v. State (1928) 200 Ind. 328, 163 N. E. 260.
18 Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. Fraze ( 1898) 150 Ind. 576, 50 N. E. 576;
Atkinson v. Wabash R. Co. (1895) 143 Ind. 501, 41 N. E. 947.
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that he does not know, it may be the means of limiting
his proof at the trial ; and if the defendant does not
answer at all, a practice which the filing of questions
encourages, judgment as by default may be had. There
is an especial need in Indiana ·of some scheme of this
sort, to discourage the filing of unverified general de
nials for the mere purpose of obtaining a delay. Inas
much as the answer to interrogatories must be under
oath, it is possible to avoid the effect of the unverified
general denial in two respects, by getting a specification
of the basis of the denial and that under oath.
A few Ohio lawyers make an effective use of discovery,
both by deposition and written interrogatories, as an aid
to summary collection in actions for liquidated amounts,
and more particularly account actions. The practice is to
either take the defendant 's deposition or annex interrog
atories for him to answer, and then to use the information
obtained as the basis for a motion to strike his answer
as sham. 17 Such tactics are effective in that they often
discourage the defendant from filing an answer.
The new Michigan Court Rules provide for the use of
depositions as well as affidavits as a means of disclosing
the absence of real issues of fact in connection with mo
tions for summary judgment. 18
While New York has a summary judgment practice
which is rather extensively used and which requires the
defendant "by affidavit or other proof " to show that he
is entitled to defend, it is not possible to use discovery
in connection with this practice. The reason is that dis
covery is generally limited to the case of the party appli
cant whereas the subject of examination in summary pro
ceedings would be the case of the opposing party.
A member of the New York City bar made the follow
ing suggestion before the New York State Bar As so1'7 See White v. Calhoun (1911) 83 0. S. 401, 94 N. E. 743 ; Butterick
Pub. Co. v. Smith (1925) 112 0. S. 73, 146 N. E. 898.
18 Michigan Court Rules (1931) rule 30, sees. 6-7,
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ciation in 1916 : "Now the result (of liberal discovery
before trial) is this : the very fact that evidence will be
disclosed speedily by those having a knowledge of the
facts, acts as a deterrent upon the litigant who would put
in a false pleading. It is notice to him in a way that
prosecution for perjury is impending. If you combine
those provisions for obtaining evidence and summary re
lief • • • I dare say you would come to the end of
your litigation in most cases, not in five years, but in five
months. ' ' 19
The decisions as to the constitutionality of summary
judgment practice in general indicate the extent to which
discovery could be used as an aid to the procedure. In
upholding the constitutionality of the summary practice
employed in the District of Columbia, the United States
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice McKenna,
has said : ' ' There is but one element in this contention
the right of a jury trial. In pl).ssing upon it we do not
think it necessary to follow the details in counsel 's
elaborate argument. • • • If it were true that the rule
deprived the plaintiff in error of the right of trial by
jury, we should pronounce it void without reference to
cases. But it does not do so. It prescribes the means
of making an issue. The issue made as prescribed, the
right of trial by jury accrues. The purpose of the rule is
to preserve the court from frivolous defenses and to de
feat attempts to use formal pleading as a means to delay
the recovery of just demands. ' ' 20
The Massachusetts experience in regard to constitu
tional problems arising in connection with summary pro
cedure may throw some light as to the extent to which
ordinary discovery procedure can be used as an adjunct
of summ�ry practice. In 1925 the Judicial Council 's first
report, after according high praise to the English sumI

19 Report

of N. Y. Bar Ass'n (1916) p. 403.
& Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U. S. 315, 319.

20 Fidelity
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mary practice, stated : ' ' The constitutional right to a
trial by jury prevents the adoption of the English system
under which the court or master may make an absolute
order for summary judgment after hearing instead of
merely advancing the case for speedy trial as is done
here. " 111 In their second report, however, the Council
changed its stand on the matter. This report stated :
" We believe that the legislation should go further than
the proposed Act which we drafted a year ago. While
the. constitutional right to a jury trial sets a limit to the
power of the legislature it seems clear that the right does
not exist unless the court can be satisfied that there is a
real issue of fact to be tried. ' ' And after setting forth
the New York case of General Investment Company v.
Interborough Rapid Transit Company 118 as one of the
reasons for changing its stand the Council further stated :
" It is' plain that it would be within the constitutional
power of the legislature to provi<:fe that in an action to
recover a debt, where the plaintiff by affidavit verifies
his cause of action and asserts that there is no defense,
the defendant must do more than merely claim a trial
by jury to become entitled to a jury trial and that he
must by affidavit or otherwise satisfy the court that
there is a bona fide dispute involving a substantial ques
tion of fact, the decision of which in his favor would
establish a defense. We are led by these considerations
to go further than we did a year ago and to recommend
legislation providing for the entry of judgment forth
with, if the defendant fails to satisfy the court that there
is a real question of fact to be tried. • • • ' ' 88 An opin
ion rendered by Rugg, C. J., which also influenced the
Judicial Council, defines more definitely the limits upon
the use of discovery in connection with summ ary pro
cedure : " Great preponderance of the apparent weight
11 Page 33.
(1923) 235 N. Y. 133, 139 N. E. 216.
18 Pages 45, 46.
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of testimony will not warrant a denial of trial by jury
provided there is seemingly enough to require a sub
mission of the case to the jury under the familiar prin
ciples. • • • Doubtless it would be within the province
of the court under the rule to require the parties to state
the substance of the evidence which each expected to offer
at the trial, and to ascertain whether there was upon such
a statement any disputed question of fact to be found
either directly or by inference ; and also in appropriate
instances to frame questions, answers to which would
settle such disputed fact or facts; Of course great care
must be exercised in the use of this power and the fullest
opportunity given to parties to · make a complete state
ment with the knowledge that it is to be made the basis
of a ruling of law upon the rights of the parties. But
there is no fundamental objection to a ruling of law made
upon a fair statement of what the evidence is expected
to be. " 114
There was an unusual handicap to the constitutionality
of summary procedure in New York due to the fact that
in 1871 it ha,d been held that a verified answer, even
though it interposed only the general issue and could be
shown to be absolutely false, could not be stricken out as
sham pleading.115 This led to the widespread belief among
the bar that summary judgment would be unconstitu
tionaJ.II8 But the New York Court of Appeals, when the
matter was actually presented, in the famous test case
which upheld the constitutionality of summary judg
ment procedure under the Civil Practice Act, said : ' ' The
argument that rule 113 infringes upon the right of trial
by jury guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be sus114 Farnham v. Lenox Motor Car Co. (1918) 229 Mass. 478, 482, 118
N. E. 874.
116 This case and the cases following it are given in Report of N. Y.
State Bar Ass'n (1916) p. 404.
118 Cf. Discussion before New York State Bar Association in 1916, in
the report mentioned in preceding note, at pages 305, 402, 404. See also
Pogson, Truth in Pleadings, 8 N. Y. Univ. L. Quar. Rev. 41.
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tained. The rule in question is siinply one regulating and
prescribing procedure, whereby the court may summarily
determine whether or not a bona fide issue exists be
tween the parties to the action. A determination by the
court that such issue is presented requires the denial of
an application for summary judgment ·and trial of the
issue by jury at the election of either party. On the
other hand, if the pleadings and affidavits of plaintiff
disclose that no defense exists to the cause of action, and
a defendant, as in the instant case, fails to controvert
such evidence and establish by affidavit or proof that it
has a real defense and should be permitted to defend,
the court may determine that no issue triable by jury
exists between the parties and grant summary judg
ment. ' ' 17
It �s clear from these decisions that the viewpoint
which safeguards the conf?titutionality of any summary
judgment procedure is that the judge merely decides
whether there is any bona fide defense, rather than that
he determines the merit of any defense which is sufficient
to raise an issue. Is this viewpoint any more jeopardized
by requiring the disclosure to be made by a deposition
taken upon an adverse examination than it is by requir
ing such disclosure to be made by affidavit T Indeed, does
not such an examination come the nearer of the two to
meeting the desiderata outlined by Judge Rugg, supra,
that the ' ' fullest opportunity be given to the parties to
make a complete statement ' ' T
1'7 General Investment Co. v. Interlxlrough R. T. Co. (1923) 235 N. Y.
133, 142, 139 N. E. 216.

CHAPTER XXVI
.,

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF PRE-TRIAL PRACTICE
It has been said that ' ' a disputed matter of fact or law
or of both, cannot be resolved into simple, ultimate ques
tions of the merits of a controversy by any system of pro
cedure which leaves the formulation of these issues to
the adversaries themselves. ' ' 1 Two methods of judicial
control of the pre-trial stage of litigation have been em
ployed under modern English procedure. These meth
ods are known as settlement of issues and summons for
directions. The purpose of both is· to give the court a
greater part in the formulation of the issues to be tried
and in shaping the subsequent course of the action.
Variations of the English practice have been attempted,
but without especial success, in New York and in . New
Jersey.
.
Procedure fQr settling issues was first employed in
Scotland and later introduced in a modified form into
English practice. In Scotland there is first a simple
pleading procedure aided by an auxiliary which is strik
ingly similar to the old positional procedure. The action
is commenced by a summons which discloses only the
general nature of the action.• Then the plaintiff files
what is called a condescendence but which is in fact noth
ing more than charges of evidence or detailed allegations
of fact to .which he desires the defendant 's personal an
swer .8 The defendant may pursue a like course as to
1 Kocourek, The Formula Procedure of Roman Law, 8 Va. L. Rev. 337,
338.
li Balfour, Handbook of Court of Session Practice, p. 23; :Maclaren,
Court of Session Practice, 356.
l id.
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any affirmative defense which he has. After this stage
is completed, together with all pleas in law, the record
is closed and a procedure is then in order with which we
are especially concerned here, namely, the settlement of
issues. Each party lodges the issues proposed by
himself, and then the parties and the judge get together
and decide on the issues which shall go to the jury. The
issue is nothing more nor less than a succinct statement
of the question the jury are desired to answer .4 ' ' Thus,
in an action of damages for personal injury, " as Balfour
explains, " it may take the form whether on or about
(date) , and at or near (place ) the pursuer (plaintiff) was
injured in his person through the fault of the defender
to his loss, injury and damage. Damages laid at • • • . ' '
Similarly, " In an action for reduction of a will on the
ground of incapacity it may be ' whether the pretended
will, is not the deed of the late A. B. ? ' ' ' 5
A variation of the Scottish practice has been intro
duced in England under the following rule of court :
" Where in any cause or matter it appears to the court
or a judge that the issues of fact in dispute are not
sufficiently defined, the parties may be directed to pre
pare issues, and such issues shall, if the parties differ, be
settled by the court or a judge. ' ' 6 A famous English
judge said that it was always his practice to get counsel
to agree at the beginning of a trial as to the issues of
fact to be tried.7 This provision merely moves up the
time for such an agreement. Other British jurisdictions
employ a similar plan. In Manitoba the judge, if he
thinks the pleadings do not sufficiently define the issues
of fact, may make ' ' an order defining and setting forth
the issues between the parties. ' ' 8 The court rule in
4 Id.
I iid.
6 Annual Practice
7 Jessel, M•. R,1 in

(1929) order 33.
.
Lowe -r• Lo�e ( 1876) 10 C. D 432.
t
u
844.
(1914)
Bench
's
King
r
of
8 Alits relating to Co
..
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Victoria is similar to the English one except that it has
an additional provision which appears feasible, namely,
any party may at any stage of the cause apply to the
court for a direction to have issues prepared, and all of
the parties, their solicitors, and other persons may be
examined viva voce and all documents which may be
necessary to the inquiry may be required to be produced
for inspection.9 Other British states have enacted the
English rules without any vital change. 10
Lord Denman advocated the adoption of the principle
which was basis of the settlement of issues procedure, but
he urged that it be adopted in a different form which
has come to be known as the summons for directions.
Said he : ' ' After the action is commenced measures
should be at once taken for affording to the litigants a
pause for consideration, and opportunities for adjust
ment. The way ought to be cleared for a fair trial of the
real point at issue, if tried it must be. A judge at cham
bers, or some similar authority, should bring the parties
together, and require from both reasonable admissions,
which ought to be preserved and handed forward for
subsequent use • in the progress of the cause. " 11 It was
through the influence of Lord Shand, of the English Rule
Committee, that this principle was actually enacted into
a rule of court in 1881. The procedure adopted )Vas first
known as the ' ' omnibus summons ' ' and is now known
as the " summons for directions. "
A summons of directions is an official document which
notifies the parties to appear before a master at an ap
pointed time so that he can get the parties together and
with their aid shape the future course of the litigation.
9 Victoria Court Rules (1916), order 33, rule 1 A.
10 Alberta Rules of Court (1914, as amended to

1923) , 224; British
Columbia Court Rules (1925), order 33; New Brunswick Judicature Act
and Rules of Court (1909) order 33 ; Newfoundlan,!l Cons. Stat. (1,918),
787 ; Saskatchewan Cons. Orders and Rules of the Court of King 's Beneh
( 1921), ordet 24.
11 Arnouid ;s Life of Loro Denman, I, 201.
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is compulsory that it be applied for in practically every
case, and at the hearing an order may be made covering
any one or more of the following matters :
1. Pleadings
2. Particulars
3. Admissions
4. Discovery
5. Interrogatories
6. Inspection of documents
7. Inspection of real or personal property
8. Commissions
9. Examination of witnesses
10. Place of trial
11. Mode of trial
12. Related matters 18
This procedure has been appropriately called the
" traffic officer " of English litigation. 18 It is framed
upon the two simple principles that the easiest way to
find out the facts is to get the parties together for that
purpose, and that the court, through an authorized offi
cer, should at any early stage of the litigation obtain a
measure of control over the suit, and supervise the pro
ceedings.
The device is more neede<l in England than in jurisdic
tions which employ an oral examination for discovery.
Indeed the procedure is used in the administration of the
general scheme of discovery by written interrogatories
and, by bringing the parties together, it supplies some
of the advantages which would be attendant upon an oral
examination. Lawyers in states which have an oral
examination for discovery have not deemed this device
necessary. William E. Fisher, a member of the Wis-

It

18 Annual Practice (1930), order 30.
18 An equally apt phrase was used by

the late Chief Justice Taft in
describing such procedure before an English master: " He knocked the
heads . of the parties togethet' so that a clear · issue between them was
quickly reached. "

JuDICIAL CoNTROL oF PRE-TRIAL PRACTICE

231

consin bar who studied the English procedure at first
hand at the request of the Wisconsin State Bar Asso
ciation, makes this significant remark : " We have many
machines in our exhibit of pleading and practice that are
superior to any existing elsewhere, including England.
Of first importance in my opinion in this category, is
section 4096 (the provision for an oral examination for
discovery) • • •. You have often heard of the work of
the English masters in eliminating upnecessary matters,
and narrowing the issues before trial. The superiority
of this work of the masters over the systems in vogue in
the American states is largely because
the other states
f
have no provision similar to section 4096. ' ' 14 Similarly
Mr. Justice Middleton, who for many years has been
regarded as a leading Ontario authority on matters of
practice, has said : ' ' The summons for directions which
has been adopted in the English practice has not com
mended itself to me. ' '
A majority of the American lawyers who have visited
English courts and watched in a more or less casual way
the actual operation of the procedure before a master
on a summons for directions have .come back with high
praise for it. They have seen the externalities of the
practice-the sgeed with which the master despatches
the hearings, the businesslike attitude of the lawyers,
the number of cases handled-and they have marvelled. 15
A number of attempts have been made to introduce the
summons for directions into the New York practice. The
Commission on the Law's Delays in 1904 recommended
the adoption of a practice similar to the English Sumli Reports

of Wisconsin State Bar Association, vol. 15, p. 178.
the following representative reports: Boesel, Wisconsin St. Bar
Ass'n Reports, vol. 15, p. 165; Dodge, in 11 Mass. L. Q. 69; Higgins,
English Courts and Procedure, 7 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 185 ; ·Leaming,
Masters : The Time Savers; 5 Mass. L. Q. 250; Loring, Procedure in
English High Court of Justice, 8 A. B. A. J. 609; Sunderland, An Ap
praisal of English Procedure, 24 Mich. L. Rev. 109, 115; Taft, Possible
and Needed Reforms in the Administration of Justice in the Federal
Courts, Reports of American Bar Ass 'n, vol. 47, pages 250, 264.

15 See
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mons for Directions.16 The Commission made its recom
mendation after correspondence with leading English
judges and lawyers. 1 7 The chief reason that the proposal
was defeated in the legislature was that it was accom
panied by a bill providing for a body of standing and
salaried commissioners to take the part of the English
masters.18 In the years ·which intervened before the ap
pearance of the report of the Board of Statutory Con
solidation in 1915 leaders of the bar continued to stress
the importance of this procedural device. Characteristic
statements as to the effectiveness of the similar English
'
practice made before the New York State Bar Associa
tion during this period are :
( 1 ) " They (the English rules ) have been framed on
the theory that the sooner the litigants are brought face
to face and compelled to disclose to each other the
strength or weakness of their respective lines of attack
or defense, the more expeditiously and thoroughly will
justice be done between them. ' ' 19
( 2 ) " These masters sit in London on every business
day and dispose each of about three hundred cases a
week. Generally all the preliminaries up to the time of
trial are under their control. The proceedings before
the master are exceedingly simple and informal. He sits
behind an office table in his room, and the solicitors or
counsel who appear before him state their motions and
argue their points in a conversational way. " 80
(3 ) " The master accepts the statements of the par
ties or their solicitors or counsel as to the nature of the
action, the proposed line of defense, and the assistance
they respectively need to enable them properly to prepare
for trial. ' ' 11
16 Of. Reports of N. Y. State Bar Ass'n
1 '7 Of. Report of N. Y. State Bar Ass 'n
18 N. Y. State Bar Ass'n Report (1912)

(1911) p. 59 ff.
(1917) p. 133.
page 238.
19 Elbridge L. Adams, of the New York Bar, in Reports of New York
State Bar Association (1908) p. 64.
10 Id. at pp. 65, 66.
11 Id. at p. 69.
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( 4 ) ' ' I venture to say that there is not a judge on
the bench, or a lawyer at the bar, who, in ten minutes
informal talk with the two lawyers in the case, • • •
would not know more clearly and correctly what inter
locutory relief should be accorded parties than he would
know from the perusal of realms of affidavits. ' ' 11
It is no wonder, therefore, that by 1917 a member of
the bar of the City of New York was able to say : ' ' Our
Bar Associations in this city are all committed to the
summons for directions. The judges are all in favor of
it in this department. ' ' 18 In 1909 the Special Committee
of the Bar of the City of New York sponsored a bill in
the legislature which would have inaugurated such a
practice, but after it had passed both houses of the legis
lature it was vetoed by the governor.•• Finally in 1911,
however, a modified form of the English practice was
enacted in the form of an ' ' Omnibus Motion. ' ' 111 It was
optional as to whether the parties used this procedure,
and not compulsory as in England. It seems that the
New York bar made little or no use of the device.
Just at the time when it seemed that this agitation
would be fruitful in introducing a more elaborate provi
sion into the New York Civil Practice Act, Samuel Rosen
baum, who had made a detailed special study of English
civil procedure, read a paper before the New York State
Bar Association in which he severely criticized the Eng
lish practice. �aid Mr. Rosenbaum : " I note with a
great deal of interest that a large number of New York
lawyers seem to favor the procedural step commonly
called an omnibus summ ons or summons for directions.
There has been discussion about that. Always the term
has been mentioned as though it offered some relief from
Ill Joseph M. Proskauer of the New York Bar in Report of the N. Y.
State Bar Ass 'n (1912) p. 230.
ll8 Report of N. Y. State Bar Ass'n (1917) p. 133.
lit Report of N. Y. State Bar Ass 'n (1911) p. 416.
llli N. Y. Laws of 1911, ch. 763.
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present defects in procedure. That surprised me a great
deal, because the summons for directions, although, of
course, it is a part of the English procedure at present
is a most unsatisfactory part of that procedure, and is
generally admitted to be a complete failure from the
point of view of improving procedure, and I think you
will pardon me for bringing to your attention a view
which should be considered on account of the agitation
concerning it in the New York practice.
' ' The reason for the adoption of that summons in
England was not so much an effort to simplify procedure,
but principally a desire to get away from the high cost
of pleadings in the English practice. As you, of course,
know there are solicitors and barristers in the English
courts, and the practice is that solicitors never draft
pleadings, but always retain counsel for drafting plead
ings, no matter how small they are, so that right at the
outset of a case the client is confronted with the expense
of retaining not only a solicitor but also a barrister.
Furthermore, under the English practice, every pleading
over seven hundred twenty words has to be printed and
every figure is counted as a word, and you have that
expense. Added to that is the wretched system in the
English courts for itemizing costs, by which every little
step is separately charged for. Lord Bramwell charac
terized it as the ' apothecary 's bill ' system of itemizing
costs. There is a separate fee for the solicitor for giving
instructions for the statement of claim, then one for the
barrister for drawing up the statement of claim, a sepa
rate fee for reading the proof when it comes from the
printer, possibly a separate fee for conferring with the
barrister for drawing up the statement of claim, always
another for delivering it, and before very long the client
finds he has run up a bill of fifteen or twenty dollars just
to deliver a statement of claim. As a consequence of a
popular out-cry against . this, some effort has been made

JumCIAL CoNTROL

OF PRE-TRIAL PRACTICE

235 ·

to require upon the commencement of an action, that
every action should come before an officer, who would
determine whether the delivery of pleadings was neces
sary in that case. Now, while that may be very well in
theory, in practice it has not worked well at all. The
intention was to give the counsel or solicitor the right
to appear before one of the masters of the court and lay
before him in an informal way the facts of the case and
then obtain from him general instructions as to the con
duct of the case ; • • • whether or not pleadings should
be filed, whether there should be discovery or not ; jury
or nonjury trial ; where the trial should take place ;
whether interrogatories should be administered or not,
etc. The fact is when the writ is issued the solicitor
knows little or nothing about the case, about the details,
and the order is always made in a purely formal manner.
The master is not told about the case, because the solic
itors do not know anything about it themselves.
' ' A great deal of thought should be given before the
summons for directions is inserted in the New York pro
cedure, where it may not be doing any good. Mr. Justice
Chitty, who is, perhaps, the greatest living authority on
English civil procedure, says at present in the great ma
jority of cases it is a useless expense. Testifying before
the 1913 Royal Commission on Delay in the King 's Bench

Division, he said :
' ' ' At present, in the great majority of cases, it is a
'
useless expense, and not an improvement on the system it
displaced. The idea of the summons for directions is
excellent, but in practice it fails, because as a rule neither
of the representatives of the parties attending it knows

anything about the nature of the requirements of the
action in which it is taken out. It comes to this, if I
might explain it : A summons is taken out and comes
before the master. It is a document which leaves blanks
to be filled in for the time at which the pleadings are to be
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delivered and various other steps taken. In a great many
cases you turn to the plaintiff's solicitor or representa
tive and he says, ' ' This is a country case. ' ' You say,
" What is it about ? " He says, " I do not know ; the writ
says it is an action for breach of contract. ' ' ' ' Cannot you
tell me something about it ? " " No, that is all I know ; I
have only had it up this morning. " Then you turn to the
defendant 's solicitor or representative and you say,
" What is the defense to the action T " He says, " I do not
know ; I do not even know what the claim is yet. " Of
course all you have to do in that state of things is to fill
in the number and say that the plaintiff must deliver his
claim in so many days, and the defendant his defense in
so many days and the plaintiff his reply in so many days ;
and then there must be discovery, because it is no use for
you to ask the parties whether they want discovery ; they
do not know.
' ' ' Then you have to fix the mode and place of trial.
At one time we used to leave it over until we knew some
thing more about what the action was going to be, but
owing to Order LIV, Rule 32, which was made some little
time ago, it was considered compulsory upon us to fix
the mode and place of trial in the first instance. That
having to be done without any information you look at
where the parties live and put in where the parties live,
and if either of the parties ask for a jury you put in
" jury" so that in this state of things all the master can
do is to order pleadings and discovery and fix the mode
and place of trial. All this might as well be done by a
rule applicable to all cases, which would save the costs
of the summons in each case. '
' ' Another prominent witness before the same com
mission was Lord Justice Phillimore, who said of the
order made under a summons for directions :
' ' ' Wh.en you have drawn up that order, all you have
done is to draw up an order that the case be conducted as
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the rules say it shall be. You have established nothing.
You have left the skeleton exactly where it was before.
The only thing that has been done is, you have saved
some stamps from the revenue because future applica
tions can be made without a summons stamp. If you
want interrogatories, you have to have a fresh summons ;
if you do not want trial by jury, you have to have a fresh
summons ; if you want to shift the venue from the place
originally named, because nobody knows where it was to
be, you have to have a fresh summons. In nine cases out
of ten you do not get anything decided by the summons
for directions, except that the case shall be tried accord
ing to the rules. '
" Finally I shall quote Mr. Justice Middleton, of
Toronto, the draftsman of the 1913 Revised Rules of the
High Court of Ontario. In the preface to the rules he
says :
" ' The summons for directions which has been adopted
in the English practice has not commended itself to me.
Iri practice in England it appears not to have accom
plished that which was hoped from it. No doubt if coun
sel of ability, fa�iliar with the details of the particular
case, appear before an experienced judge and discuss the
procedure in the particular case, the result ought to be
satisfactory ; but the actual result is far otherwise when
the factors are different ; and in practice it has been
found that in most instances a stereotyped form of order
is used which follows the general provisions found in the
rules. '
" In a contributed article in the Law Times (133 L. T.
565 ) , it is said : ' The compulsory summons for direc
tions, from which certain judges hoped for so much, has
proved very ineffective, and is deemed by all barristers
in large practice with whom I have discussed it to per
form the same functions as the fifth wheel of a coach.
One has only to read the orders made on these sum-
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mouses to see that they are all of a stereotyped character
and in the majority of cases wholly unnecessary. ' The
editorial comment on this is : ' It is quite difficult to see
what useful purpose the summons for direction has
served, and in the vast majority of cases it is wholly
unnecessary. '
" These objections were foreseen from the beginning.
At the time the summons was first invented in 1882, it
was caricatured by a contemporary writer as 'this won
derful summons, requiring from the master the sagacity
and prescience of Mr. Micawber at once to see and pre
scribe for all contingencies up to trial. ' ' ' 86
New Jersey only, among American jurisdictions, has
any procedure similar to the English summons for direc
tions at the present time. The New Jersey Practice Act,
which contains several innovations from the English
practice, has provided an adaptation of the English Sum
mons for Directions. The New Jersey procedure is
called ' ' Preliminary Reference. ' ' ll'7 The idea, of course,
is to relieve the trial judge of the necessity of hearing
matters preliminary to trial and interlocutory matters
generally, by placing a part of this burden on commis
sioners. But in contrast to the English system, the use
of the device is not mandatory. An outline of the prac86 Report of New York State Bar Ass 'n (1917), vol. 40, pp. 121-126;
Mr. Rosenbaum has expressed a similar opinion in his book, The Rule
making Authority in the English Supreme Court, pp. 144, 259: " Un
fortunately the summons as administered is not fulfilling the purposes
for which it was intended. The intention was that some idea of the
nature of the case should be imparted to the master upon the first hear
ing so that his order could be molded to fit the requirements of each
particular case. The fact is, however, that the solicitors ' clerks who
appear before the master when the summons is first heard usually know
little or nothing about the case, and the order made is almost always in
common form : pleadings by each side in so many days, mutual discovery,
trial in London with or without a jury, and ' leave to apply. ' " " In
his (MORter T. Willes Chitty) testimony before the 1913 Royal Commis
sion on Delay in the King's Bench Division, he laid much stress upon
the failure of the Rules on summons�s for directions to complement
properly the Rules on proceedings under such summonses. "
ll'7 Supreme Court Rule 80, found in 2 Misc. 1225; Supreme Court
Rules 92-95, found in 2 Misc. 1231; Chancery Rules 176-180, found in
1 Misc. 797.
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tice is as follows : at any time after service of the com
plaint either party may take out a summons approxi
mately like the following :
John Doe
v.

Commissioner's Summons

Richard Roe
To Richard Roe, Defendant :
On motion of plaintiff you are notified that on the lOth day
of January, instant at 10 o 'clock A. M., at my office, No. 10,
. . . . . . . . street, Trenton, I will hear any motion that may be
made by either party in the above stated cause respecting the
pleadings, issues, evidence or any other matter preliminary to,
and in preparation for trial ; and will make such order respect
ing the same as the parties respectively may be entitled to.
Dated January

4, 1912.

.

Supreme Court Commissioner

After the parties have appeared and been heard the com
missioner may make an appropriate order as to any one
or more of these items : Pleadings, issues, particulars,
admissions, interrogatories, or discovery of documents.88
The possibilities of this device have been almost entirely
neglected by the bar. Instead the supreme court judges
still hear the practice motions at special motion hours
and find relief fr0m their excessive burdens by distribut
ing some of the trial work among the district court
judges, as well as some preliminary matters incidental
thereto.89 Perhaps the device may yet be utilized, for in
1929 the Committee on Law Reform of the State Bar
Association recommended the ' ' appointment of six ade
quately paid Supreme Court Commissioners to act under
sec. 17 of the 1912 supplement to the Practice Act, that
is to say, to take care of all practice motions and matters
88 There is a full discussion of this procedure in the Report of the
Board of Statutory Consolidation of New York (1915), I, 109, 205, 350.
89 N. J. Laws of 1926, p. 103; Rule of Supreme Court, as amended in
1�29, found in 7 Misc. 1134.

240

DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAl'

preliminary to trial, thus relieving the Supreme Court
judges of this work, which is somewhat a burden to them,
and which because of the pressure of their other work
does not receive adequate judicial attention. ' ' 80
One of the most striking features of the new German
procedure is a provision for a preliminary hearing as a
means of preparing the cause for decision by the court.
It is not entirely unlike the English summons for direc
tions. It was adopted in 1924 as a method of economiz
ing judicial labor. A preliminary hearing may be held
before an associate judge. The power and practice of
the associate judge at the hearing is as follows : " He
attempts, first of all, to bring about a conciliation ; he
decides the issue of law or fact arising upon most kinds
of dilatory exceptions where these are not reserved for
determination with the merits ; he renders judgment in
case of withdrawal of the action, renunciation of the
claim or confession of the action, as also in case of de
fault on the part of one of the parties, or under certain
circumstances, on the part of both. He is explicitly
charged with the duty of bringing about a discussion of
the cause in all of its aspects and of seeing that it is so
far forwarded as to admit of disposition, where feasible,
at a single hearing before the collegial court. ' ' 81 Similar
expedients have been adopted in Italy and in Austria.82
80 N. J. State
81 Millar, The

Jour. 703, 705.
U ld.

Bar Ass'n Year Book ( 1928-29) page 63.
Reeent Reforms in German Civil Procedure, 10 A. B. A.

CHAPTER XXVII
ADVANTAGES IN COMBINING DISCOVERY WITH
PRESERVATION OF TESTIMONY
A number of American jurisdictions have combined
the methods for discovering and preserving testimony
into a single deposition procedure. General principles
of policy would seem to favor such a combination. It is
sound policy to consolidate previously separated devices
which are related in their origins and functions. The
end of reform is simplification. True reform does not
confuse-:-it integrates, it synthesises, it leads back to
:first principles. Lawyers are already sufficiently ac
quainted with the procedure for taking depositions to
insure its orderly operation from the start if it is used
for purposes of discovery. Use of deposition procedure
eliminates the necessity for an elaborate and detailed
statutory prov�sion for discovery. Statutory provisions
for interlocutory practice should be both concise and
simple in order that the occasion for appeals may be
reduced and in order that the actual practice may be
worked out in accordance with considerations of adminis
trative facility rather than in obedience to pre-arranged
technicalities. By making the right to take depositions
unconditional liberal means of discovering as well as
preserving testimony is provided.
The combination of discovery and preservation of
testimony has proved expedient from the standpoint of
the detailed incidents of practice which are involved.
Practically all of the problems which have arisen in con
nection with discovery procedure have been more easily
solved under the ordinary deposition statutes than under
241
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elaborate statutory provisions dealing with discovery as
such.
Discovery is available in all types of actions in states
in which a combination of discovery and preservation of
testimony has been effected. This is a more salutary rule
than the one which obtains in New York, for instance,
which limits discovery in certain types of actions. If
discovery is abused in certain types of actions, the rem
edy seems to be in keeping the record of the examination
secret rather than in curtailing the right to discovery.
The problem as to the persons from whom discovery
should be allowed is easily handled under the ordinary
deposition procedure. Such a solution has the several
advantages over the elaborate statutory provisions which
obtain in New York, Wisconsin and elsewhere. By
elimination of complex statutory provisions, the occasion
for appeals is lessened. The statute need only provide
that depositions may be taken, without further specifica
tion. This eliminates the necessity of determining who
is a party for purposes of discovery, because depositions
of parties and witnesses alike may be taken. It elim
inates the several problems as to who is examinable on
behalf of a corporation by allowing the examination of
any representative as a mere witness, with the question
as to the use of the examination against the corporation
being reserved for the trial. This is already the direction
of development under . several of the special discovery
statutes. It allows discovery from witnesses as well as
from parties. There are sufficient inhibitions upon the
use of the process in this regard to prevent its abuse, and
yet not enough to prevent its use in a proper case, name
ly, when an important witness refuses to give a voluntary
statement. Finally, such a provision makes discovery
equally available to the plaintiff and to the defendant.
The ordinary deposition procedure offers the most
expedient solution of the problem as to whether dis-

CoMBINING · DiscoVERY wiTH PRESERVATION

243

covery before pleading should be allowed. It usually
allows the defendant such discovery as of right, but re
quires that the plaintiff file some sort of pleading as a
guaranty of his bona fides. By filing a skeleton pleading,
taking depositions, and then amending, the plaintiff in
reality obtains discovery before pleading. This process
works satisfactorily enough in the states wherein it is
employed. It has not been the subject of the numerous
appeals which have attended the provisions in New York
and Wisconsin which allow examinations for the purpose
of enabling a party to plead, yet it accomplishes virtually
the same purpose.
A primary requisite to the usefulness of any pro
cedural device is that the lawyers know the details of the
procedure. This is true of the particular item of dis
covery. If elaborate details are provided by statute it
takes some time for the bar generally to become ac
quainted with them. Already most lawyers have an
adequate knowledge of the procedural details incident to
the taking of depositions. The experience of the states
in which this regular deposition procedure has been used
for discovery purposes is that the practitioners soon
learn to vary certain details and to ignore others in such
a fashion as to accommodate the procedure to its new
'
use. This has proved true of the following_ items which
are discussed in preceding chapters of this text : ( 1 )
The initiating step : with the allowance of an examination
as of right upon the mere service of notice and sub
poena, lawyers soon accord the same voluntarily. In
·
contrast, the special New York provision for notice
order procedure has not proved as satisfactory. (2)
The place of the examination can be adjusted to the con
venience of all parties involved. ( 3 ) Lawyers have
learned to adapt their own tactics so as to obtain the
most effective discovery, and to solve the few problems
which arise as to the orderliness of the proceeding.
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(4) The procedure is adaptable to differences between
the practice in c;ities and in smaller communities, and
between the large and small law offices, as far as the
necessity of having the shorthand notes transcribed is
concerned. ( 5) Problems concerning the right of the
deponent to make substantial corrections can be solved
by practical expedients apart from special statutory reg
ulation. ( 6 ) Lawyers have disregarded statutes and
rules in regard to filing the deposition and have adapted
their practices to their own convenience and to the most
effective discovery. Any inadequacies which obtain in
regard to any of these items in the practice of an indi
vidual laWy-er are the subject of education rather than of
legislation.
The most feasible solution of the problem of adminis
tering discovery examinations has been to allow the
examination to be taken down by a mere reporter, who is
qualified to take depositions, with all disputes being re
ferred to the trial court. Most of the attempts to provide
a different machinery have approximated this practice in
their actual operation. Only in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
and in isolated cases in the larger cities of Missouri does
a substantially different practice actually obtain. While
there are some advantages in having an officer who can
decide objections summarily and coerce answers, it is so
difficult to obtain officers with sufficient knowledge and ex
perience to exercise these powers intelligently that the
chances of abuse outweigh the incidental benefits. More
over the Missouri experience indicates that such an officer
is not needed in the majority of cases. Trial courts can
supply most of the benefits incident to the employment of
such an officer by granting speedy and expeditious hear
ings to the disputes which are referred to them. The plan
suggested has the following advantages : It uses a
machinery already provided by the statutes and does not
require special legislation ; it is easily adapted to differ-
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ences of practice between the large and small city, and be.:.
tween the large and small office ; it is the least expensive ;
it offers the least chance of abuse of parties and witnesses,
because each party and witness can safely refuse to an
swer any question which he deems improper until ordered
to answer by the court ; it provides for a sufficiently
liberal discovery ; it allows most of the disputes which
arise to be adjusted informally among counsel, without
resort to the court. Finally, if such a plan does not work
satisfactorily in a particular locality, the Missouri plan
appears to be the most feasible remedy, let the court
appoint a practicing lawyer to supervise the examination
if one of the parties requests it.
The comparative experience of states which try to
restrict the examination and of states which allow it to
be as broad as at the trial, respectively, indicates that
the practical advantages are with the latter plan. The
restrictive rules which have been applied by the New
York courts have defeated their own ends. On the con
trary, an examination before trial, restricted by the rules
of evidence only, has proved a deterrent of perjury and
an aid of disclosing the truth. It is noteworthy that
states which have allowed use of deposition procedure
for purposes of discovery before trial have not limited
the scope of the .inquiry.
Rules of evidence offer sufficient checks upon the scope
of the examination. This has proved true in the taking
of depositions. When lawyers for the examiner and the
examined, respectively, know that answers to questions
cannot be compelled without resort to the trial court by
the examiner, but that this can be accomplished expedi
tiously, the following experience obtains : The lawyers
adjust the majority of the objections among themselves ;
the inarticulate rationale of this adjustment is the law
of evidence, modified in its application by due regard

246

DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL

for the practicalities of the situation and for the purposes
of discovery. Under such a practice objections of privi
lege are respected forthwith. The liberality which ob
tains in regard to rules of relevancy is of the lawyers '
own making and does little or no harm because irrelevant
evidence can be stricken before it gets to the jury.
There are two penalties for unjust refusal to disclose,
namely, attachment for contempt and default or nonsuit.
The experience with these has been satisfactory. They
furnish a sufficient sanction so that it seldom is neces
sary to actually apply either one, and so that a full dis
closure is encouraged. Any dissatisfaction with the
penalty provisions of the statutes has been attributable
rather to the mode of their enforcement than to the pen
alties themselves.
The ordinary deposition procedure provides the most
satisfactory solution of the problem as to who may use
the discovery examination at the trial, and also as to
the purpose of its use. The rules under this practice are :
Neither party may use the deposition of a mere witness
as original evidence unless the deponent is unavailable at
the trial, but the taker may use it to contradict the wit
ness. The taker only may use the deposition of an
adverse party as evidence of an admission. Either party,
regardless of who has taken the deposition, and regard
less of whether it is the deposition of a party or of a
witness, may use the deposition in the event the deponent
is unavailable for oral testimony at the trial. While this
plan does not answer categorically that either the taker
only may use the examination, or that both parties may
use it, it effects a happy compromise by answering that
only the taker may use ordinarily, but that the opposite
party may also use when he really needs to, namely, when
the deponent is unavailable for oral testimony. In this
way use both for discovery and for preservation of testi
mony is made feasible.

CHAPTER XXVIII

LEGISLATIVE BASIS FOR AN ADEQUATE
DISCOVERY PR-OCEDURE
The experience of the various jurisdictions which
exhibit an effective discovery practice suggests a way
by which other jurisdictions can accomplish the same
end with a minimum of legislation. The followi:ng three
short and concise amendments to the statutes should
afford the basis for an adequate discovery procedure and
liberalize the procedure for preservation of testimony.
I. Amend the section of the statutes which sets forth
the right to take depositions to read as follows : ' 'Any
party may take testimony by deposition as of right at
any time after the court has acquired jurisdiction over
the action, suit or proceeding, and the persons of the
parties thereto against whom the depositions are to be
introduced. Depositions may be taken of parties and of
witnesses, and for the purpose either of discovering or
of preserving testimony. An adverse party may be
examined as if under cross examination upon the taking
of his deposition. ' '
II. Amend the section o f the statute which provides
for the use of depositions at the trial so as to incorporate
the conditions as to the unavailability of the witness
which at present are contained in the section regarding
the right to take depositions. If these conditions already
are p rovided in the section regarding the right to use
rather than in the section regarding the right to take,
there is no necessity for such an amendment. The
247
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enumeration of these conditions could be left exactly itS
it is at present in the particular state. The essential
change is that it be made clear that the conditions apply
to the use only and not to the taking of depositions.
III. Amend the statutory provision on discovery and
inspection of documents to read as follows : ' ' Any party,
at any time after the court has acquired jurisdiction over
the action, suit or proceeding, and the persons of the
parties thereto, may by notice require any other party
within ten days to make a disclosure upon oath of all the
documents which are or have been in his possession or
power, relating to any matters in question in the action.
Such a disclosure shall be made upon a printed form of
the following kind which shall be kept available in the
office of every clerk of a court of record :
Affidavit of Documents
State of

.

.

.

County of

.......
... .

.

.

.

{ ss.
J
Plaintiff
vs.
Defendant

I, the above named . . . . . . . . . . make oath and say as fol
lows :
1.

I have in my possession or power the following docu

ments relating to the matters in question in this action :
2.

I object to produce the following of the do�uments which

are listed in part I above :

3.

The grounds upon which I object to produce these docu

ments are :

4.

I have had but have not now in my possession or power

the following documents relating to the matters in question
in this suit :
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The last mentioned documents were last in my possession

or power on . . . . . . . . . . , and to the best of my knowledge and
belief are now located as follows :

6.

According to the best of my knowledge, information

and belief, I have not now and never have had in my possession,
custody or power or in the possession, custody or power of my
attorneys or agents, or in the possession, custody or power of
any other person or persons on my behalf, any deed, account,
book of account, receipt, letter, memorandum, paper or writing
or any copy of or extract from any such document or any other
document whatsoever relating to the matters in question in
this action or any of them wherein any entry has been made
relative to such matters or any of them other than and except
the documents which have been set forth above and the plead
ings and other proceedings in the action.

Subscribed and sworn to by
Affiant

Production for inspection of documents which are thus
disclosed may be required from the party who has pos
session or control of them by notice to produce. If a
party refuses to make an affidavit of documents or to
produce in response to the notice the .court may order
him to do so, and may enforce such order by the penal
ties which are applicable in the event a party refuses to
answer a question during the taking of his deposition,
after being ordered to answer by the court. ' '
Procedural d�tails can be left exactly as they are at
present under the various statutes on depositions. While
there are some defects in the deposition statutes of par
ticular states, it is of greater moment in the initiation of
the new use of the procedure that the lawyers be ac
quainted with the procedural details than that these lat
ter be perfect. Glaring defects which become apparent
during the actual use of the procedure may be remedied
later by special statutes. Moreover, the experience of
the states which have used this plan is that the bench
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and bar adjust the detftils to suit the purpose, without
the aid of legislation, once they are convinced that the
purpose itself is justifiable. Only in the event that the
statutes in the particular state do not allow the taking
of depositions upon oral interrogatories need the pro
cedure be changed at the start. Practically all jurisdic
tions already have subordinated the taking of depositions
by written interrogation to the taking upon oral ques
tions. The former method is used only in the event that
the witness resides at such a distance as to make oral
questioning impracticable, if it is used at all.

CHAPTER XXIX

CONTRIBUTION OF D ISCOVERY TO THE
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
The description and evaluation of any particular
mechanism of the legal machinery is incomplete unless it
takes into account the relation of the part t o the whole,
for none of the interrelated processes can exist unto
themselves. Innovations in pre-trial practice are to be
judged by their contribution to the general administra
tion of justice, and by their functional relationship to
the other incidents of legal procedure. They are also to
be judged by their contribution to the practical needs of
the lawyer and the court.
Many have been the complaints in recent years in re
gard to the unscientific and unbusinesslike approach of
legal procedure toward its various problems. Judges
and lawyers in the states which allow a full and mutual
discovery before trial say that it has had a salutary effect
upon the whole tenor of the litigious process. Perhaps
their views can be.st be summarized by quoting two terse
sentences which, are representative of the views encoun
tered in field investigations in the various states :
' ' Litigation is no longer regarded as a game. ' '
' ' The lawyer who does not use discovery procedure is
in the position of a physician who treats a serious case
without first using the X-ray. ' '
Lawyers in states in which a full and equal discovery
before trial is allowed say that it is a great aid i� ascer
taining the truth and a great preventative of perjury.
Only where a limited or unequal discovery obtains has it
been found that perjury, manufactured testimony and
251
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kindred evils are fostered. Where a full and equal dis
covery is allowed lawyers say that they come much
nearer to obtaining the truth because :
( 1 ) The witness is examined while his memory is
fresh ;
( 2 ) The witness usually is not coached in preparation
for the trial, and consequently his testimony is more
spontaneous ;
( 3 ) A party who has been pinned down to a definite
and detailed story early in the litigation can ill afford
to manufacture testimony contrary to this story, for he is
already bound.
Sometimes a lawyer does not know the truth of his own
client 's story until after the opposing lawyer has exam
ined him for discovery. A lawyer is often deceived as
to the merit of his case, by the mere recital of the facts
by the client. For instance, at the end of an examination
for discovery in a certain case the attorney arose and
addressed his client thus : ' ' Why-you did not tell me
any such story in the office. I am sorry but I will have to
withdraw from the case. ' ' Numerous incidents of a simi
lar character were related in the various jurisdictions
which were visited.
Discovery is a help in the ascertainment of truth in
the conduct of litigation by reason of the further fact that
. it furnishes a means of preserving testimony. All too
often injustice has been done because of the unavailabil
ity of necessary witnesses. A liberal provision for the
discovery and preservation of evidence gives greater
assurance that the facts of the case may be presented in
full upon the trial.
Settlements have been greatly increased by liberal
allowance of discovery before trial. The Wisconsin ex
perience in this regard is especially significant both as
to the extent of settlements and the manner of arriving
at settlements. Similar, though less pointed, testimony
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was giv�n by lawyers in other jurisdictions. The follow
ing statement from a Milwaukee attorney is repre
sentative of the views which were encountered generally
during the investigation in Wisconsin : " It is fair to
say that a very large proportion of the controversies in
which lawyers are consulted are disposed of without the
commencement of · any action. In the larger cities, at
least, it is also true that only a relatively small portion
of the actions which are commenced are brought to trial.
They are disposed of by the attorneys in settlements
which, in the majority of cases, are very carefully and
deliberately worked out. These settlements have been
made possible in a great many cases through the use of
the discovery examination. The lawyers of Wisconsin
have become quite skillful in the use of this examination.
Many of them use it either solely or partly for the pur
pose of reducing the issues, much after the manner in
which that is sought to be done elsewhere by a bill of par
ticulars. After examinations have been had on both
sides, it is a very common thing for the opposing attor
neys to sit down and discuss the case anew with the issues
for trial more clearly defined in the minds of the attor
neys on each side and with all of them better able to
judge of the probable result of a trial. The better trained
the opposing attorneys are in the sifting of evidence and
in the application of rules of law, the more reason is
there to expect that the litigation will terminate in a fair
and just settlment. ' ' 1 General counsel for some insur
ance companies require that local counsel send up copies
of the examination for settlement recommendations. Nor
is there any considerable complaint on the part of plain
tiffs ' lawyers, for they say the more skillful insurance
lawyers have tried enough automobile accident · cases to
1 :J. G. Hardgrove, Reduction of Trial 1ssues Under Wisconsin Prac
tice, Proceedings of the Wisconsin Board of Circuit Judges (1927),

� -

.

I
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be able to predict rather accurately what the case would
bring if tried, after all the facts and the condition of the
injured party have been fully disclosed upon an adverse
examination, supplemented by a physical examination ,
if necessary. Some lawyers say that they welcome the
examination of their . own client by the adversary, that
often they have not obtained a true picture of the case
until after such examination. One circuit judge says
that he has maintained a record for several years of
effecting settlements in four out of five cases docketed
for trial. He calls the lawyers into his office before time
for the trial and asks what the prospects of settlement
are. After a short discussion one of the lawyers sug.,
gests that the parties be called in. The judge explains in
an informal way to the parties the uncertainties of litiga
tion. Often the result is a settlement. In such a case
the adverse examination is either expressly or tacitly
used as the basis for the agreement.
But more often than otherwise the case does not get
this far after discovery is had. Sometimes a settlement
is effected in the presence of the commissioner before the
examination is finished. In most cases the discovery re
sults in a re-evaluation of the case by both sides and a
consequent weighing of the probabilities of further liti
gation.
The following statement from a lawyer in a large city
in the middle west indicates the use of the procedure by
representatives of liability insurance companies and
similar interests in the large cities : ' 'When a case is
filed against us we often find that we know almost nothing
of either the plaintiff or the defendant. We . call the de
fendant, whom we represent, to the office. It develops
that his story is decidedly different from that related in
the plaintiff 's petition. What is the truth ? It is worth
a good deal to us just to be able to force the plaintiff to
come in and give his story. Our chief purposes in exam-
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ining him are : To see what he looks like, whether he
seems to be honest, and especially, how he stands up
under questioning, and to question him in detail as to
the extent of his injuries. If we :find that the party has
a good case and will make a good witness at the trial, we
make every effort to effect a settlement. ' '
One attorney made the following statement which gives
a very trenchant comparison of discovery and separate
procedures for arbitration or conciliation : " The law
yers, after an adverse examination, really constitute
themselves a board of arbitration in the case. And it is
much more effective than regular arbitration and con
ciliation practice, because it is not artificial. I do not
care for the type of arbitration which forces an award on
the party, but in this way the lawyers and parties strike
their own agreement. ' ' There is afforded the judge the
materials with which to foster the kind of conciliation
which, after all, is most feasible, namely, conciliation
handled by the established courts.• The other type of
conciliation procedure, by special conciliation tribunals,
has been described as operating thus : ' ' The conciliator
points out the uncertainty of litigation, the burdensome
expense of it, the danger of personal estrangement be
tween neighbor� and friends, and that, by slight con
cession on the part of each, the differences may be ad
justed. ' ' 8 It has been pointed out that the judge of the
established court can bring about such conciliation as
well as a special conciliator. Discovery provides a means
whereby the judge can do so upon an intelligent basis.
Moreover the parties are in a position which is more
conducive to their acceptance of the suggestion of the
judge if they have already ascertained the testimony
which can be expected at the trial. Or, to put the same
8 Cf. Randall, Conciliation as a Function of the Judge, 18 Ky. L.
Jour. 330.
8 John A. Cline, in an address before the Ohio State Bar Association
in 1925, Reports, vol. XLVI, p. 63.
·
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idea in a slightly different manner, may not the " very
soul of conciliation procedure, that before a person shall
involve his neighbors and himself in legal warfare there
shall be made an effort to secure a legal peace ' ' 4 be more
readily attained " if a party, long before his legal battle
is staged in the trial court, can go into his adversary 's
camp and inspect his battle array, • • • learn how
strong his adversary is, and enter negotiations for peace
or prepare for battle intelligently " ? 6
Automobile accident litigation occupies as much time
as all other types of litigation in courts generally at the
present time. In many of the larger cities the ratio in
the trial dockets is approximately two to one. In no
type of litigation can plaintiffs, as a general rule, less
afford to wait a long time for compensation, and in no
type of litigation are defendants more often subjected to
non-meritorious claims. The signs of the times indicate
that unless the judicial system can speedily devise some
way of remedying the situation, measures akin to the
industrial accident compensation plan will be introduced.
Discovery procedure offers a way of improving the
handling of negligence cases. In every state in which an
investigation was conducted, except New York, the great
est use of discovery procedure is in connection with per
sonal injury litigation. The explanation for the New
York exception is the arbitrary limitation which the
courts have placed upon use of discovery in such litiga
tion. Especially do lawyers for insurance companies
favor the procedure. It enables them to arrive at settle
ments on an intelligent basis. Consequently in several
states the main instruction in the use of discovery pro
cedure has come from the head counsel for the insurance
companies, who have sent instructions to counsel in out
lying dist�icts to take discovery examinations in every
Hd. page 67.
6 Max W. Nohl, Discovery Proceedings, 2 Marquette L. Rev. 137.
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case involving their interests and to "Bend the same to
them for settlement recommendations. Plaintiffs ' law
yers generally are as well satisfied with discovery as are
the defendants ' lawyers. The procedure provides them
with a means of investigation which allows them to com
pete with the larger firms which have at their disposal
independent means of investigation. To the firm which
already has more cases than it can conveniently try, it
affords a way to dispose of some of them and to collect
fees, without needlessly protracted litigation. The lawyer
who is prosecuting what he regards as a good case is
glad to have his client examined with a view to obtain
ing a favorable settlement.
An oral examination for discovery affords as simple a
way of arriving at the truth in automobile accident cases
as could be had under any administrative tribunal. It
has all of the elements of informality, avoidance of the
ultra-technical rules of evidence, and general conciliation
features, which any of the existing workmen 's compensa
tion plans affords. And it has the advantage that it is
more easily adapted to, and supervised by, the existing
judicial organization. It is integrated with the regular
structural plan of the courts, and the business of lawyers,
rather than being a separate system in itself. While
possessing many of the advantages of extra-judicial pro
cedure, it has less disadvantages.
The report of the Massachusetts Special Commission
to Study Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance is of sig
nificance in this regard. Its recommendation is the more
interesting in view of the fact that a majority of the
commission were laymen. As an item in its discussion of
the relation of court procedure to the compulsory auto
mobile insurance situation, the commission stated : " Hav
ing thus suggested a prompt, informal and fair method of
settling honest claims of those who wish them thus set
tled, with or without the assistance of lawyers, we now
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turn to the matter of procedure for dealing with claims
of parties who are not willing to submit to such judicial
arbitration. These claims may be honest, or they may be
false or exaggerated. How shall they be sifted out so
that each may receive such, and only such, consideration
as the facts merit T It is a commonplace, in the dis
cussion of the administration of the criminal law, to say
that a prompt hearing and disposition of a case while the
evidence is fresh, and before the whole story is stale, is
the most important object to be attained as a deterrent
to crime. In our opinion this same promptness of in
vestigation, hearing and disposition is essential in deal
-ing with automobile accidents and unwarranted claims
arising out of them.
" As pointed out by the Judicature Commission in its
final report of 1920, Bentham a century ago criticized
the orthodox methods of inquiry in many legal proceed
ings as ' epistolary' as distinguished from the stronger
and more direct 'confrontatory ' method which he advo
cated. Now, after a suit is brought, we have had for
many years an ' epistolary' method by which each party
may examine the other by written interrogatories to be
answered in writing. While this system is useful and
has been much used, it is cumbersome, it takes up a large
amount of time and effort upon the part of the judges in
passing upon objection to certain interrogatories before
they are answered, and it has the weakness of an astute,
and sometimes evasive, question and answer writing con
test between the lawyers over the signatures of their
clients, with a view to getting as much and giving as little
information as their respective consciences will allow.
In some other states they have more direct methods, and
the Judicature Commission called attention particularly
to the statute of New Hampshire which allows each party
to take the oral deposition of the other party and of wit
nesses at any time after suit is brought. These deposi-
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tions are taken, like the deposition of any witness under
our own practice, upon notice to the other party, and
·

may be used at the trial unless the other party produces
the witness. Our practice allows such examination only
of witnesses who are more · than thirty miles from the
place of trial, or who are so ill as to · be unlikely to be

able to attend the trial, and they cannot be used at the
trial unless the illness or other reason for taking them
still continues.

We have no provision for ·an oral exam

ination of the parties to the case until the actual trial is

reached, which, as already pointed out, may be several
·

years after the accident, when the memory of everybody
may have been dulled, or unduly stimulated, to such an
extent as to create more controversy than would arise
if the story could be obtained under oath at an earlier
period.
''Now we believe that the apparent frequency of un
warranted or exaggerated claims in connection with auto
mobile accidents in Massachusetts today under our law is
such as to demand the experiment, in that branch of liti
gation, of machinery for the pro�pt oral examination
of parties and witnesses to the suit similar to the ma
chinery which they have in New Hampshire.

•

•

•

It

seems to us that the opportunity given to either party to

examine the other and witnesses orally after suit is

brought is the 'first necessary method of sifting the char
acter of claims sued upon. ' ' 8
It is important from the standpoint of substantive law
to improve the fact-sifting process by adoption of dis
covery procedure.

Of course any device which will

simplify legal procedure and help it to assume its proper
relation of handmaid rather than mistress to the work
of justice,' will, to that extent, effect an improvement of

substantive law.

This is poignantly true of the fact- ·

8 Report of the Spe�ial Col!l�i.ssion to Stu!Jy CompUlsory JLotol' Vehie1e
InliUranee . �nd Related !Latter�. (19�0) �· 98 ff.
'7 ct. Colllnti; JL. R,, in :Btl Coles (1967) 1 K. :a. 4.
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selecting process. The exact form in which the facts of a
controversy are presented for decision has an important
bearing both upon the determination of the rights of
the parties in the particular case and also upon the deter
mination of the scope of the authority of the decision
under the doctrine of stare d ecisis.8 If all of the factual
details of a controversy are presented, without any dis
criminating selection of the important facts, the judging
function is handicapped by the very multiplicity of data.9
Not only is it _necessary that there be an efficient fact
sifting process, but it is equally necessary that it be in
dulged prior to the time set for application of the law
to the facts, the trial. Otherwise there is danger that
the relative importance of particular facts be obscured in
the riot of facts.
" Discovery has a salutary effect upon the various
mechanisms of legal procedure. Especially does it have
a vital interrelation to pleadings, both in purpose and
in function. The two together effect a division of labor
toward a common end, namely, the formulation of the
dispute into a justiciable form by disclosing the material
controverted facts and eliminating the uncontroverted
and unessential facts in each case prior to its final pres
entation for decision. Discovery procedure and plead
ing approach the problem from the same basic stand
point : both are equally ill harmony with the traditional
Anglo-American doctrine of party-formulation of issues.
An oral examination for discovery is even more largely
extra-judicial in its practical operation than are plead
ings. Whatever are the theoretical arguments for the con8 Cf. Green, Judge and Jury, 268, 274 ; Pound, Theory of Judicial Deci
sion, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 641 ; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process,
142.
9 Dean Green has shown convincingly that ' ' the net-work of theory
increases in complexity with the multiplicity of data ' ' and that there is
a.cc!)rdingly more rqom for an improper grouping of facts to bolster up
a particular theory which has happen!ld to catch judicial fancy. . Green,
·
Judge and Jury, p. 25 ff. ·
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trary principle of judicial control of pre-trial practice,
the fact remains that under our present court structure
the judges already have more than they can do. The
practical necessities of the situation make the conserva
tion of judicial energy a more important consideration
at present than judicial formulation of issues.
The difficult problem under our present practice of
pleading has been to determine just where to draw the
distinction between facts, law and evidence. 10 The dis
tinction, it has been pointed out, is one of degree only,
the " real problem " being " how specific must the pleader
be ? ' ' 11 With an adequate system of compelling dis
covery this problem vanishes, for when a party can ob
tain notice of all the facts by discovery he is not likely
to complain that too small a percentage of the disclosure
is effected by the pleadings. Likewise the issue-forming
function of pleading can more conveniently be made
secondary to the notice-giving function, as it should be,
when some auxiliary is provided to eliminate unessential
facts. Indeed, discovery has been recognized in England
as a necessary complement of simplified pleading. 111 A
fortiori it has been recognized as an absolute necessity
by the advocates of what is known as notice pleading. 18
Not only in Anglo-American procedure but in the Conti
nental systems as well there has been a recognition of the
need for some such auxiliary to pleadings. The words
of a prominent student of comparative procedure and of
continental procedure in particular, Judge Gustaf Fahl
crantz, of Stockholm, Sweden, before the Universal
Congress of Lawyers and Jurists in 1904 are significant
in this regard : . ' ' But in order to avoid useless con
troversy and to keep the whole case most closely to the
10 Cf. Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading
11 Clark on Code Pleading, 155.
18 Rosenbaum, Rule-Making Authority, 72.

L. Rev. 416.
·

18 Whittier,

under the Codes, 21 Col.

Notice Pleading, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 501.
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actual issues, there is need at the very outset of the law
suit to require the parties to state the true facts. In
addition to the pleadings it is necessary to give the right
to the parties to make interrogatories to be answered by
the opponent under oath or under legal responsibility
along with discovery and inspection of documents. And
I take the liberty to consider such a right of the parties,
or the exercise of that right of theirs, as a very part of
the pleadings or a necessary appendix to them, because
without that the pleadings must frequently be void of
their proper effect and illusory. ' ' 14
Pleading alone has never furnished an adequate basis
of preparation for trial. Any formal process like writ
ten pleading has a natural tendency to become formal
istic and even ritualistic. The natural tendency of law
yers, as of human beings generally, is to adopt the easiest
course, and this accentuates the ineffectiveness of plead
ings as a fact-sifting device. Why not, therefore, let
pleadings assume the very character which it is their
tendency to assume, namely, a mere preliminary forecast
of the issues, and supplement them by a more workable
fact-sifting device T There is abundant evidence that dis
covery aids in reducing and clarifying the issues. New
Hampshire lawyers said that the simple pleadings in use
in the state were made possible largely by the discovery
practice. Ontario trial judges say the same is true un
der their practice. They say that they are able to co_me
to the trial of many cases without. ever having read the
pleadings ; that by the use of discovery the issues are so
narrowed down that it will suffice to simply ask the law
yers at the opening of the trial : ' ' Well, what 's the dis
pute about 7 ' ' While Wisconsin lawyers are rather in
definite about this particular contribution of discovery
to the administration of justice it is a noticeable fact that
pleadings are less technical than in many other states.
14 Ofileial

Re'port of th"e Congress, p. SO.
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, Under the Massachusetts written interrogatory practice
it is possible to point to one way by which discovery af
fects the pleadings. Under the prevalent practice in
Boston of having printed forms for the defendant to use,
containing a general denial and pleas that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent and that the automobile was
operated by a person without authority from the defend
ant, it sometimes happens that the defendant :files such a
form without really intending to press all of these mat
ters. Cases of record were found in which interrog
atories had brought to light exactly which of these items
the defendant did intend to rely upon. In this connection
the words of the Massachusetts Judicature Commission
are significant : ' ' The discussion of pleading naturally
leads to the consideration of methods of defining issues
before trial which the earlier technical system of plead
ing was intended to accomplish, and which the present
looser system does not accomplish. " 111
While there is. this salutary effect on the pleading stage
when a full discovery before trial is allowed, exactly the
reverse may be true under a partial discovery before
trial. Since the defendant can have no discovery exceptf
on his affirmative defenses in New York he often puts in
fictitious defenses for the sole purpose of securing an
examination of his adversary. Indeed, several New York
lawyers pointed to this as one of the chief defects of the
present New York system of discovery.
Discovery relieves the trial machinery in at least two
distinct ways. It furnishes a means of eliminating a
large number of non-meritorious cases and of settling
others so that they are not allowed to reach the already
overcrowded trial dockets. By eliminating such cases
greater guaranty is given that meritorious cases will be
accorded an expeditious trial. Discovery serves to pre-

·

111 Second and Final Report of the Massachusetts Judicature Commis·
sion {1921) p. 106.
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pare the form of the controversy, in the cases which
merit a trial, so that the trial proper can be expedited.
The trial is expedited in proportion to the measure of
clarity in the definition of the issues and freedom from all
elements of surprise. As the element of surprise, which
is the psychological child of trial by battle, is eliminated,
the expectation of trials becoming more nearly business
like meetings is realized. There is no better way to pre
vent such surprise than by allowing a dress-rehearsal be
fore the trial. The commissioners who drew up the first
New York Code of Procedure set forth still another way
in which discovery aids in the trial of cases : ' ' One of
the great benefits to be expected from the examination of
the parties is the relief it will afford to the rest of the
community in exempting them, to a considerable degree,
from attendance as witnesses, to prove facts, which the
parties respectively know, and ought never to dispute,
and would not dispute if they were put to their oaths. To
effect their object, it should seem necessary to permit the
examination beforehand, that the admission of the party
may save the necessity of a witness. " 16
The practical operation of discovery procedure is
rather interesting in light of the widespread demand for
liberalization of the rules of evidence. One of the attrac
tions of procedure before administrative tribunals is the
relative freedom from the more technical rules of evi
dence. Discovery examinations and examinations before
administrative tribunals exhibit similar conditions in
this respect. In both instances the norm which lawyers
keep in mind is the general law of evidence, but in both
instances there is a practical disregard of the more tech
nical rules. Yet there is this difference in the case of
discovery : while ther� is freedom in finding the truth,
there may be limitation upon use of the truth found, for ·
it may subsequently be non-usable at the trial if it fails
16 Report

of Commissioners on Practice and Pleading (1848) p. 244.
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to comply with the various rules of evidence. In this
way a happy compromise is effected between the two
schools of thought to which, respectively, the rules of evi
dence are either nonsense or the height of wisdom.
A noticeable tendency in the reform of appellate pro
cedure is to allow a broader scope of review of the con
troverted facts by the appellate court. Can this not
prove more p:vacticable when some way has been found
to forever dispose of the uncontroverted and unessential
facts at th-� beginning of the litigation so that they may
not later be resurrected to confuse the issues on appeal Y
Cannot our appellate courts afford to spare the time nec
essary to review more thoroughly a few contested ques
tions of fact Y Is not the present limitation upon the
scope of review maintained partly because the fact-range
in the cases which are appealed is unnecessarily broad 1
Discovery also offers a means of reducing the size of the
record on appeal. When the issues are not clarified and
reduced before trial the transcript of testimony becomes
unnecessarily large and the expense incident · thereto be
comes unnecess{lrily great. Dress-rehearsals before trial
in the form of discovery examinations should make it
possible to eliminate umi.ecessary circuity and prolixity
in interrogation at the trial. To this extent the size of
the transcript of testimony is reduced.
Not only has discovery procedure improved the gen
eral administration of justice, but it has also contributed
to the practical needs of the lawyer and the court. Law
yers in jurisdictions in which the device has been thor
oughly tested say that it has been advantageous to their
personal interests as well as to the larger interests of
justice. Interviews with several hundred lawyers in
thirteen representative jurisdictions a;s well as cor
respondence with lawyers in fifteen other jurisdictions
indicate tliat the bar favors allowance of an oral exam
ination for discovery before trial, co-extensive in scope
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with an examination at the trial, and available to both
parties equally. In states where a partial discovery only
is allowed [partial because : (a) not an equal discovery,
(b) not a discovery as to all of the issues of the con
troversy, or ( c ) written interrogatories are the means of
obtaining the discovery] there is a sharp division of
opinion among the lawyers as to the merits of the pro
cedure. The basic reasons why a full and equal dis
covery is acceptable to lawyers are that it furnishes a
means of thorough preparation for trial, and that it
makes possible the disposal of many cases without pro
tracted litigation, the collection of fees earlier, and the
handling of a greater volume of litigation.
The work of the judge is simplified in the states which
employ an oral examination before trial. A considerable
part of the pre-trial machinery for the formulation of
the terms of the controversy becomes extra-judicial in
practical operation. A great many cases are eliminated
before they ever reach the trial dockets. The greater
clarity in the definition of the issues and the elimination
of elements of surprise expedites the actual trial in cases
which must be tried. In many respects, therefore, dis
covery has made a vital contribution to the general ad
ministration of justice.

APPENDIX
STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON DISCOVERY IN
THE VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS
United States Federa.l Courts
There is the following provision for discovery before
trial in the federal equity courts :
' ' The plaintiff at any time after filing the bill and not
later than twenty-one days after the joinder of issue, and
the defendant at any time after filing his answer and not
later than twenty-one days after the joinder of issue, and
either party at any time thereafter by leave of the court
or judge may file interrogatories in writing for the dis
covery by the opposite party or parties of facts and
documents material to the support or defense of the
cause, with a note at the foot thereof stating which of
the interrogatories each of the parties is required to
answer. But no party shall file more than one set of
interrogatories to the same party without leave of the .
court or judge.
" If any party to the cause is a public or printe corpo
ration, any opposite party may apply to the court or
judge for an order allowing him to file interrogatories to
be answered by any officer of the corporation, and an
order may be made accordingly for the examination of
such officer as may appear to be proper upon such inter
rogatories as the court or judge shall think fit.
' ' Copies shall be filed for the use of the interrogated
party, and shall be sent by the clerk to the respective
solicitort of record, or to the last known address of the
opposite party, if there be no record solicitor.
267
·
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" Interrogatories shall be answered, and the answers
filed in the clerk 's office, within fifteen days after they
have been served unless the time be enlarged by the court
or judge. Each interrogatory shall be answered sepa
rately and fully and the answers shall be in writing, un
der oath, and signed by the party or corporate officer
interrogated. Within ten days after the service of inter
rogatories, objections to them, or any of them, may be
presented to the court or judge, with proof of notice of
the purpose so to do, and answers shall be deferred until
the objections are determined, which shall be at as early
a time as is practicable. In so far as the objections are
sustained, answers shall not be required.
' ' The court or judge, upon motion and reasonable no
tice, may make all such orders as may be appropriate to
enforce answers to interrogatories or to effect the in
spection or production of documents in the possession
of either party and containing evidence material to the
cause of action or defense of his adversary. Any party
failing or refusing to comply with such an order shall be
liable to attachment, and shall also be liable, if a plain
tiff, to have his bill dismissed, and if a defendant, to have
his answer stricken out and be placed in the same situ
ation as if he had failed to answer.
' ' By a demand served ten days before the trial, either
party may call on the other to admit in writing the exe
cution or genuineness of any document, letter or other
writing, saving all just exceptions ; and if such admission
be not made within-five days after such service, the costs
of proving the document, letter or writing shall be paid
by the party refusing or neglecting to make such ad
mission, unless at the trial the court shall find that the
refusal or neglect was reasonable. ' ' 1
The chief difficulties in the practical operation of the
federal equity discovery practice have been said to be
1

Hopkins New Federal Equity Rules (6th ed.) 58.
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that answers to interrogatories are usually so evasive as
not to give the desired disclosure and that the burden of
administration upon the trial courts is very heavy.8
Learned Hand, J., has said concerning the practice that,
" Much the more convenient way would be for the parties
to agree upon a master and allow the plaintiff an oral
examination. This, however, I cannot compel ; but much
the same result may probably be obtained, though it must
be confessed with the maximum of expense and time and
labor, by allowing interrogatories to be renewed as often
as justice requires. ' ' 8
There is no provision for discovery in the law side of
the federal courts. Nor do the federal statutes on depo
sitions offer great possibilities in this regard. The fed
eral statutes on depositions, from the original act of
1789 to the present time, always have made the right to
take depositions conditional. . The provision which ob
tains at present is as follows :
' ' The testimony of any witness may be taken in any
civil cause depending in a district court by deposition
de bene esse, when the witness lives at a greater distance
from the place of trial than one hundred miles, or is
bound on a voy;age to sea, or is about to go out of the
United States, or out of the district in which the case is
to be tried, and to a greater distance than one hundred
miles from the place of trial, before the time of trial, or
when he is ancient and infirm. The deposition may be
taken before any judge of any court of the United States,
or any clerk of a district court, or any chancellor, justice,
or judge of a supreme or superior court, mayor or chief
magistrate of a city, judge of a county court or court of
common pleas of any of the United States, or any notary
public, not being of counsel or attorney to either of the
parties, nor interested in the event of the cause. ReasonI Lane, Federal
8 Pressed Steel

967.

Equity Rules, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 276, 294.
Car Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co. (1917) 241 Fed. 964,
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able notice must first be given in writing by the party or
his attorney proposing to take such deposition, to the
opposite party or his attorney of record, as either may be
nearest, which notice shall state the name of the witness
and the time and place of the taking of his deposition ;
and in all cases in rem, the person having the agency or
possession of the property at the time of seizure shall
be deemed the adverse party, until a claim shall have
been put in ; and whenever, by reason of the absence from
the district and want of an attorney of record or other
reason, the giving of the notice herein required shall be
impracticable, it shall be lawful to take such depositions
as there shall be urgent necessity for taking, upon such
notice as any judge authorized to hold courts in such
district shall think reasonable and direct. Any person
may be compelled to appear and depose as provided by
this section, in the same manner as witnesses may be
compelled to appear and testify in court. ' ' 4
The following federal statute was enacted in 1892 :
" In addition to the mode of taking the depositions of wit
nesses in causes pending at law or equity in the district
courts of the United States, it shall be lawful to take the
depositions or testimony of witnesses in the mode pre
scribed by the laws of the state in which the courts are
held. " 5 The Supreme Court has held that this statute
merely regulates the mode of taking and does not enlarge
the grounds for taking so as to allow examinations be
fore trial for purposes of discovery in accordance with
local practice.6
Judge Woolsey, of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York recently made a vigorous criticism
U. S. C. A., Tit. 28, sec. 639.
5 U. S. C. A., Tit. 28, sec. 643.
6 Hanks Dental Association v. International Tooth Crown Co. (1904)
194 U. S. 303. There has been some confusion in the decisions of the
lower federal courts on this matter in spite of the Supreme Court ruling.
See annotations to U. S. C. A., Tit. 28, sees. 635, 6�3.
4
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of a federal rule as to discovery. He said : " In a former
case I had occasion to express my regret that, after the
commencement of an action on the law side of this court,
so little could be done to facilitate the preparation of
either party for the trial.
- ' ' That at this date the practice on the law side of the
federal courts should be so lacking in plasticity with re
gard to interlocutory remedies seems extraordinary,
when it is remembered that under the procedure in almost
all the states, through examination before trial or other
wise, the plaintiff can secure evidence and documents in
advance which he can use at the trial, and also that
throughout the British Empire, including all its domin
ions, India and the Crown Colonies, every paper or let
ter, even remotely connected with a case, must, unless
privileged, be discovered to the opposing party and re
main available to him pendente lite that he may, if he
wishes, offer it at the trial. It is unfortunate that the
practice of automatic compulsory discovery is not in
force here. • � • .
"In view of several illuminating experiences which I
have had in cases pending in the . English courts, I feel
hospitable to every form of interlocutory discovery.
•

•

•

' " The rationale of this attitude is, of course, not only
that the court wants to know the truth, but also that it
is good for both parties to learn the truth far enough
ahead of the trial not only to enable them to prepare for
trial, but also to enable them to decide whether or not it
may be futile to proceed to trial. The number . of cases
which have been dropped before trial owing to the rigor
ous discovery practiced in the English courts is, I under
stand, almost unbelievable. ' ' 7
'1 Zolla
319, 320.

v.

Grand Rapids Store Equipment Corp. (1931) 46 F. (2d)
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There is the following federal statute regarding pro
duction of books and writings :
" In the trial of actions at law, the courts of the United
States may, on motion and due notice thereof, require the
parties to produce books or writings in their possession
or power, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue,
in cases and under circumstances where they might be
compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules of
proceedings in chancery. If a plaintiff fails to comply
with such order, the court may, on motion, give the like
judgment for the defendant as in cases of nonsuit ; and
if a defendant fails to comply with such order, the court
may, on motion, give judgment against him by default. " 8
For more than a century trial courts disagreed as to
whether this statute authorized inspection before trial
or was limited to production at the trial, but the United
States Supreme Court finally decided that only produc
tion at the trial was authorized.9

Alabama.
There is the following provision for examination of
parties by written interrogatories, in both law and equity
actions in Alabama :
" Either party to a civil suit, whether in a court of law,
or in a court of equity, and including proceedings on
contest of answer of a garnishee, his agent or attorney,
desiring the testimony of the other party, may file with
the clerk or registe;r interrogatories to be propounded to
him, with an affidavit that the answers thereto will be
material testimony for him in the cause.
' ' Upon the filing of such interrogatories, the clerk or
register must issue a copy thereof, which must be served
by the · sheriff upon the party to whom the interrogatories
are addressed, or his attorney of record, if either re
sides within the state. If such party and his attorney
8 U. 8. C.

A., Tit. 28, see. 636.
"
Winn (1911) 221 U. 8. 533.

9 Carpenter v.
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are non-residents, the clerk or register must send such
copy by mail, postage prepaid, to one of them at his
place of residence. The sheriff, clerk or register, as the
case may be, must endorse upon the original interrog
atories the fact, " manner, and date of such service.
' ' The answers to such interrogatories may be sworn to
before any officer authorized to take and certify affida
vits ; or if the party testifying be a nonresident, before
one of the officers mentioned in section 7761 ( 3965 ) of
this code, or a commissioner appointed by the clerk or
register on the application of such party.
" When the party to whom the interrogatories are ad
dressed is a corporation, the answers thereto must be
made by such officer, agent, or servant of the corporation
as may be cognizant of the facts.
' ' The answers to such interrogatories are evidence in
the cause when offered by the party taking them.
" If the interrogatories are not pertinent to the issue
or matter in dispute between the parties, there shall be
no obligation to answer them, and if answered, the an
swers may be suppressed by the court at the trial.
' ' If answer,s to the interrogatories are not filed within
sixty days after service of a copy of the interrogatories,
or when the answers are not full, or are evasive, the court
may either attach the party and cause him to answer
fully in open court, or tax him with so much costs as may
be just, and continue the cause until full answers are
made, or direct a nonsuit or judgment by default or de
cree pro confesso, to be entitled, or render such judg
ment or decree as would be appropriate if such default
ing party offered no evidence.
" A resort to this mode of obtaining evidence does not
preclude the party calling for it from adducing other
proof of the same facts, or from contradicting it.
" Under the provision of this article, the party is bound
· to answer all pertinent interrogatories unless by the
answers he subjects himself to a criminal prosecution.
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The party may be required by the court to attach to his
answers copies of letters and documents, the originals
of which are in his possession or under his custody or
control.
"If the court does not, of its own motion, enforce the
penalties for failure to answer interrogatories, as is re
quired by section 7770 ( 4055 ) of this Code, the party
propounding the interrogatories, on failure of the other
party to answer within sixty days, may file his motion
with the judge of the circuit court for the enforcement of
the penalties provided by statute after notice for ten
days given to the opposite party so in default ; and upon
the hearing of such motion, the court may enforce the
penalties, as is provided for in section 7770 of the
Code." 10
Alabama has the illiberal type of deposition statute
which imposes conditions as to the unavailability of the
witness upon the taking rather than upon the use merely :
' ' The evidence of witnesses in civil cases may be taken
by deposition by· either party' ' 1. When the witness is a woman.
' ' 2. When the witness, from age, infirmity, or sick
ness, is unable to attend court.
' ' 3. When the witness resides more than one hundred
miles from the place of trial� computing by the route
usually traveled, or resides out of, or is absent from the ·
state.
"4. When the witness is about to leave the state, and
will probably not return until after the trial.
' ' 5. When the claim or defense, or a material part
thereof, depends exclusively on the evidence of the wit
ness.
' ' 6. When the witness is the governor, secretary of
state, state treasurer, state auditor, attorney-general,
superintendent of education, commissioner of agriculture
and industries, examiner of public accounts, or the head
10 Ala. Code

(1928) sees. 7764:-7773.
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of any other department or bureau of the state govern
ment, judge or clerk of any court of record, register in
chancery, or sheriff ; or president, director, or other offi
cer of a bank incorporated in the state ; postmaster or
other officer of the United States ; or practicing physician
or lawyer ; or a person constantly employed on any steam
boat or other water craft, or on any turnpike, or manu
factory, or about the engine or other machinery of a rail
road, or is a superintendent, secretary, treasurer, master
of road repairs, or conductor of any railroad, or is a
telegraph operator ; or a teacher of a public or private
school actually engaged in teaching, or a minister of the
gospel, or pastor of a religious society in charge of any
diocese, parish, church, district or circuit. ' ' 11
There is the following statutory provision on pro
duction of books and writings :
" In the trial of actions at law the court may, on mo
tion and due notice thereof, require the parties to pro
duce books, documents or writings in their possession,
custody, control or power which contain evidence perti
nent to the issue, in cases and under circumstances where
they might be compelled to produce the same by the ordi
nary rules of proceedings in chancery cases.
"If plaintiff fails to comply with such order, the court
may, on motion, give the like judgment for the defendant
as in cases of nonsuit ; and if the defendant fails to com
ply with such order, the court may, on motion, give judg
ment against him by default. " 11
Arizona..
There is the following provision in Arizona for taking
the deposition of the opposite party:
' ' Either party to ·an action may take the deposition of
the opposite party as .a witness, or if a corporation, the
deposition of the president, secretary, or other principal
officer or general managing agent of such corporation, in
11 Id. sees. 7744,
ll ld. see. 7744.

7745.
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the manner and by the same process, and subject to the
same rules, provided for the taking of depositions of
other witnesses. The party taking such depositions shall
not be concluded thereby, but may rebut the same, and
may ask leading questions. The right to take such depo
sition is absolute and not dependent upon the residence
of the person whose deposition is to be taken or upon
sickness, infirmity, or attendance of such person upon the
trial. If a party refuses to answer, the officer taking the
deposition shall so certify and any question which the
party refuses to answer or which he answers evasively
shall be taken as confessed. ' ' 18
There is the following provision for inspection of
books and papers :
' ' The court in which an action is pending, may order
either party to give to the other with a specified time
an inspection and copy, or permission to take a copy, of
any book, document or paper in his possession or under
his control, containing evidence relating to the action.
If compliance with the order be refused, the court may
exclude the book, document or paper from being given in
evidence, or may presume it to be such as the party
applying alleges it to be ; and may also punish the party
refusing, for a contempt. This section shall not prevent
a party from compelling another to produce books, pa
pers or documents when he is examined as a witness.
In an action by or against a corporation the court may
compel the officers of the corporation to produce the
books and records of the corporation, and to permit in
spection and the making of copies thereof. ' ' 14
Arkansas.
Arkansas has the following provision for interroga
tories annexed to pleadings in equity actions :
" In actions by equitable proceedings either party may
annex to his complaint, answer or reply written interrog18 Rev. Ariz. Code
14 Id. see. 4465.

(Struckmeyer, 1928) sec. 4444.
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atories to any one or more of the adverse parties con. cerning any of the material matters in issue in the action ;
the answers to which, on oath, may be read by either
party, as a deposition between the party interrogating
and the party answering. " 111
There is a limited provision for interrogatories in ac
tions at law :
" In actions by proceedings at law either party may, in
like manner, annex written interrogatories to his com
plaint, answer or reply, directed to any one or more of
the adverse parties concerning any material matter in
issue in the action in the following cases : First. Where
the party interrogated does not reside in the same or an
adjoining county. Second. Where the party inter
rogated is unable to attend court on account of age, in
firmity or imprisonment, or is a female. ' ' 16
Arkansas has the liberal type of deposition statute
which imposes conditions upon the use rather than the
taking :
' ' Depositions may be used on the trial of all issues, and
upon all motions in actions by equitable proceedings,
except. where th'e court otherwise directs on an issue tried
by a jury.
' ' They may be used on the trial of all issues in any
action in the following cases :
' ' First. Where the witness does not reside in the
county where the action is pending, or in an adjoining
county, or is absent from the state, or is in the military
service of the United States, or of this state.
" Second. Where the witness is the governor, secre
tary of state, auditor or treasurer of this state, a judge
or clerk of a court, a president, cashier, teller or clerk
of a bank, a practicing physician, surgeon or lawyer, or
keeper, officer or guard of the penitentiary. ·
Stat. (1921) see. 1248.
see. 1252.

16 Ark.
18 Id.
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' ' Third. Where, from age, infirmity, or imprisonment,
the witness is unabl� to attend court, or is dead.
' ' Fourth. Where the witness resides thirty or more
miles from the place where the court sits in which the
action is pending, unless the witness is in attendance at
the court. " 17
Arkansas lawyers say that very little use is made of
deposition procedure for purposes of discovery before
trial. There is a statute which authorizes the court to
compel production of books and papers at the trial but
not before the trial.18
California..
Discovery by deposition is authorized in California by
the following statute :
" The testimony ora witness in this state may be taken
by deposition in an action at any time after the service
of the summons or the appearance of the defendant, and
in a special proceeding after a question of fact has arisen
therein, in the following cases :
' ' 1. When the witness is a party to the action or pro
ceeding or an officer or member of a corporation which
is a party to the action or proceeding, or a person for
whose immediate benefit the action or proceeding is pros
ecuted or defended ;
' ' 2. When the witness resides out of the county in
which his testimony is to be used, or resides in the county
but more than :fifty miles distant from the place of trial
or hearing by the nearest usual traveled route ;
' ' 3. When the witness is about to leave the county
where the action is to be tried, and will probably con
tinue absent when the testimony is required ;
' ' 4. When the witness, otherwise liable to attend the
trial, is nevertheless too infirm to attend ;
, ' ' 5. When the testimony is required upon a motion,
or in any other case where the oral examination of the
witness is not required ;
1'7 Id. sees. 4205, 4206.
18 Id. sec. 4137.
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" 6. When the witness is the only one who can estab
lish facts or a fact material to the issue ; provided, that
the deposition of such witness shall not be used if his
presence can be procured at the time of the trial of the
cause. " 19 It should be noted that the California plan
constitutes virtually a compromise between the liberal
type of deposition statute which allows unconditional tak
ing of depositions of parties and witnesses alike and the
illiberal type of statute which imposes conditions upon
the taking of depositions of parties and witnesses alike.
There is an absolute right to take the deposition of a
party and a conditional right to take the deposition of
witnesses generally.10
The following provision is made for inspection of writ
ings :
' 'Any court in which an action is pending, or a judge
thereof may, upon notice, order either party to give to
the other, within a specified time, an inspection and copy,
or permission to take a copy, of entries of accounts in
any book, or of any document or paper in his possession,
or under his control, containing evidence relating to the
merits of the . action, or the defense therein. If compli
ance with the order be refused, the court may exclude the
entries of accounts of the book, or the document, or pa
per from being given in evidence, or if wanted as evi
dence by the party applying may direct the jury to pre
sume them to be such as he alleges them to be ; and the
court may also punish the party refusing for a con
tempt. This section is not to be construed to prevent a
party from compelling another to produce books, papers,
or documents when he is examined as a witness. ' ' 81
Correspondence with lawyers in Los Angeles and in
San Francisco indicates that discovery procedure is
·

(Deering, 1931) sec. 2021.
of the California practice see Harkleroad, The
La:w. of Discovery i� the Courts of California, 4 Southern Cal. L. Rev.
19 Code of Civ. Pro.
110 For a description

169, 185.
11

.

'

.

.

.

•

Code of Civ. Pro. (Deerln�, 1931) sec. 1000.
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widely used. Several lawyers said that they use it as of
course in practically all cases. Others said that one par
ty or the other takes depositions for discovery in more
than three-fourths of all seriously contested actions. Sat
isfaction with the procedure appears to be general.
Colorado.
The Colorado plan for discovery before trial is mod
elled after that used in California. The statutes provide
that :
' ' The testimony of a witness in this state may be taken
by deposition in an action, at any time after the service
of the summons or the appearance of the defendant ; and
in a special proceeding, after a question of fact has
arisen therein, in the following cases :
' ' First. When a witness is a party to the action or
proceeding, or a person for whose immediate benefit the
action or proceeding is prosecuted or defended.
' ' Second. When the witness resides out of the county
in which his testimony is to be used.
' ' Third. When the witness is about to leave the county
where the action is to be tried, and will probably con
tinue absent when the testimony is required.
' ' Fourth. When the witness, otherwise liable to attend
the trial, is, nevertheless, too infirm to attend.
" Fifth. When the witness is for any other cause ex
pected to be unable to attend the trial. ' ' 118
Inspection and copy of documents is authorized by the
following statute :
' ' Any court in which an action is pending, or a judge
thereof, may upon notice, order either party to give to
the other, within a specified time, an inspection and copy,
or permission to take a copy of any book, document or
paper in his possession or under his control, containing
evidence relating to the merits of the action or the de
fense therein. If OOlllplianee with the order be refu!tea,
ft Coio.

Coile of Clv. Pro.

(ltl$1)

see. 316.
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the court may exclude the book, document or paper from
being given in evidence ; or if wanted as evidence, by the
party applying, may direct the jury to presume it to be
such as he alleges it to be ; and the court may also punish
the party refusing for a contempt. This section shall
not be construed to prevent a party from compelling
another to produce books, papers or documents, when he
is examined as a witness. ' ' 81
Connecticut.
The following statutory procedure for discovery be
fore trial exists i:u. Connecticut :
' ' In any civil action in the superior court, any court
of common pleas or any city court, the plaintiff at any
time after entry of action, and the defendant at any time
after answer, may file a motion praying for a disclosure
of facts or production of papers, books or documents ma
terial to the support or defense of the suit, within the
knowledge, possession or power of the adverse party, and
such facts, pap�rs, books or documents, being disclosed
or produced, may be given in evidence by the party filing
such motion. Upon affidavit being made by the person
filing such motion, that he verily believes all the matters
therein set forth to be true, the person of whom such
disclosure or production is sought shall plead, answer or
demur in s'uch time as the court shall prescribe. If inter
rogatories shall be filed with such motion, each interrog
atory shall be answered separately and fully and the
answers shall be in writing, signed by the party and upon
his oath. If a party shall fail to comply with such order
of disclosure or production, he shall be nonsuited or de
faulted ; and, upon motion to set aside such nonsuit or
default, the court may grant the motion upon compliance with such terms as it may impose.
' ' If a corporation shall be a party to. ail action, the
opposite party may examine tlie p':tesident, ·t-teas'u:ier,
aa Id.

set.

890.
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secretary, clerk or any director or other officer thereof in
the same manner as if he were a party to the suit.
" In the conduct of any hearing or trial, a party inter
rogated shall not be obliged to answer a question or pro
duce a document the answering or producing of which
would tend to incriminate him or to disclose his title to
any property the title whereof is not material to the hear
ing or trial in the course of which he is interrogated, and
the right to refuse to answer a question, produce a docu
ment or disclose a title may be claimed either by the
party interrogated or by counsel in his behalf.
" When either party in any action shall have obtained
from the other party a disclosure on oath, respecting the
matters alleged in any pleading, the disclosure shall not
be deemed conclusive, but may be contradicted like any
other testimony. ' ' "
This procedure is very clumsy and ineffective and little
used by the bar. The Connecticut Judicial Council re
cently has suggested a revision to make it more effec
tive.26 Connecticut has the illiberal type of deposition
statute which imposes conditions upon the taking of
depositions as well as upon the use thereof at the trial :
" If any witness in a civil action shall live out of the
state or more than twenty miles from the place of trial,
shall be going to sea or out of the state or, by reason of
age or infirmity, shall be unable to travel to court, or
shall be co�ned in jail, his deposition may be taken by
a judge or clerk of any court, justice of the peace, notary
public or commissioner of the superior court ; but reason�
able · notice shall be given to the adverse party or his
known agent or attorney, or left at his usual place of
abode, to be present at the time of taking such depo
sition ; and depositions may be taken in any other state
or country by a notary public, a commissioner appointed
84 Conn. . Gen. Stat. (1930) sec�. 5,635-5.638.
85 See Report of Connecticut Judicial Council

(193d) pp. 6p, 74.
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by the governor of this state or any magistrate having
power to administer oaths and, if taken out of the United
States, before any foreign minister, secretary of lega
tion, consul or vice-consul, appointed by the United
States, or any person by him appointed for the purpose
and having authority under the laws of the country
where the deposition is to be taken ; and the official char
acter of any such person may be proved by a certificate
from the secretary of state of the United States. All
witnesses giving depositions shall be cautioned to speak
the whole truth, and carefully examined, and shall sub
scribe their depositions, and make oath before the au
thority taking the same, who shall attest the same and
certify whether or not the adverse party or his agent was
present, and whether or not he was notified, and shall
also certify the reason of taking such deposition, seal it
up, direct it to the court where it is to be used and
deliver it if desired
to the party at whose request it was
'
taken. ' ' 86
Delaware.
,

The illiberal type of deposition statute which imposes
conditions upon the taking as well as the use obtains in
Delaware :
" If it appear, by affidavit, that there is a material
witness residing out of the County, whose attendance it
is not practicable to procure, the justice may make a
rule that his deposition be taken before a commissioner
named by him ; and, unless it shall be otherwise agreed,
the party applying for such rule shall file in writing all
the questions to be put to such witness, giving at least
four days ' notice to the other party, who may file other
questions. The justice shall forward a copy of the rule
and the questions to the commissioner, with a copy of
this section. The deposition must be taken in writing,
signed by the witness, certified by the commissioner, and
86 Conn.

Gen. Stat. (1930) sec. 5584.
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sent, sealed up, to the justice. The witness must first be
sworn, or affirmed, by the commissioner, to answer the
questions truly ; neither party shall be present at the
taking of deposition, and no question shall be put but
those sent by the justice. ' ' "
The statute on production of books and writings is as
follows :
' ' At any time during the pendency of actions at law,
the court, on motion and due notice thereof, may order
a party to produce books, or writings, in his possession,
or control, which contain evidence pertinent to the issue,
under circumstances in which the production of the same
might be compelled by a court of chancery ; and the court
making such order, shall have the same power for en
forcing it which is exercised by a court of chancery in
like cases. Upon failure of a plaintiff to comply with
such order, the court, on motion, may render judgment
against him as in cases of nonsuit ; and upon a like fail
ure of a defendant, the court, on motion, may render
judgment against him by default. ' ' 88
England.
Order XXXI of the rules of the Supreme Court outline
the present English procedure in regard to discovery and
inspection. Order XXXI reads as follows :
" In any cause or matter the plaintiff or defendant by
leave of the court or a judge may deliver interrogatories
in writing for the examination of the opposite parties, or
any one or more of such.parties, and such interrogatories
when delivered shall have a note at the foot thereof stat
ing which of such interrogatories each of such persons
is required to answer : Provided that interrogatories
which do not relate to any matters in question in the
cause or matter shall be deemed irrelevant, notwith1'7 Dela. Rev. Code
88 Id. sec. 4228.

(1915) sec. 4052.
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standing that they might be admissible on the oral cross
examination of a witness.
' 'A copy of the interrogatories proposed to be de
livered shall be delivered with the summons or notice of
application for leave to deliver them at least two clear
days before the hearing thereof (unless in any case the
court or judge shall think fit to dispense with this re
quirement) and the particular interrogatories sought to
be delivered shall be submitted to and considered by the
court or judge. In deciding upon such application, the
court or judge shall take into account any offer, which
may be made by the party sought to be interrogated to
deliver particulars, or to make admissions, or to produce
documents relating to any matter in question, and leave
shall be given as to such only of the interrogatories as
shall be considered necessary either for disposing fairly
of the cause or matter or for saving costs.
" In adjusting the costs of the cause or matter inquiry
shall at the instance of any party be made into the
propriety of exhibiting such interrogatories, and if it is
the opinion of the taxing officer or of the court or judge,
either with or without an application for inquiry, that
such interrogatories have been exhibited unreasonably,
vexatiously, or at improper length, the costs occasioned
by the · said interrogatories and the answers thereto shall
be paid in any event by the party in fault.
" If any party to a cause or matter be a body corporate
or a joint-stock company, whether incorporated or not,
or any other body of persons, empowered by law to sue
or be sued, whether in its own name or in the name of
any officer or other person, any opposite party may ap
ply for an order allowing him to · deliver interrogatories
,to any member or officer of such corporation, company,
or body, and an order may be made accordingly.
" Any objection to answering any one or more of sev
eral interrogatories on · the grot:tnd that it or they is or
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are scandalous or irrelevant or not bona fide for the
purpose of the cause or matter, or that the matters in
quired into are not sufficiently material at that stage, or
on any other ground, may be taken in the affidavit in an
swer.
" Interrogatories shall be answered by affidavit to be
filed within ten days, or within such other time as a judge
may allow.
"If any person interrogated omits to answer, or an
swers insufficiently, the party interrogating may apply
to the court or a judge for an order requiring him to
answer, or to answer further, as the case may be. And
an order may be made requiring him to answer or answer
further, either by affidavit or by viva-voce examination,
as the judge may direct.
"Any party may, without filing an affidavit, apply to
the court or a · judge for an order directing any other
party to any cause or matter to make discovery on oath
of the documents which are or have been in his posses
sion or power, relating to any matter in question therein.
On the hearing of such application the court or judge
may either refuse or adjourn the same, if satisfied that
such discovery is not necessary, or not necessary at that
stage of the cause or matter, or make such order, either
generally or limited to certain classes of documents, as
may, in their or his discretion be thought fit. Provided
that discovery shall not be ordered when and so far as
the court or judge shall be of opinion that it is not neces
sary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or
for saving costs.
' ' The affidavit to be made by a party against whom
such order as is mentioned in the last preceding rule has
been made, shall specify which, if any, of the documents
therein mentioned he objects to produce.
" On the hearing of any application for discovery of
documents the court or judge in lieu of ordering an
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affidavit of documents to be filed may order that the party
from whom discovery is sought shall deliver to the oppo
site party a list of the documents which are or have been
in his possession, custody or power relating to the mat
ters in question. Provided that the ordering of such list
shall not preclude the court or judge from afterwards
ordering the party to make and file an affidavit of docu
ments.
" It shall be lawful for the court or a judge, at any time
during the pendency of any cause or matter, to order
the production by any party thereto, upon oath, of such
of the documents in his possession or power, relating to
any matter in question in such cause or matter, as the
court or judge shall think right ; and the court may deal
with such documents, when produced, in such manner as
shall appear just.
" Every party to a . cause or matter shall be entitled, at
any time, by notice in writing, to give notice to any other
party, in whose pleadings or affidavits reference is made
to any document, to produce such document for the in
spection of the party giving such notice, or of his solici
tor, and to permit him or them to take copies thereof ;
and any party •not complying with such notice shall not
afterwards be at liberty to put any such document in
evidence on his behalf in such cause or matter, unless
he shall satisfy the court or a judge that such document
relates only to his own title, he being a defendant to the
cause or matter, or that he had some other cause or ex
cuse which the court or judge shall deem sufficient for
not complying with such notice, in which case the court
or judge may allow the same to be put in evidence on
such terms as to costs and otherwise as the court or
judge shall think fit.
' ' The party to whom such notice is given shall, within
two days from the receipt of such notice, if all the docu
ments therein referred to have been set forth by him in

288

DrscoVERY STATUTES

the affidavit, or if any of the documents referred to in
such notice have not been set forth by him in any such
affidavit, then within four days from the receipt of such
notice, deliver to the party giving the same a notice stat
ing a time within three days from the delivery thereof
at which the documents, or such of them as he does not
object to produce, may be inspected at the office of his
solicitor, or in the case of bankers ' books or other books
of account or books in constant use for the purposes of
any trade or business at their usual place of custody, and
stating which (if any) of the documents he objects to
produce, and on what ground.
" If the party served with notice omits to give such
notice of a time for inspection or objects to give inspec
tion, or offers inspection elsewhere than at the office of
his solicitor, the court or judge may, on the application
of the party desiring it, make an order for inspection in
such place and in such manner as he may thin!r fit : Pro
vided that the order shall not be made when and so far as
the court or a judge shall be of opinion that it is not
necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or
matter or for saving costs.
' 'Any application to inspect documents, except such as
are referred to in the pleadings, particulars, or affidavits
of the party against whom the application is made, or
disclosed in his affidavit of documents, shall be founded
upon an affidavit showing of what documents inspection
is sought, that the party applying is entitled to inspect
them, and that they are in the possession or power of the
other party. The court or judge shall not make such
order for inspection of such documents when and so far
as the court or judge shall be of opinion that it is not
necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or
matter or for saving costs.
' ' An order upon the lord of a manor to allow limited
inspection of the court rolls may be made on the appli-
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cation of a copyhold tenant, supported by an affidavit
that he has applied for inspection and that the same has
been refused.
" Where inspection of any business book is applied
for, the court or a judge may, if they or he shall think
fit, instead of ordering inspection of the original books,
order a copy of any entries therein to be furnished and
verified by the affidavit of some person who has examined
the copy with the original entries, and such affidavit shall
state whether or not there are in the original book any
and what erasures, interlineations, or alterations. Pro
vided that, notwithstanding that such copy has been
supplied, the court or a judge may order inspection of
the book from which the copy was made.
" Where on an application for an order for inspection
privilege is claimed for any document, it shall be lawful
for the court or a judge to inspect the document for the
purpose of deciding as to the validity of the claim of
privilege.
' ' The court or a judge may, on the application of any
party to a cause or matter at any time, and whether an
affidavit of documents shall or shall not have already
been ordered or made, make an order requiring any
other party to state by affidavit whether any particular
document or documents or any Class or classes of docu
ments specified or indicated in the application, is or are,
or has or have at any time been, in his possession, cus
tody or power ; and, if not then in his possession, custody
or power when he parted with the same and what has
become thereof. Such application shall be made on an
affidavit stating that in the belief of the deponent the par
ty against whom the application is made has, or has at
some time had in his possession, custody or power the
particular document or documents or the class or classes
of documents specified or indicated in the application,
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and that they relate to the matters in question in the
cause or matter, or to some or one of them.
' ' If the party from whom discovery of any kind or
inspection is sought objects to the same, or any part
thereof, the court or a judge may, if satisfied that the
right to the discovery or inspection sought depends on
the determination of any issue or question in dispute in
the cause or matter, or that for any other reason it is
desirable that any issue or question in dispute in the
cause or matter should be determined before deciding
upon the right to the discovery or inspection, order that
such issue or question be determined first, and reserve
the question as to the discovery or inspection.
" If any party fails to comply with any order to
answer interrogatories, or for discovery or inspection
of documents, he shall be liable to attachment. He shall
also, if a plaintiff, be liable to have his action dismissed
for want of prosecution, and, if a defendant, to have his
defence, if any, struck out, and to be placed in the same
position as if he had not defended, and the party inter
rogating may apply to the court or a judge for an order
to that effect, and an order may be made accordingly.
' ' Service of an order for interrogatories or discovery
or inspection made against any party on his solicitor
shall be sufficient service to found an application for an
attachment for disobedience to the order. But the party
against whom the application for an attachment is made
may show in answer to the application that he has had
no notice or knowiedge of the order.
' 'A solicitor upon whom an order against any party
for interrogatories or discovery or inspection is served
under the last preceding rule, who neglects without rea-:
sonable excuse to give notice thereof to his client, shall
be liable to attachment.
' 'Any party may, at the trial of a cause, matter, or
issue, use in evidence any one or more of the answers or
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any part of an answer of the opposite party to interrog
atories without putting in the others or the whole of such
answer : Provided always, that in such case the judge
may look at the whole of the answers, and if he shall be
of opinion that any others of them are so connected with
those put in that the last-mentioned answers ought not
to be used without them, he may direct them to be put in.
' ' Any party seeking discovery by interrogatories or
otherwise may be ordered upon making application for
discovery to pay into court to a separate account in the
action to be called ' Security for Costs Account, ' to abide
further order the sum of 5l., or any less sum, and may be
ordered further to pay into court such additional sum as
the court or a judge shall direct. If · security be so or
dered the party seeking discovery shall, with his interrog
atories or order for discovery serve a copy of the receipt
for the said payment into court, and the time for answer
ing or making discovery shall in such cases commence
from the date of such service, and the party from whom
discovery is sought shall not be required to answer or
make discovery unless and until the said payment if so
ordered has. bef'.,n made.
' ' Unless the court or a judge shall at or before the
trial otherwise order, the amount standing to the credit
of the ' Security for Costs Account ' in any cause or mat
ter, shall after the cause or matter has been finally dis
posed of be paid out to the party by whom the same was
paid in on his request, or to his solicitor on such party ' s
written authority, in the event of the costs of the cause
or matter being adjudged to him, but in the event of
the court or judge ordering him to pay the costs of the
cause or matter, the amount in court shall be subject to
a lien for the costs ordered to be paid to any other party.
" If after a cause or matter has been finally disposed
of, by consent or otherwise, no taxation of costs shall be
req�ired, the taxing officer or Master (as the case may
.
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be ) may, either by consent of the parties, or on being
satisfied that any party who has lodged any money to
the ' Security for Costs Account ' in such cause or matter
has become entitled to have the same paid out to him,
give a certificate to that effect, which certificate shall be
acted on and have effect in all respects as if the same
had been an order made in the said cause or matter.
" In any action against or by a sheriff in respect of
any matters connected with the execution of his office,
the court or a judge may, on the application of either
party, order that the affidavit to be made in answer either
to interrogatories or to an order for discovery shall be
made by the officer actually concerned.
" This order shall apply to infant plaintiffs and de
fendants, and to their next friends and guardians ad
litem. " 119
The following British jurisdictions have provisions for
discovery by written interrogatories which are fashioned
after the English procedure :
(1) Australia ; 80 (2) British Columbia ; 81 ( 3) New
Brunswick ; 811 (4) Newfoundland ; 88 (5) Nova Scotia ; 84
(6) Queensland ; 85 ( 7 ) South Australia ; 88 (8) Victoria.87
Florida.
Discovery from adverse parties is provided by the fol
lowing statutes in Florida:
" The courts of this state may, on the trial of causes
cognizable before them respectively, upon ten days ' no
tice to the opposite party or his attorney, require the
party notified as aforesaid to produce books and other
ll9 Annual
80 County

Practice (1932) Order XXXI.
Court Prac. p. 136 ff.
XXXI; British Columbia also has pro
81 Court Rules (1925) Order for
discovery.
vision for an oral examination
82 Judicature Act and Rules of Court ( 1909) Order XXXI. New Brunswick also allows an oral examination for discovery.
88 Cons. Stat. ( 1916) vol. 2, p. 780 ff.
84 Judieature Act (1920) Order XXXI.
86 Supreme do'urt Practice (1921) p. 23.
88 Of. Wint'e'l:bot'tom v. 'Varaou & ,Sous, . 192,1 s. A. R. R. 365.
,

8'7 Supreme Court ltules (1916) drdet

XXXI.
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writings in his possession, power or custody, which shall
contain evidence pertinent to the issue ; and if he shall
fail to comply with such order, or to satisfy the court why
the same is not complied with, it shall be lawful for the
court, if the party so refusing be plaintiff, to give judg
ment for the defendant, as in case of nonsuit ; and if
defendant, to give judgment against him by default. The
party requiring the production of books or papers as
aforesaid shall, in all cases, satisfy the court of their
materiality in the cause therein pending.
" In all causes in any of the courts of this state, the
plaintiff may, at any time, after filing declaration, or the
defendant, after filing plea, deliver to the opposite party,
or his attorney, interrogatories in writing upon any mat
ter as to which discovery may be sought, and require such
party, or in case of a body corporate, any of the officers
of such body corporate, within ten days, to file in the
court in which the cause is pending, written answers
under oath to such interrogatories. Such answers shall
be evidence against, but not for, the party making them.
A failure to answer such interrogatories shall be deemed
a contempt of' court.
" In cases of omission without just cause to answer
sufficiently such written interrogatories, the court may,
at its discretion, direct an oral examination of the inter
rogated party as to such points as it may direct, either
before the court, or a person to be appointed by the
court, and the court may command the attendance of
such party for the purpose of being orally examined as
. aforesaid, or the production of any writings or other
documents to be mentioned in such rule or order, and
may impose therein such terms as to such examination,
and the costs of the application, and of the proceedings
thereon and otherwise, as to it shall seem just.
" The deposition taken as aforesaid shall be reduced
to writing and returned to and ke'pt in the court in which
the J5r'oeeedings a�e pending.
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' ' The person taking the examination shall, if required
by either party, report to the court the absence or con
duct of the person to be interrogated, and the court may
make such order as to contempt or otherwise as it may
see fit. ' ' 88 Florida has the illiberal type of deposition
statute which makes the taking conditional.89
Georgia..
The following provision for discovery · is made in
Georgia:
' ' The superior court in equitable proceedings may com
pel either party to discover facts within his knowledge,
beneficial to the other party and material to his case ; and
this either upon a petition for discovery and relief, or
for discovery alone, ancillary to some other civil pro
ceedings. But the party seeking relief may waive dis
covery, and in such case the defendant 's answer is not
evidence.
" No party shall be required to discover matters tend
ing to criminate himself; or to expose him to a penalty
or forfeiture, nor to make discovery of irrelevant mat
ters, nor the advice of his professional advisers, nor his
consultation with them, nor matters relating to his own
and not the plaintiff 's case ; nor can official persons be
called on to disclose any state matters of which the
policy of the state and the interest of the community re
quire concealment.
' ' The discovery must be full and free as to all matters
of fact of which it is properly sought, and must include
the respondent 's information and belief. If documents
are. desired, in defendant 's possession or power, he must
produce or satisfactorily account for them.
' ' The discovery must be under oath or affirmation, but
may be confined to those points. to which. special inter
rogatories are placed in the petition.
88 Fla. Comp. Gen.
89 Id. see. 4413.

Laws Ann. (1927) sees. 4405-4407.
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' ' The answer of a defendant, as to facts within his
own knowledge, responsible to the discovery sought, is
evidence in his favor, and can be rebutted only by two
witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circum
stances : Provided, discovery is expressly prayed for in
the plaintiff's petition. The petitioner is not bound to
read any portion of the answer, except that responsive to
the petition. The defendant may read all as pleading.
If the petition is for discovery alone, then the whole
answer must be read together. And in the latter case the
petitioner must pay the cost.
"What is responsive is a question for the court. Any
explanation of an admission made, or fact necessarily
connected with it, is part of the response. Any matter
in avoidance thereof is new matter, and must be proved.
" The answer of one defendant is evidence for another,
whenever it states facts against his own interest, and in
favor of his co-defendants.
' ' Discovery may be had from the opposite party, either
nominal or real, in any case pending in any court in this
state.
' ' The party seeking such discovery may either sub
poena the other party as a witness, or else file interrog
atories, and sue dut a commission, as in cases provided
for other witnesses. In the latter event, the right of
cross-examination exists as in other cases.
' ' And in all cases in any of the courts of this state,
where either the plaintiff or defendant is a corporation,
either foreign or domestic, public or private, it shall be
the right of the opposite party to file, with the clerk of
the court where such case is pending, interrogatories
directed to the president, secretary, treasurer or other
officer or agent of said corporation, and it shall be the
duty of the officer or agent named in such interrogatories
to sue out a commission directed to himself, and to have
said interrogatories executed and returned to the next
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term of the court ; the opposite party, or his attorney,
shall give twenty days ' notice before the sitting of said
court, to the attorney of record, or to any officer or agent
of such corporation in the county where suit is pending,
that interrogatories have been so filed. Said corporation ·
or its agent shall not be required to advance the costs of
executing said interrogatories.
" When interrogatories are filed in office, and notice
given thereof, it shall be the duty of the party sought to
be examined to see to the execution and return of the
same before the return term thereof.
" A party failing to appear, without sufficient excuse,
when properly subpoenaed, or failing or refusing to
answer either orally or to the interrogatories filed, . or
answering evasively, shall be subject to attachment for
contempt, and the court may also dismiss his case if he be
plaintiff, or strike his pleas if he be defendant, or give
such other direction to the cause as is consistent with
justice and equity ; and if either party be a corporation,
the officer called on to give testimony shall be subject to
attachment for contempt upon his failure to answer, and
the court may dismiss the case or strike the plea, accord
ing as the party corporation may be plaintiff or defend
ant, upon the failure of any of its officers or agents to
give testimony or to execute and return interrogatories
as provided by law.
" No party shall be required to testify as to any matter
which may criminate or tend to criminate himself, or
which shall tend to work a forfeiture of his estate,
or which shall tend to bring infamy or disgrace or public
contempt upon himself or any member of his family. ' ' 40
The Georgia deposition statute imposes conditions as
to the availability of the witness for trial upon the taking
as well as the use of the depositions.41
·

·

40

Ga .Ann. Code (Park, 1914) sees. 4543-4554.
see. 5886.

41 Id.

•
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. Idaho.
The following liberal provision on depositions obtains
in Idaho :
" In all actions depositions may be taken by either par
ty in vacation or term time ; at any time after service of
summons, without order of court therefor. They may be
used in the trial of all issues, in any action in the follow
ing cases :
' ' 1. When the witness does not reside in the county, or
when he resides in a county adjoining and more than 30
miles from the place of trial, or is absent from the state.
' ' 2. When the deponent is so aged, infirm or sick as
not to be able to attend the court or place of trial, or is
dead.
' ' 3. When the depositions have been taken by agree
ment of parties, or by the order of the court trying the
cause.
" 4. When the deponent is a state or county officer, or
judge or a practicing physician, or attorney at law, and
the trial is to be had in any county in which the deponent
does not reside. In either of the foregoing cases the
attendance of the witness can not be enforced.
" 5. When notice is given fixing the time of taking any
deposition on a day in term time, the court, if in session,
or the judge thereof in vacation may, on notice given by
the adverse party of the time and place of hearing the
motion, fix another day for such taking, and the court on
the hearing of such motion, may fix the time for such
taking, from which there shall be no appeal. ' ' ta
The following statute provides for inspection of writ
ings :
' ' Any court in which an action is pending, or a judge
thereof, may, upon · notice, order either party to give
to the other, within a specified time, an inspection and
copy, or permission to take a copy, of entries of account
·

ta Ida. Comp.

Stat. (1919) sec. 8006.

·
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in any book or of any document or paper in his posses
sion or under his control, containing evidence relating to
the merits of the action or the defense therein. If com
pliance with the order be refused, the court may exclude
the book, document or paper from being given in evi
dence, or if wanted as evidence by the party applying,
may direct the jury to presume them to be such as he
alleges them to be, and the court may also punish the
party refusing, for a contempt. This section is not to
be construed to prevent a party from compelling another
to produce books, papers or documents when he is exam- .
ined as a witness. ' ' 48
Illinois.
The illinois· Chancery Act preserves the ancient
method of obtaining discovery before trial, namely, by
inserting interrogatories in the chancery bill.44 There
is an unconditional right to take depositions of resident
witnesses in chancery :
" When the testimony of any witness, residing or be
ing within this state, shall be necessary in any suit in
chancery in this state, the party wishing to use the same
may cause the deposition of such witness to be taken
before any judge, justice of the peace, clerk of a court,
master in chancery or notary public, without a commis
sion or filing interrogations for such purpose, on giving
to the adverse party or his attorney ten days ' notice of
the time and place of taking the same, and one day in
addition thereto ( Sundays inclusive ) for every fifty
miles travel from the place of holding the court to the
place where such deposition is to be taken. If the party
entitled to notice and his attorney resides in the county
where the deposition is to be taken, five days ' notice shall
be sufficient. ' ' 45
48 Id. sec. 7193.
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 22,
46 Id. ch. 51, sec. 24.

sees. 22-26.

ILLINOIS

299

The illiberal type of deposition statute, however, ob
tains in actions at law in Illinois :
' ' And it shall also be lawful, upon satisfactory affida
vit being :filed, to take the depositions of witnesses resid
ing in this state, to be read in suits at law, in like manner
and upon. like notice as is above provided, in all cases
where the witness resides in a different comity from that
in which the court is held, is about to depart from the
state, is in custody on legal process, or is unable to at
tend such court . on account of advanced age, sickness or
other bodily infirmity. " 46
There is the following provision for production of
books and writings :
' ' The several courts shall have power, in any action
pending before them, upon motion, and good and suffi
cient cause shown, and reasonable notice thereof given,
to require the parties, or either of them, to produce books
or writings in their possession or power which contain
evidence pertinent to the issue. ' ' 47
Section 32 of the Chicago Municipal Court Act pro
vides for interrogatories in civil cases as follows :
' ' That the municipal court in any civil suit pending
therein, at any time before the trial or :final hearing
thereof, may permit the :filing therein of interrogatories
to be answered by any party to such suit or any person
for whose immediate benefit such suit is prosecuted or
defended, or by the directors, officers, superintendent or
managing agents of any corporation which is a party to
the record in such suit, at the instance of the adverse
party or parties or any of them, and to require an answer
under oath to all such interrogatories as the party to be
interrogated might be required to answer, if called as a
witness upon the trial or hearing of such suit, but the
party :filing such interrogatories shall not be concluded
46 Id.
47 Id.

ch. 51, sec. 25.
ch. 51, sec. 9.
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by the answers thereto, if he shall elect to introduce the
same or any or either of them upon the trial or final
hearing. " a
Indiana.

There are a variety of provisions for discovery before
trial under the Indiana practice. There is the following
express provision for examination of parties :
' ' A party to an action may be examined as a witness
concerning any matter stated in the pleading (s), at the
instance of the adverse party, or of any one of several
adverse parties ; and, for that purpose, may be compelled,
in the same manner, and subject to the same rules of
examination, as any other witness, to testify either at the
trial, or conditionally, or upon commission.
' ' The examination, instead of being had at the trial,
may be had at any time before the trial, at the option of
the party claiming it, before any officer authorized to
take depositi01rs, on a previous notice to the party to be
examined and any other adverse party of at least :five
days, unless, for good cause shown, the court orders
otherwise. But the party to be examined before the trial
shall not be compelled to attend in any other county than
that of his residence.
' ' The attendance of the party to be examined may be
enforced, and the examination shall be taken and :filed as
a deposition, in the cause, and may be read by the party
taking it, at his option ; but if not read, the party causing
the examination shall pay the costs thereof.
' ' The evidence of the party thus taken may be rebutted
by adverse testimony.
' ' Any party refusing to attend and testify, as above
provided, may be punished as for a contempt ; and his
complaint, answer or reply may be stricken out. ' ' 49
48 Gilbert, Municipal Court of Chicago, 294.
f9 Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) sees. 564-568.
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Discovery by written interrogatories may also be had
by virtue of the following statute :
' ' Either party may propound interrogatories, to be
filed with the pleadings, relevant to tij.e matter in con
troversy, and require the opposite party to answer the
same under oath. And corporations, through their
proper officers, agent or agents, shall be required to
answer interrogatories as natural persons. All inter
rogatories must be answered within the time limited,
positively and without evasion, and the court may en
force the answers by attachment or otherwise ; and the
party may, in addition thereto, set forth, in his answers,
all relevant matter in avoidance. The answers to the
interrogatories may be used on the trial or not, at the
option of the party requiring it : Provided, that in the
absence of such opposite party, the filing of the inter
rogatories shall not work a continuance of the cause, un
less it be shown to the court, by affidavit, that the party .
who files such interrogatories expects to elicit facts by
the answers material to him on the trial ; that he believes
such facts to be true ; that he can not prove the same by
any witness ; and that he files the interrogatories, not for
delay merely, hq.t to obtain substantial justice at the
trial. ' ' 60
The liberal type of deposition statute obtains in Indi
ana. This allows discovery before trial from witnesses
generally as well as from parties. The statute provides :
"In all actions, depositions may be taken by either
party, in vacation or term time, at any time after service
of summons, without order of court therefor. They may
be used in the trial of all issues, in any action, in the
following cases :
' ' First. Where the witness does not reside in the
county, or in a county adjoining the one in which the
trial is to be held, or is absent from the. state.
&O Id.

see.

383.
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' ' Second. When the deponent is so aged, infirm, or
sick, as not to be able to attend the court or other place
of trial, or is dead.
' ' Third. When the depositions have been taken by
agreement of parties, or by the order of the court trying
the cause.
' ' Fourth. When the deponent is a state or county
officer, or a judge, or a practicing physician, or attorney
at law, and the trial is to be had in any county in which
the deponent does not reside. In either of the fore
going cases, the attendance of the witness can not be
enforced.
' ' Fifth. When notice is given fixing the time of taking
any deposition on a day in term time, the court may, if
in session, or the judge thereof in vacation, on notice
given by the adverse party of the time and place of hear
ing the motion, fix another day for such taking, and the
. court, on the hearing of such motion, may fix the time for
such taking, from which there shall be no appeal. ' ' 61
There are the following provisions for production and
inspection of books and papers :
' ' The court, or judge . thereof, may, upon affidavit of
their necessity and materiality, upon motion, compel, by
order, either party to produce, at or before the trial, any
book, paper or document in his possession or power ; the
order may be made upon application of either party, upon
reasonable notice to the adverse party or his attorney.
If not produced, parol evidence may be given of its con
tents.
' ' The court, or a judge thereof, may, under proper
restrictions, upon due notice, order either party to give
the other, within a specified time, an inspection and copy
of any book or part thereof, paper or document in his
possession, or under his control, containing evidence re
lating to the merits of the action, or the defense therein.
lil Id.

see. 465.
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If compliance with the order be refused, the court, on
motion, may exclude such evidence, or punish the party
refusing, or both. ' ' 61
Oral examinations for discovery are quite extensively
used in the larger cities of Indiana. Attorneys for rail
way, traction and insurance companies use discovery as
a matter of coursi3. Written interrogatories are em
ployed only when the action is of such a nature as not
to justify the expense of an oral examination, or where
the action is for a simple debt or account and it is thought
that the filing of. written interrogatories may encourage a
failure to defend, or where it is desired to dispense with
mere formal matters of proof.
Iowa.
There is the following provision for interrogatories an
nexed to pleading:
' ' Either party may annex to his petition, answer, or
reply written interrogatories to any one or more of the
adverse parties, concerning any of the material facts in
issue in the action, the answer to which, on oath., may be
read by either party as a deposition between the party
interrogating and the party answering. ' ' 68
There is the illiberal type of deposition statute in
Iowa :
' ' After the commencement of a civil action or other
proceeding, if the witness is, or is about to go, beyond
the reach of a subpoena, or is for any other cause ex
P!'lCted to be unable to attend court at the time of trial,
the party wishing his testimony may take his deposition
in writing before any person having authority to ad
minister oaths ; and if the action is triable by equitable
proceedings, then without any other reason therefor
either party may so take the deposition of any wit
ness. ' ' st61 Id.
6S Ia.
6t Id.

sees. 535, 536.
Code (1931) sec. 11185.
see. 11358.
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The statute on production of books and papers fol
lows :
' ' The district or superior court may in its discretion,
by rule, require the production of any papers or books
which are material to the just determination of any cause
pending before it, for the purpose of being inspected and
copied by or for the party thus calling for them. " 66
Kansas.

There are the following provisions for taking deposi
tions in Kansas :
' ' The deposition of any witness may be used only in
the following cases :
" First. When the witness does not reside in the coun
ty where the action or proceeding is pending, or is set
for trial by change of venue, or is absent therefrom.
' ' Second. When from age, infirmity or imprisonment,
the witness is unable to attend court, or is dead.
' ' Third. When the testimony is required upon a mo
tion, or in any other case where the oral testimony of
the witness is not required.
' ' Either party may commence taking testimony by
deposition at any time after service upon the defendant
of summons or the date of first publication of notice.
" In any action now pending or hereafter instituted in
any court of competent jurisdiction in this state, any
party shall have the right to take the deposition of the
adverse party, his agent or employee, and in case the
adverse party is a joint-stock association, corporation
or copartnership, then of any officer, director, agent or
employee of any such joint-stock association, corpora
tion or copartnership, when such adverse party, or officer,
director, agent or employee of such adverse party is
without the jurisdiction of the court or cannot be reached
by the process of the trial court ; and in case said adverse
party, when duly served with notice of the taking of such
6i Id. sec.

11316.
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deposition, as provided by the code of civil procedure
for the taking of depositions, shall fail to appear at the
place fixed in said notice, which place shall be in the city
or county of the usual place of residence or place of
bu..siness of said witness, and testify and produce what
ever books, papers and documents demanded by the par
ty taking such deposition, or shall fail to produce at the
time and place specified in such notice such officer, di
rector, agent or employee the court before whom such
action is pending may, upon application of the party
seeking to take such deposition, and upon notice to the
adverse party of such application, and upon hearing had
to the trial court, strike the pleadings of such adverse
party from the files and render judgment in favor of the
party so seeking to take such depositions, in whole or
in part, as prayed for in his pleadings. " 66
The Kansas court early ruled that deposition pro
cedure could be used for purposes of discovery before
trial.67 The court reversed itself later and forbade the
use of deposition procedure for what it termed ' ' fishing
expeditions. ' ' 58
Inspection or copy of documents is provided for in the .
following manner :
' ' Either party or his attorney may demand of the ad
verse party an inspection and copy, or permission to
take a copy of a book, paper or document in his posses
sion or under his control containing evidence relating to
the merits of the action, or defense therein. Such de
mand shall be in writing, specifying the book, paper or
document with sufficient particularity to enable the other
party to distinguish it ; and if compliance with the de
mand within four days be refused, the court or judge, on
motion and notice to the adverse party, may in their
116 Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923) sees. 2819-2821.
li'7ln re Abeles (1874) 12 Kan. 451.
118 In re Davis (1888) 28 Kan. 408, 16 Pac. 790; In re Cubberly (1889)
39 Kan. 291, 18 Pac. 173 ; Hanke v. Harlow (1911) 83 Kan. 738, 112
Pac. 616.
·
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discretion order the adverse party to give to the other
within a specified time an inspection and copy or per
mission to take a copy of such book, paper or document ;
and on failure to comply with such order the court may
exclude the paper or document from being given in evi
dence, or if wanted as evidence by the party applying
may direct the jury to presume it to be such as the party
by affidavit alleges it to be. This section is not to be
construed to prevent a party from compelling another .
to produce any book, paper or document when he is exam
ined as a witness. ' ' 59
Kentucky.
Discovery may be had under the ordinary deposition
procedure in Kentucky. It is provided that : " The plain
tiff may commence taking depositions immediately after
the service of the summons ; and the defendant imme
diately after filing his answer. n 60 It is further provided
that :
' ' A party may be examined as if under cross-examina
tion at the instance of the adverse party, either orally or
by deposition as any other witness ; but the party call
ing for such examination shall not be concluded thereby,
but may rebut it by counter testimony. ' ' 61
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has held upon several
occasions that discovery before trial is authorized under
this procedure.68 The bar of Louisville and of Lexington
use the procedure quite extensively but the practice has
gained little headway in the smaller towns of Kentucky.
Written interrogatories may be allowed in certain
events under the Kentucky statutes :
' ' In equitable actions, a party may•annex to his plead
ing written interrogatories to the adverse party, concern59 Iran. Rev. Stat. (1923) sec. 2850.
80 Ky. Code (Carroll, 1927) sec. 557.
61 Id. sec. 606, sub-sec. 8.
68 Wesj;ern Union Tel. Co. v. Williams

(1908) 129 Ky. 515, 112 S. W.
651 ; Owensboro City Ry. Co. v. Rowland (1913) 152 Ky. 175, 153 S. W.
206; Willis v. Bank of Hardinsburg (1914) 160 Ky. 808, 170 S. W. 188 ;
Ky. Utilities Co. v. McCarty 's Adm'r ( 1916) 169 Ky. 38, 183 S. W. 237.
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ing any material allegation thereof ; and answers there
to, on oath, may be read by either party, as a deposition
between the party interrogating and the party answering.
' ' The party answering shall not be confined to respond
ing merely to the interrogatories, but may state any facts
concerning tlie cause of action to which the interrog
atories refer, and they may likewise be read as a deposi
tion.
" Interrogatories annexed to a petition shall be an
swered when the party is required to answer the peti
tion ; if annexed to any other pleading, they shall be
answered in twenty days after notice of the filing thereof
shall be given to the adverse party or his attorney ; but
if answered twenty days before the term at which the
action stands regularly for trial, the action shall not be
postponed on account of their not being sooner answered.
' ' In ordinary actions, a party may annex to his plead
ing written interrogatories to an adverse party concern
ing any material allegation' ' 1. If the party interrogated do not reside within
twenty miles from the place where the action may be
pending.
' ' 2. If the party interrogated be unable to attend
court on account of infirmity or imprisonment, or be a
female. ' ' 68
There is the following statute which authorizes pro
duction of documents :
" The process by which the attendance of a witness is
required is a subpoena. It is a writ directed to the sher
iff, requiring him to summon the person named therein
to attend at a particular time and place, to testify as a
witness. It may, when the court or the judge thereof so
directs, require the witness to bring with him any book,
writing or other thing, under his control, which he is
bound by law to produce in evidence. ' ' K
68 Ky. Code (Carroll,
84 Id. see. 528.

1927) sees. 140-143.
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Louisiana has a procedure which is called ' ' Interroga
tories on Facts and Articles " and which is of similar
derivation. There are the following provisions in the
code of practice :
' ' Both plaintiff and defendant are permitted to annex,
either to their petition or their answer, interrogatories
on facts and articles.
"Interrogatories on facts and articles are questions
'
put in writing, in the form of articles, and annexed to a
petition or to an answer, to which one of the parties to
the suit prays that the other be ordered to respond, under
oath, in order to make use of his answers as testimony
in support of his demand, or to aid him in his defense.
' ' The party interrogated on facts and articles is bound
to answer, on oath and categorically, each of the ques
tions put to him, unless he can not do so without con
fessing himself guilty of some crime. ·
" Except in the above case, if the party interrogated
refuse or neglect to answer, on oath, to all the questions
put tp him, the facts concerning which he shall have so
refused or neglected to answer, shall be taken for con
fessed, provided that no court shall make an order re
quiring a female to answer interrogatories on facts and
articles, in open court, unless the party propounding
them, or his or her agent or attorney, shall make oath, to
the materiality of the interrogatories, and that they are
not propounded for the purpose or in the hope oft having
them taken for confessed, but with the bona fide desire
to have them truly answered by the party interrogated.
" To enable the defendant to obtain the answer of the
plaintiff to interrogatories, he shall subjoin to the in
terrogatories proposed to be answered, his affidavit of
their materiality, and that in his opinion the answer of
the plaintiff would assist him in making his defense ; but
the party interrogated may object in writing,to any of the
questions as not pertinent, and the judge shall decide
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summarily whether he ought to answer or not ; if ordered
to answer, he must do it, otherwise the facts unanswered
will be deemed confess�d.
' ' The party propounding the interrogatories may re
quire the party interrogated to answer in open court, and
in his presence, on the day appointed to that effect by the
judge, if the party interrogated reside in the p�rish
whe·re the court holds its sittings.
" In all cases where a party interrogated resides out
of the parish where the suit is pending, and whether
within or without the state, it shall be his duty to file his
answer to the interrogatories propounded to him within
such period as shall be :fixed by the court, on the motion
of the party interrogating, and notice of which order, fix
ing the delay, together with a copy of the interrogatories
propounded, shall be served on the attorney representing
the party interrogated ; provided, that when the party
interrogated resides out of the state, his answers shall
be taken by commission.
" In answering a question, the party must simply con
fess or deny ,the fact. Nevertheless, the party interro
gated may state some other facts tending to his defense,
provided they be closely linked to the fact on which he
has been questioned and an appeal made to his conscience.
His declarations, in such case, shall have as much effect
as his answer to the question itself.
' ' The answers of the party interrogated are evidence,
but do not exclude adverse testimony, and shall be
weighed by the judge as other testimony.
' ' The party who sues for recovery of a debt, or the
execution of an obligation arising from a written act,
may be interrogated on the reality or simulation of the
act.
' ' The party wishing to avail himself of the confessions
made by the adverse party in his answer to an inter-
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rogatory on facts and articles, must not divide them ; they
must be taken entire. ' ' 65

Maine.
The ancient chancery practice is preserved in actions
in equity in Maine :
' ' If discovery is sought, it may be by bill, with or
without interrogatories annexed thereto, for the purpose
of such discovery. Answers thereto shall be made within
thirty days after the return day of such bill, or within
such time as the court orders, and questions arising there
on shall be determined by the rules established by said
court as herein provided, and in the absence thereof, by
the rules applicable to bills of discovery in equity pro
cedure. ' ' 66

The illiberal type of deposition statute which imposes
conditions upon the taking of depositions as well as the
use thereof at the trial is provided by the Maine stat
utes.67
There is the following provision for production of
books and papers :
" Where books, papers or written instruments material
to the issue in any action at law pending in the superior
court, are in the possession of the opposite party, and
access thereto refused, the court upon motion, notice, and
hearing, may require their production for inspection. In
case of unreasonable delay or refusal in complying with
such requirement the court may order a nonsuit or de
fault as the case may require. ' ' 68

Maryland.
The following statute on depositions offers a means of
discovery before trial :
' ' Either party in any action depending in said courts,
after due notice to the other party or his attorney, agree-

65 La. Rev. Code of · Prac. (Marr, 1927) Arts.
66 Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) ch. 91, sec. 45.

6'1 ld.
68 Id.

ch. 121, sec. 4.
ch. 96, sec. 23.

347-356.
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ably to such rule as shall be made by the said courts,
respectively, may take the deposition of any witness be
fore any of the said commissioners, to be used as testi
mony on the trial of such action, in case only of the death
of such witness, · or on proof to the satisfaction of the
court of the inability of the party to produce the attend
ance of such witness at the time of trial and the probable
continuance of said inability until and at the next term,
before the court shall permit such testimony to be used ;
and the opposite party shall be entitled to 'cross-examine
any witne.ss whose deposition shall be so taken, or to
examine him or her on notice, before the same or any
other commissioner. ' ' 89
There is the following statutory provision for dis
covery of documentary evidence :
' ' The court shall have power in the trial of actions at
law, on motion made at the first court after the appear
ance court, supported by affidavit that the same is not
intended for delay, and due notice thereof being given,
to require the pal'ties to produce copies, certified by a
justice of the peace, of all such parts of all books or
writings in their possession or power as contain evidence
pertinent to the issue, or to answer any bill of discovery
only which may be filed by the second court after the
appearance court, in cases and under circumstances
where they might be compelled to produce said original
books or writings or answer such bill of discovery by the
ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery, and if a plain
tiff shall fail to comply with any such order to produce
such books or writings or answer such bill of discovery,
it shall be lawful for the said courts on motion to give
the like judgment for the defendant as in cases of non
suit, and if a defendant shall fail to comply with such
order to produce books or writings, or to answer any bill
of discovery only, it shall be lawful for the court, on
. motion, as aforesaid, to give judgment against him by
88 Md.

Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924) Art. 35,

see.

21.
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default ; provided, that any plaintiff or defendant may,
in compliance with any rule for producing extracts of
such books or papers, bring into court the original books
or papers. ' ' 70

Ma.ssa.chusetts.
The following provision is made in Massachusetts for
written interrogatories for discovery :
' ' Any party, after the entry of a writ or the :filing of a
bill or petition, may interrogate an adverse party for the
discovery of facts and documents admissibl� in evidence
at the trial of the case. The word ' party, ' in this section,
in sections sixty-two to sixty-five, inclusive, and in sec
tion sixty-seven, shall be deemed to include parties inter
vening or otherwise admitted after the beginning of the
suit.
' ' The answers shall be in writing, on oath, and signed
by the party interrogated, who shall, before making
answer, make such inquiry of his agents, servants and
attorneys as will enable him to make full and true an
swers to the interrogatories.
" Interrogatories shall be :filed in the clerk ' s office, and
notice of such :filing, with a copy of the interrogatories,
shall be sent by the party interrogating to the party inter
rogated, �r to his attorney of record. If, within ten days
after such notice, or in a district court within such less
time as the court may by general or special order direct,
the party interrogated does not answer the interrog
atories, the court shall, upon motion, order the party
. interrogated to answer such of the interrogatories as it
:finds proper, within such time as it may :fix ; but no party
interrogated shall be obliged to answer a question or
pr<;>duce a document tending to criminate him or to dis
close his title to any property the title whereof is not
material to an issue in, the proceeding in the course of
which he is interrogated, nor to disclose the names of
70 Id.

Art. 75, sec. 106.
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witnesses, except that the court may compel the party
interrogated to disclose the names of witnesses and their
addresses if justice seems to require it, upon such terms
and conditions as the court deems expedient. A party
shall not interrogate an adverse party more than once
unless the court otherwise orders, except as to any new
matters disclosed by answers to interrogatories previ
ously filed.
" If a corporation is a party, the adverse party may
examine the president, treasurer, clerk or a director,
manager or superintendent, or other officer thereof, as if
he were a party. If a municipal corporation is a party,
the mayor or the chairman of the board of selectmen may
be examined as if he were a party, except that no city or
town official shall be interrogated concerning matters of
public record. If a minor or person under guardianship
is a party, the adverse party may examine as if said
party were not a minor or under guardianship ; provided,
that if the minor be not of such age as to appreciate an
oath, or the person under guardianship be mentally in
competent to answer, the person appearing in the suit
as the guardian, guardian ad litem or next friend of such
party shall make answer..
' ' Such order may be made respecting costs, in the ac
tion or cause or otherwise, as the court may direct by
general rule, or by a special order in each case.
" Sections sixty-one to sixty-six, inclusive, shall not
affect the right of a party interrogated, under the direc
tion of the court, to seal up or otherwise protect from
examination such parts of any document, book, voucher
or other writing as contain matters not pertinent to the
subject of the action, or affect the power of the court to
protect said right, or any right of the party interrogated,
by suitable order. " 71
71 Mass.

Gen. Laws (1921) ch. 231, sees. 61-67.
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Interrogatories are widely used by the Massachusetts
bar. Interrogatories were found to be on :file in ap
proximately half of three hundred consecutive case rec
ords which were inspected in the clerk 's office of the Su
preme Court of Suffolk County (Boston) . There have
been several problems in connection with the administra
tion of the procedure, however. Answers often are too
evasive to be of any use to the party applicant ; mimeo
graphed forms with many questions have proved a bur
den on the court and on the lawyers. The majority of
the Boston bar seem to be satisfied with the present pro
cedure althoug)l there is considerable sentiment in favor
of the adoption of an oral examination for discovery be
fore trial similar to that which is employed in New
Hampshire.
The following statute authorizes inspection of docu
ments :
" Every party to any cause or proceeding may inspect
and take copies of any document referred to in the plead
ing or particulars of any ot�r party and relied on by
such other party, unless the court is satisfied that the
same is not in his possession or control or that he has
some other reasonable excuse for not producing the same
for such inspection, and the court may make orders for
production of said purposes, enforceable in like manner
as orders to answer interrogatories. ' ' 711
The illiberal type of deposition statute is employed in
Massachusetts :
" If a witness or party whose testimony is wanted in a
civil cause or proceeding pending in the commonwealth
lives more than thirty miles from the place of trial, or is
about to go out' of the commonwealth and not to return
in time for the trial, or is so ill, aged or infirm as to make
it probable that he will not be able to attend at the trial, .
his deposition may be taken. ' ' 78
'7ll ld. ch. 231,
'78 Id. ch. 233,

sec. 68.
sec. 25.
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Michigan.

·

The new Michigan Court Rules make the following pro
vision for discovery by deposition :
' ' Any party to an action or suit may cause to be taken
by deposition according to the practice regulating the
taking of depositions, at a:p.y time after action commenced
and before trial, the testimony of any other party, o:t any
person who has verified a pleading of another party,
which is material and necessary in the prosecution or
defense of the action or suit. A party to such action or
suit also may cause to be so taken the testimony, which is
material and necessary, of the original or prior owner of
a claim which constitutes, or from which arose, a cause
of action acquired by the adverse party by grant, convey
ance, transfer, assignment or endorsement, and which is
set forth in his pleading as a cause of action or claim of
set-off or recoupment.
" When an adverse party, or an original owner of a
claim mentioned in the foregoing section, whose testi
mony may be taken as provided in such section by depo
sition, is a corporation, joint stock association, or other
unincorporated association, the testimony of one Qr more
of its officers, directors, managing agents or employees;
which is material and necessary, may be so taken.
' ' The notice of taking such deposition shall include a
statement as to the matters upon which such persons are
to be examined. Such notice shall operate as an order.
' ' Any question as to the right to take the testimony of
such party, or the officers and employees of a corpora
tion, joint stock association or other unincorporated asso
ciation, or as to the time or place, or as to the matters
as to which the testimony is to be taken, or as to the per
son before whom it is to be taken, may be raised by a
motion to vacate or modify the notice. Such motion may
be supported by affidavits and opposed by counter affida
vits. The service of notice of the motion, if made for the
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first sitting of court at which the motion can be heard,
shall operate to stay the taking of testimony until the
determination of the motion. If the taking of the testi
mony be not authorized by the provisions of the preced
ing paragraphs, the notice shall be vacated.
" In any action for damages for injuries to person or
property, or to recover upon any policy of insurance
respecting sickness or bodily injuries or damages or in
juries to property, physical examination by physicians
of the person sick or injured, or by the defendant or his
agent of the property damaged or injured, may be or
dered in advance of the trial, on motion with due notice,
upon such just and reasonable terms and conditions as
the court may prescribe. ' ' 74
There is the following procedure for production of
books and papers :
' ' Application may be made by petition to any court of
record in term time, or to the judge thereof in vacation,
to compel the production and discovery of books, papers
and documents relating to the merits of any action or
suit pending in such court, or of any defense to such
action or suit, in the following cases :
.
( a ) By the plaintiff, to compel the discovery of pa
pers or documents in the possession of or under the
control of the defendant, which may be necessary to
enable the plaintiff to declare or answer to any pleading
of the defendant.
(b ) The plaintiff may be compelled to make the dis
covery of papers or documents, where the same shall be
necessary to enable the defendant to answer any plead
ing of the plaintiff.
( c ) The plaintiff may be compelled, after declaring,
and the defendant, after pleading, to produce and dis
cover all papers or documents on which the action or
defense is founded.

'74 Mich.

Court Rules (1931) Rule 41.
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( d ) After issue joined in any action, either party
may be compelled to produce and discover all such books,
papers and documents, as may be necessary to enable
the party applying for such discovery to prepare for
the trial of the cause.
' ' The petition for such discovery shall state the · facts
and circumstances on which the same is claimed, and
shall be verified by affidavit, stating that the books, pa
pers and documents whereof discovery is sought are not
in the possession or under the control of the party apply
ing therefor, and that the party making such affidavit is
advised by his counsel and verily believes, that the dis
covery of the books, papers and documents, mentioned
in such petition, is necessary to enable him to declare,
or answer, or to prepare for trial, as the case may be.
' ' The rule granting the discovery shall specify the
mode in which the same is to be made, which may be
either by requiring the party to deliver sworn copies of
matters to be discovered, or by requiring him to produce
and deposit the same with the clerk of the court in which
the trial is to be had. The order shall also specify the
time within which the discovery should be made.
' ' The court, or presiding judge thereof, in granting
such order, shall be governed by the principles and prac
tice of the court of chancery in compelling discovery,
except that the costs of such proceedings shall always
be awarded in the discretion of the court.
' ' Every such order may be vacated by the court, or
the judge granting the same :
" (a ) Upon satisfactory evidence that it should not
have been granted.
" (b ) Upon the discovery sought being obtained.
" ( c ) Upon the party requiring to make discovery
·
denying on oath the possession or control of the books,
papers or documents ordered so to be produced.
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" The order directing the discovery of books, papers
or documents, shall operate as a stay of all other pro
ceedings in the cause, until such order shall have been
complied with or vacated ; and the party obtaining such
order, after the same shall have been complied with or
vacated, shall have the like time to declare, plead or
answer, to which he was entitled at the time of making
the order.
" In case of the party refusing or neglecting to obey
such order for a discovery, within such time as the court
shall deem reasonable, the court may nonsuit him, or
may strike out any plea or notice he may have given, or
may debar him from any particular defense in relation
to which such discovery was sought ; and the power of
the court to compel such discovery shall be confined to
the remedies herein provided, and shall not extend to
authorize any other proceedings against the person or
property of the party so refusing or neglecting.
' ' The books, papers and documents, or sworn copies
thereof, produced under any order made in pursuance of
the preceding rules, shall have the same effect, when
used by the party requiring them, as if produced upon
notice according to the practice of the court. ' ' 76

Minnesota..
The Minnesota statute on depositions is as follows :
' ' The deposition of a witness whose testimony is
wanted in any civil cause pending in this state before
a court, magistrate, or other person authorized to exam
ine witnesses, or in a controversy submitted to arbi
trators, may be taken, upon notice to the adverse party of
the time and place of such taking, by or before any officer
authorized to administer an oath in the state or terri
tory in which the same may be taken, when the witness :
' ' 1. Is within , the state and lives more than thirty
miles from the place of trial or hearing ; or is about to
'1& Id.

Rule 40.
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go out of the state, not intending to return in time for
the trial or hearing ; or is so sick, infirm or aged as to
make it probable that he will not be able to attend at
the trial or hearing.
'-' 2. Is without this state, and within any state or
territory of the United States. " 76
There is the following statute on inspection of docu
ments :
'- ' The court before which an action is pending may
order either party to give to the other, within a specified
time, an inspection and copy, or perinission to take a
copy, of any book, document, or paper in his possession
or under his control, containing evidence relating to the
merits of the case. If compliance is refused, the court
may exclude the book, document, or paper, or, if wanted
as evidenc& by the party applying, may direct the jury to
presume it to be as alleged by him. The court may also
punish the party refusing as for a contempt. "This sec
tion shall not be construed to prevent a party from com
pelling another to produce books, papers and documents
when he is examined as a witness. ' ' 77

Mississippi.
Mississippi has retained the ancient chancery practice
of inserting interrogatories in the bill.78
The following, illiberal type of . deposition statute ob
tains :
' ' After the declaration, bill or petition has been filed
and summons served' the plaintiff, complainant or peti
tioner may take the depositions of witnesses residing or
being within the state in civil causes, including any mat
ter in the chancery court, and the defendant, or cross
complainant, or respondent may likewise take deposi-

76 Minn. Stat. (Mason,

'7'7 Id. sec. 9886.
78 Miss. Code (1930)

1927)

sec.

sec. 373.

9820.
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tions, after filing of his plea or answer or cross bill, in the
following cases :
' ' 1. When the person whose testimony is required
shall be about to depart from the state, or, by reason of
age, sickness, or other cause, shall be unable, or likely to
be unable, to attend the court.
' ' 2. When the claim or defense, or a material point
thereof, shall depend upon the testimony of a single
witness.
"3. When the person whose testimony is required
shall be a judge of the Supreme Court, or circuit court,
or chancellor, or any other officer of the government of
the state or of the United States, who, on account of his
official duties, cannot conveniently attend the court to
give evidence.
" 4. When the testimony of the clerk of any court of
record, or of any sheriff or justice of the peace, shall be
required beyond the limits of the county of his residence.
" 5 . When the witness shall be a female.
' ' 6. When the witness shall reside within the state,
and more than sixty miles from the place of trial. ' ' ,9
There is the following provision for discovery of docu
mentary evidence :
' ' The court in which any action or suit is pending
may, on good cause shown, and after notice of the appli
cation to the opposite party, order either party to give to
the other, within a specified time, and on such terms as
may be imposed, an inspection and copy, or permission to
take a copy, of any books, papers, or documents in his
possession or under his control containing evidence re
lating to the merits of the action or proceeding or of the
defense thereof ; and if compliance with such order be
refused, such books, papers or documents shall not be
given in evidence in the action or proceeding by the party
so refusing ; and the court may punish the recusant party
'79 Id.

sec. 1538.
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as for a contempt of court ; and if a complainant, or
plaintiff, fails to comply with such order, the court may,
on motion, give the like judgment for the defendant as
in cases of nonsuit or dismissal ; and if a defendant fails
to comply with such order, the court may, on motion, give
judgment or decree against him by default or con
fession. " 80

Missouri.
The right to take depositions is unconditional in Mis
souri by virtue of the following statutes :
' ' Any party to a suit pending in any court in this state
may obtain the deposition of any witness, to be used in
such suit, conditionally.
" When the witness is found in this state, the deposi
tion may be taken by the proper officer thereof without
any commission or order from any court or clerk : Pro
vided, that whenever a notice shall be given as required
by law in a cause pending in any city which has, or which
shall hereafter have, a population of over fifty thousand
inhabitants at the time such notice shall be served, to
take the depositions of witnesses at any place in such city,
the party upon whom such notice shall be served, as
provided by law, may at any time after the service of
such notice, anq before the taking of such depositions
shall be commenced, after having given the party or his
attorney, on whose behalf such notice shall have been
given, one day 's notice, in writing, to be served by de
livering a copy thereof to the adverse party or his attor
ney of record, of his intention to apply for the appoint
ment of a special commissioner to take such depositions,
and of the time and place of making such application,
apply to the circuit court, or the clerk or any judge there
of, to appoint a special commissioner to take the deposi
tions under such notice, and thereupon such circuit court,
or the clerk or judge thereof, upon such application, and
80 Id.

sec. 744.
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upon . proof of service of the notice of such application,
as above required, shall forthwith appoint such special
commissioner to take such depositions, which said
special commissioner shall be an attorney of record in
such court, learned in the law, disinterested, and of no
kin to either party to such cause ; and the said court,
judge or clerk, in the order appointing such special com
missioner, shall designate the time and place at which
such special commissioner shall take said depositions.
Such special commissioner so appointed shall be alone
authorized to take such depositions, but any subpoena
which shall have been issued by any officer authorized
by law to issue subpoenas in such cases, and which shall
have been served upon any witness, as required by law,
commanding his presence at the time and place desig
nated in such notice to take depositions aforesaid, shall
be effectual to require the attendance of such witness be
fore such special commissioner at the time and place
specified in such subpoena, or at the time and place desig
nated by such court, judge or clerk in the order appoint
ing such special commissioner as aforesaid ; and in case
such witness shall not attend in obedience thereto, such
special commissioner shall be authorized to compel the
attendance of such witness by attachment, as if such
subpoena had been issued by such special commissioner
under the authority conferred by this section. Such spe
cial commissioner, for the purposes of taking such depo
sitions and of certifying and returning the same as re
quired by law, shall possess the same power and author
ity and be subject to the same duties and obligations as
now are or hereafter shall be conferred and imposed by
law upon officers authorized to take depositions : Pro
vided, however, that such special commissioner shall have
power and authority to hear and determine all objections
to testimony and evidence, and to admit and exclude the
same, in the same manner and to the same. extent as the
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circuit court might in a trial of said cause before such
circuit court ; ' and whenever the special commissioner
shall sustain such objection to testimony or evidence, the
party against whom such ruling shall be made shall have
the right to have such ruling reported by the special com
missioner to the said circuit court, or a judge thereof, and
it shall be the duty of such special commissioner to re
port the same forthwith, or at the close of the examina
tion of any witness who may be under examination at the
time such objection shall be made, or at the close of the
taking of all the depositions to be taken under such no
tice, or at such other time during the taking thereof as
shall be determined by such special commissioner to such
circuit court, or any judge thereof ; and upon such report
being presented to the circuit court or judge thereof, the
said court, or said judge thereof, shall forthwith pass
upon the ruling so reported, and make an order affirming
such ruling or reversing the same ; and in case such rul
ing so reported shall be reversed by said circuit court, or
judge thereof, the said circuit court or judge thereof shall
enter an order of record, directing said special commis
sioner to cause the testimony or evidence so excluded to
be admitted ; and whenever the said special commissioner
shall report hi111 ruling to the circuit court as aforesaid,
or to a judge thereof, said special commissioner shall
adjourn the further taking of said depositions to such
time and place as he may direct, and enforce the attend
ance of any witness thereat, by attachment or otherwise,
so as to enable any party to have any question answered
which the said special commissioner shall have ruled out,
and which such circuit court, or judge thereof, may di
rect to be answered, together with such other questions
as may appear proper under the ruling of such circuit
court, or judge thereof, in reversing the ruling of such
special commissioner. " 81
81 Rev. Mo. Stat.

(1929) sees. 1753, 1759.
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The Missouri Supreme Court has held that these stat
utes authorize taking of depositions for purposes of dis
covery before trial.811 The bar of St. Louis and of Kansas
City use the procedure extensively. Satisfaction with it
appears to be general.
There is the following rather elaborate statutory pro
vision for production and inspection of books and papers :
' ' Every court or judge thereof shall have power to
compel any party to a suit pending therein to produce
any books, papers and documents in his possession or
power, relating to the merits of any such suit, or of any
defense therein.
' ' To entitle a party to the production of such books,
papers and documents, he shall present a petition, veri
fied by the affidavit of himself or some other credible per
son, to the court, or to the judge thereof in vacation, upon
which an order may be granted by such court or officer
for the production of such books, papers and documents,
or that the party show cause why the prayer of the peti
tion should not be granted.
' ' Every such order may be vacated by the court or
officer granting the same : First, upon satisfactory evi
dence that it ought not to have been granted ; second,
upon the party required to produce the books, papers and
documents denying, on oath, the possession or control
thereof.
" If the party neglect to obey such order for the pro
duction. of books, papers and documents, within such time
as the court or judge shall prescribe for that purpose, the
court may nonsuit him, or strike out any answer, or
debar him from any particular defense in . relation to
which such books, papers and documents �ere required
to be produced, or may punish him as for a contempt.
' ' The court before which an action is pending, or a
judge thereof, in vacation, may, in his discretion, and
upon due notice, order either party to give to the other,
at Tyson

740.

v. Savings and Loan Ass'n (1900) 156 Mo.

588, 57 S.

W.
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within a specified time, an inspection and copy, or per
mission to take a copy, or to make a photograph of a,
paper in his possession or under his control, containing
evidence relating to the merits of the action or defense
therein. If compliance with the order be refused, the
court, on motion, may exclude the paper from being given
in evidence, or punish the party refusing as for contempt,
or both. ' ' 81

Montana..
There is the following statute on depositions, modeled
after the California statute, which allows discovery from
parties :
' ' The testimony of a witness in this state may be taken
by deposition in an action at any time after the service
of the summons or appearance of the defendant, and in a
special proceeding after a question of fact has arisen
therein, in the following cases : 1. When the witness is a
party to the action or proceeding, or an officer or member
of a corporation which is a party to the action or pro
ceeding, or a person for whose immediate benefit the ac
tion or proceeding is prosecuted or defended. 2. When
the witness resiaes out of the county in which his testi
mony is to be used. 3. When the witness is about to
leave the county where the action is to be tried, and will
probably continue absent when the testimony is required.
4. When the witness, otherwise liable to attend the trial,
is nevertheless too infirm to attend. 5 . When the testi
mony is required upon a motion, or in any other case
where the oral examination of the witness is not required.
6. When the witness is the only one who can establish
facts or a fact material to the issue ; provided, that the
deposition of such witness shall not be used if his pres
ence can be procured at the time of the trial of the
cause. " 84

88 Rev.

Mo. Stat. (1929) sees. 924-928.
K Rev. Mont. Code (1921) sec. 10645.
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Inspection of documents is authorized by the following
statute :
' ' Any court in which an action is pending, or a judge
thereof, may, upon notice, order either party to give to
the other, within a specified time, an inspection and copy,
or permission to take a copy, of entries of accounts in
any book, or of any document or paper in his possession,
or under his control, containing evidence relating to the
merits of the action, or the defense therein. If compli
ance with the order be refused, the court may exclude the
entries of accounts of the book, or the document, or paper
from being given in evidence, or if wanted as evidence
by the party applying, may direct the jury to presume
them to be as he alleges them to be ; and the court may
also punish the party refusing for a contempt. This
section is not to be construed to prevent a party from
compelling another to produce books, documents, or pa
pers, when he is examined as a witness. ' ' 8&

Nebraska..
Discovery under the ordina.ry deposition procedure is
·
authorized by the following Nebraska statute :
' ' The deposition of any witness may be used only in
the following cases : First. When the witness does not
reside in the county where the action or proceeding is
pending, or is sent for trial by change of venue, or is
absent therefrom ; Second. When, from age, infirmity
or imprisonment, the witness is unable to attend the
court, or is dead ; Third. When the testimony is re
quired upon a motion or in any other case where the oral
examination of the witness is not required.
' ' Either party may commence taking testimony by
depositions, at any time after service upon the defend
ant. ' ' 88
86 Id. see 9771.
86 Nebr. Comp. Stat. (1929) eh. 20, sees. 1246, 1247.
.
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The Supreme Court of Nebraska has upon several
occasions made liberal interpretation of this statute and
has held that discovery before trial is authorized there
under. 87 The statute is used by Omaha lawyers for tak
ing the deposition of adverse parties in approximately
ten per cent. of all cases but depositions of witnesses are
less frequently taken. The Nebraska bar seems to be
well satisfied with the practice.
Discovery of documentary evidence is authorized by
the following statutory provision :
' ' Either party or his attorney may demand of the
adverse party an inspection and copy, or permission to
take a copy, of a book, paper or document in his posses
sion or under his control, containing evidence relating to
the merits of the action or defense therein. Such demand
shall be in writing, specifying the book, paper or docu
ment, with sufficient particularity to enable the other
party to distinguish it, and if compliance with the de
mand within four days be refused, the court or judge, on
motion and notice to the adverse party, may in their dis
cretion order the adverse party to give the other, within
a specified time, · an inspection and copy, or permission
to take a copy, of such book, paper, or document ; and on
failure to comply'with such order, the court may exclude
the paper or document from being given in evidence, or
if wanted as evidence by the party applying, may direct
the jury to presume it to be such as the party by affidavit
alleges it to be. This section is not to be construed to
prevent a patty from compelling another to produce any
book, p aper or document when he is examined as a wit
ness.
" Either party or his attorney, if required, shall deliver
to the other party or his attorney, a copy of any deed,
8'7 Dogge v. State (1887) 21 Neb. 272, 31 N. W. 929; Ulrich v. Mc
Conaughey · (1901) 63 Neb• 10, 88 N. W. 150 ; Olmsted v. Edson (1904)
71 Neb. 17, 98 N. W. 415.
.
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instrument or other writing whereon the action or de
fense is founded, or which he intends to offer in evidence
at the trial. If the plaintiff or defendant shall refuse to
furnish the copy or copies required, the party so refusing
shall not be permitted to give in evidence, at the trial,
the original, of which a copy has been refused. This sec
tion shall not apply to any paper a copy of which is filed
with a pleading. ' ' 88

Nevada.
The following Nevada statute authorizes taking of the
deposition of the adverse party for purposes of discovery :
' ' The testimony of a witness in this state may be taken
by deposition in an action at any time after the service
of the summons or the appearance of the defendant ; and
in a special proceeding, after a question of fact has arisen
therein, in the following case s : 1. When the witness is
a party to the action or proceeding, or a person for whose
immediate benefit the action or proceeding is prosecuted
or defended. 2. When the witness is the president, vice
president, secretary, treasurer or general manager of a
corporation· for whose benefit the action is prosecuted
or defended. 3. When the witness resides out of the
county in which his testimony is to be used. 4. When
the witness is about to leave the county where the action
is to be tried, and will probably continue absent when the
testimony is required. 5. When the witness, otherwise
liable to attend the trial is nevertheless too infirm to
attend, or resides within the county, but more than fifty
miles from 'the place of trial. ' ' 89
Inspection of books and papers is provided for in the
following terms :
' ' Any court in which an action is pending, or a judge
thereof may, upon notice, order either party to give to the
other within a specified time an inspection and copy, or
permission to take a copy of any book, document, or
88 Nebr. Comp. Stat. (1929) ch. 20, sees. 1267, 1268.
89 Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) sec. 9001.
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paper in his possession, or under his control, containing
evidence relating to the merits of the action, or the de
fense therein. If compliance with the order be refused,
the court may exclude the book, document or paper from
being given in evidence, or if wanted as evidence by the
party applying, may direct the jury to presume it to be
such as he alleges it to be ; and the court may also punish
the party refusing for a contempt, This section shall
not be construed to prevent a jury ',from compelling an
other to produce books, papers, or documents when he is
examined as a witness. ' ' 90

New Hampshire.
The following concise and simple provision has fur
nished the means of a very liberal discovery practice in
New Hampshire :
' ' The deposition of any witness in a civil cause may be
taken and used at the trial unless the adverse party pro
cures him to attend so that he may be called to testify
when the deposition is offered. ' ' 91
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that this
statute authorizes examinations for discovery before
triai.911 Today the New Hampshire bar uses the pro
cedure extensively and with apparently uniform satis
faction. So satisfactory has been the New Hampshire
experience that tllere is a strong sentiment in neighbor
ing states, especially in Massachusetts, in favor of the
adoption of a similar practice.

New Jersey.
The following provision for discovery before trial by
written interrogatories obtains in New Jersey :
' ' After an action is at i�sue either party may serve on
the adverse party, whether such party be a natural per90 Id.

sec. 8963.

91 N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) ch. 337, sec. 1.

911 Eaton v. Farmer (1865) 46 N. H. 200; LaCoss v. Lebanon (1917)
78 N. H. 413, 101 Atl. 364.
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son or body corporate, written interrogatories upon any
matter material to the issue, and written answers to the
same under oath shall be served in ten days after serv
ice ; the answers shall be strictly responsive, and in the
case of a body corporate shall be under the oath of such
of the officers, agents or employees of the corporation
as have personal knowledge of the facts or custody of
the books, records or papers a discovery of which is·
sought ; the court or a judge may for the purpose of com
pelling an answer attach for contempt, suppress the de
fense or stay or dismiss the proceedings ; the answer
shall be evidence in the action if offered by the party
proposing the interrogatories, but not otherwise ; pro
vided, the court or a judge may for good cause and on
notice to the adverse party order any of the interrog
atories to be stricken out or amended or new ones to be
added or grant further time for answering or order or
permit the answers to be amended. ' ' 98
An oral examination of the adverse party before trial
is also allowed under the following statutory provisions :
' ' Any party to an action may by order of the court or
a judge thereof or by a judge of the Court of Common
Pleas, in the county in which such action is pending, in
the absence of a Supreme Court justice a Circuit Court
judge, if the action is pending in the Supreme Court or
Circuit Court, be examined as a witness at the instance
of the adverse party or any one of several adverse parties
after issue joined and before trial ; such examination may
be before the court or a judge or a Supreme Court Com
missioner or Examiner Master in Chancery on four days '
notice to the party to be examined, unless a shorter time
is; for good cause prescribed ; the granting of said order
shall be discretionary ; the service of the order shall be
sufficient summons and notice to the party named therein
98 N. J.

Oomp.

Stat. (1910)

p.

4097.
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to attend before the court, judge or officer named there�
in, and such attendance and examination may be enforced
in the same manner as answers to interrogatories.
' ' N o party who shall reside in this state shall be com
pelled to attend and testify in any other county than that
where he resides, but any party residing out of this state
may be compelled to attend and testify in any county
named in . the order or in the state or country where he
resides ; a nonresident party may be served out of this
state with personal notice to attend such examination.
' ' The examination and cross-examination shall be re
duced to writing and shall be signed by the party so exam
ined and certified by the court, judge or officer, and filed
with the clerk of the county where the cause is to be tried,
and said examination may be used by either party at the
trial ; where the examination is made before the court
or a judge, such court or judge may authorize the same
to be reduced to writing by the clerk of any circuit court
or by an attorney or counselor ; any question may be ob
jected to and the answer taken subject to the objection ;
if the party refus� to answer, the court or a judge shall
compel the party to answer, if the party examining is
legally entitled to have an answer ; the examination thus
taken shall not be conclusive but may be rebutted at the
trial.
' ' The party examined shall receive the same fee as if
subpoenaed and attending as a witness on the trial of an
action, and the commissioner or examiner taking the
testimony shall receive the same fees for his services as
are allowed by law to a master il:t chancery for taking
1
testimony in a cause.
' ' The party examining shall in the first instance pay
the witness fees and all the costs and expenses of the
examination, unless the court or a judge otherwise or
der, and shall tax therefor in his bill of costs only such
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sum as the court or a judge shall certify to be reason
able and proper. " 94
There is the following statute which allows inspec
tion of books and papers :
' ' The court in which an action is pending or a judge
may on four days ' notice and upon terms order either
party to give to the other within a specified time an
inspection and copy or permission to take a copy of any
books, papers or documents in his possession or under
his control, containing evidence relating to the merits of
the action or the defense thereto, and if compliance with
the order be refused, such books, papers or documents
shall not be given in evidence in such action, and the
court may punish the party so refusing as for contempt.
' ' Every such application shall be in writing and shall
state the grounds upon which it is made, verified by the
oath of the party or his attorney or agent ; the affidavit
of the adverse party or his attorney or agent may be
read in opposition to such application without notice of
the taking of such affidavit or either party or any other
witness may on such application be examined in relation
thereto. ' ' 96
The New Jersey statute on depositions generally is of
the illiberal type and provides as follows :
" If any material witness in an action or suit of a civil
nature, or any material witness for any defendant in any
indictment pending in any of the courts of this state, be
in this state, but is ancient or very infirm, or is sick, or
is about to go out of this state, then the deposition of
such witness may, at the option of either party, in such
civil suit, or at the option of the defendant in such indict
ment, be taken de bene esse before any justice of the
supreme court, or judge of the court of common pleas, or
supreme court commissioner, or master in chancery ; pro
vided, that the officer before whom the deposition is to
94 Id. p.
96 Id. p.

4098 as amended by Laws of N. J. (1924) ch. 93, p. 183.
4098.
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be taken shall cause notice to be given to the adverse
party immediately, or at such short day as the case in
the opinion of the said officer may require, to attend and
be present at the taking thereof, and to put questions and
cross-examine, if he shall think fit. ' ' 96 New Jersey courts at the present time are very strict
in their allowance for discovery before trial. Newark
lawyers stated that the only application for an oral exam
ination which had been granted there during several
months was made in the case of an infant plaintiff who
had been struck by an automobile and who had not a
single witness in his behalf. It is said the courts are so
very strict in allowing examinations and that even when
they allow them they restrict the scope of them to such
an extent that they have little practical value to the pro
fession.

New Mexico.
The following provision for depositions Is made in
New Mexico :
' ' Depositions of witnesses to be used in any court in
this state, in all oivil cases and proceedings, may be taken
in the following cases : First. When, by reason of age,
infirmity, sick:pess or official duty, it is probable that the
witness will be unable to attend the court. Second. When
the witness resides without the state or the county in
which the suit is pending. Third. When the witness has
left, or is about to leave the state or county in which
the suit or proceeding is pending, and will probably not
be present at the trial. ' ' 91
The New Mexico provision for inspection of papers in
the possession of the opposite party is as follows :
' ' The court before which an action is pending, or the
judge thereof, may, in his discretion and upon due notice,
order either party to give to the other, within a specified

p. 2230.
9'7 N. Mex. Stats. (1929) ch. 45, sec. 101.

96 ld.
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time, an inspection and a copy or permission to take a
copy of a paper in his possession or under his control
containing evidence relating to the merits of the aotion.
If compliance with the order be refused, the court, on
motion, may exclude the paper from being given in evi
dence or punish the party refusing as for a contempt, or
both.
" If the party neglect to obey such order for the pro
duction of books, papers and documents within such time
as the court or judge may prescribe for that purpose, the
court may nonsuit him or strike out any answer, or
debar him from any particular defense in relation to
which such books, papers and documents were required
to be produced, or may punish him as for a contempt.
' ' Every such order may be vacated by the court or
officer granting the same : First. Upon satisfactory
evidence that it ought not to have been granted. Second.
Upon the party required to produce the books, papers·
and documents denying, on oath, the possession or con
trol thereof. ' ' 98

New York

A short summary of the origin and history of the New
York discovery practice is a necessary preface to an
understanding of the complicated practice which exists
today. The Code of Procedure of 1848 made a simple yet
liberal provision for an oral examination before trial. A
rule of court was adopted in 1870 limiting the scope of
discovery to facts " material in proving the case or de
fense of the party. ' ' 99 Thereafter for about twenty years
the rules which were applied became so strict as to defeat
almost entirely the right to discovery. 100 The so-called
' ' Throop Code ' ' effected even greater stringency by com98 Id. sees. 831-833.
99 Rule

21, quoted in Adams v. Cavanaugh (1885) 37 Hun 232, 233.

100 N. Y. State Bar Association Report (1917) page 467; Report of the

Board of Statutory Consolidation on the Simpli1ieation of Civil Praetiee
of New York (1915) vol. 1, p. 332 tf.
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bination of the several modes of taking testimony before
trial into a single deposition procedure. In 1904 the Com
mission on the Laws Delays urged liberalization of the
rules in regard to discovery.101 In 1907, in the case of
Goldmark v. U. S. Electro-Galvanizing Company/08 a
great liberalization was effected and examinations for
discovery became more nearly a matter of right. In
1910 the Special Committee of the Bar of the City of
New York on the Simplification of Procedure recom
mended ' ' that either party might call his opponent, or
any officer of any corporation that is a party, and cross
examine him. ' ' A bill to this effect was sponsored in
1910 but was defeated by the Senate.108 This would have
enlarged the scope of the discovery as well as the right
to discovery. During the years from 1910 to 1916 lead
ers of the New York Bar praised the English system of
discovery in extravagant 'terms and urged that examina
tions for discovery in New York be allowed as of
course.104 In 1912 and in 1915 the Board of Statutory
Consolidation made its first reports on the Simplification
of Procedure and therein recommended some liberaliza
tions as to the discovery rules but still did not go so far
as to make discov�ry a matter of course. The provisions
as to discovery were contained in the proposed rules ·
appended to the Act, rather than to the Civil Practice
Act itself.106 The following year, 191 6, the New York
State Bar Association ' s Committee, appointed to exam
ine the report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation,
made its report, and one of the few points of difference
was as to discovery. This committee recommended a
considerably more liberal practice as to discovery, and
Doll v. Smith (1904) 43 Mise. 417.
A. D. 526, 97 N. Y. S. 1078.
108 See Report of N. Y. State Bar Association (1911) p. 434.
104 See Reports of N. Y. State Bar Association (1911) p. 432 (1912)
pp. 232, 249, 250.
106 Report of the Board of Statutory Consolidation on the Simplifiea·
tion of the Civil Praetiee of New York (1915) Vol. 1, p. 98 ff.
101 See

108 111
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in addition recommended that the provisions be put in

the Civil Practice Act itself, as well as in the Rules. The
examination was to be had, unless the opposing party
got an order from the court limiting the examination.106
The Joint Legislative Committee, which was appointed to
study the report of the Board of Statutory Consolida
tion and which finally concluded that an independent
revision should be its task, made some very liberal
recommendations in its preliminary reports regarding
discovery.107 In its final report, however, the Committee
concluded that there was such a division of opinion in
regard to discovery that " the provisions on this subject
should be restored for the present in practically the same
language as they now exist. " However, the committee
added : ' ' The Committee recommends that the subject of
examination of parties and witnesses before trial be fur
ther considered by the lawyers of the state to the end
that a more simple procedure may be presented to the
legislature. ' ' 108 Later the Joint Legislative Committee
made a supplemental report as to the particular matter
of evidence before trial. The provisions of the supple
mental report required that the applicant for discovery
show that the testimony was material and necessary. It
provided further that discovery examinations could be
initiated either by court order or by notice, the latter of
which could' be contested by the opponent by a motion
to vacate the notice. The Civil Practice Act of 1920
adopted the provisions recommended in the supplemental
report.
106 Report of N. Y. State Bar Association (1916) pp. 332, 352.
107 Of. Preliminary Report, No. 4 (1918) p. 9: " A party to an action

in a court of record may examine an adverse party and have his deposi
tion taken, within or without the state, after issue joined and before
trial, and procure an order therefor as a matter of right, without show
ing the materiality of the expected testimony or the necessity for such
examination. " It was clear also from the explanatory notes that it was
intended that the scope of discovery was to be broadened so as ' ' not to
exclude an inquiry pertinent to the issue. ' '
108 Final Report (1919) found in Legislative Document No. 111,

p. 44.
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New York has the most elaborate statutory provisions
for discovery before trial which exist in any of the vari
ous states, yet the actual practice thereunder is very
illi'Qeral and unsatisfactory. The following provisions of
the Civil Practice Act outline the framework of the pro
cedure :
' ' Any party to an action in a court of record may cause
to be taken by deposition, before trial, his own testimony
or that of any other party which is material and neces. sary in the prosecution or defense of the action. A
party to such an action also may cause to be so taken
the testimony which is material and necessary, of the
original owner of a claim which constitutes, or from
which arose, a cause of action acquired by the adverse
party by grant, conveyance, transfer, assignment or
endorsement and which is set forth in his pleading as a
cause of action or counterclaim. Any party to such an
action also may cause to be so taken the testimony of
any other person, which is material and necessary, where
such person is about to depart from the state, or is with
out the state, or resides at a greater distance from the
place of trial than one hundred miles, or is so sick or
infirm as to afford reasonable grounds of belief that he
will not be able to attend the trial, or other special cir
cumstance,s render it proper that his deposition should
be taken:
" When an adverse party, or an original owner of a
claim mentioned in the foregoing section, whose testi
mony may be taken as provided in such section by deposi
tion, is a corporation, joint stock association or other
unincorporated association, the testimony of one or more
of its officers, directors, managing agents or employees,
which is material and necessary, may be so taken.
' ' A party to an action desiring to obtain testimony
therein by deposition shall give reasonable notice to his
adversary, or if his adversary has appeared by attorney,
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to such attorney, stat!ng in writing : 1. The person be
fore whom the testimony is to be taken ; 2. The time
and place at which it is to be taken ; 3. The name or
names of the person or persons to be examined ; 4. The
matters upon which such person or persons are to be
examined.
' ' Any question as to the right to take the testimony,
or as to the time or place, or as to the matters as to
which the testimony is to be taken, or as to the persons
before whom it is to be taken, may be raised by a motion
to vacate or modify the notice. The service of notice of
the motion, if made for the first term or sitting of court
at which the motion can be heard, shall operate to stay
the taking of the testimony until the determination of
the motion. If the motion is brought on by order to
show cause, the order may be returnable either at cham
bers or to the court and may contain such a stay. The
motion shall be heard upon the notice of the taking of
testimony, the pleadings, if any, and upon such affidavits
in support of such notice, and in answer thereto, as the
parties may submit. If the taking of the testimony be
not authorized by the provisions of this article the court
shall vacate the notice.
' ' A party entitled to take testimony by deposition may
obtain an order of the court therefor in the first instance,
instead of proceeding by notice. The motion shall be
upon notice to the other parties who have appeared or
answered.
.
" Upon motion, made upon notice and upon proof of
facts and circumstances which render proper the taking
of testimony by deposition during the trial of the action,
or after judgment in order to carry the judgment into
effect, the taking thereof may be ordered by the court.
' ' Testimony which is material to an expected party in
the prosecution or defense of an action about to be
brought in a court of record may be taken at his instance,
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by deposition, if the taking or preservation thereof is
necessary for the protection of his rights. Such testi
mony may be taken only in pursuance of an order of a
court in which the action may be brought, or a judge
thereof.
" If the deposition is to be taken pursuant to an order,
the order may require, in a proper case, the production
of books and papers in the custody of the party or per
son to be examined, as to the contents of which an exam
ination or inspection is desired, and on the examination
the books and papers or any part or parts thereof may
be offered and received in evidence in addition to the
use thereof by a witness to refresh his memory. ' ' 109
The following details of practice are added by the
Rules of Civil Practice which are made pursuant to the
Civil Practice Act :
' ' The notice of taking testimony by deposition shall
contain the title of the action and be subscribed with the
name and address of the person giving the same and
shall be ser.ved at least five days before the time speci
fied therein for the taking of the testimony.
" If a party desire to take the deposition of an adverse
party or a witness to obtain information to enable him,
to draw a complaint, he shall apply for an order, or if he
shall apply for an order to take testimony by deposition
under any provision of article twenty-nine of the civil
practice act, he must present proof by affidavit that stat
utory grounds exist for taking the same ; that the testi
mony of such person is material and necessary for the
party making such application, or the prosecution or
defense of such action. If an adverse. party, or the orig
inal owner of a claim� whose testimony is sought, be a
corporation, joint-stock or other unincorporated associa
tion, the affidavit must state the office or position in such
corporation or association held by the person whose
109 N. Y. Civ.

Prae. Act, sees. 288-293, 295, 296.
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testimony is material and necessary. If the production
of books and papers be desired, the affidavit must describe
them, so far as practicable, and state facts to show that
their production is material and necessary.
' ' On an application for an order allowing testimony to
be taken by deposition for use in an action about to be
brought in a court of record, the applicant shall present
to the court in which the action may be brought an affida
vit setting forth the nature of the controversy which is
expected to be the subject of the action and the circum
stances which render it necessary for the protection of
the applicant 's rights that the witness ' testimony be
perpetuated.
' ' If a party on whom a notice to take testimony by
deposition is S(;)rved shall move to vacate, modify or
limit the same, he shall specify in his notice of motion the
grounds of the motion, and may support the same by
affidavit, which shE!,ll be served with the notice of mo
tion. If the court or judge who hears the motion shall
deem that the testimony sought to be taken is not ma
terial or necessary for the party who served the notice,
or for any reason that the interests of justice would not
be subserved by such examination, an order may be made
vacating and setting aside the notice to take the testi
mony or limiting the scope of the examination. If the
court or judge shall deem that the testimony should be
taken at a time or place, or before a person, other than
specified in the notice, an order may be made fixing a
different time or place for the taking of the testimony,
and designating some other person to take the same, and
imposing reasonable terms or conditions . ' ' 110
Discovery and inspection of documentary evidence is
authorized under the following provisions :
' ' A court of record, other than a justices ' court in a
city, by order may compel a party to an action pending
110

N. Y. Rules of Civ. Prae., 121-124.
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therein to produce and discover, or to give to the other
party, an inspection and copy, or permission to take a
copy or photograph of a book, document, or other paper,
or to make discovery of any article or property, in his
possession or under his control, relating to the merits of
the action, or of the defense therein. The procedure for
obtaining such order shall be regulated by rules.
" Where an order directs a discovery or inspection, the
party in whose behalf it was made upon proof that the
adverse party has fl!-iled to obey it and upon notice to
him, may apply to the court for an order to punish him
for the failure. Upon the hearing of the application, the
court, upon the payment of such a sum for the expenses
of the applicant as the court fixes and upon compliance
with such other terms as it deems just to impose, may
permit the party in default to comply with the order for
a discovery and inspection ; and, for that purpose, it may
direct that the application to punish him stand over to a
future time. Upon the final hearing of the application
to punish the party in default, the court, in a proper
case, may direct that his complaint be dismissed or his
answer or reply be stricken out and that judgment be
rendered accordingly ; or it may make an order striking
out one or more causes of action, defenses, counterclaims
or replies, interposed by him ; or that he be debarred
from maintaining a particular claim or defense in rela
tion to which the discovery or inspection was sought.
Where the party has failed to obey an order allowing an
inspection by the adverse party and requiring him to
furnish a copy or permit a copy to be taken, the court
may also direct that the . book, document or other paper
be excluded from being given in evidence ; or it may pun
ish the party for a contempt ; or both.
' ' A book, document or other paper produced under an
order for its discovery has the same effect, when used by
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the party requiring it, as if it was produced upon notice,
according to the practice of the court.
' ' Every party to an action shall be entitled, at any
time, by notice in writing, to give notice to any other .
party, in whose pleadings or affidavits reference is made
to any document, to produce such document for the in
spection of the party giving such notice, or of his attor
ney, and to permit him or them to take copies thereof ;
and any party not complying with such notice shall not
afterward be at liberty to put any such document in evi
dence on his behalf in such cause or matter, unless he
shall satisfy the court that such document relates only
to his own title, he being a defendant, or that he had
some other cause or excuse which the court shall deem
sufficient for not complying with such notice ; in which
. case the court may allow the same to be put in evidence
on such terms as to costs and otherwise as the court shall
think fit.
' ' The court, on the application of any party to an ac
tion, also may make an -order requiring any other party
to state by affidavit whether any one or more specific
documents, to be specified in the application, is or are,
or has or have at any time been in his possession or
power, and if not then in his possession, when he parted
with the same, and what has become thereof. Such appli
cation shall be made upon an affidavit stating that in the
belief of the deponeJ!t the party against whom the appli
cation is made has, or has at some time had, in his
possession or power the document or documents specified
in the application, and that they relate to the matters in
question in the case or matter, or to some of them. "
" A party to an action may apply to the court for an
order requiring an adverse party to show cause why he
should not be compelled to produce and discover, or. to
give an inspection and copy of, or permission to take a
copy or photograph of a book, document, paper, machine
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or other article, or to make a discovery of any article or
property in his possession or under his control, relating
to the merits of the action or of the defense therein. Such
order to show cause shall be granted on an affidavit show
ing that the book, document, paper, machine, article or
property whereof discovery or inspection is sought is
not in the possession or under the control of the party
applying therefor but is in the possession or under the
control of the party against whom discovery or inspec
tion is sought, or of his agent or attorney.
' ' On the return of such order to show cause, the court
shall make such an order with respect to the discovery
or inspection prayed for as justice requires. The order
for discovery or inspection shall specify the time, place
and manner in which it is to be made. The order may
stay any other proceedings in the action until such order
shall have been complied with or vacated.
" If discovery or inspection be directed, a referee may
be appointed by the order to direct and superintend it,
whose certificate, unless set aside by the court, is pre
sumptive, and, except in proceedings for contempt, con
clusive evidence of compliance or non-compliance with
the terms of the order. " m

North Carolina.
There is the following statutory provision for examina
tion of parties before trial :
" No action to obtain discovery under oath, in aid of
the prosecution or defense of another action, shall be al-'
lowed, nor shall any examination of a party be had on
behalf of the adverse party, except in the manner pre
scribed by this article.
' ' A party to an action may be examined as a witness
at the instance of any adverse party, and for that pur
pose may be compelled, in the same manner and subject
to the same rules of examination as any other witness,
111 N. Y. Civ.

Prac. Act, sees. 324-328; Rules of

Civ.

Prac� 140-142.
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to testify, either at the trial or conditionally or upon
commission. Where a corporation is a party to the ac
tion, this examination may be made of any of its officers
or agents.
' ' The examination, instead of being had at the trial, as
provided in the preceding section, may be had at any
time before trial, at the option of the party claiming it,
before a judge, commissioner duly appointed to take
depositions, or clerk of the court, on a previous notice to
the party to be examined, and any other adverse party,
of at least five days, unless for good cause shown the
judge or court orders otherwise.
' ' The party to be examined, as provided in the pre
ceding section, may be compelled to attend in the same
manner as a witness who is to be examined conditionally ;
but he shall not be compelled to attend in any county
other than that of his residence or where he may be
served with a summons for his attendance. The exam
ination shall be taken and filed by the judge, clerk or com
missioner, as in case of witnesses examined conditionally,
and may be read by either party on the trial.
' ' If a party refuses to attend and testify, as provided
in the preceding sections, he may be punished as for a
contempt and his pleadings may be stricken out.
' ' The examination of the party thus taken may be re
butted by adverse testimony.
" A party examined by an adverse party, · as provided
in this article, may be examined in his own behalf, sub
ject to the same_ rules of examination as other witnesses.
But if he testifies to any new matter, not responsive to
the inquiries put to him by the adverse party, or neces
sary to explain or qualify his answers thereto or to dis
charge himself when his answers would charge himself,
the adverse party may offer himself· and must be re
ceived as a witness in his own behalf or in respect to the
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new matter, subject to the same rules of examination as
other witnesses.
' ' A person for whose immediate benefit the action is
prosecuted or defended, though not a party to the action,
may be examined as a witness, in the same manner, and
subject to the same rules of examinations, as if he was
named as a party.
' ' A party may be examined on behalf of his co-plaintiff
or co-defendant as to any matter in which he is not jointly
interested or liable with such co-plaintiff or co-defendant,
and as to which a separate and not joint verdict or judg
ment can be rendered. He may be compelled to attend
in the same manner as at the instance of an adverse par
ty ; but the examination thus taken cannot be used in be
half of the party examined. When one of several plain
tiffs or defendants who are joint contractors, or are
united in interest, is examined by the adverse party, the
other of such plaintiffs or defendants may offer himself,
and must be received, as a witness to the same cause of
action or defense. ' ' ttll
It is also possible to obtain discovery by use of the
following ordinary deposition procedure in North Caro
lina :
' 'Any party in a civil action or special proceeding,
upon giving notice to the adverse party or his attorney
as provided by law, may take the depositions of persons
whose evidence he may desire to use, without any special
order therefor, unless the witness shall be beyond the
limits of the United States.
' ' Every deposition taken and returned in the manner
provided by law may be read on the trial of the action
or proceeding, or before any referee, in the following
cases, and not otherwise : 1. If the witness is dead, or
has become insane since ·the deposition was taken. 2. If
the witness is a resident of a foreign country, or of an1111 No.

Car. Code (1931) sees. 899-907.
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other state, and is not present at the trial. 3. If the
witness is confined in a prison outside the county in
which the trial takes place. 4. If the witness is so old,
sick or infirm as to be unable to attend court. 5. If the
witness is the President of the United States, or the head
of any department of the federal government, or a judge,
district attorney, or clerk of any court of the United
States, and the trial shall take place during the term of
such court. 6. If the witness is the governor of the
state, or the head of any department of the state govern
ment, or the president of the university, or the head of
any other incorporated college in the state, or the super
intendent or any physician in the employ of any of the
hospitals for the insane for the state. 7. If the witness
is a justice of the supreme court, or a judge, presiding
officer, clerk or solicitor of any court of record, and the
trial shall take place during the term of such court.
8. If the witness is a member of the congress of the
United States, or a member of the general assembly, and
the trial shall take place during a session of the body of
which he is a member. 9. If the witness has been duly
summoned, and at the time of the trial is out of the state,
1 or is more than seventy-five miles by the usual public
nfode of travel from the place where the court is sitting,
without the procurement or consent of the party offering
his deposition. 10. If the action is pending in a justice ' s
court the deposition may be read on the trial of the ac
tion, provided the witness is more than seventy-five miles
by the usual public mode of travel from the place where
the court is sitting. ' ' 118
Inspection of writings is authorized under the follow
ing statute :
" The court before which an action is pending, or a
judge thereof, may, in their discretion, and upon due no
tice, order either party to give to the other, within a
specified time, an inspection and copy, or permission to
118 Id. sec.

1809 (in part), 1821.
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take a copy, of any books, papers and documents in his
possession or under his control containing evidence re
lating to the merits of the action or the defense therein.
If compliance with the order be refused, the court, on
motion, may exclude the paper from being given in evi
dence, or punish the party refusing, or both. ' ' 114

North Dakota.
There is the following statute for examination of par
ties before trial :
" No action to obtain discovery under oath in aid of
the prosecution or defense of another action shall be al
lowed, nor shall any examination of a party be had on
behalf of the adverse party, except in the manner pre
scribed by this chapter.
' ' A party to an action, or in case a corporation is
a party, the president, secretary or other principal offi
cer or general managing agent of such corporation, may
be examined as a witness at the instance of an adverse
party or any of several adverse parties and for that pur
pose may be compelled in the same manner and subject to
the same rules of examination as any other witness to
testify either at the trial, or conditionally, or upon com
mission.
' ' The examination instead of being had at the trial as
provided in the last section may be had at any time be
fore the trial at the option of the party claiming it before
a judge of the court, or by a referee appointed by the
judge of the court for that purpose, on a previous notice
to the party to be examined and any other adverse party
of at least five days, unless for good cause shown the
judge orders otherwise ; but the party to be examined
shall not be compelled to attend in any other county than
that of his residence or where he may be served with a
subpoena for his attendance. Where a referee shall be
so appointed the referee shall take the testimony either
114 Id. see.

1823.
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himself or by a stenographer in his presence, which testi
mony shall be certified to by the referee.
' ' The examination of the party thus taken may be
rebutted by adverse testimony.
" If a party refuses to attend and testify, he may be
punished as for a contempt and his complaint, answer
or reply may be stricken out.
' ' A party examined by an adverse party may be ex�
ined on his own behalf, subject to the same rules of exam
ination as other witnesses.
"A person for whose immediate benefit the action is
prosecuted or defended, though not a party to the action,
may be examined as a witness in the same manner and
subject to the same rules of examination as if he was
named as a party.
' ' A party to the record of any civil action or proceed
ing, or a person for whose immediate benefit such action
or proceeding is prosecuted or defended, or the directors,
officers, superintendent or managing agents of any cor
poration which is a party to the record in such action or
proceeding, may be examined upon the trial thereof· as if
under cross-examination at the instance of the adverse
party or parties or any of them, and for that purpose
may be compelled in the same manner and subject to the
same rules for examination as any other witness to
testify, but the party calling for such examination shall
not be concluded thereby, but may rebut it by counter
testimony. " 111
The liberal type of deposition statute which makes the
right to take depositions unconditional is used in North
D akota :
' ' The deposition of any witness may be used only in
the following cases :
' ' 1. When the witness does not reside in the county
where the action or proceeding is pending or is sent for
trial by change of venue, or is absent therefrom.
11&

No. Dak. Comp. Laws

(1913) sees. 7862-7870.
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' ' 2.

When from age, infirmity or imprisonment the
witness is unable to attend court or is dead.
' ' 3. When the testimony is required upon a motion or
in any other case when the · oral examination of the wit
ness .is not required.
' ' Either party may commence taking •testimony by
depositions at any time after service upon or the appear
ance of the defendant in the action. ' ' 116
Inspection and copy of documents is authorized by the
following statute :
' ' The court before which an action is pending, or a
judge thereof, may in its or his discretion and upon due
notice order either party to give to the other within a
specified time an inspection and copy, or permission, to
take a copy of any books, papers and documents in his
possession or under his control, containing evidence re
lating to the merits of the action, or the defense therein.
If compliance with the order is refused, the court may on
motion exclude the paper from being given in evidence,
or punish the party refusing, or both. ' ' 117
Ohio.
The Ohio statutes provide that : " Either party may
commence taking testimony by deposition at any time
,,
after service upon the defendant. . 118
' ' At the instance of the adverse party, a party may be
examined as if under cross-examination, either orally,
or by deposition, like any other witness. If the party be
a corporation, any or all the officers thereof may be so ex
amined at the instance of the adverse party. The party
calling for such examination shall not thereby be con
cluded but may rebut it by counter testimony. ' ' ue
These two statutory provisions have been the means of
establishing a very effective discovery practice in Ohio.
The bar generally, in cities like Cleveland, Toledo and
118 Id. sees. 7889, 7890.
117 Id. sec. 7861.
111 Ohio Oode (Throckmorton,
.

119 Id. sec. 11497.

1930) aec. 11526

•
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Cincinnati, and to a lesser extent throughout the state,
use the procedure extensively. There is apparently gen
eral satisfaction with the results obtained.
There is also provision for annexing interrogatories
for discovery to pleadings :
' ' A party may annex to his pleading, other than a
demurrer, interrogatories, pertinent to the issue made in
the pleadings, which interogatories, if not demurred to,
shall be plainly and fully answered under oath, by the
party to whom they are propounded, or if such party is
a corporation, by the president, secretary or other officer
thereof, as the party propounding requires.
" When annexed to the petition, the interrogatories
shall be answered within the time limited for answer to
the petition ; when annexed to the answer, within the time
limited for a reply ; and when annexed to the reply, with
in the time allowed for an answer. But further time may
be allowed in all cases by the court, or a judge thereof in
vacation.
" Answers to interrogatories may be enforced by an
order of dismissal, judgment by default, or by attach
ment, as the justice of the case requires. On the trial,
such answers, so far as they contain competent testimony
on the issue or issues made, may be used by either
party. " 110 This provision is not used often by the bar.
Interrogatories are employed only when the action is
of such a nature as not to justify the expense of an oral
examination or when it is desired to dispense with mere1
formal matters of proof. When a thorough probing of
the adverse party is desired, an oral examination is al
ways employed in preference to written interrogatories
in Ohio.
Discovery before pleading is authorized under the following statute :
" When a person claiming to have a cause of action,
or a defense to an action commenced against him, with-

1110 Id.

sees. 11348-11350.
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out a discovery of the fact from the adverse party, is
unable to file his petition or answer, he may bring an
action for discovery, setting forth in his petition the
necessity therefor, and the grounds thereof, with such
interrogatories relating to the subject matter of the
discovery as are necessary · to procure the discovery
sought, which, if not demurred to, must be fully and
directly answered under oath by the defendant. Upon
the final disposition of the action, the costs thereof shall
be taxed in such manner as the court deems equitable. ' ' 111
Inspection and copy of books and documents is pro
vided for as follows :
" Either party or his attorney, in writing, may demand
of the adverse party, an inspection and copy, or permis
sion to take a copy, of a book, paper, or document in his
possession, or under his control, containing evidence
relating to the merits of the action or defense, specifying
the book, paper, or document with sufficient particularity
to enable the other party to distinguish it. If compliance
with the demand within four days be refused, on motion
and notice to the adverse party, the court or judge may
order the adverse party to give the other, within the time
specified, an inspection and copy, or permission to take
a copy, of such hooks, paper, or document. On failure to
comply with such order, the court may exclude the paper
or document if offered in evidence, or, if wanted as evi
dence, by the party applying, may direct the jury to
presume it to be such as such party, by affidavit alleges
it to be. This section shall not prevent a party from
compelling another to produce any book, paper or docu
ment when he is examined as a witness.
" If the party in possession of any such book, paper,
writing or document, alleges that it, or a part thereof
is of mere private interest, or of such character that it
ought not to be produced, or an inspection or copy allowed
181 Id.

see. 11555.

,
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or taken, on motion of either party, the court may direct
a private examination of it by a master. If he finds that
such book, paper, writing, or document contains matter
pertinent to the case, and proper to be produced, in
spected or copied, he shall report it to the court, or a
copy of such part as he finds pertinent to the case, and
proper to be produced, · inspected or copied. The book,
paper, writing or document, or part thereof, so reported,
shall be admitted in evidence on the trial, unless for
proper cause the court excludes it.
" Either party, or his attorney, if required, shall deliver
to the other party, or his attorney, a copy of any instru
ment of writing whereon the action or defense is founded,
or :which he intends to offer in evidence at the trial. If
the plaintiff or defendant refuses to furnish the copy
required the party so refusing shall not be permitted to
give the original in evidence at the trial. This section
does not apply to a paper, a copy of which, as required
by law, is filed with a pleading. " 112
·

oklahoma.
The following statute on depositions obtains in Okla
homa:
' ' The deposition of any witness may be used only in
the · following cases :
' ' First. When the witness does not reside in the
county where the action or proceeding is pending or is
sent for trial by change of venue, or is absent therefrom.
' ' Second. When, from age, infirmity, or imprisonment,
the witness is unable to attend court or is dead.
' ' Third. When the testimony is required upon a mo
tion, or in any other case where the oral testimony of
the witness is not required.
' ' Either party may commence taking testimony by
deposition at any time after service of summons upon
the defendant. ' ' 118
1ft Id. sees.
118 Okla.

11152-11154.
Stat. (1921) sees. 612, 613.

Comp.
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court, following the lead of
the Kansas Supreme Court, has held that this statute
does not authorize discovery before trial in spite of the
fact that the statute apparently gives an unconditional
right to take depositions.184
There is the following provision for inspection of doc
uments held by the adverse party :
" Either party, or his attorney, may demand of the
adverse party an inspection and copy, or permission to
take a copy of a book, paper or document in his posses
sion or under his control, containing evidence relating to
the merits of the action or defense therein. Such de
mand shall be in writing, specifying the book, paper or
document with sufficient particularity to enable the other
party to distinguish it, and if compliance with the de
mand, within four days, be refused, the court or judge,
on motion and notice to tne adverse party, may, in their
discretion, order the adverse party to give to the other,
within a specified time, an inspection and copy, or per
mission to take a copy, of such book, paper or document ;
and on failure to comply with such order, the court may
exclude the paper or document from being given in evi
dence, or, if ·wanted as evidence by the party applying,
may direct the jury to presume it to be such as the party,
by affidavit, alleges it to be. This section is not to be
construed to prevent a party from compelling another to
produce any book, paper or document when he is ex
amined as a witness. ' ' 116

Onta.r.io.

The rules of practice and procedure of the Supreme
Court of Ontario make the following provision for oral
examination for discovery:
' ' A party to an action whether plaintiff or defend
ant, may, without order, be · orally examined before the
trial touching the matters in question by any party adllfi Guinan v. Readdy (1920) 79 Okla. 111, 191 Pac. 602.
Comp. Stat. (1921) sec. 634.

1111 Okla.
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verse in interest, and may be ,compelled to attend and
testify in the same manner, upon the same terms, and
subject to the same rules of examin�tion as a witness
except as hereinafter provided.
" In the case of a corporation any officer or servant
of such corporation may, without order, be orally
examined before the trial touching the matters in ques
tion by any party adverse in interest to the corporation,
and may be compelled to attend and testify in the same
manner and upon the same terms and subject to the same
rules of examination as a witness except as hereinafter
provided ; but such examination shall not be used as evi
dence at the trial.
" After the examination of an officer or servant of a
corporation a party shall not be at liberty to examine
any other officer or servant without an order.
" Where a party to be examined is out of Ontario the
court may order the examination to be taken at such
place and in such manner as may seem just and con
venient, and service of the order and of all papers nec
essary to obtain the examination may be made on the
solicitor of the party, and any conduct money may be
paid to him unless the order makes other provisions
therefor.
' ' The court may order the examination for discovery
at such place and in such manner as may be deemed just
and convenient of an officer residing out of Ontario of
any corporation party to an action, and service of the
order and of all papers necessary to obtain such examina
tion may be ·made upon the solicitor for such party, and
conduct money may be paid to him, and if the officer fails
to attend and submit to such examination pursuant to
such order the corporation shall be liable if a plaintiff
to have its action dismissed, and if a defendant to have
its defense struck out and to be placed in the same posi
tion as if it had not defended. Such examinations shall
not be used in evidence at the trial.
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' ' Any party may, at the trial of an action or issue, use
in evidence any part of the examination of the opposite
party ; but the judge may look at the whole of the ex
amination, and if he is of opinion that any other part is
so connected with the part to be so used that the last
mentioned part ought not to be used without such other
part, he may direct such other part to be put in evi

dence.
' ' Any person who refuses or neglects to attend at the
time and place appointed for his examination, or refuses
to be sworn or to answer any proper question put to him,
shall be deemed guilty of a contempt of court and pro
ceedings may forthwith be had by attachment. He shall
also be liable, if a plaintiff, to have his action dismissed,
and if a defendant, to have his defense, if any, struck
out.
" When an infant is a party the opposite party may
examine the next friend or guardian of the infant or at
his option t�e infant, if he is competent to give evidence.
' ' Any person examined for discovery may be further
examined on his own behalf, or on behalf of the corpora
tion whose officer or servant he is, in relation to any
matter respecting which he has been so examined, and
such explanatory examination shall be proceeded with
immediately after the examination in chief.
' ' A · person for whose immediate benefit an action is
prosecuted or defended may without order be examined
for discovery.
" Where an action is brought by an assignee the as
signor :n;tay without order be examined for discovery.
' ' Examination for discovery may take place at any
time after the statement of defense of the party examin
ing or to be examined has been delivered or after the
pleadings have been noted as closed as against the party
to be examined, and the examination of a party to an
issue may take place at any time after the issue has been
filed.
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' ' A party within Ontario shall attend for examina
tion for discovery before the proper officer in the county
in which he resides upon service of an appointment upon
his solicitor seven days before the day appointed for the
examination, and conduct money shall be paid or ten
dered to the solicitor.
' ' The solicitor shall forthwith communicate the ap
pointment to the party required to attend, and shall
not apply the money to any debt due to the solicitor or
any other person, or pay the same otherwise than to such
party for his conduct money, and the same shall not be
liable to be attached.
" Any witness examined shall be subject to c:t;oss-ex
amination and re-examination ; and the examination,
cross-examination and re-examination shall be conducted
as nearly as may be as at a trial.
' ' The examination (:unless otherwise ordered or
agreed) shall, if the examiner is a shortha!ld writer or a
shorthand writer is available, be taken in shorthand by
the examiner or· by a shorthand writer approved and duly
sworn by him and shall be taken down by question and
answer ; and it shall not be necessary for the depositions
to be read over to, or signed by, the person examined.
' ' A copy of the depositions so taken, certified by the
person taking the same as correct, and if such person be
not the examiner, also signed by the examiner, shall be
received in evidence saving all just exceptions.
" The depositions taken by the examiner shall, upon
payment of his fees, be returned to and filed in the office
in which the proceedings are carried on.
' ' The person to be examined or any party to the action
shall, if so required by the subpoena or notice, produce
on the examination all books, papers and documents re
lating to the matters in issue which he could be required
to produce at a trial.
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' ' Where any person admits, upon his examination,
tb:at he has in his custody or power any such document
the examiner may direct him to produce it for the inspec
tion of the party examining, and for that purpose allow
a reasonable time.
" If any person under examination objects to any ques
tion put to him, the question and the objection shall be
noted, and the validity of such objection shall be decided
by the examiner, whose decision shall also be noted.
' 'Any direction or ruling of the examiner shall be sub
ject to review upon any motion with respect to such ex
amination without an appeal.
" Any party who is liable to be examined may be
required to attend before the proper officer in the county
in which he resides, for examination, upon being served
with an appointment and upon payment of the proper
fees.
' ' Any person not a party, liable to be examined, shall
be served with a subpoena.
' ' The party examining shall serve the appointment for
such examination upon the solicitor of the opposite party
at least forty-eight hours before the examination.
' 'An order may be made for the examination of any
person liable to · be examined as aforesaid before any
other p erson or in any other county. ' ' 188
Discovery of documentary evidence is provided for as
follows :
" Each party, after the defense is delivered, or an issue
has been . filed, may by notice require the other within
ten days to make discovery on oath of the documents
which are or have been in his possession or power, relat
ing to any matters in question in the action ; and to pro
duce and deposit the same with the proper officer for the
usual purposes. A copy of such affidavit shall be served
forthwith after filing.
·

·

188

Ont. Cons. Rules of Prae. (1928) rules 327-347.
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' ' The court may at any time order production and in
spection of documents generally or of any particular
document in the possession of any party.
" When a document is in possession of a person not
a party to the action and the production of such docu
ment at a trial might be compelled, the court may at the
instance of any party, on notice to such person and to
the opposite party, direct the production and inspection
thereof, and may give directions respecting the prepara
tion of a certified copy which may be used for all pur
poses in lieu of the origi:O:al.
' ' A party shall be entitled to obtain the production,
for inspection, of any document referred to in the
pleadings or affidavits of the opposite party, by giving
notice to his solicitor, and shall be entitled to take copies
of such documents when so produced for inspection.
' ' The party to whom such notice is given shall
forthwith deliver to the party giving the same a notice
stating a time within two days from the delivery thereof
at which the document may be inspeGted at the office of
his solicitor, and shall at the time named produce the
document for inspection.
' ' If the party from whom discovery of any kind or
inspection is sought objects to the same, or any part
thereof, the court, if satisfied that the right to the dis
covery or inspection sought depends on the determina
tion of any issue or question in dispute in the action, or
that for any other reason it is, desirable that any issue or
question in dispute should be determined before deciding
upon the right to the discovery or inspection, may order
that such issue or question be determined first, and re
serve the question as to the discovery or inspection.
"If a party fails to comply with any notice or order for
production or inspection of documents, he shall be liable
to · attachment and shall also be liable, if a plaintiff, to
have his action dismissed, and if a defendant, to have his
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defense, if any, struck out. Service of the notice of mo
tion upon the solicitor of the party is, unless the court
otherwise directs, sufficient. ' ' 1117
Discovery procedure is extensively used and with
uniform satisfaction by the bar of Ontario. Inspection
of records of five hundred consecutive cases in Toronto
indicates that discovery is used as of course in approx
imately fifty per cent. of all seriously contested cases.
Toronto practitioners said that discovery examinations
form one of the most satisfactory and salutary features
of Ontario practice.1811
Oregon.
There is an unconditional right to take the deposition
of a party before trial under the following Oregon
statute :
' ' The testimony of a witness in this state may be taken
by deposition in an action at law or suit in equity at any
time after the service of the summons or the appearance
of the defendant ; and in a special proceeding after a
question of fact has arisen therein, in the following
cases :
" 1. When a witness is a party, or an agent, officer,
servant, or employee of a corporation which is a party
to the action or proceeding by the adverse party.
' ' 2. When the witness ' s residence is such that he is
not obliged to attend in obedience to a subpoena.
' ' 3. When the witness is about to leave the county and
go more than twenty miles beyond the place of trial.
" 4. When the witness, otherwise liable to attend
the
trial, is nevertheless too infirm to attend.
' ' 5. Wh,en the testimony is required upon a motion,
or in any other case where the oral examination of the
1117 Id. rules 348-353.
188 For general appraisals

.

of the Ontario practice, see address of Mr.
Justice William Renwick Riddell before the .American Bar .Association
in 6 .Am. Jud. Soc. Jour., 6, 11. See also rules of civil procedure rec
ommended in 1919 by the .American Judicature Society, Bulletin XXIV,
p. 93, for a description and appraisal of the Ontario practice.
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witness is not required ; providing, however, that in any
case provided for in subdivision 1 of this section, such
deposition may be taken only before the court in which
said suit or action is pending, or before a judge of a court
of record within the county where such suit or action is
pending ; but in case such ' witness be not within said
county such deposition may be taken before any judge
of a court of record in any county within the state where
such witness may reside or be found. ' ' 119
There is the following statutory provision for inspec
tion of books and papers :
' ' The court or judge thereof, while an action or suit is
pending, may order either party to give the other, within
a sp�cified time, an inspection and copy, or permission
to take a copy of any book, document, or paper in his
possession, or under his control, containing evidence or
matters relating to the merits of the action or suit, or the
defense therein. If obedience to the order be neglected
or refused, the court may exclude the book, document,
or paper from being given in evidence, or if wanted as
evidence by the party applying therefor, may direct the
jury to presume it to be such as he alleges it to be ; and
the court may also punish the party so neglecting or re
fusing as for a contempt. This section is not to be con�
strued to prevent a party from compelling another to
produce books, documents, or papers, when he is ex
amined as a witness. ' ' 180

Pennsylvania..
There is a Pennsylvania statute which provides that :
' ' In any civil proceeding the testimony of any com
petent witness may be taken 'by commission or deposi
tion, in accordance with the laws of this commonwealth
and the rules of the proper court. ' ' 181
189 Ore. Code (1930) eh. 9, see.
180 Id. eh. 7, see. 203.
181 Purdon 's Penna. Stat. Ann.

1503.
(1930) Tit. 281 see. 5.
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It has been held, however, that a rule of court which
provides that a rule may ' ' be entered by either party
to take the depositions of witnesses without regard to the
circumstances of their being aged, infirm or going wit
nesses, stipulating, however, eight days ' notice to the
adverse party " is contrary to law and void. 181 The effect
of this construction of the statute is to make the right
to take depositions conditional upon the prospective un
availability of the witness at the trial.
There is the following statute on production of books
and papers :
' ' The supreme court, and several courts of common
pleas. in this state, shall have power, in any action de
pending before them, on motion, and upon good and suffi
cient cause shown, by affidavit or affirmation, and due
notice thereof being given, to require the p arties, or
either of them, to proquce books or writings in their pos
session or power, which contain evidence p ertinent to
the issue ; and if either party shall fail to comply with
such order, and to produce such books or writings, or to
satisfy said courts why the same is not in the party's
power so to do, it 'shall be lawful for the said courts, if
the party so refusing shall be a plaintiff, to give judg
ment for the defendant as in cases of nonsuit, and if a
defendant, to give judgment against him or her by de
fault, as far as relates to such parts of the plaintiff's or
plaintiffs ' demand, or the defendant's or defendants '
defense, to which the books or papers of the party are
alleged to. apply. ' ' 188
Quebec.
The Quebec discovery practice is a combination of the
Ontario, practice and the Continental interrogatory pro
cedure. 1"
181 International Coal Mining Co. v. Pa. R. R. Co. (1906) 214 Pa.
, 63 Atl. 880.
' 496188
Purdon's Penna. Stat. Ann. (1930) Tit. 28, sec. 61.
lit See the able articles of Judge E. Fabre-Surveyer in 2 La Revue du
Droit, pp. 173, 204, 440 as to the respective French and English in1luences
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There is the following provision for an oral examina
tion before trial :
' 'After defence filed, any party may, after one clear
day ' s notice to the attorney of the opposite party, sum
mon any of the following persons to answer as a witness,
before the judge or the prothonotary, upon all facts re
lating to the action or the defence :
' ' 1. The opposite party, his bookkeeper, agent or man
ager ;
' ' 2. When the opposite party is a corporation, the
president, manager, treasurer, or secretary of such cor
poration ;
" 3. When the opposite party is a foreign firm or cor
poration doing business in this province, the agent of
such firm or corporation.
' ' The rules governing the summoning, examination
and punishment of witnesses and the taking of evidence,
apply, in so far as may be, to the cases mentioned in the
preceding article.
" If any dispute arises during the examination before
the prothonotary, the parties are sent before the judge
to have it decided.
' ' The deposition taken by virtue of the preceding ar
ticles shall be used as evidence in the case ; but if the
party examined as a witness is still in the province, and
can be produced at the trial, he may be examined again.
The deposition taken before the trial shall, in any case,
form part of the record, and the costs thereof shall enter
into taxation.
" Upon the application of any party, the judge may,
at any time after defence filed and before trial, order the
opposite party to exhibit any object, or to give com
munication or furnish a copy or allow a copy to be made
of, any book or document in his control, relating to the
·

which have contributed to the present Quebec discovery practice. For
the parallel French interrogatory procedure see Cremieu, Precis de Pro
cedure Civile, p. 255.
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action or the defence, at such times and places, under
such conditions and in such manner as are deemed
proper.
' ' The costs of such examination form part of the costs
in the cause unless the judge, in adjudicating upon costs,
orders otherwise. ' ' 186
There is the following statutory procedure which is
known as interrogatories upon articulated facts:
' ' The parties may be examined upon articulated facts
as soon as the defence is filed, upon the facts in issue as
then joined, and without retarding the trial or the judg
ment.
' ' If the defendant is in default to appear or to plead
to the action, he may be examined on articulated facts
as soon as he is so in default.
' ' Parties are summoned to answer interrogatories upon
articulated facts by means of a process issued by the
prothonotary, in the name of the Sovereign, upon a
written requisition to that effect, and ordering the party
to appear before the court, the judge or the prothonotary,
to answer the interrogatories to be put to him, which are
annexed to the process and are served upon him.
' ' The order to answer upon articulated facts is served
upon the party personally or at his domicile, and not
upon his attorney; unless such party is absent or abscond
ing ; and a copy both of the order and of the inter
rogatories must oo left with him.
" If the party is absent, the attorney who has been
served may apply to have delay given him to appear, or,
if he declares the place where such party then is, the
opposite party may require that he be examined under
a commission.
' ' Even in the case where service is made on the party
himself, a copy of the order and of the interrogatories
1811

Que. Code of Civil Pro. (Curran, 1922) sees. 286-290.
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must be left with the attorney, observing the same delays
as to service.
' ' A party summ oned to answer interrogatories upon
articulated facts must appear personally to give his
answers under oath.
"When the service is made upon a corporation or
legally recognized body or community, the answers may
.
be given under oath by the president, manager, secretary,
treasurer, or other officer or employee, if he holds a gen
eral or special authorization for that purpose ; or the
answers which he must give and swear to as being those
which the party summoned intends to give, may be spec
ified by special resolution.
" When such service is made upon a foreign corpora
tion carrying on business in this province, the answers
may also be given under oath by the person who is at the
time intrusted with carrying on the affairs of the cor
poration, whatever be his designation or official title ; but
such answers may also be given by any person previously
authorized by a resolution of the board of directors of
such foreign corporation, to appear and answer in its
behalf the interrogatories that may be served upon it.
" If the party served with the rule fails to attend or
to answer the questions put to him, a default is recorded
against him, and the facts may be held to be admitted.
' ' The judge may, nevertheless, for cause shown and
upon such conditions as he thinks fit, allow the party so
in default to answer the interrogatories afterwards, be
fore the conclusion of the evidence of the party who sum
moned him.
' ' The interrogatories must be drawn up in a clear and
precise form, in such a manner that the absence of an
answer shall be an admission .of the fact sought to be
proved.
' ' The answers are taken down in writing and signed .
by the party.
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' ' The court or the person before whom the party is
summoned to answer, may put any other interrogatories
he may deem necessary and pertinent.
' ' If the party refuses to answer such interrogatories,
the court, the judge or the prothonotary, as the case may
be, causes them to be written out and placed in the rec
ord, and they are held to be admitted.
' ' The answers must be direct to the question, categor
ical and precise.
" If any dispute arises during the examination, the
parties are sent before the judge to have it decided.
' ' Every answer which is not direct, categorical and
precise, may be rejected, and the facts mentioned in the
interrogatory declared and held to be proved.
' ' The expense of interrogatories upon articulated facts
forms part of the costs in the cause.
' ' Any party, on being served with a rule to answer
interrogatories upon articulated facts, may demand the
necessary funds to pay his travelling expenses ; but when
he is before the court, the judge or the prothonotary, he
cannot refuse to be sworn or to answer unless he is paid.
" He has a right to have his expenses taxed, and such
taxation may be enforced by execution against the oppo
site party. ' ' 186
Rhode Isla.nd.
·

The following statute on depositions obtains in Rhode
Island :
' ' Except in equity causes, any justice of the supreme
or superior court, justice of the peace, or notary public,
may take the deposition of any witness, to be used in the
trial of any civil suit, action, petition or proceeding, in
which he is not interested, nor counsel, nor the attorney
of either party, and which shall then be commenced or
pending in this state, or in any other state, or in the
District of Columbia, ,or in any territory, government, or
186 ld. sees.

359-370.
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country ; and in equity causes testimony may be taken by
deposition or orally. ' ' 18'7
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, however, has held
that a party is not a witness in the sense that his deposi
tion may be taken before trial. 188 There is at present in
Rhode Island a concerted movement among the bar to so
amend the statutes as to allow adverse examinations be
fore triai.l89
Discovery of documentary evidence is authorized un
der the following statute :
" Whenever either party to any proceeding at law or
equity in the superior court shall set forth in writing,
under oath, upon his knowledge or belief, that the op
posite party is in the possession or control of some docu
ment which the applicant is entitled to examine, and
prays for its production, a justice of the court, to whom
application is so made, on such petition, may order the
opposite party, or if the same be a body corporate, then
some officer thereof, to make answer on oath at or before
a time to be fixed in said order, as to what document
he or it so has relating to the matter in dispute between
the parties, or what he knows as to the custody of such
document, and, if in his or its possession or control,
whether he or it objects to the production of the same
and the grounds of such objection ; and thereupon such
justice, after hearing such petition, answer, and evidence,
shall decide whether or not said document shall be pro
duced, and order, or decline to order, its production, and,
if proper, compel the party having the same in his or
its possession or control to allow the applicant to ex
amine the same, and, if necessary, to take examined
copies of the same, or have such original documents im- .
pounded, and may make such further order in the prem
ises as shall be just. ' ' 140
18'7 R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) ch. 342, sec. 22.
188 Tilden-Thurber Corp. v. Farnell (1921) 43 R. I. 42.
189 See Fourth Report of Rhode Island Judicial Council (1930) p. 21.
140 R.�I. Gen. Laws (1923) ch. 342, sec. 50.
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South Carolina..
There is the following provision for oral examination
of parties before trial :
" No action to obtain discovery under oath, in aid of
the prosecution or defense of another action, shall be
allowed, nor shall any examination of a party be had on
behalf of the adverse party, except in the manner pre
scribed by this chapter.
' ' A party to an action may be examined as a witness,
at the instance of the adverse party, or of any one of
several adverse parties, and for that purpose may be
compelled in the same manner, and subject to the same
rules of examination as any other witness, to testify,
either at the trial, or conditionally, or upon commission.
" The examination, instead of being had at the trial,
as provided in the last section, may be had at any time
before trial, at the option of the party claiming it, before
a judge of, the court, on a previous notice to the party to
be examined, and any other adverse party, of at least
five days, unless, for good cause shown, the judge order
otherwise. But the party to be examined shall not be
compelled to attend in any other county than that of his
residence, or where he may be served with a summons
for his attendance ; nor unless it be upon the order of a
judge of the court granted after four days ' notice, and
upon good and sufficient cause being shown therefor.
' ' The party to be examined, as in the last section
provided, may be compelled to attend in the same manner
#
as a witness who is to be examined conditionally ; and
the examination shall be taken and filed by the judge in
like manner, and may be read by either party on the
trial.
' ' The examination of the party, thus taken, may be
rebutted by adverse testimony.
" If a party refuses to attend and testify, as in the
last four sections provided, he may be punished as for
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a contempt and his complaint, answer, or reply may be
stricken out.
' ' A party examined by an adverse party, as in this
chapter provided, may be examined on his own behalf,
subject to the same rules of examination as other wit
nesses. But if he testify to any new matter, not respon
sible to the inquiries put to him by the adverse party, or
necessary to explain or qualify his answers thereto, or
discharge when his answers would charge himself, such
adverse party may offer himself as a witness on his own
behalf in respect to such new matter, subject to the same
rules of examination as other witnesses, and shall be so
received.
" A person for whose immediate benefit the action is
prosecuted or defended, though not a party to the action,
may be examined as a witness, in the same manner and
subject to the same rules of examination as if he were
named as a party.
' ' A party may be examined on behalf of his co-plain
tiff, or of a co-defendant, as to any matter in which he is
not jointly interested or liable with such co-plaintiff or
co-defendant, and as to which a separate and not joint
verdict or judgment can be rendered. And he may be
compelled to attend in the same manner as at the in
stance of an adverse party ; but the examination thus
taken shall not be used in the behalf of the party ex
amined. And whenever one of the several plaintiffs or
defendants who are joint contractors, or are united in
interest, is examined by the adverse party, the other of
such plaintiffs or defendants may offer himself as a wit- .
ness to the same cause or action or defense, and shall be
so received. " 141
There is the following statute on depositions :
" The clerks of the courts of common pleas in this
state, in all civil causes or proceedings at issue in the
141 S. C. Code of Laws (1922) sees. 690-698 as amended by S. C.
Session Laws (1923) eh. 122.
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courts of common pleas for their respective counties,
shall, upon the application of either party to such cause
or proceeding, after ten days ' notice to the adverse party,
take, in writing, the depositions of said party, or of any
witness or witnesses in said cause or proceeding, whose
· examination shall be required by the party making such
application ; upon taking which depositions, the several
parties shall be entitled to the same rights of examina
tion, cross-examination, and examination in reply, and
the same exceptions to the admissibility of evidence, as
are allowed by law upon examination before the court.
And the depositions so taken shall be certified by the
clerk before whom such examination was had, · and may
be read in evidence. at the trial of the said cause or pro
ceeding ; subject, nevertheless, to the right of either
party to require the personal attendance and viva voce
examination of the witness or witnesses at the trial of
said cause, or proceeding ; the exercise of which right,
however, not to cause a continuance or delay in the trial
of the said cause or proceeding.
' ' In addition to the methods for taking testimony now
provided by law the testimony of any witness may be
taken in any civil action pending in the court of com
mon pleas for any county within this state by deposition
de ' bene esse, where the witness lives without the county
in which such cause is to be tried, or at a greater distance
from the place of trial than one hundred miles, or is
bound on a voyage to sea, or is about to go out of this
state or out of the county in which the cause is to be
tried, · or to a greater distance than one hundred miles
from the place of trial before the time of trial, or when
he is aged or infirm. The deposition may be taken before
any circuit judge of this state, or the clerk of any of the
circuit courts of this state, or any magistrate or notary
public of this state, or any chancellor, justice or judge
of a supreme or superior court, mayor or chief magis-

370

DISCOVERY STATUTES

trate of a city, magistrate, judge of a county court or
court of common pleas, of any of the United States or
the Dominion of Canada or Kingdom of Great Britain,
or any notary public not being of counsel or attorney to
either of the parties interested in the event of the cause.
Reasonable notice, not less than ten days, must :first be
given in writing by the party or his attorney proposing
to take such deposition, to the opposite party or his at
torney of record, as either may be nearest, which notice
shall state the name of the witness and the time and
place of the taking of his deposition ; and whenever, by
reason of absence from the state and want of an attorney
of record or other reason, the giving of the notice herein
required shall be impracticable, it shail be lawful to take
such depositions as there shall be urgent necessity for
taking, upon such notice as any of the circuit judges of
this state shall think reasonable and direct. Any person
may be compelled to appear and depose as provided by
this section in the same manner as witnesses may be
compelled to appear and testify in court. ' ' 142
There is the following provision for inspection of
w:ritings :
' ' The court before which an action is pending, or a
judge or justice thereof may, in their discretion, and
upon due notice, order either party to give to the other,
within a specified time, an inspection and copy, or per
mission to take a copy, of any books, papers, and docu
ments in his possession or under his control, containing
evidence relating to the merits of the action or the de
fense therein. If compliance with the order be refused,
the court, on motion, may exclude the paper from being
given in evidence, or punish the party refusing, or
both. ' ' 148
.142 Id.

sees.

148 Id. sec.

719, 722.
in part.

689
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South Da.kota..
Examination of adverse parties is provided for by the
following statutes :
' ' No action to obtain discovery under oath in aid of
the prosecution or defense of another action shall be al
lowed, nor shall any examination of a party be had on
behalf of the adverse party, except in the manner pre- ·
scribed by this chapter.
.
' ' A party to the record of any civil action or proceed
ing ; a person for whose immediate benefit the action or
proceeding is prosecuted or defended ; or any officer,
superintendent or managing agent of any corporation
which is a party to the record, may be examined as a
witness at the instance of the adverse party and for that
purpose may be compelled, in the same manner as any
other witness, to attend and testify either at the trial,
conditionally or upon commission. Such examination
shall be subject to the rules applicable to the examination
of other witnesses, except as otherwise provided in this
chapter. Such adverse party or witness may be exam
ined by the adverse party as if under cross-examination ;
the party calling him shall not be bound by his testimony,
and the testimony given by such witness may be rebutted
by the party calling him. Such witness, when so called,
may be examined by his own counsel, but only as to mat
ters testified to on such examination.
' ' The examination provided for in the preceding sec
tion may be had at any time before the trial, at the option
of the party claiming it, before a judge of the court or a
referee appointed for that purpose by a judge of the
court, upon six days ' notice to the party to be examined
and any other adverse party, unless, for good cause
shown, the court order otherwise ; but the party or per
son to be examined shall not be compelled to attend in
any county other than that of his residence or where he
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may be served with notice of such examination ; and the
examination sh8J.l be taken and filed before the judge or
referee as when a witness is examined conditionally, and
may be read by either party at the trial.
. " If a party refuse to attend and testify, as provided
in this chapter, he may be punished as for a contempt,
and his complaint, answer or reply may be stricken
out. ' ' lit
There is the following liberal provision for taking
depositions :
' ' Either party may commence taking testimony by
depositions at any time after service upon the defendant.
' ' The deposition of any witness may be used only in
the following cases :
' ' 1. When the witness does not reside in or is absent
from the county where the action or proceeding is pend
ing or is sent for trial.
' ' 2. When from age, infirmity or imprisonment, the
witness is unable to attend court, or is dead.
' ' 3. When the testimony is required upon a motion,
or in any other case where the oral examination of the
witness is not required. ' ' 146
Inspection of writings is authorized as follows :
' ' The court before which an action is pending, or a
judge thereof, may, in its or his discretion and upon due
notice, order either party to give to the other, within a
specified time, an inspection and copy, or permission to
take copy, of any books, papers and documents in his
possession or under his control, containing evidence re
lating ,to the merits of the action or the defense therein.
If compliance with the order be refused, the court, may,
on motion, exclude the paper from being given in evi
dence, or punish the party refusing, or both. ' ' 146
lit So.
146 Id.
llfl Id.

Dak. Comp. Laws (1929) sees. 2713-2716.
sees. 2756, 2757.
sec. 2712.
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Tennessee.
Examination of parties is provided for as follows :
" In all chancery causes, and proceedings in the nature
of chancery causes, the depositions of parties may be
taken by the opposite side, or by a coparty on the same
side when the latter is entitled to such evidence, upon
notice as in the case of other witnesses.
" Either party to a suit at law is entitled to a discovery
from the other party of any matters material to the issue
of such suit, in all cases where the same party would, by
the rules of equity, be entitled to a discovery in aid of
such suit.
" To obtain such discovery, · he shall present his peti
tion, verified by affidavit, to the court, judge, or justice,
setting forth the matter upon which his claim to dis
covery is founded, the facts sought to be discovered, and
such interrogatories in relation thereto as he may think
necessary to exhibit in order to obtain a full discovery.
' ' This petition, in all cases pending in courts of record,
should be presented at least five days before the trial
term, or a sufficient excuse given by affidavit for not thus
presenting it.
' ' The court, judge, or justice may, upon such petition,
grant an order requiring the party from whom such dis
covery is sought, to answer the petition and interrog
atories, or such of them as it may appear to the court or
officer ought to be answered, or show cause why they
should not be answered.
' ' The order shall prescribe the time within which the
petition and interrogatories should be answered, or cause
shown against the rule ; and the trial of the cause will be
stayed until the order is complied with or vacated.
' ' The petition and order will be filed with the other
papers in the cause, and a copy served upon the party
from whom discovery is sought, or his counsel, and such
p roceedings may be had as are had by a court of equity,
· upon a bill of discovery in aid o� a suit at law.
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' ' The answer to the petition and interrogatories may

be sworn to before the same officers, and in the same

way, as answers in chancery to bills of discovery.
' ' The answer of the party to the petition and inter
rogatories is evidence on the trial of the suit, in the same
manner, and with like effect, as an answer to a bill in
equity, for discovery.
' ' If the answer is not filed in the time prescribed, or
if it is not full, or is evasive, unless further time is given,
the party filing the petition is entitled to take the same
for confessed, or to proceed by process of contempt to
enforce a full and satisfactory answer, as in the court of
chancery.
"If the petition is taken for confessed, the facts stated
in the petition may be given in evidence as admitted by
the person from whom the discovery is sought. ' ' 147
There is the following provision for depositions :
" The evidence of witnesses may be taken by deposi
tion, in civil actions, by either party :
' ' 1. When the witness, from age, bodily infirmity, or
other cause, is incapable of attending, to give testimony
at the trial.
' ' 2. When he resides out of the state.
" 3 . When h e resides in the state, but not within the
limits of the county in which the suit is pending ; in
which case, the adverse party may, if he desire to have
the witness examined in open court, cause him to be sub
poenaed.
" 4. When he is under the necessity of leaving the
state before the cause is tried, or even before it is at
issue.
' ' 5. When he is about to leave the county in which the
suit is pending, and will probably not return until after
the trial.
' ' 6. When he is the only witness to a material fact.
147 Code of

Tenn. (1932) sees. 9868-9878.
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" 7. When he is an officer of the United States, an
officer of this state, or of any county in the state, the
clerk of any court of record other than that in which the
suit is pending, a member of the general assembly while
in session, or clerk or officer thereof, a practicing physi
cian or attorney, a jailer or keeper of a public prison in
any county other than that �n which the suit is pending.
' ' 8. When he is a notary public, whether a suit be
pending or not ; to be evidence between the same parties
in any suit then or thereafter pending, should the notary .
die or remove out of the state before the trial.
' ' 9. When the suit is brought by a party in forma
pauperis. ' ' tts

Texas.
There are the following statutory provisions for dis
covery and preservation of evidence under the ordinary
deposition procedure in Texas :
' ' Depositions of witnesses may be taken when the
party desires to perpetuate the testimony of a witness,
and, in all civil suits heretofore or hereafter brought in
this state, whether the witness . resides in the county
where the suit is brought or out of it ; provided, the fail
ure to secure the 'deposition of a male witness residing
in the county in which the suit is pending shall not be
regarded as want of diligence where diligence has been
U:sed to secure his personal attendance by the service of
subpoena or attachment, under the rules of law, unless
by reason of age, infirmity or sickness, or official duty,
the witness will be unable to attend the court, or unless
he is about to leave, or has left the state or county in
which the suit is pending and will not probably be pres
ent at the trial.
' ' The testimony of any witness and of ap.y party to a
suit by oral deposition and answer may be taken in any
civil case in any district or county court of this state, in
1M Id. see.

9806.
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any instance where depositions are now authorized by
law to be taken.
' ' These rules shall govern the taking of the deposition
of the adverse party :
' ' 1. Either party to a suit may examine the opposing
party as a witness, upon interrogatories filed in the
.
cause, and shall have the same process to obtain his testi
mony as in the case of any ·other witness.
' ' 2. No notice of the filing of the interrogatories is
necessary.
' ' 3. A commission to take the answers of the party to
the interrogatories shall be issued by the clerk or jus
tice, and be executed and returned by any authorized
officer as in other cases.
" 4. A copy of the interrogatories need not be served
on the adverse party before a commission shall issue to
take the answers thereto.
' ' 5 . The examination of the adverse party shall be
conducted and testimony received in the same manner
and according to the same rules which apply in the case
of any other witness, subject to the provisions of this
article.
" 6. The party interrogated may, in answer to ques
tions propounded, state any matter connected with the
cause and pertinent to the issue to be tried ; and the
adverse party may contradict the answers by any other
competent testimony in the same manner as he might
contradict the testimony of any other witness.
" 7. If the party interrogated refuses to answer, the
officer executing the commission shall certify such re
fusal ; and any interrogatory which the party refuses to
answer, or which he answers evasively, shall be taken as
confessed.
' ' 8. The party interrogated may, upon the trial of the
case, take exception to the interrogatories on the ground
that they are not pertinent, and to the answers that
they a�e not competent evidence.
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" 9. It shall be no objection to the interrogatories that

they are leading in their character.
' ' 10. Where any party to a suit is a corporation, such
corporation shall not be permitted to take ex parte depo
sition, nor shall any ex parte deposition be taken of the
agents of such corporation, but if there are more than
two parties to the suit ex parte depositions may be taken
by or of any such parties to the suit, except the corpora
tion or its agents. It is hereby expressly provided that
any party to a suit wherein a corporation is a party .
shall have the right to take written and oral depositions
of any party to such suit or of any witness, after giving
notice and complying with the other requirements of
that statutes (statute ) of the State of Texas, as to the
taking of written and oral depositions of witnesses. It
is further hereby expressly provided that when any ex
parte deposition is taken in any suit whatever, either the
party taking the same or the party giving the same shall
have the right to introduce the deposition in evidence,
subject to the general rules of evidence without regard
to whether the person offering the same has crossed the
interrogatories or not, and without regard to whether
or not the witness who gave the deposition is present in
court or has testified in the case. ' ' 149
Uta.h..

Examination of adverse parties may be had by deposi
tion under the following Utah statute :
' ' The testimony of a witness in this state may be taken
by deposition in an action, at any time after the service
of the summons or the appearance of the defendant ; and,
in a special proceeding, after a question of fact has
arisen therein in the following cases :
' ' 1. When the witness is a party in the action or pro
ceeding, or a person for whose immediate benefit the
action or proceeding is prosecuted or defended ;
149 Tex. Stat. (1928) Arts. 37381 3752, 3769.

378

DISCOVERY STATUTES

" 2. When the witness resides out of the county in
which his testimony is to be used ;
" 3. When the witness is about to leave the county
where the action is to be tried, and will probably con
tinue absent when the testimony is required ;
" 4. When the witness, otherwise liable to attend the
trial, is nevertheless too infirm to attend ;
' ' 5. When the testimony is required upon a motion,
or in any other case where the oral examination of the
witness is not required. ' ' 150
There is the following provision for inspection of
books and papers :
' ' Any court in which an action is pending, or a judge
thereof, may, upon notice, order either party to give to
the other within a specified time a copy, or permission
to take a copy, of entries of account in any book, or of
any document or paper in his possession, or under his
control, containing evidence relating to the merits of
the action, or the defense therein. If compliance with
the order be refused, the court may exclude the entries
of accounts of the book, or the document or paper from
being given in evidence, or if wanted as evidence by the
party applying, may direct the jury to presume them to
be such as he alleges them to be ; and the court may also
punish the party refusing for a contempt. This section
is not to be construed to prevent a party from compelling
another to produce books, papers or documents when he
is examined as a witness. ' ' 1111
Vermont.
There is the following statutory provision for taking
depositions :
' ' Justices inay take the deposition of a witness or
party out of court :
' ' I. When he resides more than thirty miles from the
place of trial ;
·

150 utah Comp. Laws
1111 Id. see. 7204.

( 1917) see. 7178.
.1 •.
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" II. When he is going out of the state, not to return
before the time of trial ;
' ' III. When by reason of age, sickness or other bodily
infirmity, he is rendered incapable of traveling and ap
pearing at court ;
"IV. When he resides out of the state ;
" V. When he is confined in jail ;
"VI. When he is a judge of the supreme court and is
going out of the county in which he resides to perform his
official duties, not to return before the time of trial.
' ' VII. When she is a cloistered sister of a religious .
community. ' ' m
Virginia..
Interrogatories to the adverse party are authorized by
the following statute :
' ' In a case at law a party may file in the clerk 's office,
and, in a case or matter before a commissioner of a court,
any person interested may file with such commissioner
interrogatories to any adverse party or claimant. The
clerk or commissioner shall issue a summons, requiring
the officer to summon the proper party to answer said
interrogatories, and make return thereof within such
time, not exceeding sixty days, as may be prescribed in
the summons. With the summons there shall be a copy
of the interrogatories, which shall be delivered to the
person served with the summons at the time of such
service ; if the summons be against the plaintiff who is
not a resident of this state, or a defendant who is not a
resident of this state, but who has appeared in the case
or been served with process in this state, the service may
be on his attorney-at-law. When the court in which the
case is, or whose commissioner issued the summons, is
satisfied that the interrogatories are relevant, and such
. as the person to whom they are propounded would be
bound to answer upon a bill for discovery, and sees also
168 Vt. Gen. Laws

(1917) sec. 1910.
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that the interrogatories have not been unreasonably de
layed, it may, if the said person do not in a reasonable
time file answer thereto, upon oath, or, if he file answers
which are ·evasive, attach him and compel him to answer
in open court, or to answer more explicitly. It may also,
if it see fit, set aside a plea of his, and give judgment
against him by default, or if he be plaintiff, order his
suit to be dismissed with costs, or, if he be claiming a
debt before a commissioner, disallow such claim. An
swers to such interrogatories may be used as evidence
at the trial of the cause, in the same manner and with
the same effect as if obtained upon a bill of discovery.
A cprporation may be required to answer proper inter
rogatories under this section, and shall answer by its
president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, cashier,
business manager, or by any officer or agent, having the
information sought in said interrogatories, and any such
person may be summoned to answer said interrogatories
for such corporation. " 168
There is the following provision for taking depositions :
' ' In any pending case the deposition of a witness,
whether a party to the suit or not, may be taken in this
state after the declaration or bill has been filed by a
justice, or notary, or by a commissioner in chancery ; and,
if certified under his hand, may be received without proof
of the signature to such certificate. " 164
Discovery of documentary evidence is provided for as
follows :
" In any case at law a party may file in the clerk 's
office, and in any case or matter before a commissioner
of a court any person interested may file with such com
missioner, an affidavit, setting forth that there is, he
verily believes, a book of accounts or other writing in
168 Va.

15! Id.

Code (1930) sec. 6236.
sec. 6225.
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possession of an adverse party or claimant containing
material evidence for him, specifying with reasonable
certainty such writing or the part of such book. The
clerk or commissioner shall issue a summons, directed
as under the preceding section, requiring him to sum
mon the proper party to _produce such writing, or an
-exact copy of such part of the said book, and make re
turn thereof as under that section. With the summons
there shall be a copy of the affidavit, which shall be de
livered to the person served with the summons at the
time of such service ; if the summons be against a plain
tiff, who is not a resident of this state, or a defendant
who is not a resident of this state, but who has appeared
in the case or been served with process in this state, the
service may be on his attorney-at-law. When the court
in which the case is, or whose commissioner issued the
summons, is satisfied that the person filing such affidavit
has no means of proving the contents of such writing, or
of such part of the book, but by the person summoned
producing what is required by the summ ons, and also
that the call therefor has not been unreasonably delayed,
it may, unless the person summoned shall, in a reason
able time, either produce what is so required, or answer
ing in writing, upo:n oath, that he has not under his con
trol such book or writing, or any of the like import,
attach him and compel him to do the one or the other.
It may also, if it see fit, set aside a plea of such person,
and give judgment against him by default, or if he be
plaintiff, order his suit to be dismissed with costs, or if
he be claiming a debt before a commissioner, disallow
such claim. This section shall apply to corporations and
the court or commissioner, as the case may be, shall have
jurisdiction to enforce its provisions as to a corporation
by attaching the . proper custodian of any such book or
other writing, in the possession of such corporation. ' ' 155
156 Id.

see. 6237.
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Washington.

There is the following provision for examination of
parties before trial :
' ' A party to an action or proceeding may be examined
as a witness, at the instance of the adverse party, or of
one of several adverse parties, and for that purpose may
be compelled in the same manner and subject to the same
rules of exahlination as any other witness to testify at
the trial or he may be examined on a commission.
' ' Instead of the examination being had at the trial, as
proyided by the last section, the plaintiff, at the time of
filing his complaint or afterwards, and the defendant, at
the time of filing his answer or afterwards, may file in
the clerk 's office interrogatories for the discovery of
facts and documents material to the support or defense
of the action, to be answered on oath by the adverse
party.
' ' Such interrogatories shall be served in the manner
provided by law for the service of summons, or by service
upon the attorney of the party to be interrogated, and
the answers thereto shall be served and filed within
twenty days after such service unless for cause shown a
further time be allowed by the court. A private corpora_
tion may be interrogated in the same manner as indi
viduals, and it shall not be excused for a failure to an
swer any proper interrogatory unless it shall show that
no one in its employ or connected with, or interested in
it, can give the desired answer or information.
' 'A party to an action or proceeding, having filed inter
rogatories to be answered by the adverse party, as pre
scribed by the last two sections, shall not thereby be pre
cluded from examining such adverse party as a witness
at the trial, nor from taking his deposition to be read at
the trial.
" If a party refuse to attend and testify at the trial, or
to give his deposition, or to answer any interrogatories
filed, his complaint, �nswer or reply may be stricken out,
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and judgment taken against him, and he may also, in the
discretion of the court, be proceeded against as in other
cases for a contempt : Provided, that the preceding sec
tions shall not be construed so as to compel any person
to answer any question where such answer may tend to
criminate himself. ' ' 1&&
There is the following provision by rule of court for
discovery by taking depositions :
" The testimony of a witness may be taken by deposi-.
tion, to be read in evidence in an action; suit, or proceed
ing commenced and pending in any court in this state, in
the following cases :
' ' 1. When the witness resides out of the county, and
more than twenty miles from the place of trial ;
' ' 2. When the witness is about to leave the county, and
go more than twenty miles from the place of trial, and
there is probability that he will continue absent when the
testimony is required ;
' ' 3. When the witness is sick, infirm, or aged, so as
to make it probable Fhat he will not be able to attend at
the trial ;
" 4. When the ,witness resides out of the state ;
' ' 5 . When the witness is ('a ) a party to the action or
(b) an officer, agent, partner, stockholder or employee of
a party or (c) the next friend, guardian or guardian ad
litem of an infant party or party of unsound mind or
(d) the person or any of the persons for whose benefits
the action is prosecuted or defended.
" The deposition of a defendant or of an officer, agent,
partner, stockholder or employee of a defendant or of
the next friend, guardian or guardian ad litem of a de
fendant or the person or any of the persons for whose
benefit the action is defended shall not be taken until the
expiration of twenty days after the service of summons
upon such defendant, Provided, however, that for good
168 Wash. Comp. Stat. �Remington, 1922) sees. 1225-1230.
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cause shown the court may permit the taking of such
deposition prior to the expiration of said twenty day
period and in such case a copy of the order authorizing
the taking of such deposition shall be served with the
notice for the taking of the same. ' ' 167

West Virginia.
There is the following provision for taking and using
depositions:
' 'In any pending case the deposition of a witness,
whether a party to the suit or not, may, without com
mission, be taken in or out of this state by a justice, or
notary public, or by a commissioner in chancery, or be
fore any officer authorized to take depositions in the
county or state where they may be taken. And such
depositions may be taken in shorthand, or stenographic
characters or notes, and shall be written out in full and
transcribed into the English language by the stenog
rapher taking the same, and certified to by the officer
before whom the depositions are taken ; and if certified
by such officer under his hand and if further certified by
him that such stenographic characters and notes were
correctly taken and accurately transcribed by him, or
under his direction and supervision, and that the wit
nesses were duly sworn, such depositions may be received
and read in evidence without proof of the signature to
such certificate and without the signature of the witness
to such depositions. And in case the stenographer tak
ing such depositions is not the officer before whom the
same are being taken, then such stenographer, before
proceeding to take any of said depositions, shall be sworn
to take correctly and accurately transcribe the same, and
· the certificate of the officer before whom the depositions
are taken shall state that the stenographer was so
sworn. ' ' 1&8

Supreme Court Rule 8, .found in 150 Wash.
Code (1931) eh. 57, art. 4, see. 1.

16'7
168 W. Va.

XXXVII.

WEsT VmorNIA

385

There is the following provision for production of
writings :
" In any case at law, upon a party making affidavit that
a particular book of accounts, or other writing or paper
is important for him to have in the trial of his cause, he
may p rocure from the clerk of the court in which the
action is pending a subpoena duces tecum requiring any
party to the action to appear before the court on a day
named therein, and bring with him and produce before
such court such book of accounts, or other writing or
paper, as is specified in such process, in order that the
same may be used as evidence on the trial of the action.
And unless the person upon whom such process is served
shall, at the time specified therein, produce what is so
required, or show to the satisfaction of the court that he
has not under his control such book, writing or paper, or
unless, from an inspection or otherwise, the court is of
opinion that the character of the book, writing or paper
is such as should not be used as evidence on the trial of
the action, the court may attach him and compel him to
produce the same. It may also, if it see fit, set aside a
plea of such pe1'son and give judgment against him by
default, if he be a defendant, or, if he be a plaintiff,
order his suit to be dismissed, with costs, _or if he be
claiming a debt before such court or commissioner, dis
allow such claim.
" When it appears by affidavit or otherwise that a
writing or document in the possession of any person not
a party to the matter in controversy is material and
proper to be produced before the court, or any person
appointed by it or acting under its process or authority,
or any such person as is named in section one of this
article, such court, judge or president thereof in vacation
may order the clerk of the said court to issue a sub
poena duces tecum to compel such production at a time
and place to be specified in the order. ' ' 1119
1119 Id.

ch. 57, art. 5, sees. 3, 4.
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Wisconsin.

There is the following provision for discovery examina
tions before trial :
' ' The adverse examination of a party, his or its as
signor, officer, agent or employe, or of the person who
was such officer, agent or employe at the time of the
occurrence made the subject of the examination, may be
taken by deposition at the instance of any adverse party
upon oral or written interrogatories in any civil action
or proceeding at any time before final determination
thereof. Each of said persons may be so examined once
and no more, except when examined before issue joined,
in which case he may be again examined after issue
joined, upon all the issues. If. the examination is taken
after the complaint is served, but before issue is joined,
it may extend to all the allegations of the complaint.
' ' Except as provided otherwise by this section, such
examination may be had within or without the state, and
may be instituted and conducted under and pursuant to
the laws and rules regulating the taking of other deposi
tions for use in actions or proceedings.
" Such examination, when taken within the state, shall
be taken before a judge at chambers or a court commis
sioner on previous notice to all adverse parties or their
respective attorneys of at least five days. If the person
to be examined is a nonresident individual who is a
party to the action . or proceeding, or is a nonresident
president, secretary, treasurer or managing agent of a
foreign corporation that is a party to the action, the
court may upon just terms fix the time and place of such
examination, either within or without the state, and such
nonresident shall attend at such time and place and sub
mit to the examination, . and, if required, attend for the
reading an4 signing of such deposition, without service
of subpoenas. Such examination shall not be compelled
in any county other than that in which the person exam- ·
ined resides, except when a different county shall be
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designated for the examination of a nonresident, and
except that any nonresident subject to examination may
be examined in any county of this state in which he is
personally served with notice and subpoena.
" If discovery is sought, to enable the plaintiff to
frame a complaint, the notice of taking the examination
shall be accompanied by the affidavit of himself, his
attorney or agent, stating the general nature and object
of the action or proceeding ; that discovery is sought to
enable him to plead, and the subjects upon which informa
tion is desired ; and the examination relative thereto
shall be permitted unless the court or presiding judge
thereof shall, before the examination is begun, further
limit the subjects to which it shall extend, which may be
done on one day 's notice.
' ' Such portions of any such deposition as are relevant
to the issues may be offered by the party taking the
same, and shall be received when so offered upon the
trial of action or proceeding in which it is taken, notwith
standing the deponent may be present. ' ' 160
The testimony of a witness other than a party may be
taken when :
' ' 1. He shall live more than thirty miles from the
place of trial or hearing of the action, proceeding or
matter in which his testimony is wanted or beyond reach
of the subpoena of the court.
' ' 2. When he shall be about to go out of the state,
not intending to return in time for the trial or hearing.
" 3. When he is so sick, infirm or aged as to make it
probable that he will not be able to attend at the trial
or hearing. ,
' ' 4. When he shall be a member of the legislature, if
any committee of the same or the house of which he
shall be a member, shall be in session, provided he waive
:Q.is privilege.
160 Wis. Stat. (1927)

eh. 326, sec. 12.
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When his testimony is material to any motion or
other similar proceeding in any court of record, and he
shall have refused to make affidavit of the facts, within
his knowledge, in reference thereto. ' ' 161
Inspection of documents is provided for as follows :
" The court before which an action or proceeding is
pending, or a judge thereof, may, in discretion and upon
due notice, order either party to give to the other, '!ithin
a specified time, an inspection and copy or permission
to take a copy of any books, papers and documents in his
possession or under his control containing evidence re
lating to the action or proceeding. If compliance with
the order be refused, the court may exclude the paper
from being given in evidence or punish the party refus
ing, or both. " 168
Wyoming.
' ' 5.

1

Written interrogatories are authorized by the following
statutes :
" A party may annex to his pleading, other than a
demurrer, interrogatories pertinent to the issue made in
the pleading, which interrogatories, if not demurred to,
shall be plainly and fully answered under oath by the
party to whom they are propounded, or if such party is
a corporation, by the president, secretary or other officer
thereof, as the party propounding requires.
"When annexed to the petition the interrogatories
shall be answered within the time limited for answer to
the petition ; when annexed to the answer they shall be
answered within the time limited for a reply ; when an
nexed to the reply they shall be answered within the time
allowed for an answer, but further time may be allowed
in all cases by the court or a judge thereof in vacation.
' 'Answers to interrogatories may be enforced by non
suit, judgment by default or by attachment, as the justice
161 Id.
168 Id.

ch. 326, sec. 7.
ch. 327, sec. 21.
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of the case may require, and on the trial such answers,
so far as they contain competent testimony on the issue
or issues made, may be used by either party. ' ' 168
There is the following provision for depositions :
' ' The deposition of a witness may be used only in the
following cases :
' ' 1 . When the . witness does not reside in, or is absent
from, the county where the action or proceeding is pend
ing, or by change of venue is sent for trial.
' ' 2. When the witness is dead, or, from age, infirmity
or imprisonment is unable to attend court.
' ' 3. When the testimony is required upon a motion,
or when the oral examination of the witness is not re
quired.
' ' Either party may commence taking testimony by
deposition at any time after service upon the defend
ant. ' ' 164
There are the following provisions for discovery of
documentary evidence :
' ' The court in .which an action is penaing, may, on
motion and on rea.sonable notice thereof; require the par
ties to produce books and writings in their possession or
power which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in
- cases and under circumstances where they might hereto
fore have been compelled to produce the same by the
ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery ; if the plaintiff
fail to comply with such order to produce books or writ
ings, the court may, on motion, give judgment for the
defendant, as in case of nonsuit ; and if a defendant fail
to comply with such order to produce books or writings,
the court, on motion, may give judgment against him by
default.
' ' Either party, or his attorney, may also demand of
the adverse party an inspection and copy, or permission
to take a copy, of a book, paper, or document in his pos-

168 Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1920)

164 Id.

sees. 5831, 5832.

sees. 5689-5691.
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session, or under his control, containing evidence relating
to the merits of the action or defense, which demand
shall be in writing, and shall specify the book, paper, or
document with sufficient particularity to enable the other
party to distinguish it ; if compliance with the demand
within four days be refused, the court or judge may, on
motion, and notice to the adverse party, order the ad
verse party to give the other, within the time specified,
an inspection and copy, or permission to take a copy, of
such book, paper or document ; and on failure to comply
with such order, the court may exclude the paper or
document from being given in evidence, or if wanted as
evidence by the party applying, may direct the jury to
presume it to be such as the party, by affidavit, alleges
it to be ; but this section shall not be construed to prevent
a party from compelling another to produce any book,
paper or document when he is examined as a witness.
" If the party in possession of any such book, paper,
writing or document, allege that the same, or any part
thereof, is of mere private interest, or of such character
that it ought not to be produced, or an. inspection or
copy thereof allowed or taken, the court may, on motion
of either party, direct a private examination thereof by
a master ; if the master find that such book, paper, writ. ing or document contains matter pertinent to the cause,
and proper to be produced, inspected or copied, he �hall
report the same to the court, or a copy of such part as he
finds pertinent to the cause, and proper to be produced,
inspected or copied ; and the book, paper, writing or docu
ment, or part thereof, so reported, shall be admitted in
evidence on the trial, unless excluded by the court for
proper cause.
" Either party, or his attorney, shall, if required, de
liver to . the other party, or his attorney, a copy of any
- instrument of writing whereon the action or defense is
founded, or which he intends to offer in evidence at the
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trial ; and if the plaintiff or defendant refuse to furnish
the copy required, the party so refusing shall not be per
mitted to give in evidence at the trial the original, of
which a copy has been refused ; but this section shall not
apply to a paper, a copy of which is filed with a plead
ing. " 165
165 Id. sees.

5855--5858.
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COMMON LAW PLEADING
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practical enforcement of penalty, 155.
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effect of New York rule upon right to discovery, 32.
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see also particular titles.
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federal practice, 270.
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'
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·
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correcting record, 86.
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examination by attorney for party seeking discovery, 81.
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EXAMINATION FOB DISCOVERY-Continued
1iling record, 89.
reading and signing record, 85.
record of examination, 83.
right to cross-examine, 81.
swearing of witneBB, 81.
FEDERAL EQUITY RULE 58
discovery under, 28, 46, 92, 95, 134, 267.
FILING
mode and time of filing interrogatories, 92.
of record of examination, 89.
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discovery in, 40, 92, 188, 292.
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discovery from, 77.
FORFEITURE
prohibition on use of discovery in actions to enforce, 29.
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effect upon common law. pleading, 2.
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dis�overy in, 40, 45, 92, 294.
GEB.M.ANY
innovations in pretrial practice in, 240.
IDAHO
discovery in, 188, 297.
ILLINOIS
discovery in, 188, 298.
IMPEACHING WITNESS
effect of taking deposition upon right of, 169.
INDIANA
discovery in, 29, 40, 42, 50, 59, 61, 62, 63, 66, 73, 85, 91, 92, 96, 97,

98, 101, 124, 158, 165, 177, 184, 188, 220, 300.

INJUNC'l'ION
against taking depositions, 177.
INJUBIES
questions as to, upon discovery examination, 128, 137.
INSPECTION
see also DOCUMENTS.
of documents generally, 179-188.
of property, 189-193.
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INTEB.BOGATOB.IES

see also particular titles.
administrative burden upon trial court, 117.
deciding objections and compelling answers to, 114-119.
motion for further answers to, 117.
number allowed, 93.
time and mode of answering, 95.
time and mode of filing, 92.
use of to obtain summary judgment, 220.

IOWA

discovery in, 40, 54, 96, 176, 188, 303.

ISSUE S

upon which discovery may be had, 120-145.

JUSTICE

contribution of discovery to general administration of, 251-266.

KANSAS

discovery in, 36, 188, 304.

KENTUCKY

discovery in, 42, 50, 61, 62, 63, 64, 90, 96, 97, 98, 121, 124, 157, 184,
188, 306.
LAWYERS

satisfaction with discovery procedure, 265.

LEGISLATION

to improve discovery practice, 247-251.

LmEL

restrictions upon use of discovery in actions for, 29.
scope of discovery in actions for, 129.
LOUISIANA

discovery in, 92, 157, 160, 308.

MAINE

discovery in, 188, 310.

MALPRACTICE

restrictions upon use of discovery in actions for, 29.
scope of discovery in actions for, 129.

MARYLAND

discovery in, 188, 310.

MASSACHUSETTS

discovery in, 33, 40, 43, 45, 47, 92, 93, 96, 116, 119, 122, 124, 125, 139,
145, 158, 164, 194, 196, 203, 205, 223, 312.
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MATE:&I.A.IJ:TY
requirement of, in seeking discovery, 126, 133, 136.
liiiC
i HIGAN
discovery in, 38, 40, 73, 103, 133, 160, 188, 190, 195, 197, 208, 217,
222, 315.
llrll:ME OGB.APHED FOB.M:S
of written interrogatories, 94.
l!UlOlES0'1'A
discovery in, 188, 318.
liiiS8IS
i
P
SIP I
discovery in, 188, 319.
liiiSS
i OUBI
discovery in, 30, 31, 36, 42, 50, 51, 53, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 107, 121,
124, 140, 172, 176, 184, 188, 207, 321.
MON'1'ANA
discovery in, 188, 325.
NAMES
see also WITNESSES.
disclosure of names of witnesses, 139-144.
NEBRASKA
discovery in, 42, 50, 51, 61, 62, 63, 110, 121, 124, 170, 184, 188, 326.
NEVADA
discovery in, 188, 328.
NEW HAMPSBIB.E
discovery in, 42, 50, 51, 61, 62, 66, 90, 98, no, 121, 124, 141, 145, 259,
329.
NEW JERSEY
discovery in, 34, 39, 54, 65, 74, 97, 137, 140, 148, 158, 160, 170, 188,
192, 195, 198, 238, 329.
NEW MEXICO
discovery in, 92, 188, 333.
NEW YORX
discovery in, 29, 30, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 57, 67, 78,
79, 88, 102, 126, 153, 160, 168, 178, 179, 185, 188, 190, 198, 201, 203,
.
205, 207, 231, 334.
NONRESIDEN'1'
place of exami:fiation of, 76.
NOB.'1'R CAROLINA
discovery in, 38, 40, 59, 62, 63, 73, 97, 160, 175, 176, 188, 347.
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NORTH DAKOTA
discovel'y in, 40, 59, 62, 63, 160, 188, 347.
notice as initiating step in taking discovery examination, 62.
NOTICE TO ADMIT DOCUMENTS
fol'm of notice, 209.
statutol'y provisions, 207.
NOTICE TO ADMIT FACTS
fol'm of notice to admit, 202.
means of service of notice, 200.
purpose of procedure, 194.
l'ight to qualify admissions, 205.
statutory provisions, 195-199.
type of fact which may be admitted, 200.
NUMBER OF INTEB.B.OGATOBJES
limits upon, 93-95.
OBJECTIONS TO QUESTIONS
see also COMPELLING ANSWERS

TO WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES j

DE·

CIDING OBJECTIONS.

frequency of, upon discovery examination, 151.
method of deciding, 97-120.

·

OFFICE
where examination is held, 79.
OFFICER
fees of, who supervises discovery examination, 170.
who is eligible to supervise discovery examination, 97-120.
omo

discovel'y in, 40, 42, 50, 51, 54, 59, 62, 64, 66, 89, 96, 99, 110, 120,
124,
.

139, 145, 151, 1 70, 184, 188, 222, 349.

OKLAHOMA
discovery in, 188, 352.
OB.AL QUESTIONS
as method of discovery, 25.
supel'iority to written interrogatories, 26.
OB.DER
as mode of initiating discovery examination, 67, 132.
situations in which necessary, 57, 67.
OREGON
discovery in, 188, 359.
PAB.TIOULA.B.S
bill of, 11.
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PARTIES

adverse party, discovery from, 37.
assignor, discovery from, 38.
corporation, discovery from, 39-46.
determination of for purpose of discovery, 38.
discovery from generally, 37-46.
executor, discovery from, 39.
infant, discovery from, 39.
opposite party, discovery from, 37.
real party in interest, discovery from, 38.
relation to record as affecting right of discovery, 38.

PARTY'S OWN CASE
chancery rule, 132.

cross-examination as to, practical result of allowing discovery, 121,
122, 124.

disclosure of names of witnesses, 139-144.
disclosure of party 's documents, 144.
disclosure of what party will testify to, 120-139.
discovery as to in tort actions, 126.
discovery of, in federal equity courts, 134.
limiting discovery to particular issues, 26.
materiality and necessity of discovery, 1261 1331 136.
practical e:lfeets of restrictive rules, 130.
special rules in automobile accident eases, 1271 1311 138.
ways of obtaining names of witnesses, 143.
PENALTY

see also CONTEMPT ; DEFAULT.
contempt, for unjust refusal to disclose, 156.
default for unjust refusal to. disclose, 154.
for refusal to admit, 204.
prohibition on use of discovery in actions for, 29.

PENNSYLVANIA
discovery in, 188, 360.
PEB..TtT.B.Y

e:ffeet of discovery upon, 124, 130, 251.

PERSONS FROM WROM DISOOVE:&Y MAY BE HAD

see also P.ARTIES.
corporations, 39-46.
parties, 37-39.
witnesses, 46-53 .

PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
before trial, 191.
method of conducting, 193.

necessity of statutory provision, 191.

INDEX
PLAOE OF EXAlltfiNATION
of nonresident, 76-79.
of resident, 76.
office in which examination is held, 79.
PLAINTIFF
relative use of discovery by, 34.
right to have discovery, 32-36.
PLEADING
inadequacy of pleading as basis of preparation for trial, 1-8.
relation of discovery to, 262.
P.BELIMIN.ARY REFERENOE
as method of handling interlocutory matters, 238.
PRESERVATION OF TESTIMONY
advantages in combining with discovery, 241-246.
combination with discovery, 19-25.
common law method, 19.
PB.IVILEGE
basis of decision as to questions of, 147.
matters injurious to public interest, 147.
method of asserting, 147.
professional privilege, 146.
right of attorney to instruct refusal to answer, 148.
self-incrimination, 146.
PROHIBITIONS UPON USE OF DISCOVERY
in actions for criminal conversation, 29.
in actions to enforce penalty, 29.
in divorce proceedings, 29.
in patent litigation, 29.
in summary actions, 29.
PUBLIOATION OF REOOB.D OF EXAl!diNATION
generally, 91.
restrictions upon, 30.
READING OVER AND SIGNING B.EOOB.D
necessity for, 85.
waiver of requirement, 85.
REOOB.D OF EXAlltfiNATION
conclusive effect upon party who uses, 168, 169.
contents of, 84.
necessity for transcription, 84.
purpose for which used, 163-168.
who may use, 158-163.
who transcribes, 83.
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:RELEVANCY
applying rules of evidence to discovery examination, 149.
practical method of deciding questions as to, 150.
right of witness to refuse to answer on ground of irrelevancy, 150.
:RESIDENT
place of examination of, 76.
:RESTRICTIONS
see also types of actions and
upon scope of discovery, 126-139.
upon use of discovery, 29.

PARTY 's

OwN CASE•

:REVIEW
as incident of :final appeal, 177.
availability of extraordinary methods of, 176.
of rulings enforcing penalties, 176.
of rulings granting or denying discovery, 175.
of rulings of officer upon discovery examination, 107, 109, 113.
of rulings of trial court as to discovery generally, 175-178.
RHODE ISLAND
discovery in, 188, 365.
SETTLEMENT OF ISSUES
English practice, 228.
practice in Scotland, 227.
purpose of procedure, 227.
SETTLEMENTS
use of discovery as basis for, 34, 252-255.
SOUTH CAROLINA
discovery in, 38, 39, 59, 75, 137, 188, 219, 367.
SOUTH DAKOTA
discovery in, 40, 59, 73, 160, 188, 192, 367.
STATUTES
see under each state.
provisions in different jurisdictions, 267-391.
STENOGRAPHER
right of lawyer to use own in taking discovery examination, 98.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW
effect of discovery upon development of, 259.
S�Y ACTIONS
prohibition on use of discovery in, 29.
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S'D'MMARY JUDGMENT
combination with discovery procedure, 217-223.
constitutional questions concerning use of discovery with, 224-226.
extent of use of procedure, 216.
use of discovery in obtaining, 216-226.
SUMl!riONS FOB. DIRECTIONS
appraisal of procedure, 231-238.
matters which may be presented by, 230.
purpose of procedure, 229.
SWEARING OF WITNESS
at discovery examination, 81.
TAXATION OF COSTS
of discovery examination, 172.
TENNESSEE
discovery in, 92, 373.
TEXAS
discovery in, 50, 51, 52, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 97, 121, 124, 161, 375.
TITLE
disclosure of documents in support of, 144.
see also RECORD OF EXAMINATION.
effect of discovery in expediting, 263.
effect of discovery upon orderly conduct of, 166.
TRIAL BRIEF
as basis of discovery before trial, 212.
practice in law offices, 211-215.
use of discovery in preparing, 211.
TRUTH
use of discovery. in ascertaining, 124, 252.
USE AT TRIAL OF RECORD OF EXAMINATION
conclusive effect upon party who uses, 168, 169.
purpose for which used, 163-168.
who may use, 158-163.
UTAH

discovery in, 188, 377.
VACATION
of notice to take examination, 67, 73.
VEB.MONT
discovery in, 188, 378.
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VIRGINIA

discovery in, 40, 96, 158, 165, 188, 379.
WAIVER
of formalities in taking examination, 65, 72.
of reading and signing record of examination, 85.
WASHINGTON
discovery in, 41, 79, 92, 95, 96, 118, 136, 158, 176, 192, 382.
WEST · VIRGINIA
discovery in, 85, 188, 384.
WISCONSIN
discovery in, 30, 33, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 45, 49, 56, 62, 63, 66, 76, 80,
84, 85, 90, 104, 122, 124, 141, 151, 158, 188, 190, 199, 201, 203, 205,
207, 386.
WITNESSES
disclosure of names of, 139-144.
discovery from, 46-53.
taking deposition of for purpose of discovery, 50-53.
WYOMING
discovery in, 388.

